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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I develop a social representational approach to understanding expert 
knowledge on homelessness. I relate the concept of cognitive polyphasia with 
Bakhtin’s views on the'polyphony of the person, and Herman & Kempen’s concept 
of the dialogical self. I link dialogical epistemology and ontology to show that, (i) 
polyphony and polyphasia of self and knowledge are two sides of the same coin, and 
(ii) the inner plurality of the person is grounded in the multiple self-other 
relationships within which identity and knowledge are co-constituted and where 
different ideas and practices clash and compete. I show that our ability to position 
ourselves in relation to the knowledge of others explains how the meanings, practices 
and identities that co-exist within individuals and groups are put to use, enabling us 
to function in multiple relationships and contexts. The research involved a 
multidimensional approach comprising: (1.) narrative interviews and focus groups 
with homelessness professionals (HPs) working in the UK voluntary sector and (2.) 
participative observation at conferences, and in a voluntary agency. The research 
showed that homelessness is a contested and contradictory notion. Expert 
representational fields are simultaneously, identity and knowledge struggles, sharply 
characterized by cognitive polyphasia, whose contents and dynamics are drawn from 
the dialogues and battles between the voluntary and the statutory sector and the 
public at large. I conclude by suggesting that identity and knowledge are inseparable 
from both the multiple relationships in which they develop and from processes of 
self-other positioning.
Keywords: Cognitive polyphasia, Dialogical self, Homelessness, Identity, Social 
representations.
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1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.1. Homeless in the UK; Current Realities.
Homelessness continues to be a pressing social problem and a major case of 
socio-economic exclusion in the UK. While it has received a great deal of attention 
since the mid-1990s from policy makers, researchers and service providers, there 
remains much controversy about the extent of the problem, its underlying causes, and 
the most effective ways to address it. These controversies are partly due to the fact 
that in the UK there is widespread disagreement on the definition of homelessness, 
which is subject to a contested variety of meanings and interpretations. This is 
expressed in the ongoing debate over the ways to define what ‘homelessness’1 is and 
to identify which people belong to this group. The homeless have been unanimously 
identified as a socially excluded group and various policies, such as the Rough 
Sleepers Unit, have been implemented to tackle the issue (Pleace & Quilgars, 2003). 
However, support and care structures are diversified across two clashing and co­
existing sectors: the voluntary and the statutory, each holding different definitions 
and competing approaches to the problem.
The voluntary sector encompasses a wide array of organizations, which 
provide services such as; housing advice, training and vocational guidance, basic 
health provision, hostels, social services and psychological support. Despite being 
independent from the public and private spheres, the privatization of state social 
welfare and transference of its responsibility to local authorities and voluntary 
agencies has led to the blurring of boundaries between the voluntary and 
governmental sectors and the overlapping of their jurisdictions (Daly, 1997). These 
developments have had a pronounced impact on the nature and functions of the 
voluntary sector in the UK. Its former philanthropic role has evolved into the 
‘provider’ of the statutory ‘financial enabler’ (Daly, 1997), which has meant a 
transformation towards a professional homeless industry (Wames, Crane, Whitehead, 
& Fu, 2003).
1 Please note that I stress the socially constructed nature of ‘homelessness’. The inverted commas 
indicate the fact that there are not agreed objective meanings o f ‘homelessness’.
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Despite these increased interdependencies, there is a general lack of 
agreement between sectors on the definition of homelessness. This creates a number 
of practical problems, ranging from difficulties in estimating the total number of 
homeless people and the different categories among them. It also has consequences 
at the level of provision of services, models of intervention and policy design. While 
state estimations indicate a decline in numbers (see ODPM, 2006), sources from the 
voluntary sector reveal that there is a vast number of homeless people that are not 
included in these statistics (Crisis, 2006) because they do not fit within statutory 
definitions or because they belong to so-called ‘hidden’ populations (i.e. those 
sleeping on a friend’s sofa). The contested nature of definitions about homelessness 
makes it difficult to achieve consensual estimations (Hutson & Liddiard, 1994) and 
impacts negatively on the social, psychological, structural and health needs of those 
who are not officially considered homeless by statutory definition (Crane & Wames, 
2001).
Like most problems of social exclusion, homelessness is constructed through 
networks of unstable and contested meanings (Anderson, 1997). Tackling the 
problem effectively requires a clear understanding of how the issue is framed by 
different stakeholders and social actors motivated by competing interests. Such 
knowledge of the socio-political context in which homelessness is constructed and 
addressed has not been enabled by British Homeless research (Jacobs et al.,-1999). 
The nature of welfare policies, care-related practices, the interventions deemed 
appropriate to prevent and respond to homelessness, and how the homeless person is 
treated are all based on meanings and definitions of homelessness. As Pleace and 
Quilgars (2003) concluded in their examination of British homeless research, there is 
an urgent need for academics of the social sciences to explore the socially 
constructed nature of homelessness in the UK from a de-politicized framework; one 
that is neither led by government funding or by that of voluntary advocates. The 
social construction of homelessness is an important focus of inquiry since it 
participates in the marginalization of this social group (Pleace & Quilgars, 2003). It 
permeates policies, interventions and the matrix of relationships within which the 
homeless person lives.
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In this thesis my purpose is to contribute towards this understanding, by 
examining social psychological dimensions and their link to socio-political contexts, 
involved in the constitution of homelessness. These play a central role in the living 
conditions, the framing of interventions and the production of subjectivities and 
health of the homeless. I focus on how professionals working with homeless people 
in the voluntary sector (from now on HPs2) produce knowledge about homelessness. 
HPs offer a privileged entry point for understanding processes of social construction 
of homelessness due to their positioning as key social actors at the interface between 
the homeless, the statutory sector, policy makers and society as a whole. HPs are 
experts in context: mediators, translators and integrators of beliefs, meanings and 
images of homelessness circulating in the UK. Definitional disagreements and 
conflict of approaches with the statutory sector are core dilemmas with which HPs 
have to cope in their everyday practices and relationships with clients and other 
social actors.
Drawing on the theory of social representations (Jodelet, 1989/1991; 
Moscovici, 2000) and the concept of cognitive polyphasia (Jovchelovitch, 2002, 
2007; Moscovici, 1961/1976) and from a Bakhtinian approach (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984a, 
1986), I argue that HPs’ knowledge production is a plural phenomenon. It is shaped 
by the definitional clashes and competing approaches that characterize the context of 
service provision. It is constructed in relation to dialogical3 others; moving between 
the streets, hostels and meetings with statutory agencies, and accommodating their 
experience-based knowledge and ethos to the definitions and models of intervention 
of statutory agencies. HPs are in a continuous state of negotiations and resolutions 
about homelessness, and it is through the struggle between adjusting to and 
contesting others’ perspectives on homelessness that their knowledge and self are co­
constructed. Understanding how they make sense of the problem and develop 
practices to deal with it is an important task for a social psychology of homelessness. 
It can produce valuable insights into the intricacies involved in defining 
homelessness in the UK and contribute to improving the care and support services
2 It is important to note that with the term ‘HP’ I am only referring to those professionals working in 
the voluntary sector.
3 Throughout the thesis I use ‘dialogue’ both ontologically and epistemologically to refer to self-other 
communicative practices through which human beings come to being and systems of knowledge are 
constructed.
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needed by homeless people. Which representations emerge from HPs’ relations with 
others along their different positions in the social landscape? How do their 
constructions of homelessness represent who the homeless person is and how should 
she be treated? And how can their knowledge help us to understand the way the 
clashes between different forms of knowing in contemporary public spheres impact 
on the definition and resolution of social problems such as homelessness?
1.1.2. How Do You Establish Which Elements Constitute Someone as 
‘Homeless’?
Definitions of what constitutes homelessness as a social problem are highly 
unstable and subject to conflicting pressures and debate (Jacobs et al., 1999). Clear 
unanimous concern about the importance of a meaningful and comprehensive 
approach to homelessness has not dissipated widespread disagreements about what 
homelessness means, who belongs to this group, and what are the best solutions to 
combat it. At the heart of these disagreements is the very context of service provision 
for the homeless in the UK, which is based on both statutory (public sector, state 
controlled) and non-statutory (voluntary sector) agencies. Clashes and ongoing 
struggles between these two sectors are common. These are framed by different 
definitions of homelessness, diverging understandings of its causes, competing 
approaches and disagreements in relation to the intentionality behind homelessness 
and the priority given to the needs of certain groups (i.e families as opposed to 
individuals). Defining to which extent the homeless person is intentionally causing 
the homelessness situation sharply differentiates the approaches between statutory 
and voluntary agencies and constitutes a site for substantial conflict and negotiation 
between sectors. At the root of these differences are more profound social 
psychological and political dimensions related to the role of the individual and the 
social in the construction of homelessness and in the attributions of responsibility for 
it.
The general approach of the statutory sector is based on access to housing, 
the intentionality of the individual person in causing the situation of homelessness 
and her ‘priority need’. Homeless people are narrowly defined in terms of
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unintentionally lacking secure or permanent accommodation (Wames et al., 2003). 
Once assessed to fit within criteria of eligibility for aid and basic categories of 
priority need, people are channeled into the official procedures for the provision of 
accommodation and referred to welfare services. The absence of coordination and 
comprehensive joined-up strategies between housing and other specialist public 
services (CESI, 2005), and the lack of a more comprehensive, flexible and 
responsive approach, which offers continuity and assists the emotional and social 
needs of the homeless have constantly led to the recurrence of episodes of 
homelessness. Statutory responses tend to be short-term and ad hoc by nature, thus 
leaving a lacuna in services that are left to be filled by the voluntary sector (Daly, 
1997). As various commentators have pointed out (Jacobs et al., 1999; Wames et al., 
2003), in adopting very narrow eligibility criteria to establish the boundaries of its 
target population and to frame its responses, the statutory sector deals with very 
restricted dimensions of homelessness, reducing the phenomena to a problem of a 
‘lack of roof over one’s head’. The statutory definition of homelessness is 
ideologically4 loaded as it constructs ‘homelessness’ as attributable to internal causes, 
implies moral assumptions about the person, and reduces the homeless experience to 
an issue of lack of housing. The way homelessness is defined is critical since it has 
practical consequences such as the symbolic and structural marginalization of groups 
that are in real need. It might have implications on the consideration of the 
importance of this social problem and the policy response to it (Hutson & Liddiard, 
1994). Constructions of ‘homelessness’ based on intentionality locate responsibility 
in the individual. Thus, they serve to legitimately sustain certain patterns of welfare 
action to the exclusion of others, concealing the heterogeneity of the group and the 
intricacy of the problem, thus justifying state lack of assistance.
Policies have constructed two different groups of people: those who are 
homeless not as a result of individual choice and are therefore considered statutory 
and those who are intentionally homeless. This criterion of eligibility has in turn
4 The concept of ideology is highly contested and is open to multiple interpretations. When used, I 
refer to Thompson’s (1990 ) definition of ideology as the operation of symbolic forms, which through 
legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and naturalisation, serve to sustain existing 
relations of domination. Ideology in this sense, refers to the way meanings are used in the social world 
in order to uphold the identities and projects of those in positions of power and to limit the pursuance 
and realization of others’ interests and ontologies.
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generated two groups of people: the deserving and the undeserving; those who are 
regarded as unintentionally homeless and therefore deserve state welfare services and 
support structures, and those who are deemed homeless through conditions of their 
own individual choice and therefore do not deserve the assistance of statutory 
services (Clapham, 2003). The latter group is not officially regarded as homeless and 
has no legal rights to housing, state support services, or benefits and are left to seek 
assistance from the voluntary sector. Therefore, the voluntary sector assists the needs 
of those who are symbolically and materially marginalized by government policies 
and services.
The hallmark of the voluntary sector’s definition of homelessness is that it 
does not include the criterion of intentionality. It defines homelessness in broader 
terms and comprehensively understands it as a multi-faceted phenomena that affects 
all aspects of one’s live. It recognizes that beyond ‘roofless-ness’ there are multiple 
forms of homelessness, and takes into account the heterogeneity of the homeless 
population as well as the intricacy of the social and emotional support needs that 
exist alongside the lack of housing. Their interventions are not restricted to the 
alleviation of a specific situation or crisis (i.e. through outreach work), but are also 
motivated by an agenda of prevention and continuity of assistance along their 
pathway of services towards independence (i.e. advice and tenancy support, training). 
The aim of voluntary services is to comprehensively tackle the diverse and 
intertwined dimensions of homelessness, deal with its underlying causes and enable 
clients to rebuild their lives. This is pursued through an individualised and responsive 
approach based upon flexibility, creativity and accessibility (Daly, 1997). However, 
these attributes and the autonomy of the voluntary sector to put into practice its own 
agenda, are threatened by dramatic transformations of the welfare system. Increased 
dependency on government funding, greater governmental contract and partnership 
work, has meant being subject to its competitive bidding to decide which voluntary 
agency is awarded short-term state funding. This has proved a double-edged sword 
for the voluntary sector, which though nominally independent from central 
government, is having to increasingly adapt to statutory practices, bureaucracies and 
paradigms of ‘homelessness’. The wide gap between both sectors in the definition 
and framing of homelessness, continuous to be at the core of the difficulties 
confronted by those working with the homeless. The government’s emphasis on
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stability, control, order, accountability and cost-cutting, jeopardizes the voluntary 
sector’s approach and ultimately the clients’ interests, since voluntary agencies are 
compelled to conform to the rigid agenda of statutory bureaucrats as a condition of 
funding (Daly, 1997). Within this context the essential role of the voluntary sector in 
response to homelessness is seriously at threat, and critically needs to be funded and 
recognized by the Government (Daly, 1997).
The ongoing debate around issues of homelessness and disagreements about 
what are the best practices for the improvement of the living conditions and 
resettlement of homeless people are underpinned by dualism between individual and 
social dimensions. British research and policy discussions have been framed in terms 
of minimalist or maximalist constructions of homelessness (Clapham, 2003; Jacobs 
et al., 1999). Minimalist definitions locate the causes of homelessness on the 
individual, have led to the dichotomy between deserving and undeserving homeless 
producing polices and interventions designed to deal only with individual factors 
(Clapham, 2003). Maximalist definitions construct homelessness as the outcome of 
social-economic shortcomings and emphasize the role of policy as the key solution to 
end homelessness (Clapham, 2003). These definitions stress the importance of either 
social structures or psychological and personal factors, but neglect the connections 
between them (Clapham, 2003). Both frame how homelessness is constructed and 
dealt with in the public sphere, and provide the backdrop against which policies and 
responses to homelessness take place. Working in such a contested and contradictory 
context and operating within increased interdependency from the government, HPs 
face the challenges of sustaining and putting into practice their approach and 
conceptualizations while simultaneously dealing with the pressures and requirements 
of the statutory sector.
This has not dissipated the voluntary sector’s role as a watchdog of the 
government and also advocate of the homeless in its campaigning to educate the 
public and to contest homelessness policies. Indeed, it performs a pivotal task in 
communicating and explaining ‘homelessness’ to the public, politicians and the 
media (Hutson & Liddiard, 1994). However, despite voluntary agencies’ concerns 
with the need to broaden the limited representations of homelessness, in their 
advocacy and fundraising role they also use victimizing constructions, since this is
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the most effective way to secure funding (Jacobs et aL, 1999). Hodgetts and 
colleagues (2005) have shown that when accessing British television media in order 
to fit public representations, charity representatives use victimizing characterizations 
that emphasise the needs of homeless people.
It is against the socio-political context and network of relationships described 
above that HPs construct knowledge and practices related to homelessness. 
Considering the social position of these professionals and the matrix of inter­
relations that frames their daily experience is key to understanding the nature of their 
knowledge and the practices they develop towards the homeless person. 
Understanding their knowledge is important since professionals working in the 
voluntary sector are well located for the exploration of the different values, meanings 
and practices that configure how homelessness is constructed and dealt with in the 
public sphere. Within the context of homeless service provision HPs’ knowledge 
plays an invaluable role in the drawing up and implementation of strategies. They 
have unsurpassed experience and critical understanding of the breadth of problems 
faced by homeless people, of the scarce welfare resources and of effective working 
methods. As a group, they have expertise, which combines theoretical and practical 
knowledge of homelessness, that no statutory agency has (Crane & Wames, 2001). 
The value of HPs’ knowledge will be further explored in section 1.4.
1.2. Research on Homelessness: Towards a Socio-psychological 
Understanding o f ‘Homelessness’.
Academic interest on the homeless commenced in the 1980’s, and in 1994, it 
was claimed, that the homeless population was one of the most popular areas of 
study since the mid eighties (Snow, Anderson, & Koegel, 1994). Since then research 
has predominantly focused on either characteristics of individual homeless such as 
health factors or alternatively on the structural elements underlying homelessness (i.e. 
housing) (Clapham, 2003). Within the UK, much of the research comes from the 
field of housing, sociology (e.g. Fitzpatrick, Kemp, & Klinker, 2000; Hutson & 
Clapham, 1999; Jacobs et al., 1999) and policy studies (e.g. Somerville, 1999). 
Housing research is dominated by an interest in issues such as homeless law (e.g.
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Bramley, 1995; Fitzpatrick & Stephens, 1999), provision and homeless persons’ 
admission to accommodation, and access to housing (e.g. Anderson, 1994; 1999). 
Within this literature there has been a considerable contribution to developing the 
concept of homelessness as a social construct (e.g. Hutson & Liddiard, 1994; Jacobs 
et al., 1999). Nonetheless, a large volume of research has concentrated on socio­
demographic characteristics and on homelessness statistics (e.g. Burrows, 1997; 
Fisher, Turner, Pugh, & Taylor, 1994; Pleace, Burrows, & Quilgars, 1997).
Even though there is a great contribution of homelessness theoretical and 
empirical research from a number of disciplines, this remains compartmentalized 
(Anderson, 2003; Christian, 2003; Pleace & Quilgars, 2003). Consequently, 
theoretical explanations are conflicting and do not offer an integrative and multi­
disciplinary approach to homelessness (Anderson, 2003). Except for few 
comprehensive studies from the field of social psychology (See Hodgetts, Hodgetts, 
& Radley, 2006; Hodgetts, Radley, Chamberlain, & Hodgetts, 2007; Radley, 
Hodgetts, & Cullen, 2006; Radley, Hodgetts, & Cullen, 2005), generally research in 
the UK has not questioned the interwoven relationship between socio-political 
contexts and material, symbolic, relational and psychological dimensions of 
homelessness. In general, research can be classified in two groups, namely: the 
situationist and person-centred research (Clapham, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al., 2000). 
The former is focused on the context and structures in which ‘homelessness’ emerges 
(i.e. lack of housing, cuts in social benefits) and searches for patterns and common 
themes. The latter, focuses on the characteristics of homeless individuals in order to 
identify risk factors (i.e. unemployment, physical/sexual abuse) (Fitzpatrick et al., 
2000). It takes the ‘homeless’ individual as the only focus of inquiry (Christian,
2003), abstracting it as an entity and detracting attention from the matrix of 
relationships and contexts among which she moves. It is certainly within these 
contexts and relationships where meanings of homelessness circulate, defining 
practices and interactions, and shaping the homeless person’s subjectivity and 
experience. Adopting a framework marked by the sovereignty of either structural or 
individual explanations is overly reductionistic (Clapham, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al., 
2000) and has prevented British research from contributing to a wider understanding 
of the dialectics between the interwoven dimensions of homelessness- the personal,
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socio-cultural, political and symbolic dimensions, as well as the material conditions 
and matrix of relationships in which the homeless live.
With the exception of few studies (See Hodgetts et al., 2006; Hodgetts et al., 
2007; Radley et al., 2006; Radley et al., 2005), the general marker of the largely 
absent socio-psychological research in the UK, has been the lack of exploration of 
the interwoven dimensions of homelessness. The focus of inquiry of some of these 
studies has been the measurement of attitudes and self-categorization variables 
(social identity) through item-based questionnaires in order to predict peoples’ 
intentions and behavioural uptake of support services (Christian & Abrams, 2003; 
Christian & Armitage, 2002). For instance, in order to construct a model for the 
prediction of access to services, one of these studies used quantitative questionnaire 
techniques to measure homeless people’s attitudes to institutional authority and 
towards their own participation in the service, together with self-categorization 
variables (as homeless and as service user) (Christian & Abrams, 2003). The results 
of this limited social psychology of homelessness are disappointing. Strong emphasis 
is put on the psychological component (i.e. individual’s perceptions, motivations, 
choices and attitudes) as a predictor of service uptake, and the methodologies used 
fail to appreciate how the behaviour and subjectivity of the individual are 
inextricably linked to the meanings and relationships of the socio-political and 
cultural context in which the persons lives.
Attempts to understand intentions and behaviour through these theoretical 
frameworks are limited. Decades of research on the attitude-behaviour causal link 
argued by Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) have shown that it does not exist as such (Wicker, 
1969). Attitudinal research is grounded in cognitive determinism (Gaskell, 2001) and 
is unable to account for the wider socio-cultural processes involved in the behaviour 
(i.e strategies of survival) and subjectivity of individuals (i.e identity, sense of self- 
worth). Indeed, other fields such as health psychology, have shown how health 
promotion strategies designed on the assumption of the predictability of the attitude 
concept have not been successful in their attempts to change health-related 
behaviours (Crossley, 2000). The reason is a failure to take into account the symbolic 
and relational dimensions (i.e dialogical identity) of health-related behaviours and
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their complex connections to socio-economic, and moral environments where social 
actors find themselves (Crossley, 2000).
Homelessness does have a psychological component (Christian, 2003), 
however, it is important to take into account how this is interwoven with the 
relational, symbolic and socio-political, since all contribute to the production of the 
ontology of the homeless individual. The relationship between these dimensions has 
been explored through research on homelessness cultures, which has used a blend of 
methodologies; narrative interviews, photo-production methods, photo-based 
discussions and qualitative narrative analysis of media coverage (Hodgetts, et al., 
2007; Radley et al., 2006; Radley et al., 2005). Such research has studied media 
representations of homeless people in the UK (Hodgetts et al., 2005) and has 
documented how homeless people actively use these mediated representations in 
order to develop a sense of self and of one’s socio-psychological and material 
experience as homeless (Hodgetts, et al., 2006; Radley et al., 2006; Radley et al., 
2005). Hodgetts and colleagues (2006) show how homeless people are aware of the 
symbolic power of media institutions to influence their subjectivities and 
engagement with the social world through characterizations of themselves that 
constrain their participation in the community and their development of a sense of 
dignity. Symbolic meanings of homelessness circulating in British society percolate 
the homeless experience and are actively re-negotiated by the person when making 
sense of her self and when taking decisions about everyday practices (Hodgetts et al., 
2006; Hodgetts et al., 2007; Radley et al., 2006; Radley et al., 2005). This body of 
work has offered a useful framework for the interpretation of how homeless people 
make decisions about accessing services, engaging in health-related behaviors and 
participating in mainstream domiciled society. It demonstrates the need to consider 
the social and symbolic environment in which homeless people live in order to 
understand their lived-experiences, actions and ontologies.
1.2.1. Homelessness ontology: relational and representational dimensions.
Increasingly, researchers are recognising the intricacy of the multiple factors 
at play influencing homelessness (Hodgetts et al., 2007; Clapham, 2003). Certainly,
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late conceptualizations have moved towards a dynamic understanding of 
homelessness as a socio-psychological, relational and physical ‘process* dependent 
on larger socio-political, symbolic and material living conditions (Clapham, 2003; 
Fitzpatrick et al., 2000; Radley et al., 2005). It is suggested that a conceptual research 
framework focused on pathways in and out of homelessness offers an innovative 
opportunity to consider the complex link between symbolic (i.e policy definitions, 
discourses embedded in services), relational and personal dimensions (i.e. agency) of 
homelessness (Clapham, 2003). An expanded understanding of these interwoven 
dimensions makes visible the connections of homelessness with socio-political and 
cultural contexts showing that material deprivation and social exclusion have direct 
impact on the experiences of homeless people. Relationships with domiciled and 
homeless others and the discourses held by others about one’s self or social group, 
which penetrate these relationships, impact directly on their identity, psychological 
and physical experience (i.e. capacity to engage in health related practices and 
decisions about seeking support). Stigma, coping strategies, neglect, low sense of 
self-worth and substance abuse, all emerge through relational processes between the 
homeless and the social world, which are permeated by meanings of homelessness.
The conceptual framework advocated by Clapham (2003), points at the 
importance of the relational and representational dimensions. He argues; ‘Each 
homeless person does not construct their life in a vacuum, but is influenced by the 
way they are treated by their family and others they come into contact with, as well 
as their projection in the media, and their treatment by professionals and public 
services they interact with. Of course homeless people themselves reinforce or 
challenge these discourses through their individual words and actions as well as 
collectively through organizations lobbying on their behalf.’ (Clapham, 2003, p. 123). 
He puts special emphasis on how the discourses of the homeless that frame service 
provision and staff interaction with clients, are central to how homeless people 
respond to interventions and construct a sense of self (Clapham, 2003).
This is corroborated by studies on the importance granted to meaningful 
personal relationships by the homeless and on the impact that meanings of 
homelessness that inform relationships have on the homeless person. Tosi (2005) 
found that homeless people consider the relational dimension of service provision
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and the personal character of their relationships with HPs, a fundamental resource for 
their material and emotional support, for reintegration and for re-establishing 
equilibrium in their lives. Zufferey and Kerr (2004) found that marginalizing 
representations inscribed in homeless agencies’ institutional controls made clients 
feel they were judged negatively by workers (i.e. as deviant) and was translated into 
challenging behaviours, refusal to engage with staff and to access services. Other 
studies also showed how homeless people’s resistance to take up services, 
constituted a responsive reaction to stigmatizing representations of themselves held 
by staff and other service users (Randall & Brown, 1995 ). Certainly, homeless 
people live in dialogicality with the excluding representations held by the 
‘domiciled’ other. Hodgetts and colleagues (2007) have shown that otherizing 
processes, mediated or communicated through social relationships with the 
domiciled other and through the regulation of social spaces- that construct deviance 
and separation from mainstream society- are materialized in the body of the 
homeless producing ill-health and a reduced sense of social worth and self-esteem.
These dimensions make clear that symbolic constructions circulating in 
society lead to particular practices, penetrate relationships shaping the identity and 
experience of the homeless and crystallizing in behaviors that can undermine their 
health and place them in a situation of increased risk. Within this context, the 
processes whereby the knowledge of experts working in the voluntary sector define 
the experience and the self-understanding of the homeless person are an important 
focus of inquiry since they shape interventions and inform the relationships with 
clients. HPs contribute decisively to the social construction of ‘homelessness’ and in 
consequence to the self-understanding of homeless people. The meanings that HPs’ 
knowledge project onto the experience of homeless people determine whether 
services are lived by the person as either ‘spaces of care’ or ‘spaces of fear’ 
(Johnsen, Cloke, & May, 2005). The former provide refuge and therapeutic shelter to 
the user and constitute a source of stability and security (Johnsen et al., 2005). The 
latter, constitute a context of estrangement (Radley et al., 2005) which subject the 
person to institutional regulations, telling her about her deviance and need to be 
socially controlled (Johnsen et al., 2005, p.806).
23
I hope I have made clear why understanding how the community of HPs 
makes sense of homelessness is far from being trivial. HPs’ knowledge constitutes an 
important symbolic environment that shapes the very experience and subjectivity of 
those it refers to, and thus the need to investigate how their notions of homelessness 
are constructed. I believe that without this understanding, policy would remain 
partial and disconnected from what happens on the ground. Focusing on their 
knowledge means engaging with the wider socio-political environment of 
homelessness, thus implying an engagement with a form of ‘psychopolitics’ (Hook,
2004) of homelessness. This refers to the practice of drawing upon the political 
within psychology in order to understand how the psychological is intimately 
interwoven and framed by the socio-political forces of its context (Hook, 2004). To 
my knowledge, there is no socio-psychological research that specifically explores 
HPs’ knowledge of ‘homelessness’ .
I have discussed the question of the centrality of meaning. In the following 
section, I will unfold the argument o f why the symbolic domain is important in the 
construction of ‘reality’, and in particular its centrality to the phenomena of 
‘homelessness’. Before I engage in a discussion of the importance of social 
knowledge, I would like to be explicit about one issue. I do not seek to ignore the 
material and physical elements of the reality of ‘homelessness’, yet I shall emphasise, 
in the following section, that the symbolic realm comes to constitute the material as 
well as psychological experience of homelessness, and thus needs to be granted 
importance.
1.3. Beyond Material Aspects: The Symbolic Meaning o f
‘Homelessness’.
1.3.1. The Symbolic Construction of Reality.
In section 1.1, I have discussed how homelessness is constructed through 
networks of contested and contradictory meanings. Definitional clashes and 
competing approaches between voluntary and statutory sectors characterize the very 
nature of service provision contributing to the formation of the social fabric that
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underlies HPs’ symbolic construction of homelessness. I have highlighted the 
importance of HPs’ knowledge of homelessness in framing understandings of 
homelessness and consequent policies. In section 1.2,1 have suggested that symbolic 
knowledge is an important social psychological dimension to be taken into account 
since it is involved in the constitution of homelessness and it plays a role in the 
identity, living conditions and health of the homeless. In this section I delve into the 
essential role of the symbolic realm, which is at the heart of our experience of the 
world. The exploration of the importance of symbolic practices in the experience of 
‘reality’5, is necessary to the delimitation of my research problem, this being social 
knowledge of ‘homelessness’ and the processes whereby this knowledge is brought 
about.
In the following pages I shall draw upon social constructionist theory, in 
order to unfold the argument that, it is within symbolic practices that social 
knowledge of the world is produced, is taken for granted as the ‘truth’ permeating the 
constitution of things and crystallizing in the ontology of individuals and groups. To 
understand this, it is necessary to problematise traditional approaches to ‘reality’.
There is an essential dispute between the conventional Cartesian 
conceptualisation of ‘reality’, which underpins mainstream psychology and 
psychological forms of social psychology (Farr, 1996), and the ‘reality’ that social 
constructionist approaches advocate. The former implies that there is a real ‘world 
out there’ in which things exist with their real material characteristics and meaning, 
and that representations6 come after them. This implies a separation between the 
individual with her representational practices, and ‘the world out there’. On the 
contrary, the latter, which is the one I propose as the underpinning theoretical 
framework for my investigation, refers to a conceptualisation of the production, 
circulation, and transformation of meaning as ‘entering the very constitution of 
things’ (Hall 1997, p.5). It recognizes the centrality of symbolic practices, together 
with the material and structural ones, in the constitution of ‘reality’. Through an
5 Inverted commas indicating something that is standing in for the object, substituting reality.
6 Representations are understood as symbols invested with meaning that stand for ‘reality’. They are 
the source of symbolic knowledge, and permeate our reality so powerfully that they eventually come 
to constitute what is ‘reality’ for us.
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emphasis on symbolic practices, one is able to overcome the dualism embedded in 
the empiricist and rationalist tradition and to understand the nature of what counts as 
‘reality’ for us (that is, as ‘truth’ facts). I will, at this point, introduce the basic tenets 
of Social Constructionism and explore its central role for critically engaging with the 
world.
The basic underlying idea that underpins Social Constructionism is the 
argument that reality as such does not exist. It is its symbolic construction that is 
taken for granted as ‘reality’. This thesis is underpinned by the assumption that 
human nature has the essential need to make sense of the chaotic avalanche of 
information that is encountered in the world. ‘Reality’ is accessed through 
communicative processes of symbolic construction between social agents. It is 
through processes of re-presenting reality that we are able to communicate with each 
other, and understand the events, people, and things in our everyday lives, whilst co- 
developing the self. Hence, the central tenet of constructionism is that things and 
persons only acquire meaning within representational systems. ‘Reality’, is not so 
much a set of things out there, as a set of representational practices that take place in 
dialogical processes with others. Primarily, ‘reality’ refers to the production and 
circulation of meanings between people, which is the source for the production of 
social knowledge and ontology. The production of meaning is the principal focus of 
social constructionist’s body of thought (Gergen, 1985).
The individual is conceived as an active agent in the struggle to construct the 
world through the multiple social relations with others. Berger and Luckmann (1966), 
argue that the life of an individual is characterized by an ongoing dialectical 
relationship with her socio-cultural environment, through which she constructs both 
herself and the social order. They challenge the monological tradition of Descartes 
by arguing that all that is human in nature is a social enterprise, including meaning 
production. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).‘Reality’ is not something that is located in 
the individual psyche or in ‘the world out there’, instead it lives in the inter- 
subjective space, in the dialogical relationships between individuals. Many have 
pointed out the dialogical nature of representations (Hall, 1997; Jovchelovitch, 2007; 
Markova, 2003a) and ontology of the person (Bakhtin, 1986; Hermans & Kempen, 
1993; Markova, 2003a). As Gergen (1985) has put it: ‘From the constructionist
26
position the process of understanding is not automatically driven by the forces of 
nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons in 
relationship .’ (p.267, emphasis added). Relationships between self and others are the 
very basis of knowledge, selfhood and social life (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Therefore, 
the ‘texture’ and dynamics of representational systems express dialogic processes 
between individuals and groups struggling to make sense of the world.
The fact that we interpret the world around us through constructing systems 
of meanings that stand for what is re-presented, is what makes unfeasible an 
objective reflection of reality (Gergen, 1985). The existence of a ‘reality’ (as an 
entity) that can be objectively grasped, as argued by Cartesian approaches, is 
problematised, since its very nature implies the inescapable fact of co-authorship of 
multiple social actors in communication and dialectical relations with the world. The 
social constructionist approach moves beyond the utopia of positivist-empiricist 
tradition, which has wrongly assumed that objective knowledge is the outcome of 
accurate mapping of reality by a knowing subject separated from the world of others. 
It is the meaning that we confer to our experience of the world what constitutes our 
knowledge and what we take for granted as ‘reality’. Hence the Cartesian duality can 
be overcome if we think that ‘meaning is not in the object or person or thing, nor is it 
in the world. It is we who fix the meaning so firmly that, after a while, it comes to 
seem natural and inevitable.’ (Hall, 1997, p.21).
At this stage I would like to stress that I am neither denying the existence of 
the physical world and the power of social structures, nor I am granting sovereignty 
to the symbolic realm. Instead, I highlight the centrality of representational practices 
as the counterpart of the material world. Far from neglecting the fact that things have 
a real, material existence in the world out there, it is claimed that what counts for 
human beings as ‘reality’ is the meaningful aspect of it, that is, the symbolic 
knowledge that is produced in our everyday lives and that penetrates the very 
materiality of things and physicality and psychology of subjects. As I will later 
discuss (section 1.3.2.), this relationship between subjective and objective processes, 
between symbolic and material conditions of human life, is at the heart of the 
theoretical framework of this thesis; the theory of social representations (Jodelet, 
1989/1991; Moscovici, 2000).
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‘Reality’, that is, the set and processes of symbolic representation that 
emerge in order to make sense of our experience of the world, has practical 
consequences for our everyday practices and rituals. Symbolic knowledge stands for 
the reality it re-presents and as such has a central role regulating social life. The 
meaning constructed in the inter-subjective space between people, whilst not being 
something that’s veracity can be checked against an external reality and proved to 
have complete validity, constitutes what is ‘reality’ for us. For social reality is 
socially constructed, and put into action by people in everyday life. Actions always 
carry meaning (Kenwood, 1999) they are the enactment of our symbolic 
constructions. Likewise, these constructions have material/physical effects, enter to 
constitute our ‘reality’, being crystallized into our ontologies and relationships. The 
knowledge of the world is so much ingrained in our everyday experience and 
relationships, that it has consequences for people and for the unfolding of social life.
For social constructionism, the wholesale rejection of an objective reality has 
a yet further implication; the fact that there is not a unique ‘truth’, since this, is 
socially constructed. What we find in the world, and particularly in contemporary 
times, is a multiplicity of voices in conflict and divergence between their different 
versions of reality claimed to hold the unique ‘truth’. Inasmuch as meaning is not an 
inherent, constitutive (permanent) quality of the objects in the natural world but the 
product of social processes of representation, it can never be completely established 
(Hall, 1997) or finalized (Bakhtin, 1984a). Different groups of people would claim 
different versions of ‘reality’ and different symbolic knowledge that is taken for 
granted as unquestionable ‘truths’ and in this way they protect particular interests 
over others. In other words, this involves the battle to seal meaning, which is at the 
core of our social life.
The concern is not only that meanings are naturalised, and taken for granted 
as being the constitutive fixed qualities, of objects, subjects and events in the natural 
world, but the fact that there is an unequal distribution of symbolic power between 
groups to direct processes of social construction. This is understood as the ‘power of 
constructing reality’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166), which is exercised through 
perpetuation over time, of one’s versions of reality, as holding the unique truth. As
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Foucault (1980) has claimed, there will always be relations of power in the dispute 
over who owns the1 meaning. Certain forms of knowledge are predominant and 
widely accepted as the truth, not because their ‘empirical validity’, but because of 
their communicative processes of defending one’s version of reality and challenging 
others (Gergen, 1985, p.268). Acquiring the power to install ‘the truth’ depends on 
the authority that one holds and the social position that one occupies to direct social 
processes of meaning making. This authority is granted to certain ‘expert’ groups in 
society, whose knowledge enjoys high prestige as establishers of ‘reality’. The 
concern is with how symbolic practices are used to support particular interests over 
others, thus maintaining the status quo and perpetuating the inequality of 
marginalised groups.
The line of argument of social constructionism, is an adequate theoretical 
underpinning for this research and has important implications for the 
conceptualisation of knowledge, since:
(a) It demystifies the authority of certain forms of knowledge and 
debunks the idea of the existence of a unique ‘truthful’ knowledge that is the 
outcome of empiricist and objective processes. Hence, in adopting a social 
constructionist perspective to the study of social knowledge, I have to be aware of 
the confusion that comes when an individual meets a member of another group, that 
is, when the different types of knowledge that people produce meet. These 
encounters imply the arena of how within 21st century, plurality of meaning gets 
institutionalized and thus imposed as the dominant legitimate way of understanding 
reality. This is ingrained in the hierarchical representation of knowledge 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007), which establishes what is considered to be the most valuable, 
right and true knowledge of reality. Meaning bears the antagonistic quality of being 
both a creative opportunity and a constraint for the exercising of power. The concern 
here is that those groups situated in the lower levels of the hierarchy may find it 
difficult to resist the meaning imposed by the representations of those at the top-end 
(Jovchelovitch, 1997). Relations between different forms of knowing embed 
possibilities for contestation and critique. However, there is a tendency to maintain 
the status quo of those in higher levels of the hierarchy of knowledge because they
7 My own emphasis denoting positivist wrong assumption of the existence of a unique true meaning.
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enjoy a privileged position to access the public sphere of debate and critique 
(Habermas, 1989). Hence, the diversity of knowledge is subjugated to that 
knowledge considered to be rational, which legitimates certain versions of reality, 
practices and ontologies whilst discrediting others.
(b) It maintains a perspective on common-sense knowledge, as being 
significant and valuable. Accordingly, it calls for the need of a critical approach to 
the study of knowledge. This implies an engagement with the knowledge of those 
symbolically and socio-economically excluded in society and a distrust of dominant 
forms of knowledge. This involves the double task of focusing on; (1) neglected and 
marginalised forms of knowledge and, (2) how these symbolically and thus 
materially marginalised people negotiate, accommodate, and contest dominant forms 
of knowledge.
A social constructionist approach is an important critical tool that enables one 
to sceptically distrust what is legitimately instituted as a unique ‘reality’. This is 
indeed the starting point of my thesis; social constructionist’s questioning of social 
knowledge that is taken for granted as the ‘truth’. Indeed, in the case of 
‘homelessness’, there are spheres of knowledge, which have acquired widespread 
authority to impose their social construction of ‘homelessness’. The concern is that 
those with a privileged position for the fixing of knowledge are, through their 
symbolic power, governing and regulating social life and social practices around 
‘homelessness’. Hence, perpetuating certain meanings of ‘homelessness’ that might 
be ideological, in Thompson’s sense (1990 ), because of naturalising and legitimising 
socio-economic exclusion. I believe that a constructionist approach would invite us 
to understand ‘homelessness’ in alternative ways, to re-consider it as a socio- 
psychological process, to raise interesting questions about the function of certain 
constructions of ‘homelessness’, and how when brought about in social practices, 
these are responsible for the sustaining and exclusion of certain knowledges and 
ontologies. Constructions about homelessness have a direct impact on the definition 
of interventions, the design of policies, the production of practices towards the 
homeless, and the identity of the homeless person.
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I conclude by arguing that social knowledge is a strong element in 
understanding any contemporary phenomena. However, an act of mapping the 
meanings that constitute the content of a particular social knowledge would not be a 
powerful critical tool unless it does enable a wider analysis of the dynamics of 
symbolic power and possibilities of contestation and critique. The concern is not only 
with how meaning is produced through representational practices, but it needs to be, 
with how dialogical processes of knowledge production are a means for the exercise 
of power to impose constructions upon others or to contest these representations. 
This power does not simply involve the attempt to cement and ingrain in our 
everyday experiences and identities, particular meanings as truthful representations 
of the world. It also refers to possibilities for questioning and rejecting ideological 
symbolic forms that constrain our identities knowledges and projects (Thompson, 
1990 ). Therefore, we need to study those social processes of negotiation, conflict, 
contestation, and assimilation of meaning that are at the heart of the warranting and 
challenging of particular versions of ‘reality’. This involves studying those social 
constructions in the social practices in which they exist focusing in the interactive 
relations between different forms of knowing.
In the light of these issues I call for a critical engagement with the symbolic 
construction of ‘homelessness’ and an analysis of the battles to institute meaning of 
‘homelessness’. I will examine in the following section, the specific social 
constructionist approach within social psychology that I have adopted to approach 
the object of my investigation.
1.3.2. A Critical Social Psychology of Homelessness: The Relevance of Social 
Representations.
An adequate social constructionist stance in which I locate in order to 
approach the object of my investigation, is that of the theory of social representations 
(Moscovici 1961; 1973; 1984; 1988; 1998). Firstly, and this is central to the present 
research, this is a powerful socio-psychological theoretical framework for the 
conceptualisation of processes of social knowledge, its production and circulation 
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Moscovici, 2001). It has its foundations in Durkheim’s
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(1898) concept of collective representations, which Moscovici renovated into a more 
flexible, dynamic, social phenomenon stating that it should be social psychology’s 
fundamental object of study (1984b). It is through social representations theory that 
the interplay between cognitive, cultural, and social processes in the construction, 
progression and change of social knowledge can be best understood. This is a key 
conceptual approach to social phenomena within social psychology, which provides 
an understanding of the dialogue between the individual and society (Jovchelovitch, 
1996) and between the representations of self and others in the co-construction of 
knowledge and identity. The concept of social representations allows one to restore a 
connection between psychological processes and the social, thus providing the means 
for studying social life as an influential element in the psychology of the individual. 
In general, according to Moscovici (1984b), a socio-psychological approach directs 
attention towards the interactions between the individual and society, specifically, 
towards how groups and individuals socially construct their reality- the process and 
content of social representations.
Secondly, social representations are the symbolic constructions (content and 
processes) that stand for the object, and hence, re-present ‘reality’. As a form of 
social knowledge, the social representations shared by a particular group, are the 
common symbolic resources, through which that collectivity make sense of then- 
social world (Moscovici, 1984b). They are symbolic resources through which people 
give meaning to social structures, experiences and material circumstances.
‘system (s) of values, ideas and practices with a two-fold function; first, to 
establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their material 
and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take 
place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social 
exchange and a code for naming an classifying unambiguously the various aspects of 
their world and their individual an group history.’ (Moscovici, 1973 p.xiii ).
Social representations act as the catalyst of behaviour and all social 
phenomena, and thus, all behaviour has a symbolic nature (Moscovici, 2000). Reality 
is mediated through social representations, which have the symbolic power of 
affecting behaviour and communication. This symbolic activity is the way through
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which the meanings embedded in social representations operate in social life. How 
meaning is produced and transformed and how symbols relate to meaning are all 
aspects linked to the process of social representations.
This approach does not seek to reify the power of the symbolic realm. Whilst, 
a preoccupation with meaning is central to the study of social representations, 
material elements of the world are not ignored within this theory. Social 
representations emerge and are developed as the symbolic devices through which 
people give meaning to social structures, experiences and material circumstances. It 
is not the case that social representations ‘stand in’ for the object in the literal sense 
of the word to the point that material circumstances do not affect our everyday lives. 
Instead, what the theory does is emphasise the power of social representations to 
inform and permeate social/institutional practices, relationships and structural 
arrangements, all of which are inscribed with meanings. Hence, social 
representations, imply the existence of material structures that we make present and 
thus meaningful in the process of re-presenting them. Symbolic phenomena and 
material practices ‘feed-back’ each other and co-exist in a form of symbiosis.
Thirdly, this theory has the potential for exercising critical psychology 
(Howarth, 2007) and it is to this element of the theory to which I seek to contribute 
to through my investigation. At the very heart of the theory is its potential political 
role in criticising ideological constructions of reality that sustain unequal relations, 
yet only few studies have empirically demonstrated it (Howarth, 2007). The theory is 
a useful critical and political tool to explore the ways in which relations of power 
function in society, and how these may be fought over by those whose position is 
marginalized and whose knowledge and identity potentials are constrained. Social 
representations not only are means through which we make sense of the world and 
propose a particular version of the social order, they also have an ideological and 
anti-ideological role in the attempt to fix or contest hegemonic constructions of 
reality. Indeed, there are always values and interests at stake underpinning social 
representations, which are sought to be protected and defended (in rejection to 
others), through the representational act (Howarth, 2007)
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Hence, these are the two sides of representations, namely; (1) the ‘positive’ or 
liberating, which refers to the potential of social representations to contest 
ideological meanings, and (2) the ‘negative’, which relates to how its taken-for- 
granted nature may lead to the hegemony and perpetuation of particular constructions 
of reality that might justify the status quo. On the one hand, social representations 
can function ideologically to, support the social status, social relations and 
legitimized versions of reality of a particular group. These representations lead to the 
naturalization of a particular social order and institutional practices that benefit 
certain groups, but disfavour others leaving them under unequal circumstances. On 
the other hand, representations also have the potential to challenge the social order 
and critically engage with inequalities. At the heart of the theory is the argument of 
the polyphasia of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2002, 2007; Moscovici, 1961/1976), 
which refers to representations as phenomena that, due to being grounded in different 
socio-cultural contexts, contain both in themselves plurality and contradiction. 
Possibilities for negotiation and contestation are to be found in the conflictive and 
tensional dynamics that occur between interactive forms of knowledge within 
polyphasic representational systems. It is the way a representation is used within 
polyphasia what determines which of its sides is enacted.
For these reasons, I do not aim to merely use this theory as a descriptive tool 
for the mapping out of the content of social knowledge of ‘homelessness’. This has 
the potential danger of consolidating social inequalities, as it would not critically 
engage with the disentangling of ideologies and with the context of the production of 
homeless subjectivities, thus not allowing for social change. I strongly agree with 
Howarth (2007) that there is a need for a development of the critical potential of the 
theory. Through my research, I seek to make a progress in the understanding of the 
relationship between processes of legitimization of knowledge and the possibilities 
of contestation to reify knowledge systems. I also aim to define the role of the 
construction of social identity in the mediation of these processes, since social 
representations are put to use in order to confirm, negotiate or resist versions of 
reality that clash with our standpoint in the world (Howarth, 2007). These are two 
points of the theory that need to be further re-defined in order to develop the critical 
potential of the theory (Howarth, 2007). In my investigation I hope to do so through 
further developing a central element of the theory; the concept of cognitive
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polyphasia. Particularly, I hope to advance the conceptual explanation of how the 
eclectic use of representations in the dialogue that occurs between interacting forms 
of knowledge within processes of cognitive polyphasia, is mediated by processes of 
identity construction. In doing so I hope to provide the means to theorize how social 
representations are used in order to impose or contest power in the relation between 
different and competing forms of knowledge that meet in the dialogical co­
production of knowledge and identity. Social representations theory has certainly the 
potential as a conceptual tool for engaging in this type of critical research since it 
believes on human agency to actively re-construct reality through critically 
responding to dialogical others’ worldviews and practices.
My research is focused on the social knowledge of ‘homelessness’ held by 
HPs and the processes whereby their representations are brought about and put to use 
to support different interests and values whilst co-constructing their identity. The 
focus is on how in sustaining and defending their own versions of ‘homelessness’, 
they contest versions that contradict their knowledge and professional identity. 
Through a critical analysis of how HPs re-negotiate co-existing and competing 
knowledge systems that fight in the struggle over meaning of homelessness, I hope to 
elucidate the dynamics of reification and contestation of knowledge. That is, how do 
they re-produce or critique forms of knowledge that enjoy more power to direct the 
definition of homelessness and thus to institute the types of being that homeless 
people are. In the following section, I discuss how HPs are in a privileged position to 
explore processes of social construction of ‘homelessness’ due to their location in the 
intersection between the different social spheres.
1.4. The Privileged Position o f Homelessness Professionals (HPs)
Working in The Voluntary Sector.
The relevance of the role of voluntary agencies to the problem of 
‘homelessness’ has been highly acknowledged (e.g. Beacock, 1979; Daly, 1997; 
Hutson & Liddiard, 1994). The voluntary sector is valued because of its approach to 
homelessness and local understanding of the issue (Daly, 1997). HPs working in the
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voluntary sector contribute decisively to the social construction of ‘homelessness’ 
and consequently to the self-understanding of homeless people. Acknowledging that 
issues of homelessness are grounded in the way homelessness is represented helps to 
understand why it is important to investigate HPs’ knowledge and integrate it into the 
design of policy, decisions about welfare systems and models of intervention. This 
section discusses the importance of focusing on HPs’ perspectives.
There are two main reasons that explain the value of HPs’ knowledge:
(1) Their alternative ethos, comprehensive definition and 
approach to homelessness.
(2) Their privileged position in the construction of ‘homelessness’ 
and their movements from the front-line of homelessness to the 
spheres of policy making and the public, which provide the resources 
for HPs to make sense of homelessness and construct the multiple 
contents and dialogues that form their knowledge.
(1) While both statutory and non-statutory bodies provide services 
they differ in their definition of homelessness, degree and quality of their 
involvement. The response to ‘homelessness’ in the UK largely comes from the 
voluntary sector. Voluntary agencies’ services are less constrained by legal 
responsibilities and their work is not so controlled by governmental bureaucracies. 
HPs adopt a responsive and individualised approach, which seeks to 
comprehensively attend to the emotional, social and structural needs of the homeless. 
They are valued for their flexibility, adaptability, ample and innovative range of 
services (Daly, 1997). Their definition of those eligible for aid is broad and not 
marked by the criteria of intentionality. Neither do they reduce ‘homelessness’ to a 
limited number of categories. In addition, in comparison to professionals from 
statutory services, HPs’ relationship with their clients is closer to the Rogerian type 
of helping relationship (Rogers, 1995).
It has been acknowledged the effect that the highly bureaucratised nature of 
welfare public agencies has in the interpretation of clients (Lipsky, 1980). In seeing 
them as a category, they disregard their uniqueness as an individual with a history 
and personal experience. Service users may perceive statutory agencies as less
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approachable and more bureaucratic than voluntary agencies, which are non- 
judgemental and less constrained with having to meet statutory duties (Wigglesworth 
& Kendall, 2000). A bureaucratisation of statutory services might prevent 
professionals from interpreting and tackling ‘homelessness’ comprehensively 
reducing the wholeness of the socio-culturally situated individual ‘homeless’ to a 
mere issue of lack of housing, mental health, drug misuse, and so on.
Currently, voluntary agencies are working in a contract culture characterized 
by increasing government cost-cutting. Within this context the value of the voluntary 
approach and its attributes are threatened (Daly, 1997) and HPs live in a continuous 
struggle to define the problem and provide support and care to the homeless. This is 
partially due to the fact that despite policies (i.e. Homeless Act 20008), emphasising 
the importance of joint-work between statutory and voluntary agencies across 
different welfare services9, HPs are sometimes downplayed by statutory experts. 
There are between HPs and professionals from statutory agencies power inequalities 
in the constant debate over issues of ‘homelessness’. While HPs play a capital role 
and have incomparable experience and understanding of homeless people and their 
circumstances, their statutory counterparts may have uncertainties about the 
legitimacy of their expertise. Such uncertainties arise because in many cases HPs do 
not have an academic degree 10(i.e. social work, mental health) that grants them with 
an authoritative expertise. Theirs is an expertise that comes from the day-to-day 
experience with homelessness and not from the sphere of science and academia. 
Hence, their versions of ‘homelessness’ might be often contested and fought over by 
those experts working in the statutory sector (i.e. doctors, psychiatric nurses from the 
NHS). In section 1.3 I drew attention to the discussion of how in contemporary times 
what counts as a truthful representation of ‘reality’, and thus widely trusted, is 
scientific/academic ‘objective’ knowledge. Although statutory professionals’ 
knowledge and skills to deal with ‘homelessness’ can not be equated to those of HPs’,
8 See extracts of British government policy announcements. 
http://www.housing.odpm.gov.uk/information/homelessness/response/
9 See extracts of British government policy announcements. 
http://www.housing.odpm.gov.uk/information/homelessness/response/
10 It is important to note here that a large extent o f professionals working in the voluntary sector have 
a background of many years of experience as volunteers that later enabled them to get into their first 
job in the sector. Some HPs have degrees, but there is not a specific degree on homelessness as there 
is in psychology, policy, or social work.
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the mere fact of having an academic degree that specialises them in their fields, 
bestows them with a greater authority as experts. This limits HPs’ power in 
pragmatic decisions, and in the designing of interventionist models. Thus, it affects 
the coordination and the provision of integrated support services to ‘the homeless’, 
who are the ultimate losers in this situation.
(2) HPs enjoy a central position in the symbolic construction of 
‘homelessness’ since they are in contact with both sides of the divide; the inner 
reality of ‘homelessness’ and the outside audience where they engage in dialogue 
with multiple social actors. From the inner reality of homelessness, to the 
government and policy, across the media and the public, HPs are positioned at a 
multiplicity of interfaces and relationships with others who co-participate in the 
construction of their knowledge. As professional practitioners, who hold both 
practical and theoretical knowledge, they act as ‘vectors’ between various social 
spheres, being important carriers and shapers of social knowledge and public images 
of their clients (Morant, 1997, p.82). They have to implement both policy and expert 
theoretical knowledge, integrate it into their practices, inform the public offer 
feedback to policymakers and raise funds. As experts in context, HPs hold the central 
role of translators and integrators of beliefs, meanings and images o f ‘homelessness’ 
in the interface between the different social spheres. They perform a pivotal task in 
communicating and explaining the issue o f ‘homelessness’ and their clients’ 
experiences to the public, politicians and the media (Hutson & Liddiard, 1994).
All these features define HPs as experts in context and make them an 
interesting case for the study of processes of construction of polyphasic knowledge. 
HPs’ knowledge integrates elements from diverse spheres, and through dialogical 
conciliations and negotiations translates them into their daily practices. Studying 
their knowledge and the interacting dialogue between its constitutive elements 
provides an insight into the relationship between the different forms of knowledge of 
‘homelessness’ circulating in British society. Their representations are key indicators 
in the process of understanding homelessness and its consequences in the living 
conditions and experience of the homeless person.
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In proposing their versions of ‘homelessness’, HPs might dialogically 
negotiate, challenge and/or contest the meaning of ‘homelessness’ held by other 
interest groups with whom they intersect. Some of these enjoy a higher position in 
the hierarchy of knowledge in society (e.g. statutory professionals). Of particular 
interest is HPs’ potential political role to question and contest reified forms of 
knowledge (e.g. policy definitions, mental health workers’ views on a particular 
client). However, it is not the case that through focusing on HPs’ knowledge as a 
form of expertise this is regarded as an objective and value-free portrait of the reality 
of ‘homelessness’. Knowledge is never neutral and involves interests and intentions 
of many kinds. Whichever form of knowledge is being considered, its analysis 
discloses the relationship between reproduction of and agency to contest ideological 
constructions.
At worst, some would argue that by omitting to provide an account of 
homeless people’s own experience, their voice is marginalised and neglected in the 
present research, and thus there is a risk of perpetuating relations of power in society. 
At best, focusing on HPs’ knowledge would critically provide and disclose processes 
of social knowledge of ‘homelessness’, which constitute the context where the life 
conditions and identity of the homeless are grounded. Their position in the 
intersection between the different knowledge spheres is the best for the exploration 
of the dynamics of clash, negotiation, reproduction and contestation of conflicting 
meanings in the encounter between different knowledge systems. Therefore, it is 
essential that the subject of this study is not misread here. It is for all the reasons 
discussed above why, I believe that, amongst the many possible paths to access 
societal understandings of ‘homelessness’, it is important to engage in an exploration 
of HPs’ knowledge.
1.5. Aims o f The Study: Research Questions.
The aim of the research is to engage in a socio-psychological exploration of 
HPs’ knowledge of homelessness and the processes through which this is brought 
about and constructed. It is hoped that the investigation of their knowledge processes
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can disclose some important elements of the link between psychological, socio­
political and structural elements of ‘homelessness’. What I suggest is a social 
constructionist approach to explore dialogical and polyphasic knowledge of 
‘homelessness’ from the perspective of experts in context. Although this research 
hopes to be an opportunity to widen the ways in which this issue is understood, it is 
important to note that I do not seek to propose a theory of professional knowledge of 
homelessness.
Reflecting on homelessness issues involves confronting an important social 
problem, which calls for a critical social psychology, attentive to the symbolic and 
relational context of the production of social structures and practices that limit the 
experience and identity of homeless people. My study hopes to critically engage 
with homelessness at three levels. Firstly, exploring HPs’ representations of 
homelessness is an attempt to bring to light the symbolic mechanisms that permeate 
interventions and sustain certain social structures, which potentially, constrain social 
justice and thus should be questioned and open to change. Secondly, I investigate 
how within the context of definitional clashes and conflicting approaches, HPs 
develop a critical engagement with relations of power around them in their everyday 
work practices, those of the legitimate authority of statutory agencies. In other words, 
the focus is on how HPs struggle to engage other social actors with their own 
frameworks manifesting agency to contest their reified and commonsensical forms 
of knowledge and excluding representations and finding ways to put into practice 
their own agenda and definitions of homelessness. Third, at the theoretical level I 
hope to contribute to the development of the critical potential of social 
representations theory. This is done through a Bakhtinian approach to the polyphasic 
use of knowledge and the co-development of the self in the dialogue with others. 
Through such a conceptual development I hope to explain how in the plural and 
dialogical process of knowledge and identity construction, people put to use 
representations in order to criticize, question, reject or reproduce others’ knowledges, 
values and practices. This would provide an understanding of the interactive 
dynamics between the diversity of forms of knowledge within the self and 
circulating in society in the encounter between groups, communities and social 
actors holding different world-views, cultures, agendas, levels of expertise and 
positionings in the social fabric.
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1.5.1. Objectives.
The central empirical task is to explore the knowledge of HPs working in the 
voluntary sector in London. This involves a double task: (1) examining the content 
and processes of construction of polyphasic knowledge, and (2) how processes of 
identity construction might mediate the dialogical dynamics of negotiation, 
argumentation and contestation of the meaning of ‘homelessness’ held by other 
interest groups with whom they intersect and they co-construct knowledge. There are 
three objectives to examining their knowledge:
• To understand the content and process of HPs’ representations 
of ‘homelessness’. Particular attention is paid to the dialogues that form their 
knowledge and how its constitutive elements interact with each other, co­
exist within the representational field and are eclectically put to use. This 
involves the two-fold task of exploring processes of representing 
homelessness and constructing a sense of self. This study attempts to 
investigate how HPs co-construct knowledge about homelessness and 
themselves, through debating with dialogical others’ representations, whilst 
struggling for social significance and recognition of their voice.
• To engage in an exploration of a somehow neglected, yet 
highly valuable form of knowledge in the framing of understandings of 
homelessness and consequent policies.
• To inform policy makers, statutory professionals and other 
relevant actors in the homeless sector, in order to move further the state of the 
homeless debate. To contribute to more efficient solutions, and to provide 
elements for reflection on the obstacles to the realization of partnerships
i
between statutory and voluntary sectors.
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2. THEORISING PROFESSIONAL PRACTITIONERS 
KNOWLEDGE.
The central aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical model that has 
been used to approach the object of investigation, namely, professional practitioners’ 
knowledge of ‘homelessness’ amongst HPs from the voluntary sector. Building on 
the general discussion in Chapter 1 of the socially constructed nature of knowledge, I 
introduce the theory of social representations focusing on the concept of cognitive 
polyphasia, and discussing lines within the theory that need further elaboration. I 
argue that there is a lacunae in social representation’s model of polyphasic 
knowledge. This needs to be further developed, in order to critically explain the 
dynamics of the use of representations within knowledge systems, characterized by 
the co-existence of different and contradictory styles of thinking.
Drawing on the concept of social positioning (Harre & Langenhove, 1998b) 
and using it in order to conceptualise the relationship between social identity and 
social representations, I present my argument on how the theory can critically 
account for the dialogical use of polyphasic knowledge. I reformulate the ‘dialogical 
triad’ of knowledge through the inclusion of social positioning as a possible mediator 
in the intricate dialogue between interacting forms of knowledge in the use of 
representations. This elaboration, involves a conceptualisation of the link between 
processes of knowledge and identity construction. My argument is on how in 
adopting different social positionings towards the dialogical other, people alternate 
and draw on diverse, dilemmatic and contradictory modes of thinking, whilst at the 
same time co-develop the self. Social positioning has the potential to explain the 
inter-relations between different co-existing forms of knowledge and how within 
dialogue people eclectically use them at different times. In offering theoretical 
progression on the dialogical use of social representations, I propose a path for 
furthering the understanding of cognitive polyphasia, which has been left behind for 
a long time within the theoretical body of social representations. In this way, I hope I 
contribute to the progression of those aspects of the theory that, as Howarth (2007) 
has argued, need further elaboration in order to develop its critical potential.
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I draw on two key ideas of the theory: (1) the dialogical and dynamic nature 
of knowledge; and (2) the phenomena of cognitive polyphasia. I present social 
representations theory’s conceptualization of knowledge, as a symbolic practice 
contained in the dialogical triad Ego-Alter-Object (Markova, 2003a). Through social 
representations theory, I propose the fact that knowledge is dialogical and does not 
refer to a system of contents and theories that exist in the mind of the individual. 
Knowledge is something that people ‘do’ and ‘re-do’, instead of hold, in 
interdependence with dialogical others. It is within this dialogical social context, that 
knowledge is open to reformulations and transformations.
I shall start by discussing the social, dialogical and communicative nature of 
social representations, and thus, the inevitable plurality and contextuality of the 
phenomena of knowledge. I shall continue by exploring the complexity of the 
dialogical relationship between different forms of knowledge, which will be done at 
two levels. Firstly, I shall examine the development and transformation of social 
representations that occur at the macro socio psychological level, within the 
relationship between the different spheres of knowledge. Secondly, I shall explore 
how the notion of social positioning can explain the dialogical use of representations 
and the relationship between different co-existing forms of knowledge at the micro 
socio psychological level. I shall explain the dialogical genesis of representations 
within self-other relations through spelling out the ‘dialogical triad’ of knowledge 
and I will claim its value as a conceptual tool for the study of the formation of 
knowledge. In section 2.2.2, I will make the case of renovating it through the 
inclusion of social positioning as a possible mediator in the dialogicality of 
knowledge, that is, in the use, and ultimately, in the transformation of social 
representations. I discuss how through the incorporation of social positioning, the 
model may gain strength in its ability to conceptualize the dynamics of knowledge, 
and the explanation of the way social identity processes are intertwined with the 
particular dialogical use of plural and contradictory ways of thinking. Such 
understanding might open ways to conceptualise the processes of emergence and 
change of social identities that occur alongside dialogical processes of knowledge in 
the encounter between the different representational systems of self and other. Indeed, 
the essential dialogical nature of human beings implies the inevitably co-occurrence 
of co-construction of knowledge and co-development of the self (Markova, 2003b).
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Having made the case for the renovation of this model of social representation into a 
model of the dialogical use of social knowledge, the last section will turn specifically 
to the world of professional practitioners’ knowledge.
2.1. The Theory of Social Representations, a Theory o f Social 
Knowledge.
The theory of social representations made its entrance into the field of social 
psychology of knowledge in the 1960s through the work of its originator, Serge 
Moscovici. Moscovici developed the concept of social representation largely in his 
first work about representations of psychoanalytic science within French culture, La 
Psychanalyse, Son Image Et Son Public (1961/1976). He found as a source of 
inspiration for the development of the concept, the work of a diverse group of 
thinkers; the sociologists Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, the social psychologist, F. 
Bartlett (1932), and developmental psychologist J. Piaget (Moscovici, 1998). In 
addition, the progress of his concept came later in his career inspired by the work on 
cultural and historical development, by a second developmental psychologist, L. S. 
Vygotsky. It is from him that Moscovici inherited his inclusion of society and social 
phenomena into the study of the psychological.
Moscovici’s theory of social representations has to be considered important 
for the social psychology of knowledge due to his particular conceptualization of the 
nature of knowing as dialogical, social, and polyphasic. I have summarized it here in 
three points.
(1) Firstly, central to the theory of social representations (Moscovici 
1961; 1973; 1984; 1988; 1998) is the proposition that knowledge is social in origin 
and founded on dialogue with the other. The theory conceptualises knowledge as a 
group’s common means of socially constructing the world in order to re-create it 
(make it understandable), and in this way, it constitutes the group’s shared reality 
(Moscovici, 1990). This conceptualisation of knowledge achieves an excellent 
reformulation of the polarity of individual-society as inter-dependent, and not as 
independent interacting entities. The theory, moves beyond this type of monological
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ontology11 proposing instead an ontology within which individual-society exist in 
dialogical interdependence and constitute the other. Hence, it overcomes not only 
individualism, but also what Farr (1996) called the ‘individualisation of the social’. 
Such dialogical essence of the human being extends to its basic activities, that is, 
thinking and communicating. I discuss, the issue of dialogicality in the next section, 
in the light of Ivana Markova’s work.
Key to Moscovici’s social psychology of knowledge is the concept of social 
representations (2000), which are both thought structures and social practices. The 
concept has a double meaning:
On the one hand, they are conceptualised as inter-subjectively co-constructed 
shared ‘theories’, systems of knowledge that function as frameworks that orient 
people in the world. Hence, social representations refer to the common stock of 
knowledge in the form of thoughts, iconic images, metaphors, symbols, beliefs and 
social practices, that are rooted in a particular milieu and are shared by its members 
in order to make sense of the world. Further, they act as behavioural guidelines, or 
‘models of action’ (Moscovici, 1998, p.244) that inform and permeate social 
practices influencing the life of individuals and groups.
On the other hand, the term also refers to the dialogical socio-psychological 
processes of communicating and meaning making, through which social 
representations emerge, develop and change. In this sense, social representations are 
fluid and dynamic ‘theories’ of social phenomena, things, individuals and groups in 
the world (Moscovici, 1998). They are ‘more or less loosely tied together’, 
constituting a ‘network’ (Moscovici, 1998, p.244) and rooted in the socio-cultural 
context and history of individuals and groups. Therefore, social representations 
concern both the symbolic content of the knowledge shared by a collectivity, and the 
communicative processes through which different elements that constitute this 
content emerge, circulate, and are put to use in different situations. Social 
representations are at the heart of the constitution of the social life of groups, either
11 The term ‘ontology’ is used here to refer to the essence of human beings, that is, to human 
existence; to how humans come to being.
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as symbolic resources that mediate our understandings and our behaviours, or as 
socio-communicative processes of constructing meaning.
The theory of social representations links the dialogicality of being to the 
process of thinking and argues that social representations exist, circulate and are 
transformed in dialogical communicative processes. They exist in the inter-subjective 
space of mediation (Jovchelovitch, 2007) of relations between co-producers of 
knowledge and the object of knowledge. It is within this dialogical context where 
due to their creative power, they are open to reformulations and transformations.
(2) Secondly, potential for change, is at the heart of social 
representation theory of knowledge. Moscovici’s work is crucial since it brings 
together the concept of communication and change to the centre of social psychology 
and presupposes that processes of social knowledge are dynamic phenomena open to 
change (Markova, 2003a). Inasmuch as social representations are dialogical and exist 
within communication and language, they are subject to debate, resistance, re- 
evaluation and change. Indeed ‘communication, by definition, involves movements 
of thoughts, transformation of meanings and contents of knowledge.’ (Markova, 
2003a, p. xiv). The dialogical nature of human thinking, which presupposes a 
reactive, responsive mind (Markova, 2003a) explains the dynamic and emergent 
nature of knowledge. The dialogical process of knowledge contains in itself, the 
potential for challenge and contestation of the meanings brought by interlocutors to 
the dialogical encounter. It involves both the production and re-construction of social 
representations. Knowledge changes in tune with new social phenomena that need to 
be accessible so that individuals are able to cope with the unfamiliarity of new 
problems and unusual events within society. These elements constitute a break in the 
stability of the usual and familiar and thus provoke uncertainty and uneasiness, and 
in order to mediate them, new representations emerge. (Moscovici, 1998).
Moscovici’s vision of social representations was shaped by the encounter 
with Durkheim’s seminal work on The elementary forms o f the religious life 
([1912] 1995) and his concept of ‘collective representation’. However, Moscovici 
moved beyond Durkheim’s ‘collective representations’ since it could only be applied 
to traditional societies characterised by stability, collective thinking and the
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inexistence of science (Moscovici, 1998). Therefore, in drawing on the concept, 
Moscovici renovated it into a more dynamic concept in order to be able to apply it to 
the study of modem societies, and gave it the name of ‘social representation’. 
Moscovici maintained the social character of representations, yet, in stressing their 
dialogicality he succinctly built a bridge between individual and social processes. 
Whilst collective representations have both a fixed and a homogeneous nature, 
Moscovici regarded social representations as phenomena confined to groups within 
society, more hybrid and open to change accordingly with variations in the socio­
cultural context. Indeed, whilst collective representations are ‘impermeable to 
experience or contradiction, and leave little scope for individual variations’ 
(Moscovici, 1998, p.226), social representations ‘are more fluid, pragmatic, 
amenable to the proof of success or failure, and leave a certain latitude to language, 
experience, and even to the critical faculties of individuals.’ (Moscovici, 1998, 
p.226-227). Different groups of people produce different social representations 
within a society that is characterised by the variety and heterogeneity of different 
forms of knowledge.
(3) Thirdly, as a consequence of the dialogical encounter between 
different forms of knowledge circulating in society in the making of representations, 
the nature of knowledge is plural, hybrid and characterized by the co-presence of 
multiple contents and modalities of thinking (Jovchelovitch, 2002; Jovchelovitch, 
2007). The consequence of this contextuality of knowledge is that there are diverse 
forms of rationality and meanings in the construction of reality (Jovchelovitch, 2002). 
Central to this conceptualisation of knowledge is Moscovici’s concept of cognitive 
polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976). Cognitive polyphasia refers to the polyphasic 
nature of knowledge, by which differing and conflicting styles of thinking, practices 
and meanings of the same phenomenon, person or object, co-exist in the same 
individual, institution, group or community. The notion captures the dialogical 
dynamics of knowledge production that are characterised by the clash of multiple 
and conflicting styles of thinking of self and others. Thus, it provides an 
understanding of the plurality of voices of dialogical others that speak through 
individual subjects and within social fields.
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On the one hand, in the dialogue between co-producers of knowledge, there is 
a clash and debate of different modes of thinking and points of view. On the other 
hand, at the same time individuals within dialogical relationships are able to draw on 
multiple thinking modes since their knowledge is characterised by the simultaneous 
co-existence of different meanings and styles of thinking. They are able to diversely 
draw on a particular one depending on cultural norms, communicative aims intended 
to be accomplished through the communicative act, and the communicative goals 
(Moscovici, 2000). Hence, the concept provides the means to study the problem of 
the dialogical debate between forms of knowledge that differ in their degree of 
symbolic power. Particularly, how within plurality, individuals take different social 
positions, mediate the contradictory contents and modes of thinking at their disposal 
and use representations negotiating, reproducing or contesting, the diversity of forms 
of knowledge circulating in society.
2.1.2. Knowledge as a Social Communicative Practice.
The theory of social representations is seriously dedicated to the study of 
processes of social knowledge through which people represent the world and thus 
make sense of it. It proposes a constructivist view of social knowledge. Having as its 
core representations and communication, it seeks to ‘elucidate the links which unite 
human psychology with contemporary social and cultural questions.’ (Moscovici, 
1998, p.241). Knowledge is conceptualised as the social representational system that 
arises as a product of people’s participation in social life. Knowledge is constitutive 
of social communicative practices (of linguistic and non-linguistic kinds); it 
penetrates them, and is transformed through them. Hence, in this way social 
representation theory is not a psychology of knowing about social life as a separate 
entity from the knowing subject. Social representations are mediating ‘agents’ 
(Jovchelovitch, 2002; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 2000) of relations between 
subjects, and between the subject and the object world. The ‘social’ of social 
representations refers to; their life within dialogical social processes, their shared­
ness amongst a group of people, and the fact that they re-present social phenomena 
and enable social life and communication. In so far as representations re-present the
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non-immediate world in order to give meaning to our experience of it, knowledge 
enters the symbolic realm.
This conceptualisation of knowledge, resolves Cartesian dualism since it 
assumes an interdependent dialogical relationship between the object of knowledge 
and the knowing subject (as well as between subjects). Indeed, Moscovici (1998) 
argues that ‘People who share a common knowledge in the course of their ordinary 
life do not ‘reason’ about it, and could not place it in front of them like an ‘object’, or 
analyze its contents by placing it at a distance to ‘observe’ it, without themselves 
being implicated in it.’ (p.238). This brings us to the heart of the matter, the fact that 
Moscovici’s conceptualisation of knowledge is constructivist, not only in the sense 
that representations re-present and construct things, persons, groups and events in the 
world in order to give meaning to them, but in the sense that they are so embedded in 
social life and action that they also constitute it. Our existence in the world consists 
of continuous re-presenting. Social representations thus become part of the reality of 
those that construct and hold them, and in so doing, they penetrate and affect then- 
social practices12. As Moscovici (1998) has noted: Representations ‘[...] evoke what 
is absent from this world, they form it rather more than they simulate it. [...] That is 
to say that shared representations, their language, penetrate so profoundly into all the 
interstices of what we call reality that we can say that they constitute it.’ (p.245)
Knowledge thus exists not inside our heads, but in dialogue with others about 
the object of knowledge, and is objectified in practices, institutional rituals, iconic 
images and so on. Hence, a social psychology of knowledge is focused on ‘symbols, 
social reality and knowledge, communicating about objects not as they are but as 
they ought to be, so what comes to the fore is a representation.’ (Moscovici & 
Markova, 2000, p.233)13. Therefore, the constructive nature of social representations 
refers to its function in the social construction o f reality and its constitution of social 
life at the same time (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Social representations are not reduced
12 The term ‘Social practices’ refers to the complex of routines and rituals that are bound up with 
material factors and that constitute the life of individuals and groups in society.
13 It is important to note that representations are approached as “ knowledge’, ‘theories’, ‘versions’, 
‘visions’ of reality, which enable individuals and groups to interpret and master that reality’ (Jodelet, 
1989/1991, p. 12).
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to thoughts, they are also ontological processes and social communicative practices 
that exist in the actions of people (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Hence, knowledge refers to 
both ways of thinking, acting and being in everyday life.
This has been made clear by Jodelet’s study of social representations of 
madness within a small French community (1989/1991). She has shown that social 
representations take root in the everyday life and practices of people. Iconic images 
and thoughts about ‘madness’ were fused with social practices (i.e. lay people’s 
interactions with mentally ill people, professional practices) developed in the course 
of everyday life. She argued that social representations are ‘crucial for the 
explanation of social functioning’ (Jodelet, 1989/1991, p.9). They are at the centre of 
the production of meaning and social practices, and are critical for the participation 
in social life. They are at one and the same time the representations of reality, and the 
constitution of reality.
Their function is to render the strange knowledgeable, to familiarize with the 
alarming and unfamiliar (Moscovici, 1984b, 1988b, 2000), through social 
construction processes of meaning making and in this way, allow communication 
between people. As Moscovici (1998) has noted; ‘Every deviation from the familiar, 
every rupture of ordinary experience, everything for which the explanation is not 
obvious creates a supplementary meaning and sets in motion a search for the 
meaning, and explanation of what strikes us as strange and troubling.’ (p. 141). This 
sense making process is achieved through the double functioning of social 
representations; anchoring and objectification. These are the two basic ‘mechanisms 
of a thought process’ (Moscovici, 1984b, p.29), which are mutually dependant 
(Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). They lie at the heart of the constructive dialogical process 
of social representation. Anchoring functions to ‘anchor strange ideas, to reduce 
them to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a familiar context’ (Moscovici, 
1984b, p.29, emphasis in original). It consists of a process of naming and classifying 
through which the foreign and extraneous are comprehended and integrated into our 
common knowledge and common categories, which are shared by all the members of 
a social group. In apprehending the unfamiliar and bringing it to a commonplace 
context, the disturbing unknown is categorised and bestowed with a name, and thus 
understood (Moscovici, 1984b). Hence, anchoring involves identifying and making
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sense of something in the light of existing categories and representations in our mind, 
which in this process are open to transformations (Moscovici, 1984b).
Objectification, is the process whereby representations are used in order to 
concretize the abstract giving it an iconic quality. To objectify the abstract is to 
‘transfer what is in the mind to something existing in the physical world’ (Moscovici, 
1984b, p.29). It is through symbols such as metaphors, images, and physical 
representations that the abstract is constructed and thus given a real ‘tangible’ 
existence in the world (Moscovici, 1984b). Whilst anchoring has an inward direction, 
in the sense that it draws upon an existing knowledge base in order to lessen the 
novel to ‘ordinary’ everyday images and commonsensical classifications, 
objectification is directed outwardly (Moscovici, 1984b). Once objectified, the 
abstract becomes communicable, penetrates social life, and pervades social practices.
In conclusion, within this context, knowledge is; (1) bounded to history and 
culture, because by anchoring and objectifying, individuals bring other 
representations and knowledges, (2) relational, because it is social in nature and 
originated in dialogical relations, (3) dynamic, because the tension created by the 
threat of the unknown allows for the transformation of the old representation and the 
emergence of a new one. Indeed, there is never an absolute finalized knowledge 
since there are always dialogical contextual re-formulations. As Moscovici (1998) 
notes, knowledge ‘cross-breeds’ and ‘is not exhausted by any particular usage, but 
constantly be refined and determined with the help of the context’ (p.238).
In summary, three core themes underpin social * representation theory’s 
treatment of knowledge:
1. Knowledge is understood as a system of social representations, 
which dialogically mediate both the relationships between subjects, and 
between subject-object. They sustain our relationships and make possible 
social life (Jovchelovitch, 2007).
2. Knowledge production is a constructive process that occurs 
within dialogical relationships between individuals and groups. This genetic 
process is interpreted broadly as one of anchoring and objectification.
52
3. Due to its contextuality and dialogicality, knowledge has a 
dynamic, creative and plural nature. Knowledge construction involves both 
conflict and cooperation between self and others (Moscovici, 2000). Thus, in 
our everyday making sense of the world, representations are re-evaluated and 
as a consequence, are either validated, re-defined or contested.
4. Knowledge in this sense is hybrid and heterogeneous, it varies 
corresponding to different constellations of context (Jovchelovitch, 2002) and 
self-other relationships where it is constituted. Different and often 
contradictory modes of thinking co-exist together and are diversely used by 
people in their everyday lives.
In the next section, I illustrate the relationship between the different social 
spheres in the genesis and circulation of knowledge. I discuss the dialogicality of 
knowledge, and work through the concept of cognitive polyphasia. I argue the 
vagueness of the theory in critically accounting for the eclectic way people make use 
of representations. Finally, I make the case for the inclusion of the notion of social 
positioning to the dialogical triad of representation in order to be able to explain the 
link between processes of representation and identity construction.
2.2. The Social Process o f Emergence and Development o f Knowledge:
Representations in The Making.
In the foregoing I have discussed the ways in which the theory of social 
representations has conceptualised the notion of knowledge as a modifiable and 
plural phenomenon. Now, one could ask, how do representations actually circulate 
and change within society? The present section focuses its attention on the 
emergence and circulation of knowledge within contemporary society. I examine 
how the concept of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976) conveys the 
dynamic dialogue that exists between different spheres of knowledge and expresses 
the inter-relations between the multiplicity of meanings circulating in the social 
world. Cognitive polyphasia plays a central role with respect to studying processes of 
social knowledge in globalised societies where new and plural communicative forms 
offer increased opportunities for encounters between diverse and competing
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knowledge systems. I further develop the concept of cognitive polyphasia in order 
for it to be able to account for the dialogical use of forms of knowledge that are 
conflicting and differ in their degree of symbolic power. That is, how within the 
plurality of knowledge, individuals adopt different social positions, mediate the 
eclectic and contradictory contents and modes of thinking and put to use their social 
representations. Expanding our understanding of this issue is particularly crucial in 
contemporary times, in which certain forms of knowledge are reified and so 
legitimized whilst others are disrespected.
The phenomenon of the emergence and development of knowledge is a 
central topic to the theory of social representations. It was the main source o f 
inspiration for Moscovici and stimulated him to develop his social psychology of 
knowledge. He was interested in the emergence and circulation of knowledge in 
modem times, since this period was characterised by the appearance of science and 
rapid development and transformation of new technologies. Indeed, the phenomena 
of science, its circulation and spread across society, were at the basis of his ideas on 
social representations (Moscovici, 2000). His theory of knowledge had two 
important contributions to the social psychology of knowledge.
Firstly, his work constituted a counteraction to the generalized mistrust of 
commonsense knowledge, which was the trend at that time amongst both the Marxist 
and the Enlightenment movements. Common sense knowledge was regarded as 
inferior and flawed. In contrast, science, was prioritized and considered as a real 
dogma that needed to be followed by ordinary people. Moscovici’s work brought 
attention to commonsense knowledge, and defended its value as a rationality in its 
own right, amongst the multiplicity of rationalities that co-exist within the plurality 
of knowledge. He emphasized the centrality of the knowledge, culture and social 
practices of lay people. Moscovici (2000) notes that he reacted in response to the 
prevailing scientific discourse and; *[...] tried to rehabilitate common knowledge 
which is grounded in our ordinary experience, everyday language and daily 
practices.’ (p. 228, emphasis my own). The importance of such argument is that it 
highlights the social and the everyday experience-based nature of knowledge. It is 
here that one has to recognise the relevance of using this theory due to its 
conceptualization of knowledge and reaffirmation of the centrality and the value of
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everyday experience and communication. Secondly, Moscovici asserted that all types 
of knowledge are constructive in nature, and all are a type of social representation. 
This means that scientific knowledge shares with common sense knowledge the same 
constructive processes of emergence and circulation within society. Anchoring and 
objectification remain at the base of all knowledge production processes.
Moscovici never reduced social representations to the realm of lay people’s 
knowledge nor did he neglect the socio-cultural construction of scientific knowledge 
and other non-commonsensical modes of thinking, as some theorists within the social 
representational framework have wrongly assumed (e.g., Bangerter, 1995; Purkhardt, 
1993). When talking about science and common sense he refers to both of them as ‘a 
system of representations’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.233). He notes; ‘[...] all forms of 
belief, ideologies, knowledge, including even science, are, in one way or another, 
social representations.’ (Moscovici, 1998, p.234). All are forms of representation of 
the world of a particular logic linked to the context within which they are produced. 
Furthermore, in his model, which is underpinned by a constructivist view of all social 
phenomena, Moscovici proposed a two-way influence between the world of 
commonsense and the world of science. Moscovici (1998) noted that ‘The changes 
and transformation take place constantly in both directions, the representations 
communicate among themselves, they combine and they separate, introducing a 
quantity of new terms and new practices into everyday and ‘spontaneous’ usage. In 
fact, scientific representations daily and ‘spontaneously’ become common sense, 
while the representations o f  common sense change into scientific and autonomous 
representations' (p.235, emphasis my own).
He proposes a dialogue, in which the movement of knowledge occurs in all 
directions. Within this dialogue, representations from the different spheres of 
knowledge clash and compete with one another in the struggle over meaning whilst 
co-existing. These dynamics are indeed enshrined in the concept of cognitive 
polyphasia, which Moscovici introduced in his early work (1961/1976). Cognitive 
polyphasia refers to the ‘diverse and even opposite ways of thinking’ (Moscovici, 
2000, p.245) that exist simultaneously within the individual and the group, and 
within the dialogical relation with others. In his study of psychoanalysis, Moscovici 
found how diverging and conflicting modes of thinking about psychoanalysis lived
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together amongst and within groups, and within individuals. It is through this 
concept that he unveils the dynamic, dialogical and plural nature of knowledge and 
the continuous relations between the different spheres of knowledge, within which 
social representations emerge and are transformed. Indeed, Moscovici (2000) has 
argued that it is in the clash of different modes of thinking; what he calls ‘a battle of 
ideas’ (p.275) where the formation of social representations occurs.
Hence, this concept allows for an understanding of knowledge as a plurality 
of co-existing and at times conflicting forms of thinking, meanings and practices 
proceeding from the different spheres of knowledge and living side-by-side in the 
same individual, institution, group or community. It clearly shows that knowledge 
formation is a battleground between different and competing knowledges where 
there is no linear development from ‘inferior’ commonsensical forms of thinking to 
‘superior’ scientific knowledge. Indeed, Moscovici (2000) has asserted that ‘[...] 
cognitive polyphasia, the diversity of forms of thought, is the rule, not the exception.’ 
(p.242). He notes: *[...] even professional scientists are not entirely engrossed in 
scientific thought. Many of them have a religious creed, some are racists, others 
consult the ‘stars’, have a fetish, damn their experimental apparatus when it refuses 
to work, [...], they even make use o f Aristotelian physics instead of the Galilean 
physics they learnt at school and which they trust. If these various, even conflicting 
forms of thought did not coexist in their minds, they would not be human minds, I 
suppose.’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.241-242). Because as well as being scientists they are 
lay people, they also have commonsensical knowledge that enables them to make 
sense and experience the world. Indeed, although they are commonly believed to be 
rooted in ‘incompatible’ rationalities, both forms of thinking are capable of living 
side-by-side within the polyphasia of knowledge. Depending on the interests of the 
subject and the concrete context in which they are embedded, different kinds of 
knowledge can be employed in the representations of an object. Indeed, Moscovici’s 
hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia ‘refers to the possibility of using different and 
sometimes diverse ways of thinking and knowing, like scientific, common sense, 
religious, metaphorical and so on.’ (Markova, 2003a, p.l 11, emphasis my own). The 
crucial element then, is the actual act of eclectically drawing upon these elements 
depending on the concrete situation. That is, how within the plurality of knowledge, 
some meanings are asserted in rejection to others?
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Within the field of social representations there is a large amount of evidence 
for Moscovici’s hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (e.g. Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 
1999; Wagner, Duveen, Verma, & Themel, 2000; Wagner, Duveen, Themel, & 
Verma, 1999). The conceptual importance of the notion is double. Firstly, it allows 
us to conceptualize knowledge as a ‘mosaic’ characterized by the co-existence of 
contradictory and heterogeneous modes of thinking rooted in the diversity of the 
social and relational context of its production. Cognitive polyphasia expresses 
precisely the plurality and dialogicality of all knowledge systems and the constant 
networks of relationships that form the experience of everyday life. It provides the 
means to theorise how a multiplicity of voices of others speak through individual 
speakers and within social fields. Secondly, it reveals the dynamics of the dialogical 
communicative processes between people or groups from the same or different social 
spheres of knowledge. It elucidates the increasing representational conflicts that 
emerge from the regime of encounters between knowledge systems in contemporary 
society (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Indeed, globalised societies are more open to 
contestation and dissent and are more heterogeneous and dynamic than ever before 
providing greater possibilities for mobility and encounters between groups and their 
different knowledges. Consequently, the nature of knowledge changes towards more 
hybrid systems characterized by the polyphasic co-existence of multiple contents and 
modalities of thinking (Jovchelovitch, 2002, 2007). Amongst this multiplicity of 
voices, there is not a universal monological consensus of what is regarded as real, yet, 
there are different groups of people, in different places and at different points in time, 
that construct different meanings and use diverse symbols to signify reality. The 
concern underlying these dynamics is that of the existence of asymmetries of 
symbolic power between knowledge systems.
Different forms of knowledge are categorised in terms of ‘the place assigned 
to them in a hierarchy, the reified forms being readily considered as higher in value 
and power than the consensual forms.’ (Moscovici, 1998, p.234). Some modes of 
thinking (i.e. scientific/reified knowledge), are legitimately regarded as containing 
the ‘truth’ and thus have a privileged relation to others in terms of the criterion of
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‘rationality’14 and truth. In contemporary times ‘it is clear that the underlying 
problem is that of modem rationality’ (Moscovici, 1998, p.231), whereby scientific 
knowledge has acquired the status o f the authoritative tmth, and thus has acquired 
great symbolic power. Rather than conceiving knowledge as a phenomena in which 
commonsensical forms of thinking aspire to develop into ‘higher’ scientific forms, 
the concept of cognitive polyphasia recognises that these indeed live side-by-side 
within the plurality of knowledge. Compromises between them, need to be 
understood in the light of the context and aims of the process of knowing 
(Jovchelovitch, 2002). Social representations theory in this sense has a potential to 
critically explain the battle over meaning between conflicting modalities of 
knowledge. The concern is: (1) how incompatible modes of thinking that diverge in 
their degree of symbolic power are eclectically drawn on, appropriated, reproduced 
or challenged by individual subjects in different situations, and (2) why some forms 
or contents that co-exist together are asserted and privileged over others at different 
times. Other authors have also outlined a difficulty within social representations 
theory’s effectiveness to socio-psychologically explain the use of representations in 
concrete contexts (Howarth, 2007; Potter & Litton, 1985).
Moscovici (2000) asserts that amongst these incompatible modes of thinking 
‘you can observe partial and temporal hierarchies.’ (p.242). This elaboration brings 
to the fore the central question of what determines that a specific thinking mode is 
drawn on at any particular time and context. To give an example, how a religious 
belief, instead of scientific ‘fact’, might be used in order to contest a conflicting 
political thought around a certain issue that is being constructed through debate? Or 
to put it in other words; What instigates that a particular form of knowledge might be 
used in order to contest another mode at a certain point in time and within a 
particular dialogical communicative context? I argue that this is an issue that remains 
ambiguous and is not clearly specified by the concept of cognitive polyphasia. Whilst 
the concept would assist the analysis of ‘the relationships which are established
14 In inverted commas indicating that there is not a unique rationality. As Jovchelovitch (2002) argues, 
the logic o f knowledge has to be understood not in terms of its objectivity and accuracy to represent 
reality; but in terms of the context where it is being produced, and the ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what for’ of 
the process of representing. Is this socio-psychological contextuality o f knowledge what explains the 
plurality of logics and rationalities (Jovchelovitch, 2002).
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between’ different ‘modalities of thought’ (Moscovici, 1961/1976, p.187, translated 
by Gervais, 1997, p.53), it needs to be further developed in order for it to be able to 
clarify the dynamics of appropriation, reproduction and contestation of meanings 
within the plurality of knowledge. That is, how in the conflict between contents and 
modalities of knowledge, individuals put to use their representations and in doing so 
dilemmatic and contradictory contents and modes of thinking are either assimilated 
or challenged. I take issue with this in the following section.
In this section I have examined the question of the plurality and contextuality 
of the phenomena of knowledge. I have attempted to show that in the process of the 
social construction of knowledge, all social spheres exist in relation to each other and 
all types of knowledge are a form of social representation. No knowledge is 
indifferent to the symbolic and material aspects of the socio-cultural and historical 
context in which they are embedded. Through discussing the concept of cognitive 
polyphasia, I have argued the polyphasic, conflicting, and dynamic nature of the 
phenomena of knowledge. Based on Jovchelovitch’s (2002; 2007) arguments of the 
importance of bringing to attention the contextuality of knowing in order to 
understand the plurality of knowledge, in the following section, I work through the 
dialogical triad of the production of social representations. In the following one 
(2.2.2.), I explore how within the dialogicality of knowing, the concept of social 
positioning (Harre & Langenhove, 1998b) can shed light on the intricate dialogue 
between interacting forms of knowledge in the use of representations. I highlight the 
role of the social positioning of the co-producers of the representation in order to 
clarify how people alternate and make use of diverse and contradictory modes of 
thinking. I shall do this in order to ground my main argument, namely, that the use of 
social representations is mediated by the social positioning of the individual towards 
the interlocutor within a particular dialogical context. The incorporation of this 
element to the dialogical triad aims at theoretical development of the concept of 
cognitive polyphasia. Particularly in its capacity to account for the dialogue between 
different meanings and modes of thinking coming from different spheres of 
knowledge and experienced first hand at the various relationships in which HPs are 
located.
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2.2.1. The Dialogical Making of Social Representations: The Relationship 
Between Interacting Forms of Knowledge.
The genesis and transformation of social representations are discussed here 
by reference to a line of research that unfolds the dialogical ontology of human 
beings. The focus is on ‘representations in the making’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.244), 
that is, on how they are produced, brought about and renovated within dialogical 
processes embedded in particular socio-cultural contexts. The making of social 
representations is a crucial phenomena since it involves the interacting and strife of 
different meanings and modes of thinking of self and dialogical others. Hence, the 
dialogical nature of social representations needs to be subjected to discussion, since it 
is essential in our understanding of cognitive polyphasia. Cognitive polyphasia can 
only be understood against the context and relational background of multiple 
dialogues with others, from which it derives the plurality of contents, dialogues and 
rationalities that it contains (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The dialogicality of social 
representations illustrates the complex relationship between different modes of 
thinking within dialogue, which concerns issues of power and resistance within the 
plurality of knowledge. Indeed, ‘social representation is not a quiet thing consisting 
of an object and a science and the transformation of that object.’ (Moscovici, 2000, 
p.275). Moscovici (2000) notes, that ‘there is kind of ideological battle, a battle of 
ideas [...]’ within the communicative making of social representations (p.275). In 
order to develop my argument regarding the critical potential of the concept of social 
representation within the polyphasia of knowledge, I start by reflecting on Markova’s 
arguments on communication and dialogicality. Indeed, the dialogicality of 
knowledge and human nature allows for the possibility of critical engagement and 
contestation to dialogical others’ meanings and worldviews. This is an issue that will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
Within social representations theory the ontology of human beings is 
dialogical in nature. Dialogicality also applies to the ontology of knowing, and 
communicating (Markova, 2003). The heterogeneous and hybrid nature of 
knowledge, cannot be understood outside the social dialogical relations within which 
it exists and is constituted. Models of the phenomenon of the development and 
circulation of knowledge neglect the ‘tension, and exchange between the emitter and 
the receiver of knowledge’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.259). Instead of an issue of
60
individual decision making, Moscovici sees this process in terms of dialogism and 
co-construction15. Co-participants in the construction of knowledge come together to 
negotiate, debate, discuss, re-construct, and/or innovate, that is to co-produce 
knowledge about the social world. Hence, Moscovici moves beyond traditional 
conceptual lines that see knowledge as discrete static entities and/or isolated 
information processes, centring his argument ‘on their genesis, on representations in 
the making, not on something already made.’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.244). To put it in 
other words, the constitution and re-constitution of knowledge refers to a process of 
knowing in dialogue, a dialogue between subjects in relation to an object, as well as a 
dialogue between diverse contents of knowledge and different forms of rationalities.
Markova (2003a) defines the notion of dialogicality as ‘the fundamental 
capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social 
realities in terms of the Alter’ 16 (p.85). Within the dialogical relation there is a 
mutual interdependence of the Ego-Alter, which refers to the fact that they exist, 
communicate and think in relationship with one another. It is through this mutual 
dialogical relation that they construct knowledge about an object and simultaneously 
co-develop themselves (Markova, 2003b). To put it in other words, both the knowing 
of the object of knowledge and the constitution of the knowing subjects are rooted in 
dialogical relations (Alter-Ego, Alter-object, and Ego-object). This is one element 
that will be taken up in the next sub-section and discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.
The starting point to understand the dialogicality of the making of social 
representations, is the triadic dialogical relationship between a minimum of two 
‘knowing’ subjects involved in a communicative action and the object of the 
representation (Moscovici, 2000). Knowledge exists in the triadic dialogical relation 
of the whole unit Ego-Alter-Object (Markova, 2003a). These three elements in 
mutual dialogical relation explain the process of knowing and becoming, which 
involves the production of social representations.
15 The prefix ‘co’ refers to the social nature of knowledge. As in the word ‘co-operation’ and ‘co­
ordination’, ‘co’ denotes the joint and common enterprise of making sense and constructing 
knowledge of the world. It expresses the idea that subjects are interdependent in the dialogical relation 
of the making of their social realities.
16 The Alter refers to ‘the other’ (be it a subject, an individual, or a group).
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Figure 1: The dialogical triad. 
(Moscovici, 1988a, p.9).
Object
Tension
Communicative action
Individual (Alter)
Tension 
Communicative action
Tension 
Communicative action
Society (Ego) (Other)
The internal dynamics of the triad can be understood through the notion of 
‘dialogical tension’ (Markova, 2003a). The in-between Ego-Alter-Object is a space 
of dialogical relations characterized by tension, which is the sine qua non for the 
dynamics of the making and renovation of social representations. Tension, which is 
the stimulus arising from opposition and antithesis in communication, creates 
conflict, which in turn brings about action, dialogue and change (Markova, 2003a). 
Thus it accounts for the dynamic epistemology of the theory of social 
representations. Tension is created by a clash of differences between the co-authors 
and the array of multiple meanings and heterogeneity of knowledges that they bring 
into the dialogue. Tension also emerges between antimonies that arise from 
confronting elements between each participant and the object of knowledge. It is this 
tension what binds Ego-Alter together into dialogue about the object. Markova’s 
description of the dynamics of knowledge through her notion of ‘dialogical tension’ 
coincides in many ways with Moscovici’s (1984/1988) account of tension as the 
source of dynamic relations. For both, dialogical tension is the source of dynamics 
within the triangle of representation, however, Markova developed this argument
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further, for she regarded Hegelian dialectics17 as not sufficient for accounting for the 
dynamics of thinking in dialogical triads. Instead, she argues, ‘it is tension and 
conflict arising from contradiction that is the source of action and vitality.’ (Markova, 
2003a, p. 152). Within the dialogical triad there are clashes between; old and new, 
past and the present, collisions between different styles of knowing, and so on. For 
instance, tensions could be caused by expertise asymmetries between co-authors, 
difficulties in co-constructing mutual understanding, to different vocabulary, cultural 
backgrounds, or different expectations.
The dialogical triad of representation has been proposed as the unit of 
analysis for the research on social representations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). The 
basic unit of emergence and transformation of social representations is comprised of 
two subjects, which are co-producers of the representations, the object of the 
representation and the project of the subjects’ social group (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). 
The project constitutes the historical and cultural context in which the representation 
is embedded, and thus represents the time and space vector of this three dimensional 
model. The model is a succinct example of how representations exist, as 
Jovchelovitch (1996) notes, in the inter-subjective relational space between people. 
The advantage of using this analytical framework is that it enables the explanation of 
the making sense of an object between; a) members of different groups, and, b) 
members of a group who share a common project but who belong to a group in 
which different meanings can co-exist at the same time. Hence, the ‘triangle of 
mediation’ assists the analysis of how the content of knowledge emerges from the 
inter-play of elements from the representational fields of the different social spheres 
of knowledge.
I draw upon this model, in the light of Markova’s notion of dialogicality 
because I believe this is essential in understanding the concept of cognitive 
polyphasia. The dialogical triad provides an excellent starting point for the 
conceptualisation of the emergence, circulation and change of social representations 
within dialogue. It can certainly illustrate the phenomena of cognitive polyphasia at 
work. It captures how the making of representations consists of the clash of multiple
17 Social Representation Theory is rooted in Hegelian dialectics.
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voices, and the interacting of diverging and incompatible modes of thinking and 
ideas in dialogue. Certainly, this raises the question of how within hybrid and 
heterogeneous knowledge systems people alternate and make use of different and 
juxtaposing modes of thinking, how these are dialogically related to each other and 
how they are particularly drawn upon in a specific intercommunicative moment. The 
dialogical triad is a conceptual tool with the potential to enable a critical exploration 
of the dynamics of agency, contestation and/or assimilation of reified meanings in 
the dialogical encounter between differing forms of knowledge. This is an area in the 
theory of social representations which is rather unclear and that Howarth (2007) has 
called to be further developed in order to prompt advance in the critical potential of 
the theory. In order to engage in this task, I believe that the dialogical triad, needs to 
be further developed to account for how representations actually work within 
dialogue in contemporary times. These are characterised by instability, plurality, 
divergence in understandings, openness to dissent, and an increased sharp difference 
in relations of power. It is indeed in this context of conflicting knowledge systems in 
which social representations have the capacity of being subject to negotiations 
(Wagner, 1994b) contestation and debate (Howarth, 2007).
Subjects construct the social object in the dialogical space, through drawing 
upon the numerous and differing co-existing meanings of the same object that they 
hold. And in this process, they are engaged in the contestation, challenge or 
reproduction of legitimised and reified forms of knowledge. As has been argued in 
Chapter 1, there are divergences in the level of authoritativeness bestowed to 
different forms of knowledge that are translated into inequalities of symbolic power. 
I have argued that social representations have two sides; they are either tools with the 
potential of engaging in critical debate, or in the perpetuation of taken-for granted 
ideological meanings. The former refers to the creative nature of representations and 
human agency, which is at the heart of the theory of social representations. Indeed, 
agency to re-construct is central to the theory since re-presentations are ‘a potential 
space for meanings to be contested, negated and transformed.’ (Howarth, 2007, 
p.77). Being descriptive about the content of representations, that is the ‘mental 
topography’ (Wagner, 1994b) of a particular group or culture, which is what the 
majority of research has done, would not enable the development of the critical 
potential of social representations. We need to bring other perspectives in order to
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understand the processes through which individuals or groups in dialogue have the 
agency to use representations creatively asserting worldviews and contesting 
symbolically powerful versions of ‘reality* As Bakhtin (1986) puts it, the 
dialogicality of humans involves a responsive nature and an ability to position 
oneself in relation to the other within a context of juxtaposition of ideas and clash of 
meanings. There is no dialogue unless there is disagreement (Rosenzweig, 1921 in 
Markova, 2003b). Dialogue is primarily characterized by divergences, debates and 
fights over ideas (Rosenzweig ,1921 in Markova, 2003b). These disputes for the 
construction of the object are dependent on the particular way subjects position 
themselves in the dialogue with others (Davies & Harre, 1998). And it is in 
positioning oneself towards the other’s worldview and knowledge that identity 
construction takes place within dialogue (Bakhtin, 1984a; Fairclough, 2003).
In the next subsection I draw upon the notion of social positioning and 
explore the polyphasic use of social representations in the dialogue between people 
and the encounter between their differing forms of knowledge. I argue that the 
constitution and re-constitution of knowledge is bound to the construction and re­
construction of social identity, which depends upon the adoption of particular social 
positionings relative to the dialogical co-partner in the process of representing. This 
involves using concrete styles and/or contents of thinking that validate and justify 
one’s position and reject and contest those that threaten or put one’s identity and 
potentialities at risk. However, this issue will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 3, 
where I seek to explore the link between the polyphasia of knowledge and the inner 
plurality of the self.
2.2.2. The ‘Use’ of Social Representations: Identity and Social Positioning.
In this section I intend to explain the relationship between processes of social 
identity and the use of social representations within cognitive polyphasic processes. I 
do so by discussing (i) how the construction and re-construction of identity occurs 
through the manifold positionings adopted by the subject, towards the other co­
producer of knowledge in the dialogical relations between them; and (ii) how the 
adoption of a particular social positioning may explain the use and defence of certain
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types of knowledge, and the contestation of those knowledges that constitute a threat 
to one’s identity.
I fully agree with Howarth (2007) that ‘without an understanding of identity 
we could not explain why and how different people use representations to different 
ends -  to legitimize, to contest, to negate, to transform.’ (p.78). The centrality of 
identity in the way social representations are put to use by co-participants of the 
process of representing, has been acknowledged by other authors (i.e., Breakwell, 
2001; Elejabarrieta, 1994). Within Moscovici’s arguments on cognitive polyphasia 
there is a reference to the relationship between the use of representations and the 
constitution of the self. He notes; ‘Through belief, the individual or group is not 
related as a subject to an object, an observer to a landscape; he is connected with his 
world as an actor to the character he embodies, man to his home, a person to his or 
her identity.’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.253). The theoretical dilemma that remains 
unanswered is how does identity actually mediate the use of representations within 
the polyphasia of knowledge. In order to do so I shall introduce the notion of social 
positioning.
Many social psychologists have studied the relationship between social 
representations and identity processes giving theoretical breadth to the dialectic 
between the intertwined processes of knowledge and identity construction (e.g., 
Breakwell, 2001; Duveen, 2001; Elejabarrieta, 1994; Howarth, 2002a). Both identity 
and social representations are ways to relate to the outside world and to the world of 
others. In making sense of the world people express their identities and in this 
process construct a sense of who they are in differentiation with the dialogical other 
(Jovchelovitch, 1996). Social identity is understood as dialogical (relational), 
contextual and open to reformulations and re-constructions through social interaction 
‘or through the successive encounters which make up the history of a particular 
interpersonal relation.’ (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990, p.8). The concept of social 
representation and processes of social identity have been linked by the notion of 
social positioning (i.e., Elejabarrieta, 1994). Elejabarrieta (1994) notes that; ‘if one 
considers social positioning as negotiated expressions of social identities that 
intervene in the communication between individuals and groups, this may open up a 
new way of analysing social representations.’ (p.251). In each social encounter
66
individuals and groups negotiate their social identity, and in so doing, they actively 
take a particular social position (Elejabarrieta, 1994). Identity construction processes 
are displayed through the social positioning adopted by dialogical participants in the 
co-construction of knowledge (Davies & Harre, 1998). Movements along different 
self-other positions allow for the co-construction of knowledge and re-construction 
of identity in our interaction with others.
It is important to note here that positioning is not a completely active choice 
of the individual as an independent entity. Instead it is dialogical and also framed by 
the positions that are given to the person by the dialogical co-partner and the 
structures and discourses of the social context. Davies and Harre (1998) note; ‘An 
individual emerges through the processes of social interaction, not as a relatively 
fixed end product, but as one who is constituted and reconstituted through the 
various discursive practices in which they participate. Accordingly, who one is, that 
is, what sort of person one is, is always an open question with a shifting answer 
depending upon the positions made available within one’s own and others’ discursive 
practices and within those practices, the stories through which we make sense of our 
own and others’ lives.’ (p.35, emphasis my own). This argument implies the 
relational and plural nature of the self, which as will be discussed in Chapter 3, is 
inherently linked to the polyphasia of knowledge.
67
Figure 2: The dialogical co-occurrence of the construction of knowledge 
and development of the self (co-construction of identity).
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The creation and re-creation of personhood occurs in the process of 
engagement in the dialogical construction of realities, and changes in tune with the 
particular social positionings adopted along the dialogue (Davies & Harre, 1998; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Accordingly, the emergence of identity is closely 
connected to the dialogical process of knowing along which co-producers of 
knowledge adopt different social positions (see Figure 2). However, it is important to 
note here that the adoption of a social position is not essentially intentional, it is also 
framed by the social position offered by the Alter in the course of their dialogue 
(Davies & Harre, 1998). Subjects may adopt one or even multiple social positions, 
along the unfolding of dialogue, and also negotiate one by rejecting positions that are 
made available to them within a discourse, and it is within each of these positions 
that they constitute themselves (Davies & Harre, 1998). In this context, identity has a
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fluid and dynamic nature and is socio-psychologically constructed and re-constructed 
through the different dialogical practices with manifold others. Hence, the concept of 
social positioning helps focus attention on the dynamic aspects of identity, as well as 
on how polyphasic representational fields can function as assets from which 
individuals draw concepts, practices and meanings that enable them to make sense of 
the world moving across their multiple relationships and locations in the social field. 
As I discuss in the following chapter it opens a potential way of establishing a link 
between cognitive polyphasia and the co-existence of multiple selves.
Representations emerge, circulate and are transformed through cognitive 
polyphasia in the course of dialogical processes in which people are ‘occupying 
different social positions in relation to one another’ (Doise, 1984, p.267-268). These 
dialogical relations are internal and external (Moscovici, 1984b) and not only are 
established with the physically present other, but also with the manifold symbolic 
others. The multiple ways in which we think about ourselves and the social world 
stem from the different social positions we adopt towards those manifold others with 
whom we are engaged (and have been) in relationships. The meanings and iconic 
images used by the subject in the construction of an object bring into play the type of 
person one takes oneself to be, which is expressed by the way she positions herself 
(Davies & Harre, 1998). Within this context, social positioning may explain how 
different types of knowledge are drawn on as a response to the dialogical interlocutor 
throughout cognitive polyphasic processes. Indeed, the processes of negotiation that 
take place in the making of social representations are intertwined with the social 
positioning adopted by individuals in a specific interaction (Elejabarrieta, 1994). 
There is evidence that the way social representations are put to use is mediated by the 
social positioning that we adopt in order to assert our social identities to others and to 
defend them when they are put at risk by others (Howarth, 2002b; Breakwell, 2001; 
Lloyd & Duveen, 1992). Threats to identity motivate the way a representation is used 
and treated (Breakwell, 2001). A particular social positioning may be adopted in 
order to defend the identity of the subject, and in adopting such social positioning it 
might be providing the grounds for the challenge, contestation, and/or defense of 
particular forms of knowledge that conflict with one’s identity.
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Hence, the dialogical process of social representing goes hand in hand with a 
process of co-construction of identities. The two processes feed each other 
(Breakwell, 2001) and involve co-participants taking particular social positionings 
towards dialogical others in the construction of the representation in order to relate to 
the world out there. In the same way that identity processes predispose the use of 
representations, the process of constructing the representation offers the space for the 
re-negotiations of identity.
The inclusion of the concept of social positioning within the dialogical triad, 
could easily become a way to understand how social representations are used in a 
particular way within the dialogical process of knowledge and identity construction. 
That is, the way identity processes are intertwined with the particular use of 
representations within the polyphasia of knowledge. The understanding of this 
relationship is central since it might explain how social identities develop and change 
within dialogical relations simultaneously within the process of knowing. The fact 
that people adopt multiple social positions in the process of making sense of an 
object might explain the reason ‘why different kinds of knowledge and 
representations can coexist together.’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.253) despite tension and 
contradiction between them. In this way, it may be possible to make sense of the fact 
that knowledge is polyphasic, identity is plural, and that different conflicting 
elements live together in tension inside the person.
2.3. Professional Practitioners’ Social Representations.
Within the social representational approach there has been some research of 
professional populations (e.g. Morant, 1997; Palmonari, Pombeni, & Zani, 1987; 
Zani, 1993). These studies apply the theory to the investigation of professionals’ 
representations. Amongst them I highlight Morant’s work on the exploration of the 
social representations of mental illness amongst mental health practitioners in France 
and Britain. Her work is the only one amongst this body of research devoted to the 
critical discussion and theoretical development of the theory.
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Morant (1997) proposes a model, for the conceptualisation of human service 
professionals’ social representations of the ‘object of their work’ (p.2). She 
reformulates Moscovici’s model of the reified and consensual universe, and includes 
two more social spheres (the sphere of professionals and of public policy). All 
spheres are in communicative interrelation with each other in the model of the social 
circulation of knowledge. Morant suggested that professional social representations 
consist of five inter-related elements of: practice, theory (formal theories from the 
world of science), professional roles and identities (social identities and inter-group 
relations), organisational factors (internal and external mechanisms of control and 
regulation), and lay commonsense. Morant’s model provides an insight into the 
possible constitutive elements of HPs’ social representations (see Figure 3). What I 
propose here, in line with Morant, is that the specific elements of HPs’ social 
representations come from different social spheres of knowledge and social sectors 
(clients, the particular organization to which professionals belong, science, lay 
commonsense, the media, the government), within which they are located and 
engaged in multiple self-other relationships. HPs’ location and movements across 
these contexts and relationships provide the resources for them to make sense of 
homelessness and construct the plurality of contents and dialogues that form the 
knowledge they hold. Hence, when identifying the specific elements of HPs’ social 
representations, I shall focus on how their different meanings of homelessness, co­
exist together within their knowledge through conflict, contestation and negotiation. 
These are sustained by different systems of knowledge and sectors in society and 
experienced first hand within the various relationships in which HPs participate. I 
focus on this aspect through exploring the way their social representations are used.
HPs are located at a variety of interfaces between the different social spheres 
and hence are in dialogue with manifold significant others (see Figure 4). Thus, they 
are an interesting case for the study of processes of construction of polyphasic 
knowledge. Professional practitioners are embedded in multiple social 
communicative processes, and it is in dialogue with their professional colleagues, 
scientists, lay people, policy makers or any other individual from the existing social 
spheres, that they construct and re-present the object of their work. Their knowledge 
is a means through which knowledge elements from different social spheres together 
with aspects from their professional organization and day-to-day experience in the
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context of homelessness, are filtered, translated and integrated into their professional 
practice. This results in an hybrid knowledge where elements that might seem to be 
incompatible co-exist together and are put to use in different ways depending on the 
contextual demands. Indeed, consensus, debate and heterogeneity are aspects that 
live together in the same representational field (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Rose et al., 
1995). Within the sphere of knowledge of HPs there is a clash of multiple and 
different types of knowledge that vary from reified to commonsensical forms, and 
thus in their degree of symbolic power.
In order to understand how HPs’ knowledge integrates elements from all the 
spheres, I draw upon Bauer and Gaskell’s model for the research on social 
representations (1999). This model has been regarded as appropriate to the study of 
the impact upon commonsense knowledge of professional understanding of the 
object of their work (Foster, 2003). The framework is understood in terms of 
dialogicality. I adopt Markova’s dialogical triad as a guide, which offers general 
principles on the making of a representation. In particular, I focus on the role of 
social positioning in the use o f representations within dialogical relations. And in 
doing so I draw on Bakhtin’s insights concerning the multi-voicedness of manifold 
significant others that occurs within the course of the dialogical process of 
knowledge production (1984a). In addition, Morant’s model facilitates the mapping 
of the social spheres involved in the circulation and transformation of professional 
representations, and hence o f the possible constitutive elements of these 
representations (Figures 3,4).
2.4. Conclusion.
In this chapter I have introduced the theoretical lenses through which I 
approach the object of my investigation; social representations theory and in 
particular the concept of cognitive polyphasia. I have argued that representations are 
systems of knowledge that are central to the constitution of the social life of groups 
and the subjectivity of individuals. I have discussed the polyphasic, social, dialogical 
and dynamic nature of knowledge. I have sought to further develop the notion of 
cognitive polyphasia in order to understand the dialogical use of representations. In
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including the notion of social positioning to the dialogical triad I have linked 
processes of knowledge production with those of identity construction. In doing so I 
have introduced my argument of how representations are used in different ways is 
mediated by the shifting and re-shifting of positions adopted by the subject towards 
dialogical others in the simultaneous process of knowledge and identity construction. 
In the next chapter I will develop the argument on the link between ontology and 
epistemology in detail, though a Bakhtinian approach to the study of social 
representations.
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Figure 3: Possible constitutive elements of HPs’ social representations of
homelessness.
Adapted from M orant’s (1997) model for the conceptualisation of human service 
professionals’ social representations of the ‘object of their work’ (p.2)
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Figure 4: Knowledge spheres involved in HPs’ social representations of
homelessness.
(adapted from M orant, 1997, p.68)
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3. COGNITIVE POLYPHASIA AND THE POLYPHONIC SELF.
Building on the argument that I have proposed in chapter two, regarding the 
mediating role of social positioning in the dialogical use of polyphasic knowledge 
and the co-development of the self, in this chapter I present my theoretical argument 
regarding the link between the internal diversity of both knowledge and self 
Adopting a Bakhtinian approach to the study of representations, the central aim is to 
discuss the link between the phenomena of cognitive polyphasia and the plurality of 
the self as dialogically co-constitutive of each other and mutually dependent. 
Drawing on Herman and Kempen’s (1993) dialogical self and on Bakhtin’s (1984a) 
concepts of polyphony, appropriation and spatialization, I conceptualise how both 
self and knowledge are co-constructed upon the basis of representational processes 
along which people take up and negotiate particular positions, put to use contents and 
modes of thinking, and in doing so criticize, challenge, negotiate or reproduce 
dialogical others’ knowledges. Hence, the dynamics of polyphasic knowledge are 
conceptualised as the movement alongside multiple positions adopted towards 
dialogical others, from which each of the many elements of the representational field 
are put to use merging with a particular self construction. Furthermore, I discuss how 
Bakhtin’s emphasis on the rhetorical nature of positioning and conceptualization of 
identity as a process of ideological becoming, can explain the contested dimensions 
of social representations. Possibilities for critically engaging with the representations 
of others contesting and re-accentuating them with their own intentions and values, 
are not absolute. Instead, they are dialogical processes and thus are also framed by 
the position of the relational co-partner and the level of authoritativeness of her 
knowledge. In this way, by discussing how positioning and appropriation are at the 
heart of possibilities for re-construction and contestation in the encounter with the 
different knowledge systems of others, I hope I contribute to the progression of the 
critical potential of social representations theory.
I depart from a basic idea pointed out by many; to make sense of oneself 
implies understanding the world around us and vice versa (Bakhtin, 1984a; Edwards 
& Potter, 1992). Processes of forming the self and constructing the world are 
dialogically co-produced side by side in a joint co-authorship between the self and at
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least one other (actual or imagined). At the heart of the discussion of the co­
constituent nature of cognitive polyphasia and the polyphonic self is the argument 
that they cannot be understood beyond the bounds of the social context of their 
production; that of the multiplicity of ego-alter dialogical relations, within which 
there is a confrontation of plural values, perspectives and discourses. The polyphonia 
of the voices of others, where diverse modes of thinking clash, is the context within 
which one constructs knowledge and makes sense of herself. The plurality of 
identities (selves) is possible because we have a ‘capital’ of polyphasic co-existing 
forms and contents of knowledge that we eclectically draw upon from different 
positions in the construction of realities along the multiple dialogues with alters. 
These plural resources are used by the subject in order to discursively respond 
through rhetorical positioning to the knowledge, values and perspectives of 
dialogical others, whilst at the same time presenting herself.
I draw on Bakhtin’s treatment of dialogue both ontologically and 
epistemologically. For Bakhtin ‘dialogue’ does not simply refer to spoken 
conversation but instead to any self-other communicative practice with the power to 
produce meaning. Dialogue penetrates any form of thinking/knowledge and being 
since the other is omnipresent in the person. Bakhtinian dialogue implies recognising 
the voice of the other, appropriating and re-constructing it with new meanings. The 
words/discourses of manifold others infused with indignation, passion or disbelief 
are always present in the person and engage in agreement, conflict, negotiation or 
even accompaniment to each other in the inner dialogues or ‘microdialogues’ 
(Bakhtin, 1984a). Bakhtinian dialogue does not refer to a means through which 
mutual agreement is sought and achieved (this would imply monologism), but to 
relational communication, which might imply diversity (instead of unity), difference 
of ideas and ‘consciousnesses’, multivoiced-ness, and therefore conflict and 
ideological struggle. Dialogue emerges out of the tension produced by the 
disagreement, difference and judgement that occurs between ‘voices’.
In Chapter Two I have discussed how the way people eclectically use diverse 
contents and modes of thinking within the polyphasia of knowledge is mediated by
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the orchestration of multiple positionings18 adopted towards the dialogical other. 
These serve as an asset against which the self is constructed and re-constructed in a 
multifaceted way. Thus, the use of a particular form or content of knowledge within 
the plurality of a representational field is intertwined with a particular construction of 
the self. In this chapter, I propose that the dialogical use of knowledge is a rhetorical 
response to the anticipated discourse of the dialogical other, and is framed within a 
particularly positioned /  that conveys a specific self construction. I suggest that in as 
much as we live in multiple contexts where we participate in a plurality of 
relationships with manifold alters, then our knowledge and self co-emerge as plural 
and even dilemmatic as they are distributed through these multiple I-other relations.
Bakhtin’s work can account for how the co-existence of multiple knowledge 
resources and of a plural self is linked to the polyphony of human beings, that is; the 
multiple voiced-ness of dialogical alters that simultaneously inhabit the person. 
Firstly, his notion of spatialization of dialogical relationships within the polyphony 
of the self, can shed light in our understanding of the plurality of identity and 
knowledge. Spatialization leaves room for the co-existence side-by-side of a 
polyphony of voices in conflict, agreement and/or negotiation, out of which 
polyphasic knowledge and multifaceted identity co-emerge. Secondly, his notions of 
positioning and appropriation can contribute to the development of the critical 
potential of social representation theory. They highlight the agency of the person to 
rhetorically position herself in relation to the discourses of others and creatively re­
construct them. Thus, they allow us to think of possibilities for contestation of more 
powerful forms of knowledge within intersubjective relations, characterized by 
inequalities of status and valuation of knowledge systems. In adopting a Bakhtinian 
approach, I hope to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of dialogical use 
o f representations in the co-construction of knowledge and identity. In this 
theoretical development we find a fertile framework to apprehend, both the dialogue 
that occurs between interacting forms of knowledge within polyphasia, and the 
everyday dialogue of encounters between individuals, groups and institutions holding 
different knowledges, cultures, projects and positionings in social fields.
18 It is important to note here that in focusing on positionings, I do not reduce the individual subject to 
her positionings in discourse thus rejecting her ontology.
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3.1. The Polyphonic Self: ‘Traces’ o f Others in the Self.
By extensively drawing on Bakhtin’s ideas of polyphony in this section I 
want to start discussing the link between cognitive polyphasia and the existence of a 
plural self This, can only be understood if we take into consideration that the 
individual exists ‘in a world of others’ words’19 (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 143) and her 
existence ‘is an orientation in this world, a reaction to others’ words’ (p. 143). As 
stems from Bakhtin, the dialogical self is inhabited by an orchestrated polyphony of 
the voices of others with their respective values and worldviews. It is in relation to 
the ‘words’ of others that knowledge of the world is constructed and the self is 
developed (Markova, 2003b). I intend to examine this by discussing; (i) the extent to 
which the inner plurality of the person is rooted in the complex network of internal 
and external dialogical relations to which the co-construction of self and knowledge 
is bound; (ii) how both self and knowledge are dialogically co-constituted along the 
shifting of rhetorical positions adopted as responses towards the polyphony of others’ 
knowledge claims; and finally, (iii) the extent to which plurality and co-existence of 
contradiction within knowledge and the identity of the person is possible due to the 
inner spatialization of the self along simultaneous dialogical relationships.
I hope it will soon be clear that the polyphasia of knowledge is bound to the 
plurality of selves and that both have an open-ended character. However, it is 
important to note that I am not arguing that self and knowledge have a chameleonic 
nature, that constantly changes along with the context and new dialogical relations. A 
view that emphasises constant flux would imply a conceptualisation of identity as 
fragmented and of knowledge as ever changing. Thus, the person would not be able 
to establish criteria for considering what is right and wrong, good or bad. This would
19 It is important to note that Bakhtin does not refer to ‘word’ in the literal sense. Utterances are not 
only verbal, they emerge in social practices and communication. Bakhtin does not reduce the study of 
dialogical relations to the linguistic realm. Instead, he studied the meta-linguistics. These refer to the 
diverse aspects o f the life of the word, which are outside the limits of the linguistics. For Bakhtin, 
dialogue does not only have a verbal quality, for him this is only one aspect of the multiple forms that 
shape the discourse. In broad terms, dialogue not only includes conversation, but also all other forms 
of communication including social practices.
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imply a schizoid and dysfunctional person. Claiming that everything is fluidity of 
knowledge and identity, would fail to recognise the fundamental human need for 
some permanence, unity and stable framework. How if not could we experience 
ourselves as single persons, or how could we explain invariance in knowledge? I will 
in section 3.2, discuss the problem of explaining how functional knowledge and a 
coherent sense of self-identity is achieved within the multiple and open-ended nature 
of both self and knowledge. Certainly, there is place for both multiplicity and sense 
of unity, change and permanence in the person across time and space.
The notion of polyphony, which was used by Bakhtin (1984a) to describe the 
plurality and complexity of the characters of Dostoyevsky’s novel, is perhaps, his 
most original contribution to our understanding of the dialogical self and the 
polyphasic nature of knowledge. We simultaneously exist in internal dialogue with 
the diverse worlds of multiple others (Bakhtin, 1986); those that we have 
encountered in the past and those which we relate to in the present time. Hence, in 
the polyphonic self there are ‘traces’ of the discourses and narratives left by others 
along the past or present dialogical relationships, which are evaluated and 
rhetorically responded to through acts of positioning (Bakhtin, 1984a). In this way 
the notion is central to our understanding of how the individual subject contains a 
plurality of polyphasic discourses about the self, others and the world. As Bakhtin 
(1984a) points out about the polyphonic novel, the polyphonic pluralistic self is 
‘multi-styled', ‘multi-accented and contradictory in its values’ (p. 15), and thus an 
heterogeneous ‘hybrid’ (p .ll). It is within the polyphonic encounter between voices 
in disagreement, harmony or negotiation, whereby meaning about the self and the 
world comes to be constituted. I believe that the conceptualization of the dialogical 
self that stems from Bakhtin’s accounts of polyphony has important implications:
1. Firstly, it moves beyond traditional conceptualizations 
of personhood as a monological unity comprised of a single voice 
(Bakhtin, 1984a) towards a decentralization of the self. In 
emphasizing the plurality and many-ness of the self it de-mystifies 
the idea of the person as a fixed entity with a unique, integrated 
ego that exists outside the dialogicality with others and the 
environment. From a Bakhtinian perspective, the self is not a unity
81
tied to itself. Instead, its limits are in the ego-alter relationship. As 
Hermans & Kempen (1993) note about the conceptualisation of 
the dialogical self, that stems from Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel; ‘It 
permits the one and the same individual to live in a multiplicity of 
worlds with each world having its own author telling a story 
relatively independent of the authors of the other worlds. 
Moreover, at times the several authors, may enter into dialogue 
with each other.’ (p.46-47, emphasis my own). It is along the 
positions adopted towards the views of dialogical others that each 
of the multiple selves of the inner plurality of the person is 
constituted in co-emergence with a corresponding discourse.
2. Secondly, it maintains a perspective of the plurality of 
knowledge as rooted in the polyphony of voices of dialogical 
others, each of which embodies a discourse20 of its own. 
Knowledge is ‘played out at the point of dialogic meeting between 
two or several consciousnesses’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.88) - ideas 
embodied in the voice of different alters to which the person 
rhetorically responds (Bakhtin, 1984a). The argument of the 
internal diversity and dialogical confrontation between opposing 
discourses sheds light on the polyphasic nature of knowledge. 
Knowledge about a referential object does not consist of a 
homogeneous representational field. Instead, is like a ‘field of 
battle for others’ voices’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.88), encompassing a 
multiplicity of meanings living side-by-side within the same 
representational field. The eclectic use o f  knowledge within the 
plurality of a representational field is understood as an answer 
towards the voice o f the other, from a subject who ‘wants to be 
heard, understood, and ‘answered’ by other voices from other 
positions.’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.88). Thus, knowledge is eclectically 
used through the adoption of a responsive position to the discourse
20 In this thesis, ‘discourse’ is used in reference to linguistic and non-linguistic practices (material, 
social/institutional).
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of the other and through which identity is co-constructed. It is the 
fact that in our making sense of self, others and the world around 
us there are multiple co-authorships that explains the plural and 
even dilemmatic nature of both knowledge and identity.
3. Thirdly, it supports the idea of the open nature of both 
self and knowledge. Bakhtin’s perspective entails a 
conceptualization of the self as unfixed and of knowledge as 
unfinalised. Inasmuch as the ontology of the human subject will 
always be bound to the dialogue with others within a variety of 
contexts, then it can be argued that both self and knowledge about 
the world are open to change and never finally constituted. As 
Barresi (2002) observes in relation to the implications of 
Bakhtin’s arguments: ‘there can never be closure on the self or full 
identification with the other. The present self is always open to the 
future, and the past can always change its meaning. And there are 
always others-real others- with whom to engage in dialogue and 
mutual interaction. Even if the self could enclose the 
consciousness or activity of the other. The other is always an 
unfinished unknown. And just as our engagement with the other is 
undetermined, so too is our relationship with our self in that 
engagement. And so the dialogue continuous....and so also the 
thinking thought...’ (p.249). The multiplicity of self and 
knowledge is understood as a reflection of the contradictions and 
diversity of contemporary times when more than ever before, 
there is abundance of opportunities to simultaneously meet a 
multitude of others from different cultures and groups. Greater 
dialogical relations provide more opportunities for novelty and 
change. As Hermans (2003) notes: ‘we are living in an era in 
which the boundaries between different domains of the self and 
the outside world are highly permeable so that a great number of 
fluctuating positions come and go as temporary parts of the self.’ 
(p. 102-103). The outcome of the multiplication of encounters is 
the increase of the hybridity of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2007)
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and of the inner plurality of the self, which enables one to cope 
with the dilemmatic and abundant contexts and relations in which 
we live.
Adopting a dialogical approach, one that recognizes that dialogue between the 
individual and manifold others is at the heart for the quest of knowledge of self, 
others and the world around us, involves a careful consideration of the polyphony of 
human beings. Hence, in the following section I adopt a Bakhtinian perspective in 
order to explore how the dialogical way we experience and come to know ourselves 
and others, is mediated by discursive acts of positioning towards the polyphony of 
the voices of others.
3.1.1. Constituting the Self; Responsiveness and Positioning Towards The Other.
In this section I draw attention to Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the 
constitution of the person as a process of ideological becoming for it emphasizes the 
contested and creative character of the dialogue with others. I intend to explain this 
by discussing (i) How the co-development of a sense of self and of knowledge about 
the world consists of a process of shifting rhetorical positions through which the 
knowledge of others is appropriated, evaluated and re-accentuated with one’s own 
intentions and values; and (ii) How the adoption of a particular rhetorical position 
towards the knowledge of other co-authors may explain the dialogical/ideological 
use of knowledge.
‘I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself to 
an other, through another, and with the help of another.’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.287)
The ontology of human beings and the epistemology of knowledge are 
symbolic activities bound to each other and deeply rooted in the plurality of ego-alter 
dialogical relations. Within the dialogical encounter between the multiplicity of 
voices of others ‘(d)iscourse about the world merges with confessional discourse 
about oneself.’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.78). Bakhtin (1984a) considered that we 
experience the world and make sense of ourselves in terms of the world of others;
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clashing with it, judging it and rhetorically positioning ourselves towards it. As he 
puts it: ‘I live in a world of others’ words. And my entire life is an orientation in this 
world, a reaction to others’ words (an infinitely diverse reaction)’ (Bakhtin, 1986, 
p. 143, emphasis my own). At the heart of Bakhtin’s view is the emphasis on the 
unavoidability of the other in the self. As he puts it; ‘Just as the body is formed 
initially in the mother’s womb (body), a person’s consciousness awakens wrapped in 
another’s consciousness.’ (1986, p. 138). From a Bakhtinian perspective, others are 
co-authors in the development of self and knowledge of the world, which are co­
constructed through a clash of plural multi-voiced21 meanings. It is indeed the 
diversity and plurality of the dialogical encounter that explains ‘the impossibility of 
the existence of a single consciousness’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p.287), and the inescapable 
polyphony of self and polyphasia of knowledge. The individual subject lives in a 
complex network of dialogical relationships with others, orientating herself towards 
the diversity of their ‘voices’, which guarantees the co-constitution of plural self and 
knowledge. As Jovchelovitch (2007) argues; ‘From the proposition that knowledge is 
bound to community/social context, it follows that knowledge varies. There are a 
number of different social formations, which produce different forms of social 
knowledge.’ (p.67) and co-constitutive selves. It is not only through present 
relationships with others that selfhood and social knowledge are constituted. It is also 
through inner dialogue with others with whom we related in the past and who left a 
‘trace’ on us, where we find resources such as ‘voices’, discourses, and ideas we 
dialogically draw upon and respond to in order to make sense of ourselves and the 
environment (Bakhtin, 1984a).
Bakhtin’s views emphasize that the person reflects back upon the self as an 
object in relation to the other’s views actively appropriating and responding to them. 
It is in doing so that she makes them her own and in this process develops a sense of 
self. The multiplicity of selves is understood as a product of processes of self- 
reflexivity with the multiple others that we encounter in life (physically or not-
21 I would like to clarify that by ‘multi-voicedness’ Bakhtin does not refer to an act of copying or 
literally uttering others’ discourses with their ‘intonations’ and emphasises’. Instead, according to 
Bakhtin (1986), an utterance is positioned in relation to the dialogical other and ‘refutes, affirms, 
supplements, and relies on the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into 
account’ (p.91). This is the responsive nature of the utterance, to which Bakhtin refers as 
‘addressivity’.
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physically), with which we co-construct different and even contradictory beliefs and 
practices. As Bakhtin (1984a) argues; ‘To be means to be for the other, and through 
the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, [...] looking 
inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another.’ (p.287). 
Thus, the I  can only make sense of herself and emerge as an ontological human being 
through identifying herself through the other and in co-operation and conflict (co- 
constructing) with the other. This highlights the mutuality of self-other and the co­
authorship of others in the development of a sense of self and in the production of 
social knowledge.
Despite the fact that Bakhtin assumes ‘the other in me’, it is through the 
notion of ‘appropriation’ (1984a) that he highlights the agency of the individual 
person to re-construct and bring novelty to the ‘voices’ of others.‘Appropriation’ is 
crucial to an explanation of how positioning constitutes an active evaluative act 
towards the discourses of others (Bakhtin, 1984a). ‘Appropriation’ refers to the 
process by which the self actively draws upon the discourses22 of others and re-works 
them making them hers through infusing them with own values and intentions 
(Bakhtin, 1981). It is in investing them with her own ‘accents’; ‘re-accentuating’ 
them (Bakhtin, 1981)23, that she gains co-authorship of them and rhetorically 
responds to the other. The dialogical constituting of the self and knowledge requires 
the person setting her own position24 towards and responding to the alter. This 
implies evaluating her perspectives, appropriating and giving them a new value. Such 
an act of positioning invites agency to contest, challenge and re-construct. It is 
through acts of signifying positioning (Bakhtin, 1984a) that she is capable of 
answering, agreeing, refuting, re-negotiating and/or re-constructing the other’s 
discourse and worldviews. Indeed, as Markova (2003b) argues, ‘Co-authorship 
demands evaluation of the other, struggle with the other and judgement of the 
message of the other.’ (p.256). The ‘use’ of knowledge is embodied in a voice and a
22 Please note that by ‘discourse’ I also refer to the symbolic construction of reality that occurs 
through social practices, structural arrangements and so on.
23 By re-accentuation Bakhtin (1981) refers to; ‘An accent, stress or emphasis. Every language or 
discourse system accents-highlights and evaluates-its material in its own way, and this changes 
through time.’ (p.423).
24 It should be noted that positioning is regarded as not merely ‘conversational’, but as a discursive 
practice, a material activity that goes beyond spoken and written language.
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position (Bakhtin, 1984a). By adopting a position, the person is co-constructing 
meaning in anticipation of the potential response of the other (Bakhtin, 1986).
In as much as self construction and the making sense of the world are one and 
the same process, then we can understand how for every response to an other’s 
discourse the new meaning that emerges ‘talks’ about both the referential object and 
the self of the person. As Bakhtin puts it (1984a), it is from a positioning towards the 
other that ‘a story is told’ and ‘a portrayal built’ (p.7). The co-constitutive process of 
proposing an identity and using a form of knowledge is done through the rhetorical 
positioning and re-positioning towards the knowledge claims of the manifold 
dialogical co-partners. It is through acts of re-negotiation, assimilation and/or 
contestation that others’ ‘words’ (social groups, institutions, politicians) come to be 
part of the identity and knowledge of the person.
It becomes clear that the process of positioning is linked to argumentative 
contexts. Positioning does not only reflect the dialogical but also the rhetorical nature 
of knowledge and self-construction, within which the person is engaged in debate 
with imagined or actual (present) others. This is critical if we are to make sense not 
only of the inner plurality of the person, but also to appreciate how this is fraught 
with dilemmas and contradictions. In as much as the individual subject is inhabited 
by a polyphony of voices of others she lives in a sphere of conflict between different 
statements of what is the truth, confronting values about justice, and so on. Our inner 
polyphony is characterized by a clash of diverging and even contradictory ‘voices’ 
(values, perspectives and ideas) of the different others and the person’s discursive 
evaluations of them. Hence the polyphony of the self is co-constitutive of the 
polyphasia of knowledge, as it refers to the co-existence within the person of 
discourses and perspectives of diverse and even contradictory nature embodied in the 
voices of manifold others. Furthermore, Bakhtin’s (1984a) emphasis on the agency 
of the person to rhetorically position within the dialogical relationship with others, 
helps us understand the eclectic use of knowledge within plural representational 
fields. The evaluative act of positioning, mediates the contradictory and dilemmatic 
way individual subjects represent the world and come to know and experience one­
self. In this way, the inner reality of the individual subject resembles a public sphere 
where multiple voices with their respective discourses, social values and judgements
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clash and confront each other. It is indeed out of the confrontation of this polyphony 
of voices, in which the discourses of multiple others are evaluated, responded to and 
re-constructed by different positioned Ts, that new meaning/ideas emerge and 
different ‘Me’s are built (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Through this process a plural 
self and polyphasic knowledge emerge.
As I will develop in the following section, the polyphonic self is understood 
as the simultaneous co-existence of a multiplicity of I-other positionings towards the 
discourses of others. This guarantees the plural nature of self and knowledge and 
explains the possibility of internal dilemmas and contradictions. As Markova (2003b) 
argues; ‘The speech of others and their thoughts contain strangeness, which the self 
tries to overpower by imposing its own meaning on the other or to appropriate by 
making it part of its own thoughts and speech.’ (p.257). In positioning oneself with 
respect to others’ knowledge over time, ‘appropriating’ it in order to claim and 
defend a particular vision of the world ‘one that strives for social significance’ 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p.333) one engages in what Bakhtin calls a process of ‘ideological 
b eco m in g As Tappan (2005) puts it; ‘Identity development as ideological becoming, 
for Bakhtin, entails gradually coming to authorize and claim authority for one’s own 
voice, while remaining in constant dialogue with other voices [...]’ (p.55, emphasis 
my own). Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the constitution of identity as ideological 
becoming along the shifting of discursive positionings, has an important bearing on 
the issue of the contested and argumentative dimensions of social representations . 
As argued in Chapter Two, the importance of introducing the notion of positioning as 
a mediator in the dialogical making of social representations is that it would further 
enable the development of the critical potential of the theory. A critical version of the 
theory ‘highlights the intersubjectively negotiated and contested character of human 
relations’ (Howarth, 2004, p.363). The notion of positioning does indeed so. It does 
not only mediate the use of knowledge and the co-construction of identity, it also 
accounts for the creative agency of the person to rhetorically respond and re­
construct the knowledge of others. Positioning accounts for the possibility of a new 
production; a re-presentation, that emerges through dialogical/ ideological reworking 
of the voiced claims of others with the aim of serving one’s own intentions.
25 This issue will be discussed in the last section.
In this section I have argued that the internal diversity of self and knowledge 
is an expression of the responsive nature of human beings towards the polyphony of 
discourses of others. The act of adopting particular social positionings mediates the 
dialogical appropriation of the plurality of others’ meanings and their contestation, 
re-production or re-negotiation. We can conclude that identity and knowledge 
construction are plural co-constitutive acts of co-authoring with the other. However, 
the diversity of knowledge and multiplicity of selves bring to the fore the question of 
how different forms of knowledge, meanings and identities live, simultaneously 
within individuals and groups. The question that remains to be answered is how co­
existence of plural and opposing forces (selves and forms of knowledge) within the 
person can be possible. In order to discuss this, in the following section, I draw upon 
Bakhtin’s principle of spatialization (1984a) of dialogical relationships. In particular, 
I discuss Bakhtinian spatialization in reference to Hermans and Kempen’s (1993) 
perspective on the dialogical self.
3.2. Spatialization o f the Plural Self: Use of Polyphasic Knowledge as 
Movement o f I  Positions.
‘In the polyphonic translation of the self there is not an overarching I  
organizing the constituents of the Me. Instead, the spatial character of the polyphonic 
novel leads to the supposition of a decentralized multiplicity of 1 positions that 
function like relatively independent authors, telling their stories about the respective 
Me’s as actors. The /  moves, in an imaginal space, from the one to the other position, 
from which different or even contrasting views of the world are possible. Moreover, 
like the authors in Dostoevsky’s novels, the different authors, localized at different 
positions in the imaginal landscape, may enter into dialogical relationships with one 
another, agreeing or disagreeing with each other. In this highly open and dynamic 
conception of the self, transactional relationships between the different I  positions 
may lead to the emergence of meanings that are not given at one of the available 
positions’ (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p.47, emphasis my own).
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In this section I draw attention to the relationship between the use of 
polyphasic knowledge and the plural self, understood as constituted along the co­
existence of spatialized /-positions adopted towards dialogical others. Hermans and 
Kempen’s (1993) perspective on the dialogical self is the springboard from which to 
engage in a discussion of the feasibility of polyphasia and co-existence of plural 
selves. They draw upon Bakhtin’s notions of polyphony and spatialization and the 
Jamesian distinction between /  (self as knower) and Me (self as known object) 
(James, 1890) in order to conceptualize the dialogical self as a multiplicity o f I- 
positions dialogically related to each other and orientated to actual or imaginal others. 
Both James and Bakhtin assume the plurality of the human mind, yet each one has a 
different view on it. On the one hand, for James the multiple selves of the person are 
intertwined by a volitional, unifying and distinctive /  that tends towards the 
continuity of the self through time (Hermans, 2001). Thus, for him identity tends 
towards continuity and unity despite multiplicity (Hermans, 2001). Bakhtin, on the 
other hand, emphasises conflict and discontinuity between the discourses and 
worldviews of the multiple ‘characters’ that comprise the polyphony of the human 
mind (Hermans, 2001). According to him, the internal plurality of heterogeneous 
‘voices’ with their diverse perspectives co-exist simultaneously, in terms of space 
rather than time (Bakhtin, 1984a). Hence, the internal multiplicity of the self is 
characterized by the juxta-position26 of plural meanings and discourses that live side- 
by-side without dialectically merging with each other. In this way, Hermans and 
Kempen achieve a balance since it is in drawing on Bakhtin’s perspective that the 
assumption of essential unity and continuity of the self implied in James’ work is 
overcome whilst a certain unity within the self is assumed. This balance enables 
explaining how a sense of having a united self identity is possible within the 
multiplicity of selves. Both Jamesian unity (continuity) and Bakhtinian co-existence 
(discontinuity) are integrated in their notion of the dialogical self, thus allowing for a 
degree of coherence within the multiplicity of the self (Hermans, 2001). Although 
they achieve a decentralized notion of the dialogical self as a co-existence of a 
multiplicity of ‘characters’ (positioned I ’s), at the same time they leave space for the 
experience of a certain sense of permanence and of being one person (oneness of
26 Please note that by including the hyphen I am highlighting the spatialization of dialogical positions 
within the plural self, through which multiple and even opposing meanings about the self, others and 
the environment are co-constructed.
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mind), which responds to the essential human need for some reference and stable 
framework. James’s I  ‘preserves the continuity and agency of the same self whilst 
the Bakhtinian notion of position helps understanding how ‘the self is extended 
towards a discontinuous heterogeneity of individuals and groups of the society.’ 
(Hermans, 2003, p. 109). In both there is an assumption of the agency of the T  (in 
James’ case) or the ‘character’ (in Bakhtin’s case), to reject and discredit the other’s 
meanings and thoughts.
The dialogical self is spatially extended along a dynamic multiplicity of 
opposing or mutually supporting /-positions27, which the person is able to alternate 
between in relation to contextual changes in the dialogue with manifold others 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993). These different /-positions exist in mutual dialogical 
relation of contradiction, exclusion, difference, questioning, coalition and/or co­
operation (Hermans, 2001; 2003). The positioning repertoire of the person, is open to 
change by the inclusion or suppression of positions depending on the changes in the 
situation (Hermans, 2003). This is what ensures the possibilities of change of 
knowledge about self, others and the world around us. Depending on the demands of 
the socio-cultural context, the person develops different types of relations between 
her repertoire of /-positions in order to respond to the battles of everyday relational 
life with actual or imagined others from the different milieus where she 
simultaneously lives. In these different milieus the person is engaged with different 
projects, values and systems of knowing.
The multiplicity of selves, each of which can come into conflict with each 
other, is therefore understood as the co-existence of spatialized /-positions and their 
corresponding discourses, which are claimed or ‘used’ from those positions. The 
person shifts from one position to another in a dynamic way enabling the articulation 
of responses to dialogical others, whereby multiple selves are experienced and plural 
knowledges ‘used’. Indeed, the production of meaning is understood as dialogical 
movements along the multiple and even opposite spatialized /-positions from which a
27 /  positions are not fully volitional and result o f the agency of the individual. They are not fully 
organized and controlled by the individual, they are also organized by the social environment and 
shaped by the dialogical other.
91
particular voice or discourse is ‘heard’ and a related self narrative co-emerges 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993). As in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel every thought is 
‘the position of a personality’ (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 9) and conveys a particular self 
within a pluralistic identity. Each /-position tells different and even opposing 
‘stories’ about the world and the self. Hence in this way, particular selves, or 
identities are intimately bound up with particular forms of knowledge, discourses and 
social practices.
The notion of identity as spatialized is essential in understanding the 
simultaneous co-existence of a multiplicity of selves each merging with specific 
meanings about the object world, which are eclectically ‘used’ (claimed) from 
different /-positions. Any human being, by virtue of being human, has a dialogical 
ontology and thus lives in a constant process of becoming, along which re-negotiates 
and changes who she is by trans-positioning her-self28 towards multiple others in the 
dialogical event of meaning-making. The question that arises is; How do the 
conditions of a globalised modem world, in which there are multiple possibilities for 
meeting other cultures, groups and communities impact on the self? On the one hand, 
these coming social conditions offer more possibilities for dialogical relations and 
the encounter with different knowledges and thus new and plural possibilities for 
experiencing and coming to know oneself, others and the world around us. On the 
other hand, there are concerns on the impact to a person from the over-saturation 
with media and the sheer increase of the backdrop of social relations against which 
identity and knowledge are co-constructed. If we argue that the person is open to 
change, it is tempting to assume that within contemporary society the self is, as some 
authors have envisaged, ‘distributed’ (Bruner, 1990; Wetherell & Maybin, 1996), 
‘saturated’ and ‘multiphrenic’, lacking coherence within the manifold and opposite 
potentials of being and knowing that these conditions give way to (Gergen, 1991). 
However, as I have argued earlier in the chapter, I distance myself from such 
postmodernist and radical anti-essentialist views of the self (Salgado & Hermans, 
2005). They assign too much importance to fragmentation and fluidity of self and 
knowledge in a way that can be quite overwhelming within the characteristics of
28 The prefix ‘trans’ stands for ‘moving across’ positions along which a shifting of identities is 
achieved.
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contemporary society. It dismisses the existence of an internal and subjective space 
and instead implies incoherence and vacuity of the self (Salgado & Hermans, 2005).
However, the question that arises is; How can the plural polyphonic person 
experience herself as being single, integrated and the same across time and 
spatialization of dialogical relationships? In recognizing the open-endedness of self 
and knowledge then we confront the dilemma of explaining how a functional sense 
of self-identity as well as intelligibility and coherence along the multiple relations 
with others are achieved. Indeed, the maintenance of a sense of personal continuity 
with oneself is an essential condition for the existence of the self (Habermas, 1991) 
and for being comprehensible and coherent within communicative processes. A 
dialogical notion of the self can resolve the paradox of unity versus multiplicity since 
it implies that both dilemmatic aspects are two opposing, yet complementary by­
products of the dialogicality of our existence (Salgado & Hermans, 2005). A 
‘position’, which refers to the specific ‘location’ from which a particular knowledge 
is claimed, can change from moment to moment, yet it is the Jamesian I  that enables 
the creation of a sense of permanence and unity in the person. The /  that emerges in 
relation to the dialogical other is what remains at the centre of the ‘here-and-now’ 
experience across space and time, thus, enabling the ‘centredness’ feeling of the 
concrete experience (Salgado & Hermans, 2005). From one moment to the next, the 
position of the I  might be different, yet ‘it still remains an I-position: unity and 
multiplicity are brought together in the notion of the I-position.’ (Salgado & 
Hermans, 2005, p. 10). Moreover, it is out of our constant need to engage in 
communicative dialogue with oneself and others what requires us to be intelligible. 
This explains our constant engagement in a process of seeking and negotiating with 
others and with oneself, a degree of coherence and stability (Salgado & Hermans, 
2005). Despite the fact that modem social life involves the multiplication of 
dialogical relations and the continuous re-shifting of positions, it is the Jamesian I  
that brings a certain degree of certainty to our sense of personhood and coherence to 
our identity as it travels through the multiplicity of selves and as it merges with the 
eclectic use of diverse and competing forms of knowledge. Ultimately, in embedding 
multiple potentialities of being and knowing, the plural person is able to cope with 
the vicissitudes of modem social life and the competing dilemmas that the 
multiplication of relationships bring forward.
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The notion of the dialogical self as spatialized and internally polyphonic 
allows us to understand the link between the polyphasia of knowledge and the plural 
nature of the self Perhaps, more importantly, an understanding of personhood as 
being constituted and re-constituted along the shifting of /-positions, allows for 
recasting the issue of co-existence and eclectic use of opposing forms of thought and 
the concomitant experience of multiple selves. Polyphasic knowledge does not live 
within the bounds of a single unified self or ‘consciousness’ as Bakhtin (1984a) 
would say. Instead, knowledge is similar to the genre of the Dostoevskian 
polyphonic novel, which is ‘multi-accented and contradictory in its values’ (Bakhtin, 
1984a, p. 15), reflecting the pluralistic and dilemmatic nature of the social world and 
the contradictions that co-exist among and within people in society.
According to Bakhtin (1984a), the person’s consciousness ‘is in essence 
multiple. Pluralia tantum’ (p.288) and has a multiplicity of co-existing authors 
(poisoned I ’s) each ‘voicing’ their own discourse. Such arguments constitute a 
brilliant aid to the understanding of the link between the eclectic use of knowledge 
within polyphasic representational fields and the concomitant experience of plural 
identities. From a Bakhtinian perspective, the use of knowledge is understood as a 
dialogical response to the alter, mediated by the adoption of an /-position through 
which both knowledge about the referential object and the self is co-constructed. Due 
to its embodiment in different ‘characters’, or positioned F s, knowledge is conceived 
as a multiplicity of heterogeneous and even conflicting worldviews ‘voiced’ through 
the different positions in response to the other dialogical co-author. The fact that the 
dialogical being is linked to a certain /-position only in space and time opens the 
possibility for the shift between multiple selves and the eclectic use of different and 
even opposing forms of knowledge. Thus, the internal plurality of the person, 
functions as an asset that can be drawn upon when co-constructing knowledge and 
identity, in order to cope with the juxtaposition of voices and discourses 
characteristic of the vicissitudes and the distensions of modem life.
The person’s multiplicity of unmerged selves and co-existence of a plurality 
of knowledges are not dialectically synthesised in a Hegelian whole. Instead, they 
live side-by-side, juxtaposed in dialogue. There is no fusion of the inner ‘voices’, but
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instead co-existence and even confrontation in the dialogue between the voiced 
discourses of each positioned I  and the diverse and even rival selves. The spatial 
extension of the self across a multiplicity of /-positions provides opportunities for the 
plural realisation of the person and for the eclectic use of different forms and 
contents of knowledge. Furthermore, spatialization alongside co-existing positions 
ultimately makes feasible the plural nature and plasticity of knowledge and self as 
two co-constitutive phenomena. These are open to change by the addition of novel 
perspectives and positions and the suppression of others as a consequence of new 
encounters with others and the establishment of new relational styles (i.e becoming a 
mother). Hence, it becomes clear that the person exists in a process of becoming and 
her knowledge is ‘plural and plastic, a dynamic and continuously emerging form 
capable of displaying as many rationalities as required by the infinite variety of 
sociocultural situations that characterise human experience.’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007, 
p.70). The transition from one position into another explains the plural nature of 
identity and the emergence of a multitude of contents and forms of knowledge. And 
the Jamesian /  leaves space for our sense of being the same person across time and 
relationships.
In Chapter Two, I have argued the role of social positioning as a mediator 
between the eclectic use of polyphasic knowledge and the co-constitutive process of 
identity construction. Having adopted a Bakhtinian perspective and discussed the 
dialogical self, we can now conclude that knowledge and identity are co-developed 
upon the basis of representational activities that occur along the spatialization of 
dialogical relationships with others. From a Bakhtinian approach, I regard the use of 
knowledge as a discursive response to the anticipated view of the other, which is 
framed within a specifically positioned I  that conveys a particular ‘me’ or self 
construction of the individual. Hence, the dynamics of polyphasic knowledge consist 
of an ongoing trans-positioning from one orientation and valuation of the alter’s 
knowledge to another, along the network of dialogical relations. As the person moves 
alongside positions, each of the many elements of the plural representational field are 
used merging with a particular self construction. Indeed, the notion of the dialogical 
self suggests an understanding of ‘meaning as movement’ (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993). Therefore, assuming a spatialized plural self that shifts across /-positions in 
the making of meaning further clarifies what I proposed in the previous chapter; the
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fact that social positioning explains the way people alternate and make use of 
different and contradictory contents and modes of thinking whilst simultaneously co- 
constructing an identity.
3.3. Critical Use o f Representations: Contesting The Other Through 
Rhetorical Positioning.
In the foregoing section I have discussed the co-construction of self and 
knowledge that occurs along the movements of positions towards others within the 
dialogical space. Now, one could ask: If there are possibilities for movement across 
multiple positions, what is it that drives the eclectic selection of the mind within the 
inner plurality of the person? In order to answer this question, in this section I re­
address Bakhtin’s argument on the discursive nature of positioning (discussed in 
section 3.1.) since it brings about the issue of the critical potential of social 
representations. Positioning implies the appropriation of the other’s knowledge, its 
re-accentuation with one’s intentions, which in turn invites for re-construction and 
contestation. However, I also point to the fact that it is due to the dialogicality of the 
human nature, that the person does not hold total agency and authority sovereign 
from the position of the dialogical other. In engaging in this discussion, I hope to 
further articulate two main arguments that I have put forward in the previous 
chapters.
In Chapter One, I have argued that social representations are tools with the 
potential to contest or exercise power. It is dependent on whether they are used in 
order to challenge or impose hegemonic and/or taken for granted commonsensical 
discourses and versions of reality that they might serve to perpetuate or contest 
relations of inequality and dominance. At the root of both usages of representations 
is the desire to support the different interests, values and ultimately identities at stake, 
underpinning the representational act. In Chapter Two I have explained how 
positioning mediates the intricate dialogue between interacting forms of knowledge 
within polyphasic representational fields. The shifting across different social 
positionings explains how, within inner and outer dialogue, the individual subject is 
able to eclectically use multiple co-existing forms of knowledge, which differ in their
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degree of symbolic power. This is done in order to assert her social identities towards 
others and to defend them when they are put at risk. The particular interests and aims 
that are held at a given time and place are responded to by a particular use of a form 
of knowledge and a concomitant representation of the self.
The strength of Bakhtin’s views lies in their potential for articulating these 
two arguments, for he asserts that positioning refers to an active rhetorical practice 
by which the other’s views and knowledge are discursively evaluated and responded 
to and in this process knowledge and identity are co-constructed. Insofar as Bakhtin 
argues that positioning has a rhetorical/evaluative character, then it is essential to 
note that we are positioned29 agents, who do not exist in a neutral relation to the 
discourse of the other co-author in the making of representations. This approach to 
the dialogicality of representations implies that knowledge is eclectically used from a 
particular /-position from which, the interlocutor engages in a rhetorical act of 
judgment of the discourse of the dialogical other and in doing so defends her own 
positioned knowledge and concomitant identity. As such, social positioning is a 
rhetorical act of orientation and defence of one’s view, which expresses the 
commitment (responsibility) to one’s knowledge and to the particular self that co- 
emerges with it. Within polyphony, where the voiced discourse of every co-author is 
attempting to dominate the others (Bakhtin, 1984a), commitment to one’s ‘words’ is 
essential. The failure to commit could lead to loosing self identity and authenticity 
(Markova, 2003b). Within dialogical polyphony there is amongst all voices a 
yearning to acquire a position of superiority and a struggle to control one another. It 
is through this active strife with the other’s thought (regarded as both verbal 
language or material practices) that new meanings emerge.
It is precisely the adoption of a position, that mediates the use of some 
elements of knowledge and the rejection of others. In this regard, the mediating role 
of positioning within the dialogical triad of knowledge brings about the issue of the 
critical potential of social representations. In implying the appropriation of the
29 It is important to note here that positioning is not conceived in mere individualistic terms. Instead, 
positioning is regarded as negotiated and mutually constitutive, since the positioning of the self is co- 
determined/co-constituted by the anticipated positioning of the other. Positioning is understood as co- 
authorship.
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other’s knowledge, its re-construction and re-accentuation with one’s intentions, it 
invites for its contestation. This resonates in many ways with the act of re-presenting, 
which ‘is intimately tied to the operation and contestation of power’ (Howarth, 2004, 
p.358). Both refer to the argumentative essence of dialogue and the contested nature 
of knowledge. It is the rhetorical nature of positioning what makes possible 
questioning and debate.
As an evaluative act of the discourse of the dialogical co-partner, the act of 
positioning is accomplished by the use and defense of certain modalities of 
knowledge and the assertion of the particular concomitant self. This invites 
contestation to those discourses of others that are assessed by the person as a threat to 
her identity, values, interests and striving for social recognition or desire to deny it to 
the other. Hence, positioning is infused with intentions and brings to the fore the 
critical nature of social representations which relates to the yearning for social 
recognition and its denial to others. Indeed, dialogicality, entails ‘judgments, 
evaluation and passions and these are concerned with the desire for and the denial of 
social recognition.’ (Markova, 2003a, p .189). The positioned use of knowledge 
within dialogical relations conveys commitment to projects, social practices and 
memberships to communities, groups or cultures, and mediates the experience of our 
identity. Intertwined with this commitment and our experience of identity is the 
search for or denial of social recognition (Markova, 2003a). Social recognition 
‘involves realization of two fundamental dialogical potentials. One potential refers to 
the Ego, who desires that the Alter treat him with dignity. The other potential refers 
to the Alter, who desires that the Ego treat him with dignity. Social recognition, 
therefore, is a basic social drive-or desire-directed towards other human beings.’ 
(Markova, p.255). In this sense, the need of social recognition explains how despite 
multiplicity of selves there is a search for a certain degree of continuity and 
coherence in our identity and polyphasic knowledge, which in turn drives the 
contestation and challenge of those representations that constitute a threat to our 
identification and commitment to values, projects and communities. Indeed, along the 
same lines of Markova, Jovchelovitch (2007) argues that dialogicality; the 
orientation and response to the other is ‘fraught with underlying psychic forces that 
struggle to preserve the omnipotence of self and its narcissistic programme.’ (p. 128, 
emphasis my own).
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The adoption of a particular social positioning in the fight for social 
recognition or in the endeavor to refute others’ social recognition is intimately 
related to our commitment to forms of knowledge and identities. Thus, positioning 
invites the critical use of social representations; the defense of certain types of 
knowledge, and the contestation of those that constitute a threat to one’s identity 
within the dialogical encounter between differing forms of knowledge. A particular 
social positioning may be adopted in order to defend the identity of the subject. This 
might provide the grounds for the contestation and resistance of particular forms of 
knowledge ‘voiced’ by the alter and that conflict with our commitment to values, our 
desire to remain omnipotent, be socially recognized or our attempt to deny social 
recognition to the other.
However, I would like to make a point here; the agency to take a rhetorical 
position critically engaging with the representations of others, cannot be separated 
from the fact that the person is also framed by the authoritative position of the 
dialogical other30. In this way her knowledges and identities have the risk of being 
constrained by the way the other positions her. It is because of the very dialogical 
nature of human beings that the person does not have an absolute agency and 
authorial stance independent from the other’s position. She is not fully able to freely 
move from one /-position to another, independently from the dialogical co-partner. 
Instead, she is also framed by the position of the other and shaped by its level of 
authoritativeness. When the self is seen in this dialogical framework, questions arise 
as to the differences in authoritativeness between positions and the knowledges they 
convey. The power of the other to shape one’s position co-exists with the power and 
agency of the person to challenge and contest it. Both types of power are mutually 
dependant, and we cannot speak of one without the other.
In order to further develop the critical potential of the theory of social 
representations, it is important to problematise the possibilities for criticizing and
30 In addition one should not idealize agency and also be aware of the fact that the agency (volition 
and ability) to change something is also inherently related to having the structural opportunity within 
the socio-cultural and political context to do so (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002).
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contesting more powerful knowledges and the positions that they impose on us. It is 
to the discussion of such issue that the following section is devoted. I therefore 
explore this issue in the light of Jovchelovitch’s (2007) model of the encounter 
between different knowledge systems and Bakhtin’s perspective on the process of 
identity formation as ‘ideological becoming’. The aim is to draw attention to the 
implications of the socio-ideological nature of both representations (Howarth, 2004) 
and identity (Bakhtin, 1981) for a critical social representations theory.
33.1. Socio-ideological Representing and Becoming.
Spatialization along dialogical relationships makes possible polyphasic 
representational fields and multiple selves, yet, it brings to the fore the problem of 
dominance in the interaction of forms of knowledge that are conflicting and differ in 
their degree of symbolic power. In this section I argue that despite the individual 
subject is susceptible to being subordinated to the dominant ‘voices’ of 
authoritative/powerful others, she has the potency to take contesting and innovative 
/-positions subverting the knowledge of the other and the position it imposes on the 
self. Such tense ‘cut and thrust’ between different ‘forces’ inside the person 
constitute the dynamics of struggle that characterize the socio-ideological making of 
representations and the concomitant process of becoming. Such contradiction and 
tension within the internal dialogues o f the person are a reflection of the conflicts 
with which self-other relationships are loaded (Jovchelovitch, 2007). In putting 
forward this argument I hope to draw attention to the creative and assertive use of 
social representations, which sits at the core of their contested nature. That is, their 
power to critique more powerful knowledge systems; those that dominate and exert 
control on self and others. Indeed, from a critical social psychological perspective it 
is contended that power, which suffuses all human experience, is both agency 
(blended with structural opportunity) to ‘fulfill or obstruct personal, relational or 
collective needs.’ (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002, p.7, emphasis my own).
Domination of the self-other relationship is understood as the taking of 
control in the co-construction of knowledge and identity, whereby the positioned
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discourses of the more powerful interlocutors place the other in a lower position. It 
entails the restriction of the individual’s freedom and opportunity to move from one 
I-position to another, asserting identities and claiming without the other’s control, 
contents and modalities of knowledge through those positions. Some /-positions 
might be constrained and denied a ‘voice’ by the powerful other, whose discourse 
has a structuring influence. For the one in the lower status it implies that her 
knowledge and identity are disregarded and her ability to co-author the definitions of 
her self and the understandings of the world are constrained. Hence, the risk is that 
her perspectives would be suppressed, her self would tend towards monologism 
(Hermans, 2003) and the polyphasia of her knowledge would be seriously reduced. 
In an extreme case, this could result in ‘segregation/destruction (monological 
cognition)’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 147) of those forms of knowledge belonging to 
subordinated positions. Such severe exclusion of the perspective of the other is what 
Jovchelovitch (2007) calls the non-dialogical encounter between knowledge systems, 
whereby the knowledge of others is displaced by those that are higher in status and 
valuation.
Both internal and external relations are subjected to differences in power 
between positions since these are ‘institutionalized and culture-bound.’ (Hermans, 
2003, p.96) and the types of knowledge they are linked to are unequally valued and 
recognized in social life (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The asymmetries between the voices 
that dialogize within the self are a reflection of relationships in society, where there 
are power inequalities between the ‘voices’ of groups, communities and cultures. 
Within the dialogues of the inner plurality of the person there are clashes between 
interacting forms of knowledge and a struggle to develop the different possibilities of 
selfhood (identity) of the person. Some ‘voices’ are more dominant than others and 
their positions and the knowledge they claim through them enjoy a higher status in 
society (i.e. because of their position in an institution, community or cultural 
landscape). Hence, they are more powerful to impose their knowledge and to reject 
competing representations. The consequence for the marginalized positions would be 
the denial of the opportunity to voice their ideas and to experience the concomitant 
identities.
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These internal socio-ideological ‘battles’ between ‘voices’ constitute the 
dynamics of the production of knowledge and the co-development of the person. The 
formation of identity is a socio-ideological process that consists of ‘an intense 
struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and ideological 
points of view, approaches, directions and values.’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p.346). His 
conceptualization of the formation of identity, as a process of ‘ideological becoming’ 
(Bakhtin, 1981) whereby a plural ‘consiousness’ (knowledge) is co-constructed in 
dialogue with others, resonates with the making of representations that occurs 
alongside ‘a kind of ideological battle, a battle of ideas’ (Moscovici, 2000, p.275). 
The dialogical (Markova, 2003a) and socio-ideological process of re-presenting 
(Howarth, 2004) involves the constant clash and fight between competing 
representations ‘voiced’ from different positions, from which they are constructed. 
As Howarth (2004) puts it; ‘Re-presentations are socially and ideologically 
(re)constructed in dialogue and practice with actual, multiple and generalized 
others—and some ‘others’, particularly powerful institutions and dominant 
discourses, may have more social capital to impose constructions and so marginalize 
competing re-presentations.’ (p.372).
Jovchelovitch’s model (2007) of the encounter between the different 
knowledge systems of self and other can be extrapolated into the sphere of the inner 
self in order to shed light on our understanding of self-other relations that occur at 
the micro-level. Indeed, inter-subjective relations in the socio-cultural and 
institutional contexts in which the person lives function as the relational capital 
against which internal dialogues are formed when constructing reality and making 
sense of the self. These occur between the polyphony of ‘voices’ of others that one 
has encountered in social life and whose perspectives of the world are diverse and 
opposing, thus infusing dialogues with dilemmas and contradictions.
According to Jovchelovitch (2007) self-other relationships are dilemmatic 
and are fraught with productive and contradictory destructive energies. Thus, they 
have both the potential for empowering and restraining the formation of our 
knowledge and identity. The possible positive or negative outcomes of self-other 
relationships depend on ‘whether interlocutors can communicate and mutually 
recognize each other as legitimate partners in interaction.’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007,
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p. 132). Indeed, acknowledging the other, engaging in a relationship with her 
difference and becoming able to take her perspective are a condition for the 
constitution of the person (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The concern is that, some voices 
and the knowledges that they claim have a lower or even no degree of legitimacy and 
authority. Thus, their different perspectives are not recognized in their own right, and 
the person is not acknowledged as a legitimate relational partner in the construction 
of knowledge with the outcome that no communicative dialogical relationship is 
established within such encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Amongst all the voices 
that one encounters in the socio-cultural context, some are backed up by an 
authoritative status (i.e. religious, scientific, political), thus their discourse is socially 
and institutionally endowed with power to exclude the other and the alterity of her 
identity, knowledge and projects. Hence, the encounter with other interlocutors 
whose knowledge is believed to be inferior and is denied legitimacy leads to a 
process of domination and displacement of the views, practices and values that it 
embeds by those from the more powerful knowledge system (Jovchelovitch, 2007).
When the legitimacy and validity of the knowledge of the authoritative one is 
recognized by the person, the concern is that it comes to be part of herself as a form 
of static monologue not open to change (Bakhtin, 1981). In this way, the words of 
the powerful other function as ‘authoritative discourse’ not open to appropriation and 
upon which the person does not have either co-authorship or co-responsibility. A 
discourse of others that functions as authoritative is ‘recited by heart’ and ‘demands 
our unconditional allegiance’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p.343). It has a monological ‘closed’ 
character and does not allow for dialogical ‘play’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p.343). The 
encounter with this type of discourse has the risk of leading to the displacement and 
segregation of the less powerful knowledge of others upon which is imposed 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007). Thus, the possibilities for the realization of multiple identities 
and for creating new meanings and putting them into practice are constrained. This 
becomes a psycho-political problem since what is at stake is not only their 
knowledge systems but also the identities that they bring forward. As Jovchelovitch 
(2007) argues: ‘If it is your knowledge and representations that are put at the lower 
end of a scale this can devaluate you as a person and de-authorise your vision of the 
world vis-a-vis other social groups. It can discredit what you have to say and 
undermine your chances of gaining access to resources and opportunities.’ (p.42).
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Nevertheless, the constraining framework of authoritative discourses is not 
absolute. For, representations also constitute a site for creative contestation to more 
powerful knowledge systems. This can be fully appreciated if we consider the 
rhetorical/argumentative character (Billig, 1991) and contested nature (Howarth, 
2004) of social representations, that goes hand in hand with the agentic nature of the 
self. The dilemmatic clash between diverse and opposing meanings within the self- 
other dialogicality provides the grounds for argumentation and opens possibilities for 
the contested re-construction of knowledge. The confrontations and dilemmas 
embedded within the polyphony of human beings provide the matters for the 
continuous debate and argumentation that occurs alongside the socio-ideological 
processes of knowing and becoming.
The making of representations is inherently linked to the rhetorical capacity 
of the person to argue and negate, that is, ‘appropriate’, the counter-position of the 
other. The process of thinking that occurs through the making of social 
representations, is as an activity of arguing (Billig, 1991) where there is always a 
potential for re-working and re-valuating (Moloney & Walker, 2002). Knowing 
needs to be understood as re-presenting since change and resistance are always 
possibilities within social representations (Howarth, 2004). The Bakhtinian notion of 
dialogical appropriation (Bakhtin, 1981) is at the core of this critical potential. It 
implies an agentic self and invites for re-presentation and challenge of the discourse 
of the other. It is through positioning that the other’s discourse is ‘re-told’ with one’s 
own values, accents and re-formulations (Bakhtin, 1981). Expressing one’s own 
position constitutes an act of arguing, which goes hand in hand with the endeavour to 
criticise and contest the counter position (Billig, 1991) of the dialogical co-partner. 
In this way, Bakhtin’s arguments imply the agentic and contested nature of the 
person to challenge and reformulate authoritative discourses. As he puts it; ‘One’s 
own discourse and one’s own voice, although bom of another or dynamically 
stimulated by another, will sooner or later begin to liberate themselves from the 
authority of the other’s discourse. This process is made more complex by the fact 
that a variety of alien voices enter into the struggle for influence within an 
individual’s consciousness (just as they struggle with one another in surrounding 
social reality)’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p.348, emphasis my own). And it is this continual
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battle between discourses along the shifting of positionings that constitutes the socio- 
ideological becoming of the person (Bakhtin, 1981). This Bakhtinian characterization 
of the formation of the person is highly relevant to the times we are living in, where 
the multiplication of encounters between people produce continuous clashes between 
opposing knowledges and competing identities.
Along the same lines as Bakhtin’s notion of appropriation, Moscovici (1984b) 
argues that within the dialogicality of knowing, representations ‘are re-thought, re­
cited and re-presented’ (p.9). However, he is silent about how this is achieved. 
Drawing on a Bakhtinian approach to the study of representations, then we can argue 
that it is the positioning and re-positioning in the making of social representations, 
that highlights the possibilities for argument, contestation, and the development of 
alternative knowledges and identities. The rhetorical process of positioning that 
mediates the development of knowledge and the co-constitutive process of identity 
formation is thus at the heart of the contested nature of social representations. It is 
through ‘appropriation’ that is possible to engage in a critique of other forms of 
knowledge. Indeed, representations ultimately are ‘an expression of the agency of 
social subjects who engage, think, feel and eventually transform the contexts in 
which they find themselves’ (Jovchelovitch, 1996, p. 128). The ‘ideological’ battles 
that take place between agentic self-others in the work of representation and the 
constitution of the person are characterized by argument and debate. It is the 
character of this genesis that defines the plural and contradictory nature of the inner 
person.
In this chapter I have discussed the link between the plurality of the self and 
the polyphasia of knowledge. In adopting a Bakhtinian perspective I have argued that 
the internal plurality of the person needs to be understood as being developed 
alongside the rhetorical positioning and re-positioning adopted toward the polyphony 
of dialogical others. Hence, the polyphasia of knowledge is regarded as the co­
existence of diverse and even contradictory responses to the voices of dialogical 
others. It is alongside the movement of the eclectic use of polyphasic knowledge that 
multiple identities are co-constructed. Spatialization of dialogical relationships in 
which the person takes different /-positions, provides the grounds for co-existence of 
diverse forms of knowledge and identities, and thus explains their dynamic and
105
plural co-constitution. Alongside spatialization the person has agency to take 
contesting positionings and through appropriation finds ways to subvert 
representations that position her in an inferior place and that sustain relations of 
dominance.
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4. INVESTIGATING HPS’ EXPERT KNOWLEDGE: 
METHODOLOGICAL ‘DIAGNOSIS’ AND ‘PRESCRIPTION’
One of the challenges one confronts when doing research is what Bauer and 
Gaskell (2000) call the ‘diagnostic decision’ of methodological techniques and 
analytical processes. Such ‘diagnosis’ is a matter of the intricate interplay between 
the epistemological foundation, conceptual framework, research question and 
methodology (see Figure 5). The research question is framed within a particular 
theory, which is underpinned by certain philosophical assumptions about the nature 
of reality and scientific knowledge. Accordingly, methodological procedures 
designed to answer the research question need to be guided by both the theoretical 
framework and its epistemological underpinning. Additionally, through 
methodological techniques further theoretical development is enabled (Howarth, 
2000). Therefore, in order to engage in a discussion of my approach to the challenge 
of deciding ‘how’ the research was going to be conducted, I ought to start by 
outlining the epistemological premises of my theory first, and thereafter address the 
question of which methodological technique may be most adequate to address the 
object under investigation.
Figure 5: Methodological prescription.
Theory Question Method
Analysis
A
EPISTEMOLOGY
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4.1. Epistemological Underpinning: Dialogism / Constructivism.
‘As our methodologies become increasingly sensitive to the relationship of 
researchers to their subjects as dialogical and co-constructive, the relationship of 
researchers to their audiences as interdependent, and the negotiation of meaning 
within any relationship as potentially ramifying outward into society, individual 
agency ceases to be our major concern. We effectively create the reality of relational 
process/ (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1042)
This quotation illustrates the epistemological foundations in which I position 
my research. Any investigative inquiry needs to make explicit in its discourse the 
underpinning epistemological assumptions about the nature of the world and the 
knowledge we construct about it. Many have warned of the danger of failing to 
account for the philosophical foundations of socio-psychological scientific research 
(Jovchelovitch, 1995; Markova, 1982). The primary concern is that neglecting the 
epistemological premise of the theory prevents the researcher from having the 
opportunity to reflect upon methodological options and from questioning her own 
research (Markova, 1982). In addition, it does not enable public accountability, since 
it stops the research community considering and questioning the research.
I strongly agree with Jovchelovitch (1995) that there is a demand within 
science to be explicit about ‘what* and ‘how’ we conduct investigative practices 
(p.86). Throughout the foregoing chapters I have explicitly defined my theoretical 
framework, outlined some elements of its underpinning epistemology and introduced 
my research question. In doing this I have answered the ‘what’ of the research. The 
main concern of this chapter is with the ‘how’. Therefore I shall start by discussing 
the philosophical presuppositions that underpin my theory and guide my 
methodological strategies. In particular, I shall consider the dialogical and 
constructivist epistemology of social representations theory.
I have discussed in Chapter 2 how social representations theory is positioned 
within a constructivist view, which considers human action as essentially meaningful 
and regards knowledge as actively and socio-culturally constructed by individuals.
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Furthermore, there is also an inevitable dialogical dimension to this construction. I 
have also examined, how social representations theory is underpinned by a 
fundamental dialogical epistemology. Markova (2000), who is committed to the 
study of the epistemology of social representations theory, argues that:
‘The theory of social representations and communication is not simply the 
study of interdependence between the collectively experienced phenomena and their 
reconstitution in the minds, activities and practices of individuals and groups. It is, 
above all, its underlying dialogism: that is, this interdependence involves dynamic 
tension, the transformation of meanings and of communicative genres resulting from 
this interdependence, polyphony and clash.’ (p.455-456).
Her words convey the fundamental dialogical and socio-psychological 
constructed nature of social representations, and the centrality of communication and 
language in processes of knowledge production. Knowledge is not an entity bounded 
in the individual mind. Instead it lives within the dialogue between the self and 
multiple others. Hence, it is formed by inner dialogues, permeated by manifold 
voices and differing perspectives, as well as being inhabited by the knowledges of 
many others. In this sense, it has a profound heterogeneous nature.
Social representations theory rests on a relational (dialogical) ontology of 
human beings and thus regards knowledge as socially constructed within dialogical 
and inevitable dialectical processes. The self exists in dialogical interrelatedness with 
the other. Within this logic, both the construction of the world and the constitution of 
the self are sides of the same coin. Self and other are co-constitutive of each other 
and co-authors in processes of knowledge production. In this context, I believe that 
Bakhtin’s dialogical epistemology (1981), can significantly contribute to our 
understanding of the dialogism underpinning the theory. In particular, his concept of 
‘unfinalization’ conveys the unfeasibility of a constituted truthful knowledge of the 
world (Frank, 2005). Insofar as the person is an essential dialogical being, the 
meanings she constructs are not fixed but open to dialogue with manifold others. 
This argument contributes to our understanding of the dynamic, fluid and non­
definitive nature of social representations. However, first and foremost, this 
Bakhtinian idea expresses the inevitable unfinalized character of the person. The
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dialogical self is not definitely constituted but continually emerging in tune with the 
many contexts and dialogical others. Hence, dialogism implies; on the one hand, an 
unfinalized person that lives in a process of ‘becoming’, and on the other, an 
inconclusive knowledge. Both co-emerge through the dynamic dialogue with the 
polyphony of others’ knowledges and discourses. It is in this self-other dialogue that 
interlocutors co-constitute each other. This has direct implications for the research 
act, the nature of scientific knowledge and the presentation of research reports 
positioned within this epistemology.
While positivist monological epistemology has instituted an understanding of 
knowledge as a truthful finalized representation of the world, dialogical 
epistemology postulates the relational, dynamic and non-definitive nature of 
knowledge. If knowledge is understood as dialogical, then the question arises as to 
how this relates to the scientific explanations that the researcher develops about the 
same dialogical knowledge. In the dialogical act of research, as in the process of 
interference between therapist and client, the researcher and the field of research, 
influence each other (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The reality of the field of research 
informs and reshapes the researcher’s previous knowledge, assumptions and working 
hypothesis (Jovchelovitch, 2007). At the same time, the researcher participates and 
impacts on the field of research with the languages, knowledge, agendas, culture and 
working hypothesis that she brings to it (Jovchelovitch, 2007).
A dialogical epistemology of knowledge needs to go hand in hand with a 
dialogical attitude towards our research practice. Our need as researchers to be 
engaged in dialogue with the researched communities has been asserted by many 
(see Frank, 2005; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Scollon, 2003). 
This attitude requires the researcher to recognise her participation and implication in 
the field of research whilst at the same time developing a position of disinterest and 
distancing (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Dealing with the dilemmatic tension between 
participation and separation is a requisite for active listening to and dialogical 
engagement with the researched community, and is at the heart of the emergence of 
critical reflection and effective research interventions (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The 
social researcher needs to be cautious about making positivist statements about the 
results of the research (Frank, 2005). Within a dialogical approach to research one
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should bear in mind the ‘unfinalized’ nature of knowledge, which renders the
monological scientific discourse unethical since it finalizes and institutes the
researched subject/object as a definitive constituted entity (Frank, 2005). Instead, a 
dialogical engagement with research demands a ‘more significant task of 
representing individual struggles in all their ambivalence and unfinalizability; in 
particular, how is each voice the site o f multiple voices, and what is the contest
among these voices.’ (Frank, 2005, p. 972, emphasis my own).
Hence, the dialogical/constructivist paradigm has two implications for the 
development of scientific practice. First, dialogical research does not seek a 
rationalist assertion of the reliability and external validity of its knowledge. Second, 
it needs to be aware of the researcher’s co-authorship in the participant’s dialogue 
about the object of knowledge. This demands the researcher to see the research as 
‘relation’ (Gergen & Gergen, 2000), to self-reflect upon her participation as an alter 
that is in dialogue with the subject of investigation, and to be aware of her socio­
cultural positioning. Furthermore, inasmuch as the self is conceptualized as ‘relation’, 
our methodologies need to be sensitive to this in order not to fall into reifications of 
the monological knowledge of the researcher (Gergen & Gergen, 2000).
The above discussed constructivist/dialogical epistemology is the framework 
that guides my research practices. The methods and the analytical procedure have 
been carefully chosen in order to capture the discussed assumptions about knowledge. 
That is, its dialogical, discursive and socio-culturally constructed nature. As well as 
aiming to do justice to the underpinning epistemology, I have sought to choose a 
methodology that would enable me to respond to my research question. As outlined 
in Chapter 1, my research aim is to engage in a critical socio-psychological 
exploration of HPs’ knowledge of homelessness. Hence, in applying dialogical 
principles of research to the study of HPs’ knowledge of homelessness, my objective 
is not to authoritatively institute ‘the’ knowledge of HPs as statements that are held 
to be true representations of the phenomenon of homelessness. Instead, my objective 
is to examine the different symbolic contents and dialogues that form their 
knowledge, and the discursive dynamics of negotiation, argumentation and 
contestation of both ‘taken-for-granted’ and reified forms of knowledge of 
‘homelessness’. Hence, in approaching the research question from a dialogical
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perspective, particular attention was paid to, on the one hand, the exploration of the 
different discourses conveyed through the polyphony of voices that emerge in 
participants’ conversations during their processes of knowledge production. And on 
the other, I also focused on the different positionings that participants take as 
rhetorical strategies towards the manifold addressees within the different internal 
dialogues, which emerge in the course of their knowledge processes. These internal 
dialogues are innumerable and ultimately indefinite (Scollon, 2003). Thus, my 
intention was to identify, wherever possible, the general patterns of internal 
dialogues and voices present in the participants’ conversations.
Through the foregoing discussion I have sought to demonstrate that this 
investigation requires a methodology that captures the dialogical and socio-cultural 
construction of knowledge. The attempt has not been to create a ‘paradigm war’ 
between positivist and non-positivist epistemologies (Kelle, 2001). Instead, I have 
sought to introduce the epistemology underpinning my theoretical framework in 
order to demonstrate the importance of prescribing a methodology that is coherent 
with it. I believe that a qualitative methodology based upon communicative 
processes (conversation, dialogue) could profoundly capture the polyphony of voices, 
clash of discourses and eclectic use of thinking modes that occur within the processes 
of knowledge production. The suitability of qualitative methodological tools rests in 
their capacity as highly sensitive means to elucidate the symbolic content of social 
representations, while allowing the individual to freely express their thoughts, 
offering direct access into meanings and belief systems (Fraser & Gaskell, 1990).
In what follows, I shall examine my engagement with the research process as 
a dialogical relationship. For this purpose I will discuss the dialogical relationship 
between the researcher-researched, and I will reflect on my co-participation in the 
participants’ processes of representing homelessness.
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4.1.1. Reflexivlty On The Dialogue Between Researcher (Self) -  Researched 
(Other).
From a dialogical approach to research we assume that there is an inevitable 
relationship between researcher (self) and researched object/community (other). As 
Farr and Anderson (1983) claim ‘Perceiver and Other are to be considered in relation 
to each other’ (p.63). This is because the researcher is not a separate entity from the 
investigative process, rather, she is dialogically engaged with the research participant 
(Frank, 2005; Gergen & Gergen, 2000). Inasmuch as research is understood as 
relation, investigating the other, necessitates a reflection on the socio-cultural and 
historical situatedness of the researcher, since she brings these resources to the 
research dialogue. This is crucial in order to develop an attitude of active and 
disinterested listening to the understandings of others, which requires us to suspend 
our own agendas and situatedness (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Self-reflection of how the 
researcher dialogically relates to the researched is important since it is through this 
dialogue that the object of research is constructed and investigative conclusions are 
derived. Indeed, within qualitative research, self-reflexivity is an indicator of the 
quality of the research practice (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000) and of an ethical attitude 
with the researched community (Howarth, 2000).
Dismissing self-reflexivity implies privileging the voice of the researcher 
over the poly-vocal others. This would constitute an unethical exercise of power 
through which the researcher institutes her monological discourse about the 
researched. As Gergen & Gergen (2000) argue in critique of monological 
methodologies: ‘Typically, the investigator functions as the ultimate author of the 
work (or the coordinator of the voices) and thus serves as the ultimate arbiter of 
inclusion, emphasis, and integration.’ (p. 1028-1029). In relation to the literary work, 
Bakhtin argues (1986) that it is indeed because of our essential dialogicality, that the 
author needs a responsible engagement with her piece of art. This is indeed the 
challenge that all qualitative researchers confront, and must take into account in 
order to guide their responsibility and obligations to the researched society 
(Schwandt, 2000). In this context one is enjoined to pay attention to the personal 
investments in the research act through reflecting upon one’s positionings and 
personal histories.
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Self-reflection is an act I engaged with throughout the research process and 
participation in the field. I agree with Jovchelovitch (2007) that an ability to 
recognise and deal with our implication in the research process is certainly a 
necessary skill of any researcher working with socio-psychological phenomena. I do 
not attempt here to do an ‘autoethnography’ (Ellis & Bochner, 1996) through which I 
would delve into a detailed account of how my situatedness and personal histories 
impregnated the research process. In what follows, I shall briefly discuss how I have, 
through my dialogical approach to research, worked out the tension between 
distancing and participation in the field of research, which is central to active 
listening to the researched (Jovchelovitch, 2007). This is a skill I was trained in 
during my clinical background and I developed through therapeutic practice. In 
extrapolating it to the conduction of the research it enabled me to combine what 
appears as two paradoxical, yet necessary, positions: being detached in order to 
observe and recognise the difference of others whilst at the same time implicated and 
participative in the field of research (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Dealing with these 
tensional positions required me to self-reflect upon the dynamics of difference and 
similarity that exist within the research relationship (Howarth, 2000). As Farr and 
Anderson (1983) explain: ‘Man’s effectiveness as an agent is thus highly contingent 
on the facility within which she can alternate, in her mind, between the competing 
perspectives of self and of other.’ (p.50). In what follows I shall look at both the 
different ways in which my-self connected with, and separated from the object of 
research.
My research relationship with HPs and homelessness was characterized by an 
interplay of self positions as both an ‘outsider’ and an ‘insider’. Ideally, the research 
should be a space in which participants feel free to take up a tacit positioning through 
which to voice the self. However, participants intentionally respond to the researcher 
according to the assumptions they make about her positioning (Harre & Langenhove, 
1998a). As I knew that HPs struggle to get their voice and expertise recognized, I 
wanted to explore their social representations of homelessness without adopting a 
scientific ‘expert’ positioning since such positioning would intimidate and prevent 
participants from talking at length about their meanings of homelessness. It would 
force them to adopt intentional positionings as scrutinized practitioners and hence
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hinder any tacit positioning, which would lead to a more ‘natural’ and spontaneous 
process of knowledge production. However, I was aware that I would be seen as both 
a middle class academic and an outsider. I am detached from them, particularly in 
terms of experienced-based knowledge and contact with the homeless. Prior to 
engaging in this stage of my research I had spent the last twenty-four years of my life 
in Bilbao, a small city in northern Spain, with, in relative terms, an apparently 
insignificant incidence of homelessness, with the result that there is no 
‘homelessness voluntary sector’. The strangeness of the phenomenon is indeed what 
awoke my curiosity and encouraged me to choose this as my area of research.
As Howarth (2000) has demonstrated, difference between the researcher- 
researched is highly valuable for the investigation. Whilst I also believed difference 
between myself and the participants of my study could be usefully employed for the 
benefit of the research, I though it was also crucial for me to sincerely present myself 
as a naive researcher with a genuine interest in homelessness. In this sense I could 
make use of difference whilst at the same time avoiding potential representations of 
me as an expert. The potential gap between them and me as an academic ‘expert’, 
could hence be bridged through communicating my genuine interest in their views, 
and verbalizing my lack of experienced-based knowledge. I entered the field of 
research with a dialogical approach, and whilst observing, interviewing or 
conducting focus groups, I engaged in an active attitude of disinterested listening to 
the community of HPs, which required self-reflexivity and self-critique. My task was 
to allow HPs to communicate their thoughts, so that I could understand their 
community, perspectives of homelessness and how they organized their everyday 
practices. In order to engage in dialogue with them I always sough to recognize their 
voice and to allow them to express their perspectives. Therefore, I stressed that 
because of their wealth of knowledge my aim was ‘to explore and not to test’. I 
literally asked then to ‘instruct’ me and ‘teach’ me. My wish was to communicate my 
authentic desire to understand homelessness through their expertise, and by 
approaching them in this way, balance the fact that I might be seen as an academic 
seeking to judge their practice or methods. Through my participation in the field I 
was able to move beyond my perspective as an ‘outsider’ and gain some experiential 
insight into the responsibilities of each sub group of HPs, their day-to-day activities 
and the work dynamics of the voluntary sector.
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It became clear to me throughout the research process that participants felt 
empowered through the discussion about homelessness. After the interview/focus 
group, and in follow-up conversations with them, most communicated how much 
they had enjoyed participating. They recognized that no one had ever asked them 
about their understanding of homelessness, nor had they stopped to think about it. 
For instance, one participant asked me after the focus group to get a written list of the 
questions that I had raised in the group discussion, since she wanted to show this to a 
colleague. To sum up, it became apparent that this process had proved a positive 
experience, through offering a platform to air their points of view. I will, in what 
follows, discuss the design of the research; the choice of methods of data collection 
and the rationale that has guided the selection of the different sub-groups from the 
milieu of HPs that have participated in the study.
4.2. Method.
4.2.1. Methodological Strategies.
Moscovici (1984b; 1988b) advocates for a creative broad methodological 
approach to the study of social representations, that considers the socio-cultural 
situatedness of the phenomena with which the theory is concerned. Even though 
there is no strict outline of which methods should be used, the epistemological 
assumptions of the theory always determine the choice of methodological approaches 
and data analysis (Bordieu, Chamboredon, Passeron, & Krais, 1991).
The nature of social representations and of the research questions required the 
triangulation of different qualitative methods: narrative interviews, focus groups and 
participant observation31 (see Figure 6). Triangulation involves a combination of 
methods, data and levels of analysis that enables one to comparatively examine the 
diverse ways in which different groups make sense of reality (Gervais et al., 1999).
31 This study has benefited from drawing on aspects o f the ethnographic method of participative 
observation, however, I do not claim that I have fully utilised this technique in its orthodox form.
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The benefits of triangulation are twofold. On the one hand, triangulation has been 
advocated as a strategy that increases the credibility o f data collection, analysis and 
interpretation in qualitative research (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Flick, 1992b). On the 
other hand, as Fielding & Fielding (1986) put it, the combination of methods 
enhances the ‘breadth or depth to our analysis’ (p.33). In particular, within social 
representational research, triangulation of observational and langue-based methods 
increases the effectiveness of this strategy (Jodelet, 1989/1991), and enables to reveal 
the more implicit aspects of the representation (Gervais et al., 1999). Denzin 
introduced this technique in 1978 as an indicator for testing the validity of the results 
in qualitative research (1978). However, triangulation has not been used with its 
original rationalist purpose of attempting to achieve a ‘finalised’ objective 
knowledge. The pursuance of this monological knowledge is contradictory with a 
dialogical epistemology and approach to research (Frank, 2005). In combining three 
qualitative methods I was informed by Fielding and Fielding’s (1986) suggested use 
of triangulation as a means for achieving an in-depth understanding through an 
integrated examination of the different angles and dimensions of the complex 
phenomena under study.
Figure 6: Research design.
HPs’ Knowledge
Focus Groups Participant observationNarrative Interviews
Hence, the research comprises three linked studies seeking to investigate 
representations of homelessness in the group of HPs of non-statutory organizations 
working within inner London. In this case, narrative-interviews and focus groups, in 
combination with participative observation were regarded as the most appropriate for 
studying how HPs represent the object of their work. This particular choice was 
motivated by theoretical considerations. Wagner (1994a), conceptualises social 
representations as ‘integral units of beliefs and action’ (p.243), which are best
118
investigated through a combination of observational and language-based techniques 
(such as interviews and focus groups). Indeed, both behaviour and verbal 
communication are data which ‘must be seen as two illustrations of the same 
representational contents’ (Wagner, 1995, p. 16). In particular, triangulating data 
from focus groups, interviews, and observations, enabled an integration of the 
individual and the social elements of social representations, and thus an exploration 
of the subjective and shared. This type of triangulation (see Table 1: ‘Strategies of 
Triangulation’) has been a strategy of other studies of professional social 
representations (see Morant, 1997).
Table 1 outlines the methods of data collection, the milieus of HPs that 
participated in the study and the objectives of each method. In the following 
subsection I describe the rationale for using each method.
Table 1: Strategies of triangulation.
DATA TRIANGULATION. TRIANGULATION 
OF METHODS.
TRIANGULATION OF 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS.
Narrative interviews/Focus 
groups/Participative observation: 
-With different subgroups of HPs. 
-In a range of locations (different 
inner London boroughs).
-In a range of services (outreach 
teams, day centres first stage and 
temporary hostels, resettlement 
teams and employment/ training 
schemes).
-Narrative 
Interviews. 
-Focus groups. 
-Participative 
observations.
Data collection and 
analysis integrates the 
following levels: 
-Individual. 
-Inter-individual. 
-Group.
-Organizational/
institutional.
-Socio-cultural.
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INTERVIEWS PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES
-Front-line
-Rear-line
Narrative interviews with: 
Outreach workers,
Project workers (in hostels, day 
centres, semi-independent 
housing),
Project Managers
Mental health, drug misuse
workers
Director of programs,
Policy officers,
Press officers,
Media officers,
Fundraisers.
Eliciting and gathering individual 
narratives of homelessness.
SETTING
Volunteering work as a researcher at 
a London-based voluntary 
organization (9 months)
Observing what HPs do within the 
setting of the voluntary organization: 
their day-to-day activities, 
responsibilities and work dynamics.
Gathering HPs’ accounts through 
informal conversations, gathering 
documents and speaking with clients.
GROUP Four ‘natural’ social groups: OBJECTIVES THE SECTOR: OBJECTIVES
(1) Outreach workers Creating the social scenario for the CONFERENCE EVENTS Observing the dynamics of
-Front-line
-Rear-line
(2) Training & development 
workers
(3) Mental health & drug misuse 
workers
(4) Project managers, director of 
programs
discussion, generation and 
negotiation of meanings. 
Exploration of the emergence and 
circulation of social representations 
in the dialogical communicative 
space between HPs doing the same 
job.
Participation in two conferences on 
homelessness:
(1) ‘Innovations Fair 2004: From 
homelessness to loneliness: social 
exclusion in the 21st century’ 
(Crisis)
(2) 'A Job Worth Doing'
(OSWEmployability Conference)
concentrated debate and heated 
discussion on homelessness amongst 
the different organizations within the 
voluntary sector.
Table 2: Data collection methods and participants.
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Generating data: Narrative Interviews and Focus groups.
To elicit the representations of front and rear-line HPs, I adopted a multi­
method approach, which combined four focus group discussions and thirty-six 
narrative interviews with both groups of professionals. The approach to these studies 
has as its central assumption, the fact that it is through spoken language (dialogue, 
conversation) that it is possible to gain access to people’s dynamic and flexible 
constructions, perspectives and world-views (Moscovici, 1984b). Language is ‘what 
allows us to have the world we have’ and ‘makes possible the disclosure of the 
human world’ (Taylor, 1995, p.ix). These two techniques that I have utilized rest on 
conversation and social communicative interactions as means of understanding the 
world. These are fundamental socio-psychological activities (Harre, 1979) and a 
central domain of our discipline.
Each technique enables one to examine how social representations work at 
two different levels. On the one hand, focus groups create the social scenario for 
discussion, generation and negotiation of meaning. The group discussion discloses 
the shared, the contested and the more idiosyncratic and taken for granted elements 
of their social representations. On the other hand, individual narrative interviews 
enable the researcher to delve into the more subjective elements of social 
representations. They provide a way of exploring the plurality of ways in which 
shared stock of representations are subjectively anchored within each individuals’ 
own experience.
Narrative Interviews
Narrative interviewing is a qualitative research technique which has been 
broadly used in the social sciences (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000) and in many 
studies of social representations (e.g. Jovchelovitch, 2000). It is through narratives, 
which are a universal means of story telling, that individuals freely communicate 
their social knowledge, meanings and belief systems of the world (Jovchelovitch & 
Bauer, 2000). Our activities are symbolic in nature, and narratives are the vehicle and 
the site within which meaning of the world and of the self is constructed and re­
constructed. Narrative techniques are regarded as valuable for investigative 
explorations of the symbolic realm and in particular for conducting dialogical
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research since ‘the very act of telling and listening to stories is entangled in a 
dialogical intersubjective structure’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 165).
The way ‘narrative’ approaches treat interview data is absolutely opposed to 
‘realist’ approaches that seek to map out the objective representation of the 
respondent’s experience (Silverman, 2001). Instead, within this approach interviews 
are regarded as means to access the different narratives produced by respondents in 
their active engagement in constructivist processes of meaning-making (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 1995; Silverman, 1993). These narratives do not picture the experience of 
the de-contextualised individual, instead they ‘are embedded within the sense- 
making processes of historically and culturally situated communities’ (Gergen & 
Gergen, 2000, p. 1027). In order to construct their narratives respondents draw on the 
multiple voices and different socio-cultural and historical discourses, whilst at the 
same time co-constructing themselves through discursive processes of positioning. 
The nature of narratives therefore does justice to the epistemological and theoretical 
presuppositions of this investigation.
Furthermore, the presupposition underlying the choice of narrative interviews 
is that their in-depth and open quality is best suited to acknowledge the four 
methodological principles formulated by Moscovici (1984) (Farr, 1993). Narratives 
are elicited by asking the interviewee to tell the story of an object. Hence, in 
abandoning the question-answer schedule and focusing on story-telling they diminish 
any constraining influence on the interviewee (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000). Due to 
their ‘open’ quality, they offer the interviewee free scope for the reconstruction and 
negotiation of her views without these being shaped and controlled by the 
interviewer’s own representations (Farr, 1982). Hence, their in-depth, non-structured 
and flexible nature renders them the most adequate for the free emergence of the 
interviewee’s worldviews and thus for drawing on issues that are more relevant to 
her (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000). Their appropriateness for studies of social 
representations is that they create a setting, which is sensitive to the social nature and 
historical and cultural context of social representations.
The use of narrative interviews was informed by the format introduced by 
Bauer and Jovchelovitch (2000). The ‘informant’ (interviewee) (Jovchelovitch &
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Bauer, 2000) was asked to ‘tell’ her meaning of homelessness. I invited them to talk 
at length as if they were telling me a story of what homelessness means to them. The 
purpose was to elicit the narratives through which the informant would re-present her 
meanings of homelessness. Before starting I clarified the procedure of the interview. 
Hence, I highlighted the fact that it consisted of one question, a process of story­
telling, in which I would not intervene, followed by a final questioning phase. I 
emphasized that I was interested ‘on their views, rather than on testing their 
knowledge’. This posed an initial problem to the informants creating on them 
confusion and anxiety that later disappeared in the course of the interview.
In order to minimize the informant’s initial anxiety and develop my role in 
the elicitation of narratives, I drew on my clinical training in the client-centred 
therapeutic relationship. As is done in counselling, before starting I communicated to 
them my non-judgemental and evaluative attitude and that what they had to say 
would be very valuable. I manifested my warm interest in their views through verbal 
and non-verbal communication that showed attention and recognition of their voice. 
This created a feeling of security, which is indeed a fundamental direction to take in 
the process of the client-centred therapy (Rogers, 1991). The aim is to avoid any 
threat to the self of the client and hence create the context within which she feels 
secure to freely utter her experience (Rogers, 1991). In addition, in order to enhance 
the authenticity of their narratives, I presented myself as ignorant on the issue of 
homelessness. This technique prevents the informant from engaging on ‘strategic 
communication’ that addresses the assumed agenda of the interviewer (Jovchelovitch 
& Bauer, 2000). Hence, within this framework, once accepted the invitation to talk at 
length, the informant relaxed and moved from an initial rigid intellectualizing 
position towards a more experiencing one. The movement was towards a position in 
which the self engaged on a dynamic, spontaneous and more emotionally engaged 
symbolic experience of constructing the meaning of homelessness.
Despite encouragement to talk it is important to note that in some interviews 
there were long moments of silence. However, in order to be consistent with the 
principles of narrative interviewing, I did not ‘rescue’ the informant from the silence. 
Silence was respected and understood as a valuable space for reflection and hence, as 
an essential element of the symbolic experience. Silence is also a marker of the end
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of a story-line. Hence, in order to assure that the story was finished I used probing 
questions such as ‘is this all you want to tell me?’ (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000). In 
adopting this fully informant-centred orientation to the interview I could trigger rich 
narratives and thus tap into the informants’ profound and intricate meanings of 
‘homelessness’. After this initial phase of the interview, once the main narrative on 
‘homelessness’ was finished, there was a questioning phase (of four possible 
questions) aimed at exploring the way informants see themselves and the way they 
perceive others see them as professionals from the voluntary sector. Their beliefs on 
other HPs’ and statutory professionals’ views on homelessness were also explored. 
Through these questions I wanted to examine the interplay between statutory’s and 
voluntary sectors’ discourses on homelessness, and the discursive practices of the 
informant, that is, how would she position towards them (see appendix 1). It is 
important to note here that these elements emerged in the main narrative, and thus, it 
was not always necessary to draw on the four questions.
Hence, in adopting a narrative approach, the data generated from the 
interviews was treated as narrated versions of HPs’ constructions of the meanings of 
homelessness. In particular, these narrations were regarded as the site where the 
different voices and their respective discourses that live within the socio-cultural 
context of the respondent clash. The attempt was to explore the respondent’s 
rhetorical use of the different discourses that circulate in society and that they 
actively draw upon when representing homelessness. In adopting a rhetorical 
approach to the narratives I focused not only on ‘what’ discourses the interviewee 
uttered but ‘how’ she uttered them through acts of positioning towards other 
interlocutors. In constructing the narrative as a whole many different story-lines 
unfold, in which the interviewee shifts from one to another positioning (Harre & 
Langenhove, 1998a) through which relations of opposition, conflict or 
complementation between the elements of their representational field are visible. In 
this sense, the rhetorical analysis was facilitated by the identification of these 
positionings as indicators of ‘how’ the interviewee responded to particular discourses 
of dialogical others. A discussion of the analytical framework will be presented in 
Chapter 5 and 6.
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In what follows I will discuss the rationale for using focus groups as a 
complementary means for eliciting a social process of constructing narratives.
Focus groups
Focus groups are a research technique that has been commonly used amongst 
many social representation researchers (De-Graft Aikins, 2005; Howarth, 2000; 
Jovchelovitch, 1995). The choice of focus groups was informed by the conceptual 
aim of exploring how social representations actually live in the inter-subjective 
communicative space between people. While the individual interview is based upon 
the subjective, focus groups rely on social interactive processes, thus providing data 
that would not be accessible otherwise (Morgan, 1988). The group dynamics that 
they create, which are triggered by the plurality of participants, are key aspects for 
the research since they elicit the emergence of social processes of meaning making 
and construction of shared knowledge (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). This research 
technique was considered to have a lot to offer to the understanding of the social 
processes of development of the social knowledge that emerged through the 
individual interview data. Hence, four focus groups with HPs were conducted (See 
Table 2).
Focus groups aim at replicating, insofar as the design of the research would 
enable, the social context where people would naturally interact (Morgan, 1988; 
Morgan & Krueger, 1993). Hence, they are of key importance for the exploration of 
social relations (e.g. conversation) in which, as Moscovici argues, social 
representations are constructed, transformed and enacted (Moscovici, 1984b). They 
create a scenario of discussion for the generation and negotiation of meaning, which 
allows one to observe the process of circulation and development of social 
representations. Hence, they provide a way of moving beyond the individual’s 
narratives gathered through the interviews, and examining the different dialogical 
dynamics and interactive processes between participants. They provide the 
opportunity to observe how through dialogue, clash of perspectives and adoption of 
heterogeneous positions, people construct and transform knowledge together. 
Therefore focus groups, are methods that enable tapping into both the shared and 
conflicting aspects of representations (Gervais & Jovchelovitch, 1998). The
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communicative processes between participants, disclose both the more idiosyncratic 
and taken for granted elements of their social representations. Focus groups are 
particularly significant for the purpose of this study since they offer high quality data 
of the group dynamics of contestation, confrontation and negotiation between 
participants.
An advantage of this technique is that in focusing attention on the collective, 
rather than on the individual, it creates a context in which participants feel free to 
express themselves and are stimulated to utter their views (Frey & Fontana, 1993). 
Such an emphasis on the collective leads to empowerment of the participants through 
the recognition of their voices and experiences (Madriz, 2000). Indeed Gaskell (2000) 
has characterized the focus group situation as close to Habermas’ ideal of the public 
sphere. In this way, it can be argued that the potential danger of the power 
relationship between the researcher-researched is minimized.
Similarity within focus groups and difference across groups are the two main 
factors that need to be considered when segmenting the group and selecting 
participants (Howarth, 2000). Morgan (1988) suggests that there is a need of a 
degree of homogeneity in background, but not in perspective, for the discussion to be 
elicited. On the one hand, similarity between participants within a group enables one 
to observe natural shared processes of knowledge production whilst at the same time 
allowing for a degree of heterogeneity. The group discussion benefits from being 
compounded by people that belong to the same social milieu and share a common 
socio-cultural project, in which the moderator can act as a naive observer (Gaskell, 
2000) thus titling the balance of power over the debate towards the group. On the 
other hand, segmenting the groups on the basis of different natural social categories 
provides a multi-perspective view of the subject of study, thus, enabling the 
researcher to explore and understand the worldviews of the groups that compound 
the field under investigation (Howarth, 2000).
For the purpose of this investigation I considered both similarity and 
difference. Hence, I determined four ‘natural’ social groups. These were split on the 
basis of job/profession within the voluntary sector. The study contained four focus 
groups: (1) outreach workers, (2) training and development workers, (3) mental
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health and drug misuse workers, (4) Project Manager/Director of programmes. Each 
of them was comprised of HPs from different London-based organizations. This 
segmentation aimed at obtaining an understanding of the array of different 
worldviews on homelessness (in terms of job experience and location at the various 
interfaces of homelessness) within the whole voluntary sector. Due to their job 
practices, these groups deal with different aspects of homelessness. The first three 
groups work in the front-line and hence have direct experience and access to the 
voice of the homeless. The fourth group has less degree of contact with clients but 
greater access to the ‘outside word’ through dealings with statutory agencies, funding 
bodies and so on. The four groups together resembles a cross-section of the voluntary 
sector. However, I am aware that a gap has been left by not setting up two additional 
specific groups with policy officers and fundraisers. There are practical and 
theoretical reasons for this.
Whilst the jobs of policy officer and fundraiser are important within the 
sector, there are only few such posts within each voluntary organization. 
Organizations tend to have a vast majority of front-line HPs. The reduced number of 
policy officers and fundraisers that were available, added to the fact that these were 
very inaccessible and reluctant to participate, posed considerable problems to setting 
up focus groups with these professionals. However, it is important to note here that 
this shortcoming was partially overcome since participants of the fourth group also 
developed activities related with policy and funding, or had done so in the past.
Each focus group had between seven and ten participants. The length of the 
discussion was between 60 and 90 minutes. All were conducted at the Social 
Psychology Institute of the London School of Economics and all were video and 
audio digitally-recorded with previous consent. Both the phase prior to the initiation 
of the discussion and the informal conversations that emerged once the focus group 
was finished were recorded for analytical purposes. This contextual information is 
very valuable for the analysis of friendship and the relationship of each participant to 
the rest of the group (Howarth, 2000). Documenting the development of these social 
dynamics and interactions provided me with some very important data. Indeed, it 
proved highly valuable in assisting the understanding of the group dynamics within 
the actual discussion. In order to facilitate the discussion and encouragement of
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social interactions participants were requested to arrive half an hour before the focus 
group in order to have tea in an informal gathering. Despite belonging to different 
organizations, some participants knew each other from the field. The discussion 
evolved very easily since they all shared a professional experience and all were 
familiar with the issues that were raised.
In the light of the narratives and issues that emerged in the individual 
interviews I designed a schedule for the focus group, which was flexibly used as a 
guide of the topics I wanted to cover (see below). Indeed, in the course of the 
discussion I discovered that participants were naturally covering the questions in the 
same sequence that I had designed.
I wanted to tackle the following issues (see appendix 2 for full details): 
-Their views on homelessness.
-The meaning and experiences of the one-to-one relation with clients. 
-Sources of knowledge of homelessness.
-The dynamics of professional identity: their self-views as 
professionals doing that job, and as members of the voluntary sector.
Similar questions were posed to the four focus groups in order to create a 
framework for the analysis. In all of them I wanted to explore the socio- 
psychological process of re-presenting ‘homelessness’ and the co-occurring process 
of constructing the self. Hence attention was on processes of social identification 
with one’s job and with the community of the voluntary sector. In particular, in 
having four focus groups with different professionals, I wanted to explore whether 
they would draw on specific elements of their job and location when constructing the 
meaning of homelessness.
I functioned as the moderator of the discussion. As in the interviews, at the 
beginning, I presented myself as a naive observer (Gaskell, 2000) interested in their 
views and experience. I emphasised that questions would be posed to the group as a 
whole. Thus making clear that the debate was open to all. I communicated that I 
wanted them to share experiences and be responsive to each others’ comments. 
Therefore my role was to catalyze the interventions encouraging people to participate.
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Participant Observation: Entering The Field.
During the initial phase of my thesis, in which I was engaged with the 
literature review and the design of the theoretical framework of the thesis, my work 
got trapped in an impasse. I realized that if I wanted it to advance I needed to move 
beyond my perspective as an ‘outsider’ and gain some experiential insight in the field. 
This encouraged me to entering the field of the voluntary sector. Hence, I drew upon 
aspects of participant observation, as a way of immersing myself in the field and 
developing a more thorough understanding of the context where HPs’ representations 
emerge, circulate and evolve. Whilst I do not claim that I have fully utilised the 
ethnographic method of participative observation, I acknowledge that this study has 
benefited from drawing on aspects of this technique, since is well suited to research 
on social representations (Gervais, 1997). The aim was to complement interviews 
and focus groups, and aid reflexive engagement with the process of designing and 
reviewing the methodology of the study. Agar (1986) highlights that when observing, 
the social ethnographer rather than measuring or testing hypothesis, should be 
encouraged to learn and make sense of the world she encounters through focusing on 
what people actually do. This goal is underpinned by three theoretical assumptions, 
which are pointed out by Silverman (1993) as being shared by many social 
ethnographers. The three of them echo central aspects of social representations 
theory. Firstly, a valuation of common sense as rich, intricate and wise (Silverman, 
1993). Secondly, social practices are regarded as the place where common sense 
lives. Thirdly, the phenomena under study exist on the site of particular practices and 
settings, and are understood through them. This shows how not surprisingly 
ethnography has richly contributed to the research on social representations (De- 
Graft Aikins, 2005; Gervais, 1997; Howarth, 2000; Jodelet, 1989/1991).
Moscovici highlights the symbolic power of social representations to 
influence behaviour and communication (1984). Nevertheless, Moscovici is not 
referring to a causal unidirectional influence of representation over behaviour. This 
remark is useful since without it, deductive models of explanation would have to be 
advocated for the present study. For this reason it is appropriate to refer to Wagner’s 
(1995) assumption that both communication and behaviour are expressions of social 
representations. Communicative processes between individuals within the public
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space constitute both the environment and an inherent component of their genesis 
(Jovchelovitch, 1996). The diverse forms of interaction of HPs is the context in 
which their representations are engendered, enacted and transformed; a context that 
Moscovici has claimed must be acknowledged through observational techniques 
(1984).
Participative observation is a technique that has been specially recommended 
for studies where ‘the meanings people use to define and interact with their ordinary 
environment are central issues’ (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 23). This is certainly the case of 
the study of HPs’ social representations. HPs’ meanings permeate their interactions 
with clients, advocating/lobbying practices, ‘translations’ and portrayals of 
‘homelessness’ to the outside audience (government, public, media). I was interested 
in observing what HPs were doing within the setting of the voluntary sector as a way 
of accessing their social processes of meaning making in context. Hence, borrowing 
from elements of participative observation involved; some direct observation of 
relevant events, some social interaction in the field with the subjects of study, 
informal interviewing, and the collection of documents (McCall & Simmons, 1969). 
Documents were gathered through my participation as well as from the 
organizations’ web pages and emails received as a member of two voluntary sector 
networks. Immersing myself in the context of the voluntary sector allowed me, 
whilst analysing the data, to move beyond interviewees’ and groups’ accounts and 
relate their discourses to their specific social-political and cultural contexts.
I performed two practices of participant observation in chronological 
sequence. Firstly, the initial attempt to enter the field consisted of an observation of 
what HPs do within the setting of the organization. For this purpose I volunteered 
over the period of nine months as a researcher for a London-based homeless 
organization. The aims were to observe the workings of the voluntary agency as a 
source that could lend meanings to the design of methodology. This type of 
preliminary information was also significant in later analytical stages of the accounts 
that emerged in the interviews and focus groups. Through this experience I was able 
to have informal conversations with HPs, gather documents, speak with clients, and 
observe interactions amongst professionals. Volunteering gave me an insight into the 
fact that there were possibly different views held between those working at the front-
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line and those at the rear-line. This informed the segmentation criterion of front-line 
and rear-line professionals.
Secondly, I wanted to examine meanings circulating within the voluntary 
sector. I was concerned with the ‘hot’ issues and debates on homelessness that were 
being discussed amongst the different voluntary organizations in London. I was able 
to locally observe these through my participation in two main conference events on 
homelessness organized by the homeless voluntary sector (see appendix 3 for 
conference programme details). They were hold five months after my initial 
observation. One was organized by the organization Crisis under the title 
‘Innovations Fair 2004: From homelessness to loneliness: social exclusion in the 
21st century \  The other one, lA Job Worth Doing’ was organized by the voluntary 
agency OSW, and the focus was on employability. Participating in these conferences 
(and in the organizational setting) offered me an excellent opportunity to move 
beyond research dialogues. I could observe how the voluntary sector, in context, 
collectively made sense of homelessness and co-constructed a simultaneous shared 
identity as a community of HPs, critically engaging with reified and taken-for- 
granted forms of knowledge. Indeed, conferences disclosed rich information about 
the dialogues that form HPs’ knowledge and the dynamics of negotiation and 
contestation of institutionalized discourses of homelessness, that inform their identity 
and knowledge.
Data from both practices of observation was recorded through notes. In 
addition, some sessions of the conferences were taped. The data gathered through 
both observational processes was used as an aid to the analysis and interpretation of 
interviews and focus groups. Both experiences offered a valuable backdrop to my 
research providing me with a deep understanding of the workings of the voluntary 
sector. Most essentially, they offered a perspective on the complex interplay between 
homelessness policies, the shortcomings of the welfare system and the daily realities 
of homelessness services. Additionally, they were an opportunity for me to reflect on 
my research methods and make the first contacts with participants.
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A note on ethical considerations.
In all the studies I carefully considered all the ethical aspects of the British 
Psychological Society’s (BPS) code of conduct related to my research. Particularly, 
special attention was paid to each of the issues in the section on ‘ethical principles 
for conducting research with human participants’. Participants were treated with 
consideration and respect. Information of the study was previously supplied to all the 
participants. I provided through both verbal communication and written documents, a 
summary of the aims and objectives of the research. They were also informed as to 
how the research involved them as participants, and of their right to leave the study 
at any moment if they wished so. In both interviews/focus groups and conference 
sessions, participants were asked for their consent to be video/audio taped. When 
applying for the two conferences I told the organizations about my research and 
explained in what way attending the conference could contribute to my study.
Participants were ensured confidentiality of the data they provided, which has 
been treated with anonymity through the use of codes. The systematic process of 
encoding the name of each participant has ensured that they are not identifiable. In 
addition, verbatim texts have been safely kept.
4.2.2. Segmentation of the Social Milieus of HPs.
For the qualitative purpose of exploring HPs’ representations, participants 
were selected through segmentation procedures (Gaskell, 2000). This technique 
enables one to engage with the ultimate aim of qualitative research, which consists of 
‘exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue’, rather 
than, ‘counting opinions or people’ (Gaskell, 2000, p.41). In order to inform the 
selection, as Gaskell (2000) suggests, I conducted prior background research 
volunteering within an organization and thus I was able to talk to different HPs. In 
addition, I did desk research on the infrastructure of the voluntary sector and the 
different jobs developed within it. Hence, this a priori research made me realize that 
different views were possibly held between those HPs working on the front-line with 
clients and those working at the rear-line of homelessness. In particular, I believed
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that it was necessary to select various members doing different jobs within each of 
these two groups. Therefore, the social milieu of HPs from the voluntary sector in 
London, was segmented into front-line and rear-line HPs (see Table 3). Given the 
social milieu of HPs from the voluntary sector, the aim was to explore the diversity 
of views on homelessness within each sub-group and within each of the wider social 
milieus (front-line, rear-line).
In addition, this criteria of segmentation was informed by theoretical 
considerations underpinning the research. On the basis of the dialogical triad of 
representation (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), which has been introduced in chapter two as 
the unit of analysis, it was believed that worldviews and positions would differ 
amongst HPs dialogically engaged (co-participating) in different constellations of 
‘ego-alter-object-project’. Therefore, participants were selected on the basis of their 
ability to exemplify the different job positions within the homeless voluntary sector. 
With the aim of obtaining a sample that reflects the full range of professional 
positions that exist within non-statutory homelessness organisations, interview/ focus 
group respondents were broken down into two sub-groups: rear-line and front-line 
HPs. The alter and the project vary across front-line and rear-line HPs in relation to 
their jobs and quality/quantity of relationship with clients. There are differences 
between both in the place of work, type of practices and interaction with the 
homeless sub-groups. The group of rear-line HPs is comprised of those individuals 
with office-based activities such as fundraising, public campaigns, media 
communication and policy. Front-line staff are workers that have direct contact with 
clients. Amongst these, we find HPs of outreach teams, day centres, first-stage and 
temporary hostels, resettlement teams and employment/ training schemes.
Each group deals with a different dimension of the phenomenon of 
homelessness. Both groups are at the interface of the divide between the homeless 
and the outside world, however front-line professionals are closer to the inside reality 
of homelessness (see Figure 7). Their practices consist on one-to-one daily support 
and contact with clients. On the other hand, rear-line professionals are the public side 
of homelessness. Their practices consist on communications with the outside world 
(the public, the government and the media). Whilst the former have an advantaged 
experience of working in relationship with clients, the latter have a privileged
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position in the social fabric for communicating about homelessness. For instance, 
fundraisers and public campaign officers aim at portraying the issue of homelessness 
to potential donors and the outside public. Policy officers are in constant contact with 
the government in their lobbying and advocating practices.
Figure 7: Location of HPs in the public space.
FRONT-LINEWIDER SOCIETY- REAR-LINE HOMELESSNESS
Interface Interface
PROFESSIONALS
The selection of number of interviews and focus groups as well as the number 
of respondents in each segmentation was informed by the notion of ‘corpus 
construction’ (Bauer & Aarts, 2000; Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). This is a systematic 
process that consists of selecting respondents, analyzing texts and re-selecting more 
respondents until a saturation is reached and additional data can not provide new and 
unknown representations (Bauer & Aarts, 2000). Hence, in aiming at maximizing the 
variety of representations until the range of worldviews is exhausted ‘corpus 
construction maintains the efficiency that is gained from selecting some material to 
characterize the whole.’ (Bauer & Aarts, 2000, p.20).
Recruiting Participants.
Participants were chosen from twelve key London-based organizations. Even 
though I had developed contact with professionals of two main voluntary agencies 
through past voluntary investigative work and through my MSc research work, entry 
access was an extremely difficult challenge. In order to select participants for
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individual interviews and focus groups, I made written and oral contact with these 
organizations. For some of these, research that involves recruiting members of the 
staff has to be approved by the organization. Therefore, prior to the recruitment 
process with these particular organizations I submitted a successful introductory 
letter and research synopsis. In addition, an e-mail with the information about the 
aims of the research and procedure of the interview/ focus groups was sent to all 
potential participants. This e-mail was followed by a telephone discussion in which I 
explained my proposed research and the implications of participating in the study. 
The name of the organizations will not be quoted here for confidentiality reasons.
I conducted thirty-six interviews with HPs from different organizations and 
four focus groups (see Table 3). Both lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Interviews 
were tape-recorded and conducted, in most cases, in the organization and also at the 
London School of Economics. As I have stated previously, focus groups, were video/ 
audio digitally recorded and took place chronologically after the process of collecting 
interview data. They were hold at the Social Psychology Institute of the London 
School of Economics.
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Table 3: Segmentation of participants.
(see appendix 4 for a description of each area of work).
Front-Line (N=24) Rear-Line (N=12)
Outreach
worker
Project worker32 Project
manager
33
Director
of
programs
Policy
officer
Press
officer
Media
officer
Fundraiser
Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview
N=4 N=13 N=7 N=2 N=3 N=3 N=4
Focus
group
Focus group Focus group
N=1
Outreach
workers
N=1
Training and 
development 
workers
N=1
Mental
health
and
drug
misuse
workers
N=1
Project managers and 
chief executives
4.3. Quality Assurance.
Insofar as this study is engaged with essentially dialogical phenomena, the 
quality of the research can not be assessed within the framework of the Cartesian 
paradigm of Science. Quality assurance in qualitative research is not achieved 
through criteria of reliability, validity and representativeness. These are criteria that 
do not do justice to a dialogical/constructivist epistemology. Adopting them would 
mean turning to the same epistemology and nomothetic methodologies that I have 
intended to escape from. However, the inability to transfer positivist quantitative 
criteria to qualitative research does not restrain the latter from having its own critical 
and rigorous factors of excellence. Indeed, as a result of fighting over traditional 
positivism and seeking to develop own quality standards, there has been within the 
field an emergence of rich methodological innovations (Gergen & Gergen, 2000).
32 In hostels, day centers, semi-independent housing.
33 In hostels, day centers, semi-independent housing.
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Gaskell and Bauer (2000) ground their view of quality in qualitative research 
in the importance of introducing public accountability as criteria of excellence of the 
investigative practice. In relation to adopting an external indicator they argue that 
there are ‘internal benefits of setting a frame for constructive discussion and peer 
review.’ (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000, p.337). Being informed by the criteria of public 
accountability, throughout the research process, this investigative inquiry has 
carefully paid attention to issues that would critically ensure its own quality and 
credibility. Hence, I have sought to meet GaskelPs and Bauer’s (2000) proposed 
quality indicators of confidence and relevance. Confidence is a measure that ensures 
that the outcomes of the analysis, far from being fruit of the fantasizing of the 
researcher, rest upon solid foundations and transparency that render them open to 
critical debate. Relevance, refers to whether the research is both significant and 
useful in practical and/or theoretical terms. In aiming to achieve this, I have adopted 
Gaskell’s and Bauer’s (2000) suggested strategies of triangulation, reflexivity, 
procedural transparency, thick description and corpus construction (see Table 4).
As I have earlier discussed, there are various levels of triangulation in the 
present research (see Table 1). In using triangulation, as well as seeking to gain a 
deeper understanding of the phenomena under study my concern was also to engage 
in a process of self-reflexivity. Hence, there are in this research two uses of 
triangulation that ensure a path towards confidence and relevance. In addition, I have 
attempted earlier to demonstrate, as much as it can be conveyed in written, the 
personal process of reflection upon my relationship with the researched. In making 
explicit my epistemological foundations, discussing the diagnosis of methodology, 
outlining the analytical framework, and communicating the reflection of my relation 
with the researched, I hope that throughout the thesis I have achieved both clarity and 
transparency, and thus opened the doors for public accountability. In being 
transparent I have sought to give the reader the information needed in order to de­
construct and unveil my research construction.
Furthermore, thick description as a marker of relevance and confidence has 
been performed through the presentation of a wide range of verbatim resources, 
through which I have sought to both show the origin of my claims and communicate 
the richness and complexity of the worldviews of the participants. Relevance and
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confidence have also been achieved through the process of corpus construction. The 
sample was segmented, and interviews and focus groups were analysed until there 
was evidence of saturation.
Table 4: Quality indicators.
Quality indicators Brief explanation Confidence Relevance
Transparency and 
procedural clarity
Transparency of 
epistemological position, 
theoretical framework, 
methodological diagnosis, 
data collection procedure, 
analytical framework and 
analytical process.
V
Triangulation Triangulation of: methods, 
data, and levels of analysis.
V
Reflexivity Reflexivity upon the 
dialogical relationship 
between researcher and 
researched as an attempt to 
occupy an ethical space 
within this relationship.
V
Thick description Verbatim samples. V V
Corpus construction Saturation is achieved 
through sample 
segmentation procedures.
V V
4.4. Conclusion.
This chapter has examined the methods through which the object of 
investigation has been approached. I have discussed the epistemological foundations 
that have guided the choice of investigative strategies. Hence, firstly, I have affirmed 
my position within a dialogical paradigm, and discussed the ethics of a dialogical 
approach to research. Secondly, I have highlighted the benefits of utilising focus 
groups and narrative interviews, and examined the problems I have confronted
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throughout the research process. Finally, I have discussed how in adopting certain 
methodological strategies, the research has ensured quality through indicators of 
confidence and relevance.
Epistemological foundations and the theoretical questions of my research 
directed the interpretative analytical procedure. In Chapters 5 and 6 I discuss the 
analytical framework of the two levels of interpretative analysis that were conducted. 
On the one hand, the content of symbols and meanings was researched through 
thematic analysis. This is an analytical technique that assists the researcher in the 
process of coding qualitative data. It consists of a systematic process of; perceiving 
and encoding patterns, identifying and interpreting themes. This endows the 
researcher with a profound insight into the more latent meanings, thus revealing 
fundamental aspects of the content of the representation. For these reasons, thematic 
analysis was chosen as an appropriate technique to assist the analysis of all the 
qualitative data derived from the studies. Specifically, I followed the pragmatic 
process of thematic analysis established by Attride-Stirling (2001).
On the other hand, I conducted a meta-analysis of internal dialogues, which 
was guided by Bakhtin’s view that what people convey in conversation, comes from 
the polyphony (1984a) of voices of multiple others that inhabit the self, i.e. 
institutions, other groups etc. The aim of combining both hermeneutic and dialogical 
approaches was to examine the critical aspects of HPs’ social representations, and 
thus to understand how different elements of the representations were put to use 
within the polyphasia of knowledge. Both analytical processes were computer- 
assisted through the programme ATLAS/ti.
139
140
5. SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF HOMELESSNESS: 
DIALOGICALLY NARRATED EXPERT KNOWLEDGE.
This chapter provides the analysis of the data collected from the in-depth 
interviews with both rear-line and front-line HPs34. Section 5.1. discusses the 
procedure of the analysis, and the analytical model that has functioned as the 
framework for the two-level analysis of the interviews. Section 5.2 provides the 
results of the analysis. The subsequent section discusses the general pattern of 
dialogues between the multiple co-existent voices of symbolic ‘others’ that emerge in 
the dynamics of knowledge production. In section 5.4,1 present illustrative accounts 
from my participative observation that mirror the themes found in the interviews. 
The last section draws conclusions from the discussed analyses.
5.1. Analytical Model and Processes.
The analytical model comprises a combination of two perspectives. On the 
one hand, the meta-analysis of internal dialogues was guided by the concept of 
positioning and Bakhtin’s view that what people convey in conversation comes from 
the polyphony of voices of multiple others that inhabit the self of the interlocutor 
(1984a). On the other hand, the rationale for the analysis of the content departures 
from the concept of cognitive polyphasia and Jovchelovitch’s model of the dialogical 
encounter between different forms of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 1997,2002,2007).
5.1.1. Meta-analysis of Internal Dialogues.
The basic idea that underlies this analysis is the view that what people convey 
in conversation comes from the co-existence of voices of multiple symbolic ‘others’ 
that percolate the self of the interlocutor (i.e. institutions, other groups etc). As 
discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the self exists in dialogical relationship with manifold 
‘others’, with whom she is dialogically engaged in the production of knowledge and 
the co-construction of identity. Both from psychoanalysis to Mikhail Bakhtin’s
34 A total of 24 Front-line and 12 Rear-Line HPs were interviewed.
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literally philosophy, one can find recurrent arguments of how the multi-voicing of 
others’ meanings permeate the talk of the interlocutor.
The present analysis adopts Bakhtin’s perspective of the heteroglossic nature 
of communication and knowledge. By ‘heteroglossia’(1981) he referred to the 
‘camival’( 1984b) and the ‘polyphony’ (1984a) of multiple ‘others’ that get 
articulated through the voice of the speaker. Through positioning and in relating the 
other’s voice with the voices of many other symbolic interlocutors within the course 
of conversation, the borrowed voice acquires a new value (Bakhtin, 1984b). Through 
the utterance’s quality of addressivity to the other’s message the self positions in 
relation to the symbolic other (Bakhtin, 1986). The speaker is able to anticipate and 
respond to the symbolic other, who is constructed as responsive co-participant in 
dialogue. In the course of this process, the meanings and opinions of the voiced other 
are subjected to contestation, criticism, or assimilation and defence. An 
understanding of this discursive process can be enhanced by drawing on the concept 
of ‘positioning’ (Harre & Langenhove, 1998b). In the course of speech, as a 
discursive act the self adopts multiple and fluid stratums of positionings towards the 
symbolic other. Their articulation depend on the particular story-line and the 
positioning of the dialogical co-authors with whom the interviewee is engaged with 
(Harre & Langenhove, 1998a). The object of knowledge is represented within the 
clash of multiple voices, through processes of re-constructing others’ perspectives 
from the different intertwined positionings.
In adopting this model, I engaged with a ‘dialogical orientation to research’ 
(Markova, 2005), which involved, an analysis of the different dialogues that occur 
within conversation. I also focused on the different positions people take in the 
representation of ‘homelessness’. In the context of the interview dialogicality occurs 
at two levels. Firstly, there is dialogue between interviewer and interviewee that 
occurs at the inter-subjective level. The rhetorical tools and the meanings constructed 
are to an extent shaped by the interviewer’s verbal and non-verbal communicative 
acts and the interviewee’s assumptions concerning the interviewer and the 
consequent positionings adopted towards her. Secondly, there are multiple internal 
dialogues, within which the interviewee takes different positions towards symbolic 
interlocutors, whose knowledge is spoken and responded to through the
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interviewee’s voice (see Figure 8). The story telling is guided by a sequence of 
argumentation and contra-argumentation towards the symbolic addressees, in the 
course of which the interviewee utters her explanations, beliefs and justifications. 
Thus, there are at least three interlocutors in the social communicative context of the 
interview: the interviewer, the interviewee and the symbolic other. The importance of 
conducting a meta-analysis of internal dialogues is that these form the knowledge 
that HPs hold, where symbolical others are co-authors in its construction.
The unit of analysis for both levels of analysis was the spoken utterance. The 
dialogical communication of the person is build up of a chain of responsive and 
interconnected utterances. This is a speech unit that is naturally bounded by the 
speaker through pauses, breaths and/or silences once her presentation of an idea or 
rhetorical purpose is accomplished. The utterance can therefore be comprised of one 
or more sentences. Within dialogue between speakers that are physically present, the 
beginning and ending of the utterance is demarcated by the change of speakers. 
However, in the individual interview the utterance is bounded by the uttering of a 
different voice of a symbolic other. Hence, the focus of the analysis was not only on 
the single spoken utterance, but in addition special attention was paid to the 
dialectical relationship between utterances, that is, how an utterance qualified a 
preceding one.
Focusing on spoken utterances as single units of analysis, the attempt was to 
look at; the different others engaged in dialogue, and the fluid layers of positionings 
adopted by the interviewee within each of the main discursive themes that emerged 
in the narratives. Hence I asked myself: Which are the main arguments in the 
storyline? How is the interviewee subjecting others’ messages to re-constructions in 
order to mark them with a different meaning? And what is the discursive goal of the 
interviewee’s positioning? The key to answering this was to adopt an approach 
sensitive to the sequential emergence of dialogues within the narrative. It was 
through a broader look at the sequential compound of the clashing of voices, and 
their relationship with each other, that I was able to make sense of the particular 
positioning and communicative aims of the interviewee in the course of constructing 
homelessness. Both the analysis of the internal dialogues and of the content of 
knowledge, were developed hand in hand through a process of multiple coding
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rounds. In section 4 .3 ,1 provide an explanation of how through this two-fold analysis 
one is able to make sense of the dynamics of HPs’ polyphasic knowledge of 
homelessness.
Figure 8: Inter-subjective and intra-subjective dialogues.
Object
Object
144
5.1.2. Analysis of Content.
Following from theoretical discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 on the concept of 
cognitive polyphasia, and Jovchelovitch’s model of the dialogical encounter between 
different types of knowledge, the second level of analysis is focused on the hybrid 
and plural nature of knowledge. The plurality of knowledge is rooted in the dialogue 
that occurs in the encounter between the different modalities and contents of 
knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2002, 2007). The goal of the analysis was to document 
the varied forms of rationality and multiple meanings embedded within HPs’ 
knowledge. Cognitive polyphasia was viewed as the co-existence, within an 
individual and a group, of multiple and contradictory styles of thinking and meanings. 
These are products of the network of dialogues that take place between self and 
manifold others.
5.1.3. Procedure.
The analytical procedure was a combination of top-down (from theory to data) 
and bottom-up approaches. In a similar vein to grounded theory, once I developed 
and matured my theoretical framework I delved into the corpus of data. It was in the 
course of reading and re-reading the interviews that I started to ‘discover’ the 
different themes and dialogues. The procedure of the analysis consisted of two 
coding processes that took place sequentially. This chronological process goes hand 
in hand with the emergence of results from a concrete and textual level to a more 
abstract (conceptual) and interpretative level. The analysis moved beyond the story 
line that emerged in the interviews to observations in the broader socio-political and 
cultural context of the social actors; the conditions where their representations 
emerge. For this I drew upon the media, web pages of the voluntary organizations, 
Government and policy documents. I sought connections between the text 
(interviews) and the context. These were recorded in the form of comments in 
ATLAS.ti ‘memos’ and assisted the interpretation of the data.
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ATLAS.ti enabled the creation of two hermeneutic units (HU), called ‘Rear- 
Line’ and ‘Front-Line’ through which the entire data set was separated. Hence the 
focus was on the two basic milieus of HPs within the voluntary sector. My first 
engagement with the data consisted on an exploratory analysis in which I looked at 
each individual interview within its context35 and within the ‘hermeneutic unit’ 
(Rear-line or Front-line) to which it had been imported. It was only in later stages 
when I looked at the data as whole in order to find common patterns and themes 
between both milieus of HPs.
In the first coding process I subjected all the interviews to the most basic 
open coding-frame based on the following codes:
1) Self about Homelessness
2) Self about HPs
3) Self about Organization
4) Self about Statutory Sector
5) Self about the Public
6) Self about the Self
7) Self about Voluntary Sector
This open coding frame emerged after the first ‘round’ of reading of the
interviews. In the course of this reading I realised that the narratives could actually
be categorised under different objects of communication (‘'the talked about*), which 
are all involved in the phenomena of homelessness.
Following this initial segmentation of the data I continued by exploring the 
different utterances in each coded text segment in order to look at: (1) What is the 
interviewee conveying through this utterance? (2) How was the message being 
communicated? And (3) Why was the message communicated in that way? Both the 
Why and the How were not present in all the utterances. Answering to these questions 
involved a conceptual work that required me to be able to look at the utterance within
35 With ‘context’ I mean the information of each interviewee that was appended to Atlas.ti ‘memos’. 
The contextual information was on the following issues: professional and academic background, 
actual job, activities developed within this job, organization, training received within the organization 
and/or job.
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its particular location in the narrative of the interviewee. Hence, I had to be aware of 
which was the context in which a particular ‘what’ emerged within the whole 
interview. It was in examining each utterance taking into account its location within 
the succession of sequences of utterances in the interview, that I realised the presence 
of multiple symbolic others with whom the interviewee was engaged in dialogue and 
positioned upon. It was here that I engaged on a parallel meta-analysis of the internal 
dialogues (see appendix 5).
In the course of profoundly examining the data through the multiple rounds 
of exploration of these three questions, I started to realize the different themes that 
were emerging from each code. Hence, a second open coding frame was developed 
and applied to both Hermeneutic Units. After multiple thorough ‘rounds* of coding 
and re-coding, the coding-frame was improved and all the data was segmented under 
a final coding-frame comprised of eighteen codes (see appendix 6). Once the data 
was segmented, I engaged in a long process of search for themes. ATLAS.ti 
networking tool, enabled me to technically link codes, quotations and memos, hence 
supporting me in this conceptual and interpretative phase of the analysis. At this 
stage the focus was on meanings, symbols and images of homelessness.
Alongside the analysis of the content, I started to realise the general patterns 
of internal dialogues. It was in the last analytical stage when I exclusively devoted 
myself to look at both symbolic interlocutors and the positioning and rhetoric 
strategies adopted by the self of the interviewee upon these voices. At this last stage I 
sought to answer: What are the main concepts that are being conveyed here, through 
which voices and positionings? The sequential approach assisted the exploration of 
how the transitions between positions were articulated in a comprehensive way, 
through integrations, clashes and conflicts between the discourses claimed from 
different positions. In addition, being able to recognise the different voices and their 
discourses constituted a careful process of moving beyond the narrative text towards 
the context of knowledge production. Hence I drew on background information 
(interviewee, sector) and accessed organizations’ web pages, agencies’ campaigns, 
policy documents and news media. Looking at the social context from which the 
many discourses of homelessness emerge assisted the identification of the different 
internal voices and positionings that were disclosed through communication.
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5.2. Findings.
This section introduces the results of both levels analysis. The first subsection 
discusses the analysis of the content and the second presents the meta-analysis of the 
internal dialogues that emerge in the process of re-presenting homelessness. The 
analysis ultimately reveals how the representational field of one community, that of 
HPs, is characterized by the co-existence of dilemmatic dialogues. The contested 
context where HPs work and the conflicting nature of the internal and external 
dialogues HPs are engaged with shape the representations they hold about 
homelessness. The dynamics of knowledge production in the community of HPs is 
bound to, and at the same time expresses, the conflicts and clashes of the context 
where it is produced and enacted. Through these dynamics emerges a 
representational field characterised by the co-existence (within the community and 
within the individual) of polyphasic themes. These are constituted through 
contradiction and plurality in ways of thinking and acting towards homelessness. 
Contradiction and plurality apply both to the dynamics within each one of the major 
themes as well as to the dynamics between the themes. The representations I found 
were framed by the clashes between the co-existing voluntary and statutory sectors 
and the dilemmas of sustaining the responsive, comprehensive and individualised 
approach of the voluntary sector, when funded by or working in partnership with the 
government. The representational field about homelessness held by HPs is organised 
around three co-existing, competing and inter-related themes. Each theme contains 
its own internal dynamics and contradictory content: (1) discourses o f humanization*, 
(2) institutional discourses and (3) discourses o f identity (see Figure 9). Firstly, HPs 
live within dialogical dilemmas between humanizing and institutional discourses, 
which compete to produce a view of what homelessness is. It is out of this struggling 
relation that discourses o f  identity containing representations about the identity of the 
homeless person emerge. Discourses of humanization, which seek to preserve the 
homeless person as a holistic human being appeared linked to HPs’ role as 
communicators and educators of the public, politicians and the media. Their 
campaigning battle against the otherization of the homeless claims an idealist ethical 
encounter with ‘the other’ through practices of understanding and healing as the first
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step in a moral commitment to them. In constructing discourses of humanization HPs 
enter a contradictory dialogue with the rhetoric of victimization, which is anchored in 
images of deficiency and incompleteness of the homeless and is expressed in 
practices of judging and curing. Institutional discourses reflect the dilemmas lived by 
HPs in their everyday work. These concern the struggle to free themselves from the 
pressures to conform to the institutional discourse of funding bodies, mainly the 
government, and their efforts to sustain the humanizing ethos of the voluntary sector 
and their role as critical advocates of the homeless. They express claims of 
independence and self-agency to put into practice their agenda and ethical mission 
against the pragmatic needs of the job and the wish for the development of the 
voluntary sector as a professional industry. The clashes between discourses of 
humanization and institutional discourses and their respective internal contradictions 
are played out in an ultimate representation of who the homeless person is that 
emerges through discourses of identity. This surfaces as competing representations of 
the identity of the homeless, who emerges simultaneously as someone tom between 
being objectified and victimised or ontologically recognised as a whole human being.
The dynamics of HPs’ polyphasic knowledge are characterized by dilemmatic 
dialogue between these three contradictory and co-existing themes. Hence, their 
representational field is constructed through manifold dialogues with others and 
against a background of constant contradiction and dilemmas between: (a) the 
approach of the voluntary sector grounded in a humanizing view of the homeless as a 
whole person, (b) the statutory sector’s tendency to victimize and objectify the 
homeless through practices of curing, labelling the homeless and pushing them into 
official categories (c) wanting to sustain the ethical approach of the voluntary sector 
based on practices of healing and understanding, and (d) the pragmatics of everyday 
work in the industry, which implies sacrificing ethos and having to adjust to the 
definitions and approaches of others (public funding, the government and statutory 
professionals).
Rear/Front-line locations
For both rear-line and front-line HPs, the three themes are interwoven with 
each other forming a patchwork of arguments and contra-arguments, that unfold 
through the positioning and re-positioning of the ego towards multiple dialogical
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others and their views on homelessness. In the process of re-presenting homelessness, 
both rear/front-line HPs draw on symbolic resources from daily work practices; 
stories about clients, the public, statutory/media representations and daily struggles 
to defend the ethos of the voluntary sector. There are minor differences between 
front and rear line HPs’ knowledge content and processes.
There are clear indications of how the positioning from which the person 
speaks in the dialogue frames what is said. Rear-line and front-line are locations that 
provide different experiences of the phenomena of homelessness. And it is this 
difference of experience what explains divergence in representations and knowledge. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, difference in job practices and location is translated into 
difference in the constellations of dialogue in which the ego is engaged. If we 
understand this within the framework of the dialogical triad (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), 
then we see how different constellations of Ego-Alter-Object-Project result in 
different representations. This explains how divergence of experiences due to 
different contextual and relational locations, are the key to understand differences in 
knowledge. Whilst rear-line HPs present an intellectualised and ‘second-hand’ 
discourse about homelessness, those working on the front-line convey their direct 
experience of the one-to-one dialogue with the homeless person.
Whilst rear-line HPs theorize about, communicate and mediate between the 
homeless world and the outside world, front-line HPs participate in the inside o f  the 
homeless world. Jovchelovitch (1995) has indicated how ‘This difference between 
the knowledge developed about, and the knowledge of, the vivid experience leads to 
the issue of the creation of different representations according to the distinct locus of 
the participants in the social fabric.’ (p.133, emphasis my own). Rear-line HPs’ 
processes of re-presenting homelessness are marked by policy and the discourse that 
both the voluntary sector and the organization use in communicating to the outside 
audience. Policy lobbying discourse, public campaign slogans and the organization’s 
mission statements permeate their accounts. They seem to engage more with 
institutional discourses than with discourses of humanization. They also fall more 
frequently into processes of victimization, which might be used as rhetorical devices 
in their campaigning, funding and policy lobbying. In general, they talk about 
campaigning, advocating, lobbying policy change, communicating about and raising
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funds for the homeless. Their representations of homelessness are, for the most part, 
iconic and general.
Front-line HPs’ talk, by contrast, shows a rather more ‘phenomenological’ 
discourse and a greater ability to draw on the voice of clients and particular 
experiential examples as resources in the production of knowledge. Their 
representations are far more personal, intimate and particular. Their talk is permeated 
by the particular; names, personal experiences of clients, and the everyday practices 
that they develop with them. Because they are in dialogue with clients, they seem to 
be more aware of their own work practices and their impact on the homeless person. 
They tend to draw more on discourses of humanization and their attitude towards the 
homeless is tougher and less victimizing. They express a greater ability to engage in 
a brotherhood relation with the homeless, rather than in one of ‘rescuer-victim’. This 
is because there is an inexorable recognition of the individual agency of the homeless 
person and no need to ‘sell’ the cause to the outside audience. Below I present in 
more detail the internal dynamics of each one of the discourses found.
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Figure 9: Dialogical co-existence of poly phasic themes.
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5.2.1. Discourses of Humanization.
Humanization, which co-exists in paradox with a rhetoric of victimization, 
was the overwhelming discourse that spontaneously and reiteratively arose in the 
interviews. The opposition between humanization and victimization is central to 
HPs’ representations of homelessness. On the one hand, there is a rhetoric of moral 
commitment to the homeless that, in asserting their human dignity and wholeness, 
seeks to liberate them from representational violence undermining otherizing 
representations that reduce them to problems. The defence of the need to ethically 
relate to the homeless, which is regarded as the ultimate condition for their re­
integration into society, constitutes a dominating rhetorical trend. On the other hand, 
interviewees’ talk paradoxically discloses a co-existing rhetoric of victimization in 
which the homeless are otherized, pitied and represented as voiceless and 
disempowered. This conflict stems from the clash between different understandings 
of homelessness sustained by different systems of knowledge and sectors of society 
(common sense, policy, the media, the voluntary sector and the inner reality of 
homelessness), which are experienced first hand at the various interfaces and 
relationships in which HPs are located. In those locations, in communicative 
interaction with these groups through work practices, press releases, public 
awareness campaigns, responses to policy and partnerships with the statutory sector, 
HPs’ social representations emerge and change.
5.2.1.1. Moral Commitment & Victimization.
There is a paradoxical call for moral commitment to the homeless, which is 
justified through a humanizing discourse that asserts their dignity and holistic nature. 
This rhetoric co-exists alongside a discourse of pitying them, which represents them 
as ‘vulnerable’ and ‘lacking’. This is anchored in images of deficiency and 
incompleteness. The confronting dialogue between commitment and victimization is 
represented in the dynamics of inclusion-exclusion of the homeless from the world of 
‘us’; the ‘mainstream’. On the one hand, the recognition of them as subjects instead 
of as objects of violent representations seeks to undermine reductionistic, 
stigmatising and homogenising representations of the homeless. On the other hand,
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the group of HPs is a community of champions and representatives of the homeless, 
and it is through victimization that they achieve compassion for the homeless from 
the outside world.
7 think the phrase ‘homelessness’ has the capacity to, I  can't think o f  the word... I  
can't think o f any other word but dehumanize, has the capacity to dehumanize those 
who are labelled with it to just, to mean that they're just a problem and not a 
person. ’ Rear P4
‘But being able to see dignity in people is, is a very different thing, which is a really 
valuable thing for any o f  us, for us to learn is that even in people that you don't like 
who, that, that you can point to, where you see, see qualities that you just don't like 
about them, you still need to see the dignity in that person, to see that they are 
actually a human being, that they as well as having, negative traits that they're not 
all negative. And that's what I  really respect about homeless sector staff, that despite 
seeing all the negative things and being, being real to them rather than pretending 
they're not there, as well as seeing those negatives things, they have to see the 
positive as well because you have to see the positive to be able to work with people. ’ 
Rear P6
‘Part o f  the problem fo r  Government workers that work with the homeless is they get 
so fa r removed from a person as a person. You know, they just become a statistic 
Front P3
The rhetoric o f commitment is permeated by images of the homeless as 
integrated persons comprised of both negatives (lacks, problems) and positives 
(potentialities). This comprehensive approach, which is claimed to be an essential 
quality of HPs’ devotion to homelessness, is regarded as the sine qua non for 
homeless people’s inclusion into society. The unfolding of this rhetoric is permeated 
by criticisms to lay people’s and government’s objectification of the homeless and 
statutory professionals inability to see their dignity and human nature. All 
interviewees voiced critiques to reductionistic statutory funded services (i.e. hostels) 
for not taking into account an holistic view of the person, and hence perpetuating the
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vicious cycle of homelessness. Ultimately, this rhetoric seeks to defend HPs’ 
humanizing attitude and comprehensive approach as ethical social responsibility.
‘A lot ofpeople loose that, and they loose a big sense o f themselves. And, because the 
process o f physically not having a home is difficult to have, ... build up self-esteem. 
It's difficult then to interact with other people, so the more isolated and entrenched in 
what you haven't got, rather than building and using what you have got, or what you 
possibly want to have, and work on that. So, I  think I  would say homelessness also 
involves like a negative view o f  yourself and a negative cycle. ’ Front PI
‘But I'm sure the people who work with homeless people are driven by the same 
sense o f  compassion that many people are in the homeless sector. ’ Rear P4
The examples show how HPs’ moral dedication to the homeless is 
paradoxically intertwined with an emphasis of homeless people’s misfortunes and 
sufferings. They reveal a clash between moral commitment and victimization. The 
negatives of the homeless refer not only to physicality but also to the socio- 
psychological, which points to the lack of connection to social sources from which a 
sense of self-esteem, self-worth and feeling of belonging emerge. The ideal of moral 
commitment co-exists with compassion, which in turn leads to victimization. Hence, 
paradoxically, HPs seem to engage, at points, in the same processes of perpetuation 
of homelessness that they criticise institutional bodies for.
5.2.1.2. Understanding & Judging.
The conflict between humanization and victimization is also played out 
within practices, which appear as the conflict between understanding and judging. 
On the one hand, there is a discourse that claims that in order to ethically address 
homelessness we need to dialogically understand their ontological experience. This 
discourse is linked to HPs’ struggle to advocate for the homeless and emerges 
intertwined with the rhetoric of moral commitment. On the other hand, there is an 
opposing judging rhetoric that represents homelessness as a life downwards and as a 
detrimental place for a human person to be. HPs talk about homelessness as a very
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damaging experience, and recognise that they would not like to be in that situation. 
Indeed, HPs’ work is driven by the compassion towards those ‘victims’ that are 
judged to be at the bottom of their personhood.
Understanding; here we have a central identification of homelessness with 
the ‘ being’ of the person, which is articulated in the form of a defence o f homeless 
people’s existential autonomy. In all the interviews there are claims of the need to 
listen to the voice of the homeless. These are manifested through the presence of 
allusions to ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’ of the homeless ‘personal’ experience. 
Widespread processes of ‘tagging’ the person with the ‘homeless label’ are counter­
claimed through assertions of the need to understand the way she makes sense of her 
own experience.
‘People are different and I  think there's a lack o f understanding from people who are 
in this mainstream, this big group o f ‘normal’ is the wrong word but this big group 
o f people, the people in mainstream society who are socially included it’s very hard 
to understand what drives somebody to sleep on the streets rather than go to 
somewhere they could get a bed, what drives somebody to take drugs, what drives 
somebody to wake up first thing in the morning and buy a can o f Tenants Super from  
the off-licence and go down to the park. I t’s very hard for people to understand. I  
think it's very hard to connect that to people, to explain that this could be you 
because they don’t see it as, ‘it could be you’. ’ Front P4
7 can ’.t tell you what sort o f life they lead because I  don’t understand. I've never been 
homeless, and I  would not disrespect those people by saying, 7 know what you’re 
going through ’. ’ Front P2
‘It's much harder to see this guy that owned his own business who had a heavy load 
o f bereavement at the same time, who's now trapped in a downward spiral. ’ Rear P4
The interviews are abound with examples like the ones above, which reveal 
the prevalent criticism to society’s taken for granted assumptions and lack of 
understanding of the homeless ontology. The criticisms are articulated in the form of
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a disclaim of the reduction of the person to her problems, and of contestations to the 
associated labels (i.e. ‘alcoholic’, ‘rough sleeper’, ‘homeless’). Living a ‘normal’ live 
does not legitimize us to claim an ‘objective’ understanding of the homeless 
experience. A defense of their existential autonomy serves as a mean to undermine 
attempts to establish a unique ‘objective’ representation of homelessness through 
statutory legal definitions, or through commonsensical representations. The 
phenomenological nature of homelessness casts light on the impossibility of any 
‘objective’ measurement of the homeless experience. The discursive path is from a 
critique of an unethical and impossible ‘truthful’ representation of homelessness to a 
claim of the need to dialogically understand the homeless personal experience.
Judging -There is a common denominator amongst all homelessness 
experiences. All imply a movement ‘downwards’, are intricately comprised of a 
myriad of problems, and have a damaging effect on the person’s soul. Homelessness 
tends to be related to a vicious circle of drugs and mental health and is represented as 
a world of suffering. So it would be unethical not to rescue the victim from this 
world. Rescuing is indeed the reason for HPs to exist. Here the paradox becomes 
evident, as they engage in the very same process of determinism and reductionism of 
the homeless experience that they criticize. The immediate association that comes to 
their mind when thinking on homelessness is that this is a world from which one 
needs to escape. Their words convey a right to decide what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and to 
impose a representation of what is ‘beneficial’ for human beings. However, this 
discourse dilemmatically co-exists alongside a claim for the need to understand their 
ontology, listening to their voices and feelings.
‘It's just a very sad fact, that a lot o f  our clients, i f  they make it past 50 or 60 having 
been out on the street fo r  a long time, they're doing very well. Yeah. It's, it's life 
experience and it's awful... ’ Front P3
‘Now it means someone who doesn't have the opportunities that I've had to make the 
most o f  themselves and to live what we would call a ‘normal ’ life. You know. To 
study, to get qualifications, to get a job, to make friends, all these things that are very 
difficult i f  you have a, a background that involves homelessness or living in care or, 
you're involved with the criminal justice system Rear PI
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5.2.1.3. Healing & Curing.
The function of HPs as a ‘footbridge’ for the homeless towards self- 
actualization and rebuilding their ‘trusting’ relationship with society; the inexorable 
tendency to cure the vulnerable: such a dilemma manifested itself in the course of the 
interviewees’ talk. These are the dialectics between two opposing approaches to 
homelessness; ‘healing’- companionship, humane treatment, empowerment- and 
‘curing - institutionalism and victimization. The former, which is much more 
prevalent in front-line practitioners, is related with the ideal of the HP, the later with 
the pragmatics of everyday work, the industry and ultimately institutional discourses. 
Rear-line HPs showed a stronger and more direct tendency to engage in a defence of 
curing and when claiming healing it was done in a much more veiled way.
Healing - The rhetoric of healing functions as a counter-claim to the statutory 
discourse of curing and is inherently linked to the rhetorics o f moral commitment and 
understanding. Healing is the HPs’ ideal approach to deal with homelessness and it 
is based on an holistic personalized approach that attempts to deal with the whole 
person, rather than only with physical conditions. In such a practice HPs function as 
a footbridge for the homeless towards self-actualization and rebuilding their trusting 
relationship with society. It resembles the Rogerian’s therapeutic ‘helping 
relationship’ (Rogers, 1995) founded on companionship and humane treatment. It 
requires self-identification with the homeless rather than judgemental attitudes from 
the side of the helper. It connotes the agency of the homeless person to be able to 
cross the abysm that excludes her from society. The supportive relationship is 
represented as ‘doing with the clients, rather than doing for  the clients’. It demands 
their ‘self-determination’, ‘responsibility’ and volition to engage in the journey. 
Along the unfolding of the rhetoric of healing, interviewees defend and recognize 
their own expertise, which is seen as having ‘the knowledge o f  how to engage in 
this relationship through a ‘real understanding of the client’s needs’. Interviewees 
demonstrate being driven by an internal motivation to work with the homeless, who 
are claimed to be an object of passion and unconditional commitment.
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‘I f  you come at somebody accepting them as being essentially no different from you 
and asking them what they want, what it is that you can do to help, then I  think that's 
likely to be far more successful. I  think it's more practical, a more efficient way o f 
working with people [...] I'm talking about working with people a lot. Like I  said, 
essentially my job in terms o f when it was frontline was getting on with people more 
than working with them. It wasn't my job to change somebody's life. ’ Front P4
HPs are constructed as a ‘footbridge’ in supporting homeless people towards 
their reintegration into society and path towards self-actualization. Homeless people 
are depicted as ‘having lost the sense of self. Hence, the rhetoric of healing defends 
the need of a process that leads towards becoming a whole person. This implies ‘re­
developing’, and ‘re-discovering potentialities and skills’ that one had before 
homelessness. Being flexible and unconditional are key qualities of this support. The 
meaning of ‘home’ is drawn upon in order to contest commonsensical and policy 
views of homelessness as ‘houseless’/‘roofless’ and to criticize statutory funded 
services framed within this definition. ‘Home-less-ness’ is reconstructed as an issue 
of lacking a ‘home’, which conveys a recognition of its socio-psychological nature. 
‘Home’ is represented as both a ‘passport’ to the social world and a re-connection to 
the self. The HPs is regarded as executing the function of the lacked home through 
the support relationship. ‘Home’ refers to the ‘family’ and hence constitutes the first 
place of socialization and source of multiple feelings. ‘Home’ is represented as 
having meaningful social relationships, as a source of self-definition, self-esteem, 
security, permanence, trust and of belonging to a community.
‘...buildingpeople's self-esteem, building their social confidence, giving them things 
to do but giving them opportunities to grow and to develop skills or rediscover skills 
they'd forgotten they had... Trying to bring people back into mainstream society and 
give them a place there. Pulling them away from the margins in which they existed 
because o f all these problems, dealing with the problems but also trying to give them 
a boost, give them a push back in, being positive about it and looking about what 
achieve, helping them to achieve it rather than looking at what their problems are 
and just addressing those problems.' Front P4
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Curing - Co-existing with healing, but more veiled, is an opposing judging 
rhetoric that represents homelessness as a life downwards, a vicious circle of 
problems related to drugs and mental health, from which one needs to be cured. 
(Dis)empowerment, (in)action, (in)capability, (sub)ordination: these notions of the 
homeless person are evoked when the rhetoric of victimisation claims the need of 
curing. As opposed to the approach of healing, which recognises agency, inaction 
and subordination, rooted in incapability, expose the condition of the homeless under 
processes of curing. These notions represent the homeless as weak, needy, voiceless 
and indefensible, and tell us about the need to ‘do for’ the person instead of ‘with’ 
the person. These representations are translated into work practices, in which HPs 
paradoxically incorporate the institutional discourse- of ordination and establishing 
what is ‘convenient’- to their ideal of understanding, moral commitment, and healing. 
The examples below show how HPs also fall into judging practices that otherize the 
homeless:
‘Now it means someone who doesn't have the opportunities that I've had to make the 
most o f  themselves and to live what we would call a ‘normal’ life. You know. To 
study, to get qualifications, to get a job, to make friends, all these things that are very 
difficult i f  you have a, a background that involves homelessness or living in care or, 
you're involved with the criminal justice system. ’ Rear PI
‘Maybe fo r me it's time that I  got another job. It's the same things I  saw when I  
started work. You can be working for the same people like in five years time going 
through the same issues. ’ Front PI
5.2.2. Institutional Discourses.
This discourse shows HPs’ dynamic conflict between putting into practice the 
ethics of the voluntary sector, and the simultaneous need to adjust to the 
representations and practices defined by government and private funding bodies. 
What appears as central is the dialogue between on the one hand, claims of agency
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and on the other hand, contestation to and justification of having to conform to 
others’ agenda. This discourse, which is expressed through argumentative talk, 
shows very well the dynamics of contradiction and conflict at work. Institutional 
discourses are constituted by the daily struggle of the HP, which is rooted in the 
dilemma between on the one hand, the voluntary sector as an industry with a 
profitable nature, which demands professionalism and productivity and on the other 
hand, its ethical mission. Consequently, there is a dialogical co-existence of two 
competing versions of job responsibility and identifications of HPs as both critical 
advocates and contractors of the statutory sector. This paradox, which is rooted in the 
co-existence of job guidelines of conflicting nature, unfolds through an opposing 
dyad of representations of the homeless as both ‘clients / social cause’ and ‘products’ 
of the voluntary sector. The co-existence of this contradiction is another example of 
cognitive polyphasia, and expresses the dynamics of HPs’ work, where practicing the 
ethos of the voluntary sector is appropriate under certain circumstances, and 
adjusting to the approaches of the statutory sector and following governmental 
measures of progress in terms of ‘hard indicators’ are justified as adequate in the 
context of the industry. In both cases, conforming to the statutory framework is an 
exigency of the pragmatics of their job since the voluntary sector depends on 
statutory funding.
5.2.2.1. Ethics & Pragmatics.
The struggles that HPs experience at work between self-agency and 
submitting to instituted practices are reflected in the dialogue between ethics and 
pragmatics. Interviewees manifest an explicit conflict between identifications with 
the ethos of the voluntary sector and feelings of responsibility towards the agenda of 
the statutory sector. On the one hand, there is a discourse that through humanization 
expresses profound responsibility to the voluntary ethos as the ultimate reason to 
work in the sector. On the other hand, there is a co-existing discourse on the 
pragmatics of the industry, which demands productivity. The sector has evolved from 
having a non-profitable nature to an ‘industry’ that seeks growth and whose product 
is the homeless. This version of job responsibility is emptied of any ethical meaning, 
since it seeks to merely respond to job targets instituted by others. Adjusting to such 
work practices is justified through the victimization of the homeless. The
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contradictory character of working for the statutory sector and the desperate attempts 
to remain both ‘grassroots’ and independent. This paradox unfolds through an 
opposing dyad of representations of the homeless as both clients/social cause and 
products of the voluntary sector.
HPs as critical advocates /  The homeless as clients and social cause.
In defending themselves from the imposition of the statutory agenda, HPs 
claim the homeless to be ‘the’ clients, and ‘the’ social cause of the voluntary sector. 
This discourse functions as a justificatory rhetorical device put to use to defend the 
self-agency and practice of their ethos. Inasmuch as the interviewees profoundly 
identify with the ethos of the voluntary sector, they claim a fundamental client- 
centred approach, disclosing a profound sense of responsibility to the homeless as 
clients, which is articulated through a rhetoric of healing. This approach conflicts 
with the statutory agenda. On the one hand, HPs are recognised for their one-to-one 
support work with their clients. On the other hand, they are associated with 
‘amateurism’ by the statutory agenda, which privileges ‘resource-led’ rather than 
‘needs-led services’. The clash is between services driven by the ethos of the 
voluntary sector; focused on needs, client-centred, and services guided by the 
instituted practices of the statutory sector, resources. Here, the advocating role of the 
HP is justified through a discourse of understanding the needs of the homeless and a 
critique of the lack of resources and moral commitment of both the government and 
the public.
7 think that the housing officer's as having to put limits because they, they’re like a 
gateway and they must have targets, they must have set resources and, so they must 
have to be restricted on some level. Whereas when you’re on the side o f  the fence that 
I ’m on, you don’t have to put those restrictions. In fact, you’re fighting to do the 
opposite and so our approach from a work point o f  view is going to be different. ’ 
Rear P5
‘There is conflict basically between, organizations like [X agency] and 
organizations, and local authority housing departments. There is a conflict because, 
we, [X agency] constantly supports and represents clients who are basically in 
conflict with a housing department's decision and so, or that they may be evicting
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them, or that they're refusing to give them a house or... So, there is a conflict. ’ Rear 
P5
‘How do we as a society, such a wealthy society, allow homelessness to carry on. 
Why haven't we solved it? ’ Rear P6
The defence of the ethos of the voluntary sector, the right to put to practice 
their own agenda through claiming that the homeless are ‘their’ clients; co-exists 
with a complementary representation of homelessness as a social cause. Within this 
discourse, HPs exist in togetherness with the homeless outside ‘the system’. The 
former due to an alternative agenda, and the later due to a ‘different’ way of life. On 
the one hand, a claim of the homeless as clients of the voluntary sector serves to 
defend their ethos. On the other hand, claims of homelessness as ‘the’ social cause of 
the voluntary sector are rhetorically put to use in order to justify HPs’ criticisms to 
the lack of both statutory resources and social commitment from the mainstream (the 
government and society). In the sense that HPs are the only ones that are morally 
committed to the social cause, their ethos and independent practices are justified. 
HPs’ criticism of the lack of responsibility within the mainstream, regarding a 
problem that is rooted in society, seeks to accomplish a justification of their 
invaluable role in fighting for this social cause. HPs act as critical advocates, 
contesting public’s meanings, and pressurizing and fighting over the government’s 
legal definitions and approaches to homelessness (i.e. homelessness as 
‘bureaucracies’, ‘tick in boxes’ and ‘statistics’). Interviewees regard lobbying policy 
change as one of their main roles in order to be loyal to the voluntary ethos and for 
the sector not to work as a means in itself but as a means to fight for a social cause.
HPs as contractors /Homeless people as products.
Despite non-conformism HPs also declare the need to be submissive to the 
statutory client and its agenda. Representations of the homeless as clients and as 
social cause co-exist with conflicting representations of the homeless as products 
and the dilemmatic need to account for professionalism and productivity to the 
funding body (mainly statutory). This conflict is more common amongst rear-line 
HPs due to their duty of communicating homeless to the outside world and having to 
account for productivity and outcomes within the frame instituted by the statutory
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client. Within this context the homeless is marketed and traded, sold and campaigned 
for with the aim of being funded. Interviewees re-present the homeless as ‘products' 
that need to be depicted as ‘needy’ in order to be pitied for through emotions. Here 
victimization of the homeless co-exists in polyphasic contradiction with the ethos of 
the voluntary sector. It is used as a rhetorical device in playing ‘the system’ (i.e. 
private and governmental funding bodies). There is underlying critical awareness of 
the fact that this leads to a process of objectification, through which the homeless 
become victims of their own needs. Adjusting to practices instituted by others and 
sacrificing the voice of the homeless is considered appropriate and justified as an 
essential survival strategy within the context of state funding, since this is the only 
way o f responding to the needs of the victim. Conforming to statutory bureaucratic 
guidelines is regarded as not affecting the identification with the ethos of the 
voluntary sector.
‘My job is trying to find out at a very basic level what, what a particular potential 
funder, what homelessness means to them. [...] But that in a way is the dilemma that 
I  think all fundraisers face and a lot o f your time, ... and, as I  said, your opinions 
don't really matter. ‘ Rear PI
‘Emotional blackmail, you know... (laughs) I  think for the funding, we had to do a lot 
o f work on showing what we call soft indicators. So, i f  an indication o f success for  
somebody was getting a job at one end (laughs), we've had to really look at, at the 
end, somebody gaining selfesteem, you know, attending group for the first time, 
attending a class or some work for the first time, somebody turning up for a session 
and not drinking for an entire day and then not drinking for two days, so it is kind o f  
showing up in all o f  those first steps in order to get this last step. We've been 
documenting, you know, and showing funders that our clients need to go through 
those five steps or we've got to think about those. ... yes, we will aim for so many 
percent ofpeople to be high achieving, to go into training or jobs, but we also want 
to be able to cater within that bid fo r  those soft outcomes as well. . . . ’ Front P3
Interviewees give meaning to their relation to the statutory sector as being 
submissive and anchored in images of incestuous-ness. In having the statutory sector 
as clients, HPs have to accommodate to legal definitions of homelessness and work
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within the bureaucratized agenda of the statutory sector. Consequently, they 
jeopardise their ethos and client. Submission is justified through a discourse of 
responsibility to the statutory client complemented by a self-representation of the 
voluntary sector as a ‘professional’ contractor. The prevailing discourse is one of 
disclaiming statutory’s agenda yet accepting it as a job responsibility and a way of 
being professionally accountable. Following statutory bureaucratic procedures such 
as ticking boxes, filling forms and counting the number of homelessness cases 
‘resolved’, is openly criticised since it constrains the voluntary ethos. It causes a loss 
of contact with the client as a person and jeopardizes one-to-one client work. 
Additionally, it impacts on the unit of the voluntary sector through stemming 
competition and lack of collaboration between agencies. Here, discourses of 
humanisation, understanding, and healing are used in order to contest the statutory 
agenda.
Constructions of homelessness in terms of statutory legal definitions and hard 
outcomes (i.e. a certain percentage of people becoming economically active) co­
exist along with those of the ethos of the voluntary sector, i.e. achieving ‘soft 
outcomes’ such as self-esteem and self-worth. These are considered to be a condition 
for achieving statutory ‘hard outcomes’. The following example shows how 
adjusting to institutional discourses jeopardizes the humanization of the homeless.
7 think that it's possible even that homeless professionals who don’t work with street 
homeless people, I  think that they might even have a, a double picture in their mind, 
you know. Homeless is that person sleeping on the street outside the tube station and 
then homeless is, you know, this person, you know, my client who has, you know, just 
come out o f  hospital or something. I'm referring to this project and I  need to call him 
homeless. And I  think they actually can mean two different things when I  say that 
because I  think that just like anyone they, they just slot the label on i f  it’s useful and 
doesn't actually necessarily mean that they see their clients as homeless. ’ Front P5
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5.2.3. Discourses of Identity.
The conflicting dialogue between discourses of humanization and 
institutional discourses in HPs’ representation of homelessness, is played out in a set 
of polyphasic co-existing representations and images of the identity of the homeless 
person. These are organized in terms of contradictions: ontology vs. objectification, 
whole vs. fragmented, resulting in a bifurcated identity. The dialogues constructing 
these plural and conflicting representations are, principally with the statutory sector 
but also with the mainstream public. These representations emerge through the 
processes of contestation to statutory and commonsensical representations of 
‘homelessnessHowever, discourses of identity clearly show the polyphasic nature 
of the representational field and how, paradoxically HPs’ are also holders of the 
multiple voices that objectify and fragment the homeless person.
5.2.3.1. Objectification & Ontology.
There is across all participants a rhetoric of disclaiming the objectification of 
the homeless label since it acts as a forced identity stigmatising and ultimately 
perpetuating the experience of homelessness. Through the rhetoric of humanization, 
understanding and healing, interviewees claim that freeing the homeless from the 
taken-for-granted meanings attached to the label is an essential element of the 
process of resolving homelessness. Using the label implies an external and internal 
process of social exclusion: external through prejudice, stigma and stereotyping 
sustained by the outside, and internal though self-identification and internalisation of 
the homeless label. This perpetuates the experience of homelessness imposing an 
identity that acts as a ‘jail’ beyond which the person cannot see herself. This forced 
identity perpetuates the homeless as an outsider, socially and psychologically. As 
stated by a participant:
‘It just, it is like a tag that seems to automatically come with a homeless person and 
you just think like well .... I  think that there are some assumptions o f  ‘yeah, he 
wouldn’t possibly f it  in. They are all like crazy hair, big beards, alcoholics’. You 
know. Often from people you think should really know better, you know, rather than 
something you know. ’ Front PI
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Objectification occurs through judgement and lack of understanding of the 
human nature and ontology of the person shaped by representations of the homeless 
as a deviant other. It is also sustained by statutory practices of tagging people with an 
official homeless category (i.e. unintentional homeless) required by mainstream 
welfare services. In being labelled, the person undergoes a process of alienation, is 
cut off from her past history and present experience loosing her sense of self and 
being excluded. Statutory definitions are criticised for ideologically instituting the 
meaning of the homeless experience whilst neglecting the person’s ontological 
experience. Through an imposition of statutory services framed within the legal label, 
the service user is enforced into cure; a ‘normal’ way of life that corresponds with 
the standards of ‘the system’. The real experience and needs of the person are not 
taken into account; she is put into a ‘resource-led’ instead of a ‘needs-led’ service. 
Despite being highly disclaimed, this process of objectification is also dilemmatically 
disclosed in the interviewees’ utterances. Hence, within HPs’ knowledge processes 
an otherizing discourse, which is typical of the mainstream, co-exists alongside a 
defence of the ontology of the homeless. HPs live within multiple spheres of the 
social fabric where in dialogue with members of different sectors co-construct 
representations of homelessness. Hence, the voices of these manifold others also 
speak through the voice of the HP.
‘And because I  think the phrase ‘homelessness ’ has the capacity to... I  can't think o f  
any other word but dehumanize, has the capacity to dehumanize, those who are 
labelled with it to just, to mean that they're just a problem and not a person. And I  
think i f  you're working with homeless people day to day, you can see through that. 
Yeah ’ Rear P4
‘That's what makes working with our client group really difficult. We are talking 
about a lot o f  people who are just, basically that you would, i f  you weren't at work 
you would say they're scumbags. ’ Rear P6
167
5.2.3.2. Fragmented & Whole.
Representations of the homeless as fragmented are expressed alongside 
humanizing counter-claims that defend the need to see the homeless as a whole 
human being. Certainly, interviewees manifest difficulties in finding ‘a definition of 
homelessness’ and broadly argue that its meaning embeds many different aspects of 
the person. Processes of fragmentation are argued to be founded on the disassociated 
approach of the agenda of the statutory sector. Experts from the statutory sector 
(doctors, psychiatric nurses, housing officers) are criticised for having an oblivious 
view of homelessness reduced to their specialist area. However, at points 
interviewees represent the homeless person in the light of particular aspects of their 
personhood and experience. They fragment her into her problems (addictions, mental 
health), visual images, physicality (roofless-ness), and the psychological (self-esteem, 
mental health). These co-existing representations emerge through the unreeling of the 
conflict between ethics and pragmatics.
‘And it's hard because different, different professionals have responsibilities for  
different parts ofpeople's lives then people's lives kind o f tend to get broken up into 
chunks and given to different people which is ridiculous because the poor person is 
in the middle and to them everything is all part o f one thing, you know, but, you 
know, different people are responsible for different things. ’ Front P5
Paradoxically HPs’ are holders and contesters of representations that 
fragment the homelessness. They are themselves in conflict with this fragmentation 
since it is based on the approach of the statutory sector and undermines their multi­
dimensional and holistic approach. This reveals the conflicting nature of their 
representational field and the multiple voices speaking through the voice of the HP in 
the construction of knowledge of homelessness.
5.2.3.3. Bifurcated.
In the course of disclaiming statutory approaches an intriguing representation 
of the homeless emerges. Statutory services are regarded as producing a bifurcated
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1identity that creates an impasse in the self. It alienates, confuses and positions the 
person in a state of existing in a ‘no man’s land’. Once inside the 
hostel/accommodation system the person is separated from her own peer-group or 
‘sub-society’, which is source of social identity, support and sense of community. 
She is removed from a source of identification and simultaneously put through an 
experience where she is tagged as ‘homeless’ and in need of a ‘cure’ to be ‘normal’. 
It is impossible to escape from the otherizing process: in offering the service there is 
an invitation to be normal, yet simultaneously there is the imposition of the label. 
Criticisms are voiced regarding the fact that these approaches constitute a false 
invitation to the ‘normal world’. Through offering the service they are ‘inviting’ 
them to be re-integrated into ‘normal’ society. However, by the same token they 
impose upon them the label, otherize and exclude them from ‘the system’. Hence the 
consequences are not only a bifurcated identity but also feelings of distrust and 
resistance to the outside world.
‘And when you think of, people moving into like rough sleeper flats .... They don't 
build them with the idea that people are going to change from the status o f  
homelessness into being a couple, having a family. When they want to make an 
exchange, they can’t, it's difficult for people to move. They have to move to another 
rough sleeper flat. They can't say, ‘but that's not me anymore’. Front PI
5.3. The Dynamics o f Knowledge Production.
5.3.1. The Dialogical Co-existence of Polyphasic Themes.
The meta-analysis of dialogues gives evidence of the socio-psychological, 
dialogical and dynamic nature of knowledge. It soon became clear that in the process 
of representing ‘homelessness’ each one of the voices interviewed spoke through 
internal dialogues with multiple others representing the statutory sector, mainstream 
society, the homeless themselves, and an ‘ideal self that embodied the ethical 
commitment with the social cause and ontology of the homeless. Interviewees 
created multiple dialogues shifting positionings in their engagement in arguments
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and contra-arguments with symbolic dialogical co-authors, predominantly, those on 
the other side of the divide of homelessness. Due to the intricate intertwining of the 
multiplicity of voices and positionings a clear-cut delimitation of these was 
unfeasible. In this section I discuss the general pattern of dialogues and the manifold 
positionings taken up by interviewees as responses towards dialogical others along 
discourses o f humanization and institutional discourses (see Figure 10). The dynamic 
shifting of positionings and the matrix of voices in dialogue that constitute them is 
played out in discourses o f  identity.
The prevailing discursive paths taken in the narratives are; firstly, a 
contestation to government and public views of homelessness, secondly, a defence of 
the community of the voluntary sector through claiming the value of its ethos and 
approaches and criticising the statutory agenda, and thirdly, a justification of the 
adjustment to the definitions and agenda of others (the mainstream). These discursive 
paths unfolded through a juggling of multiple positionings through which different 
discourses were put to use as rhetorical devices for justifying, explaining and 
claiming in response to the dialogical other. Interviewees eclectically put to use 
different and sometimes conflicting meanings and forms of knowledge such as; the 
ethos and mission statements of the voluntary sector/organization, policy, common- 
sensical, job specific and professional experience-based knowledge of the homeless 
client. Their movements across different dialogues and positions express the plurality 
of the types of knowledge at once used, constructed and re-constructed by HPs as 
they make sense of homelessness in their different locations and relationships with 
others in the public sphere. These results ultimately show how within one community, 
people think in polyphasic ways drawing on different knowledges that they ‘borrow’ 
from dialogical others.
Discourses o f  Humanization.
The co-existence of the conflicting themes of humanization and victimization 
becomes clear as HPs speak of themselves as ‘ idealistic’ and fellow human beings o f  
the homeless brother’, towards the ‘cruel and ignorant’ public and statutory 
‘experts’ (doctors, psychiatric nurses, policy officers), while at the same time re­
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positioning themselves as ‘knowledgeable professionals ’ who are 1 representatives o f  
the homeless as disempowered victims in need of compassion from the outside 
world. Hence, by moving across these positions, interviewees defend the moral need 
of an experience of brotherhood with the homeless and contest the violent 
representations held by the mainstream. Paradoxically they also victimize the 
homeless representing them in their self-destructiveness. On the one hand, this 
strategy of juggling different positions and voices, allows them to reassert the 
truthfulness of the humanizing rhetoric and the defence of the homeless person as an 
ontological being. On the other hand, it allows them to sustain practices, such as 
fundraising and campaigning for the homeless. Cognitive polyphasia here becomes a 
resourceful asset that allows to eclectically use discourses of humanization and 
victimization to respond to different needs and demands to deal with the problem. 
Front-line HPs more explicitly and frequently positioned themselves as fellow  
human beings o f the homeless ’. Their daily work in one-to-one relation with clients, 
explains the greater accessibility to the voice of the homeless.
Institutional Discourses.
By positioning themselves as '’defiant nonconformist grass roots ’ members of 
the voluntary sector and as '‘idealistic H Ps\ interviewees claim the homeless client 
as their ultimate aim and invoke an emancipating and liberating counter-agenda to 
the one of the statutory sector. Here the significant others that are responded to are 
both the '’bureaucratized and careless government', and the '’socially irresponsible 
p u b l i c This is often put to practice through public awareness campaigns and critical 
responses to policy consultations. It is here particularly, where front-line 
interviewees, voice the ‘homeless brother’ in order to justify criticisms of statutory 
services.
Another important aspect that emerges in the oppositions found in 
institutional discourses is the claim HPs make of their own expertise vis-a-vis the 
expertise of the professionals of the statutory sector. The rhetorical aim is to contest 
statutory experts’ views of the voluntary sector as amateur and present themselves as 
highly professional. This is yet another battle that HPs have to fight in their daily 
practice when working in partnership with statutory experts from the NHS, housing
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and benefit departments, since there is low recognition of their work from the main 
statutory welfare agencies (Wames et al., 2003). Despite HPs position as ‘members 
o f the voluntary homeless sector’ and ‘victims o f institutional power’ attempting to 
put into practice their ethos, they also dilemmatically re-position themselves as 
‘professional experts o f the homeless industry (contractors) ’ in order to respond to 
the ‘scrutinizing government’. In shuffling between positions, where the homeless 
are not invited to the dialogue, they accomplish a discursive practice of defence of 
their professionalism and justification of the sacrifice of their ethos and their 
subordination to institutional practices.
The dialogues contained in discourses o f  humanization and institutional 
discourses are played out in a polyphasic representation of who the homeless person 
is. See the example below:
‘Some people get jaded and quite cynical about it. I  think there are some very 
committed individuals. I  think i t ’s probably more in the voluntary sector because it 
tends to allow more individualistic behaviour, allow more opportunities. So i t’s, a lot 
o f people who are in it for commitment type reasons. And I  think most people view 
homelessness as a social problem, as a housing problem. Recently people see it as a 
result o f  drugs. Mental health has been around for a long time and I  suppose 
homelessness has been recognised fo r  a long time. But I  think people have seen it 
rather as a failure o f the system to treat people or to provide the support they needed 
in their housing and that’s why they become homeless rather than as part o f  the 
mental health condition. And that they were getting the wrong sort o f  treatment and 
that’s why they became homeless. The same as a lot o f  our clients are seen as not 
being... compliant... and i t’s seen that they’re... part o f  their mental illness is that 
they won’t go to hospitals, they won’t attend appointments, they won’t take their 
medication. But i t ’s often seen that, i t’s because the hospitals and the medication 
were the wrong treatment for them before so why should they go? I t ’s not seen as an 
addict choice. I  think there’s a tendency amongst professionals to loose respect for  
homeless people just through familiarity and through sort o f doing two different 
kinds o f jobs, rather than a relationship between individuals. And certainly I  think 
that’s true for me that I ’ve worked in management, I  had less and less to do with the 
individuals I  was working with. I  was dealing with categories o f  people rather than 
the individuals. And having gone back to work on the front-line with individuals and
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face-to-face casework, has made a big difference in my perception o f  the people I ’ve 
worked for. And I  think it’s very easy to loose track o f the fact that you’re working 
fo r homeless people rather than work in an organisation that works in homelessness 
and that therefore we work to raise funding, we work to develop, we work for this, 
that and the other personal issues and... so on. A lot o f our life is managing ... But 
i t’s, so easy to forget and I  think we do sometimes forget. But certainly here we’ve 
got managers who are really clear about the fact that they work for homeless people 
and they really want to do something to help those people ’ Rear P8
This fragment shows a double-voiced discourse (Bakhtin, 1981) in which 
there is an orchestration of multiple voices of others that are internally dialogised. 
When criticising the bureaucratized statutory agenda and defending the practices and 
ethos of the voluntary sector, the interviewee is both positioned as a ‘defiant 
nonconformist grass roots ’ member of the voluntary sector and as an ‘idealistic H P’ 
speaking towards the ‘bureaucratized and careless government’ (NHS staff). The 
rhetorical device to justify self-agency of the voluntary sector is a discourse on 
understanding and commitment. The practices of the voluntary ethos allow for 
commitment and the maintenance of the original passion towards homelessness. 
However, subordination to the instituted statutory agenda makes HPs ‘jaded and 
quite cynical’. What is heard through words such as ‘individualistic behaviour’ and 
‘opportunities’ is the discourse of healing, which co-exists with conflictive 
discourses of victimization through which the homeless person is fragmented into 
problems. The homeless is objectified and labelled as an ‘addict’. Paradoxically, the 
reader also hears the voice of the ‘defiant nonconformist grass roots ’ who defends 
the homeless client against the voice of the ‘cruel and ignorant ’ statutory 'expert ’. 
From this position the homeless person is de-humanized and blamed (for not being 
compliant to medication and not attending hospital appointments). The ‘professional 
expert o f  the homeless industry’ argues that the sector also needs to develop 
managerial activities and funding bureaucracies. For the ‘victim o f institutional 
power ’ and the ‘the idealistic s e lf  this means the sacrifice of the humanizing 
practices of the ethos of the voluntary sector.
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Figure 10: General patterns of dialogue.
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Discourses of
Humanization
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* Knowledgeable 
Professional.
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Institutional
Discourses
* Defiant nonconformist 
grass roots.
* Idealistic HP.
* The homeless brother.
* Members of the voluntary 
homeless sector.
^Victims of institutional
power.
* Professional experts of 
the homeless industry (contractors).
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Public.
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5.4. Participating and Observing.
In my ongoing participant-observation I was able to have informal chats with 
HPs , visit projects and attend conferences. Here I present accounts and observed 
practices that corroborate the content and dynamics of the representational field 
found in the interview data. Through the presentation of a blend of extracts from 
documents, informal interviews and transcribed materials from conferences I provide 
examples that illustrate the content of each of the major themes, and the plurality and 
contradiction, which applies both to the dynamics within each as well as to the 
dynamics between the themes. These illustrative accounts constitute some examples 
of the traces of voices of dialogical others, and the contradictions and clashes I 
encountered in the context where HPs’ work, where their knowledge of 
homelessness is produced and ‘crystallized’ in practices. In discussing this material, I 
hope I facilitate an understanding of how the discourses that emerged in the 
interviews are linked to the contested context of HPs’ work and to their social 
position within the network of inter-relations in which they are located in their 
everyday experience. When I present quotes or I make reference to narratives from 
informal discussions I draw on fieldnotes. These capture the essence of ideas and 
arguments rather than verbatim accounts. Some of the examples from conference and 
seminar discussions were audio-taped, thus, I have presented them under inverted 
commas.
5.4.1. Discourses of Humanization.
In both conferences and documents, I found a prevailing dilemmatic dialogue 
between humanization and victimization. The title of one of the conferences -  
‘Homelessness and Loneliness: Building Social Capital in the twenty-first Century’ -  
expresses how in engaging in discourses o f humanization HPs enter in an 
oppositional dialogue with the rhetoric of victimization. This title (and the content of 
the conference) tells us about the conflict between, on the one hand, representations 
of the homeless as the ‘excluded’ and ‘most vulnerable’ (keynote speaker) needing
36 Please note that all names of HPs have been changed to preserve participant anonymity.
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social bonding with the domiciled citizen, and on the other hand, including assertions 
of them as equal co-partners. Such competing and co-existing discourses emerged in 
their debates about social capital, which was constructed as key to the social 
inclusion of the homeless. They appeared associated with HPs’ role as advocates and 
educators of the public, politicians and the media. This conference organized by the 
voluntary sector was a forum for discussion between HPs, service users and statutory 
professionals. The presence of the last two groups was minimal in terms of number. 
However, for the group of the statutory other this was compensated by the fact that, 
the voluntary sector had invited many policy makers and MPs as key speakers in the 
main debates so that the voice of the voluntary sector could be ‘heard’. The titles and 
content of the debates were permeated by the voices of statutory others. They were 
framed by policies and governmental approaches and emerged as a response to the 
dominant statutory interlocutor.
There was in the debates a rhetoric of liberation of the homeless from the 
excluding and stigmatizing label. This was accompanied by a call to the public to be 
morally committed to the homeless. HPs were represented as the footbridge and 
companion in constructing the homeless’ trusting relationships with society and in 
overcoming social exclusion:
‘More than half of the people who come to X (Agency), when asked about their next 
of kin, say they have none [...] So building a shared identity that is not based on 
homelessness is very valuable.’ (HP1 chief executive). HP1 focused on the idea that 
meaningful relationships and tackling social isolation were central to the inclusion of 
homeless people.
‘Social Capital is an old idea reformulated. Strip away the academic language and we 
are talking about people and community. It is up to us to forge the kind of 
community that we want.’ (HP2 policy officer)
176
HP3 responded to the statutory other and blamed policies (ASBOS37) for excluding 
the homeless: ‘people awarded ASBOS are treated antisocially by the authorities.’ 
(Chief Executive HP3)
A contradictory discourse co-emerged more implicitly where the homeless 
were alienated and represented as unwanted, unloved and uncared victims:
‘What homeless people need is friends and loved ones.’ (HP3 policy officer)
The same contradictory discourses were found in the other conference- 
‘Employability Conference ‘A Job Worth Doing” - where the focus was on how to 
meet the employability needs of homeless people. Employment, which was anchored 
in images of the homeless as having agency and a voice, was constructed as a healing 
approach that leads to self-actualization. There was contestation to representations of 
employment as a short-term curing solution and as ‘hard’ outcomes;
In the pack given at the conference I found information that read: ‘The programme 
intended to find solutions that empower individuals to make informed choices, test 
routes out of inactivity and worklessness, and provide innovative and individual 
options’. This resonated with the concerns of many participants with the need to be 
flexible when employing allowing for personalized support.
Conference fieldnotes extract:
Participants constantly challenged stigmatization of the homeless and claimed the 
need to recognise them as equal human beings. Tackling prejudices at work was 
regarded as central for the success of their integration into society. However, 
inclusion co-existed with exclusion of the homeless. In the main debate: ‘Labour 
market equality begins at home’ (title), I heard lots of conflicting views about 
employing former service users in the voluntary sector. On the one had, there were 
arguments of the added value of their knowledge and experience to the sector. On the 
other hand, I heard comments from front-line HPs who were reluctant to have an ex-
37 ASBOS, Antisocial Behaviour Orders
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service user working with them because of lack of trust in how they would manage 
confidentiality.
In the other conference, I heard: ‘Go back to your own organisations and find out 
why you are not using homeless volunteers in your projects.’ (HP4)
5.4.2. Institutional Discourses.
The conflict between ethics and pragmatics emerged in many of the 
narratives that I encountered in the field. In both conferences, their critical advocacy 
for the social cause co-existed with identifications as contractors of the statutory 
client. In one of the seminars -  ‘Achieving customer care while trying to meet 
targets’- I could hear many claims of attempts to put into practice the voluntary 
ethical mission as opposed to the pragmatic requirements of the job.
‘This seminar will look at how outcomes required by funding bodies affect the ability 
of organisations to deliver service to homeless people.’ (Extract from Employability 
conference programme)
Within the seminar there were claims of the need of flexible funding that allows 
them to put into practice their own agenda. An HP contested funders’ definitions of 
employability. Someone else supported him and claimed: ‘There is a tension between 
funding requirements and meeting individual needs’ (HP6) and argued the need to 
challenge them since: employability for us is different.’ The seminar was closed by 
the facilitator commenting that voluntary agencies need to become more efficient in 
their lobbying role influencing government and funding bodies agenda (HP3).
However in order to survive in the context of state funding the measurement 
of the employability of the homeless (‘hard’ outcomes) is the condition imposed by 
the government. This statutory demand co-existed in conference narratives with the 
voluntary ethos of achieving ‘soft’ outcomes. I participated in a focus group session 
titled: ‘Measuring progress to employability’. On the one hand, ‘soft’ outcomes (i.e 
increase in self esteem) were advocated as central to the progress of the individual.
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On the other hand, ways of quantifying these, so that progress to employability could 
be demonstrated to funding bodies, were at the centre of their discussions. The 
dilemma between ethics and pragmatics also emerged during informal conversations 
with HPs in my field work:
Fieldnotes extract (20/10/04): Before starting the interview Pete explained how his 
organisation: ‘has become a corporation’ and pointed at the fact that whatever he was 
going to say in the interview, these were his personal views. He wanted to separate 
himself from the industry side of his organisation. (Rear-HP)
Fieldnotes extract (7/11/04): Before starting the interview with Susan, she said that in 
the interview she was going to: ‘stand as an individual’ and was not going to speak 
from the point of view of her job (marketing/funding) since this was very different to 
the way she saw homelessness. She explained how the way she had to talk about 
homelessness when communicating with an outside audience in order to get funding 
was framed by statutory and funding bodies’ representations of homelessness.
Contesting statutory approaches and pressurizing the government emerged as 
mandatory for the HP critical advocate. This is what I heard from conference 
participants (Social Capital Conference):
‘My challenge is to agitate with government but also to change public attitudes.’ 
(HP2)
‘The point of social capital is that we do things not because there is a business case, 
but because they are the right thing to do’ (HP6)
5.4.3. Discourses of Identity.
A set of co-existing representations of the identity of the homeless person 
emerged in spatial and verbalized narratives. These resonated with those that 
emerged out of the conflicting dialogue between discourses o f  humanization and 
institutional discourses in the interviews. During my data collection I visited projects
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where practices of spatial estrangement appeared as central to the organization of the 
service. In most of the projects there was a very strict access control (i.e chip identity 
cards) and physical separation between HPs and service users. The physical barriers 
(i.e. doors, walls, different entrances for staff) functioned as a symbolic remainder of 
the otherization and separation of the homeless from the mainstream citizen. I 
understand this as the ‘materialization’ of excluding and alienating representations of 
the homeless. This constitutes a practice of institutional exclusion that contradicts the 
discourses of humanization and ontological recognition of the homeless person 
characteristic of the mission statements of the organization and which I also observed 
being enacted by HPs. Representations of the homeless as an ontology emerged in 
their talk and also in the way they non-verbally communicated with service-users, 
locating close to them in a relaxing manner. Whenever I visited a project where the 
clients were around, HPs demonstrated a genuine interest in introducing me to them 
and did so in a very personalized way. What seems to emerge out of these competing 
verbal and material discourses is a representation of the homeless as tom between 
being included as an ontology and being excluded and objectified as an outsider.
In both conferences the objectification of the homeless through the use of the 
homeless label (‘ex-homeless’) frequently co-emerged with ontological claims of 
them as whole human beings. Participants contested representations of the homeless 
that split them into their problems, yet, one could also hear representations of the 
homeless person as fragmented.
‘Some messages portray people as a collection of needs and problems, [..] and that 
makes people more likely to have preconceptions that get in the way of building 
social capital.’ (HP2 referring to the government, Social Capital Conference)
Fieldnotes extract (24/09/04)
I had a coffee with George (HP11) and before starting the interview he told me he 
was very concerned with ‘the marginalization’ of the homeless and criticised public 
and policy views. However, he also told me how surprised he was that in his current 
project where homeless people are trained and work in a restaurant, they are doing 
better that what he had expected of them.
180
Fieldnotes extract (Social Capital conference)
Interestingly a representative that lives in a shantytown project resisted the homeless 
label claiming that there are no homeless people in his community. However, later 
on, when an HP speaker from the floor commented on the same project he used the 
‘homeless’ label saying that the project is a model where ‘homeless people’ can help 
themselves. He also added that housing is the answer to homelessness. Picking up on 
that point another HP argued that homelessness is not about housing. He said that he 
did not agree that giving a house to everyone is the solution to homelessness.
Glimpses of the bifurcated identification of the homeless person emerged in 
the accounts of one participant. He had a former long-term homelessness experience 
and now worked as an HP. According to him his actual work had helped him 
personally to move on. However, he claimed that the problem was that ‘people keep 
labelling me as ‘ex-homeless” . Indeed, in the employability conference the 
bifurcated identity of the homeless was expressed as one of the main concerns of 
employing ex-service users within homeless agencies:
Fieldnotes extract (Employability conference):
Participants were worried about issues of perpetuation of the homelessness identity 
when volunteering or working in the voluntary sector. They talked about the 
importance of them moving out of the sector as an essential step towards 
reintegration. Someone argued that jobs within the sector needed to be limited so that 
they can move on and: ‘don’t become institutionalised’ (HP9)
Fieldnotes extract (Social Capital conference):
An HP speaker explained how at a course he ran for clients, the carrier bags were 
really valuable because they bestowed them with an identification as ‘students’ rather 
than ‘homeless’ or ‘mental health patient’.
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5.5. Conclusions.
The analysis of the interviews reveals that HPs’ knowledge of homelessness 
is polyphasic and contains co-existing and conflicting themes. These oppositional 
themes, rather than being mutually exclusive, live side by side in multiple dialogues, 
in which the person takes different positions and puts to use competing discourses 
through which, they propose their versions of ‘homelessness’. In putting to use 
discourses, HPs negotiate, challenge and/or contest the meaning of ‘homelessness’ 
held by other interest groups with whom they intersect. HPs have the potential to 
question and contest reified forms of knowledge and the practices they contain, and 
are able to adopt a more comprehensive and individualised relationship with their 
client.
HPs’ internal dialogues are an excellent example of how people can handle 
divergence and conflict of ways of thinking. The plurality of themes of their 
representational field operate as an asset from which HPs can draw the resources to 
deal with the contradictions and challenges of the contested context in which they 
work. HPs’ state of cognitive polyphasia is sharply shaped by the context of 
definitional clashes and conflicting approaches between the statutory and voluntary 
sectors. The content and dynamics of their knowledge express the multiple networks 
of interaction with others and the struggle through which they construct what 
homelessness is and who the homeless person is.
Representations of homelessness held by HPs are simultaneously about being 
otherized, judged and reduced to problems and being understood as a whole human, 
about being objectified through the label and having ontological right and deserving 
a personalized approach, about being fragmented through reductionistic and 
compartmentalized services and being comprehensively treated, about being cured 
and being accompanied along the healing process towards self-actualization and re­
development of potentialities, about being a social cause of the voluntary sector and 
being a product of the industry. The co-existence of internal oppositions reveal HPs’ 
everyday struggle to define the problem, to provide support to the homeless and the 
impasses related to the identity and life experience of this vulnerable group. 
Ultimately, the dilemmas and contradictions between different knowledges, values
182
and practices within their representational field, express the complexity of the 
homelessness phenomena.
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6. SOCIALLY REPRESENTING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND 
DIALOGICALLY CO-CONSTRUCTING AN IDENTITY.
This chapter provides the analysis of the data collected from the four focus 
groups conducted with different ‘natural’ categories of HPs: (1) Outreach workers, (2) 
Training & development workers, (3) Mental health & drug misuse workers, (4) 
Project managers/directors of programs. The aim was to observe the production, 
negotiation and circulation of social representations in a social scenario designed to 
simulate the context where the different groups would naturally interact. Within the 
four focus groups, my role was to facilitate a discussion, observe the ensuing debate 
and to ensure that they covered the guide to the topics.
My main concern was to allow the voices of specific subgroups to be 
expressed, as I believed that by sharing and debating their experiences within a social 
setting, they would express the heterogeneity of their work and hence reveal the 
intricacy of their relationship to it. Thereby, in discussing the findings I do not seek 
to generalize the results, but instead to look at the content and dynamics of 
knowledge production within the social scenario that resembles the work setting of 
four groups of professionals whose role is relevant to the service provision of the 
voluntary sector (See Chapter Four for a discussion of the rationale of choice and 
segmentation of focus groups). As I discussed in Chapter Four, the dialogical, 
‘unfinalized ’ and discursively constructed nature of knowledge lies at the heart of the 
paradigm within which I locate this research. Hence, in engaging with the research of 
focus groups, my intention was to investigate how groups of HPs would diverge and 
share meanings. In particular, how would each of their collectively constructed 
discourses be the site for the dialogical encounter of multiple voices, how these 
voices would be re-negotiated and contested and which identities would co-emerge 
through their rhetorical responses to others.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.1. discusses the 
procedure of the analysis, and the analytical model that has functioned as the 
framework for the analysis. Section 6.2 provides the results of the semantic units 
found in the data. Section 6.3. discusses the dynamics of knowledge production, that
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is, how the different themes emerge and relate to each other; the dynamics amongst 
group participants and the emotions evoked. In section 6.4, I present illustrative 
accounts from my participative observation that mirror the content and dynamics of 
knowledge found in the focus groups. The last section draws conclusions from the 
discussed analysis.
6.1. Analytical Model and Processes.
The model that has guided the analysis of the focus groups is grounded on the 
theoretical argument developed in Chapter Three, regarding the link between the 
plurality of the self and the polyphasia of knowledge. The analysis departs from the 
view that the polyphasic co-existence of different forms and contents of knowledge 
function as an asset that the person eclectically draws upon from different positions. 
This is in order to discursively respond to the knowledge and perspectives of the 
diverse dialogical others that percolate the self of the interlocutor. It is alongside the 
rhetorical positioning and re-positioning adopted toward the polyphony of dialogical 
others (physically present and symbolic), in the construction of realities that multiple 
identities co-emerge. The framework for the classification of the content departs 
from the view that different modes of discourses are used in order to assert and 
protect the diverse identities of the person from the threats that the knowledge claims 
of dialogical others pose to her projects and search for social recognition. This was 
established in Chapter Three.
This argument has provided the framework for the classification of contents 
under different modes of discourse, through which the diverse polyphasic elements 
and plural identities co-emerge. Hence, when exploring the data the focus was on the 
type of discourse through which the contents emerge: contestation, explanation, 
justification and defense and the feelings associated with them. It soon became clear 
across all the groups that the making of representations was linked to the rhetorical 
capacity of the participants to argue, challenge and negate the discourse of the other; 
the statutory sector/government and the public. The statutory expert/professional, 
particularly, appeared as a strong dialogical other. It was through claiming and
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defending their own views that different identities of the community of HPs were co­
constructed.
The unit of analysis was the spoken utterance. This is a speech unit that is 
defined in terms of semantics. Its beginning and end, therefore, is not necessarily 
demarcated by the change of speakers. A unit of analysis would be defined a 
posteriori as a fragment of text that would lend itself to a semantic unit. However, 
my concern was not only with the semantic themes that emerged but also with how 
these, exist side by side in relation to each other. A way of analyzing this was to 
focus on how representations were produced through the progression of the 
discussion. Analysing the pathways of the semantic units, required focusing attention 
on the dynamics of the groups and the discursive strategies used when constructing 
social representations. The focus was on the dialectical relationship between 
responsive and interconnected utterances, that is, how an utterance qualified a 
preceding one.
Focusing attention on spoken utterances as semantic units of analysis, the 
attempt was to look at the contents, interactions and emotions evoked in the groups. 
When exploring the different utterances the aim was to answer: (1.) What were 
participants communicating through this utterance? (2.) How was the message 
conveyed? And (3.) Why was it communicated in that way? Hence the focus was on 
both content and rhetorical strategies. In addition, I also asked: (a.) Which are the 
main arguments?; (b.) How are participants rhetorically responding and positioning 
themselves towards dialogical others’ messages?; i.e. how are they appropriating and 
re-accentuating dialogical others’ knowledge with new meanings and intentions?; 
and, (c.) How does the group, co-construct knowledge about themselves, whilst 
shifting rhetorical positions? Answering these questions involved a sequential 
approach that required looking at the utterance within its particular location within 
the path of arguments. It was examining the sequence of utterances, that enabled to 
make sense of the network of rhetorical responses to dialogical others, the themes at 
a higher level of abstraction and the plurality of identities that co-emerged alongside 
the process of representing homelessness.
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The data was analysed through a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. The analytical procedure, for which the workbench ATLAS.ti was used, 
consisted of two sequential coding processes. As with the interviews, I first engaged 
with the data through an exploratory ‘context’ analysis, which consisted in looking at 
each focus group in relation to the background information appended to ATLAS.ti. 
‘memos’ (i.e. activities developed within the job, organization etc.). Following this 
first exploratory stage I focused on the data as a whole in order to find common 
themes and discursive patterns. In the course of multiple rounds of examining the 
data under the above mentioned questions, I was able to develop an open coding 
frame of the themes and sub-themes that were arising. The final coding frame, which 
was developed after constant re-coding, was comprised of 32 codes (see appendix 7) 
that assisted me in the exploration of meanings, symbols and images of homelessness. 
The themes were generated once I was able to re-organize the codes into a higher 
level of abstraction.
Following this initial segmentation of the data I continued by exploring the 
different utterances in each coded text segment in order to classify contents under 
different modes of discourse. At this point, I engaged in a more dialogical analysis of 
the data, exclusively devoted to the search of rhetoric strategies adopted by 
participants towards the voices of symbolic interlocutors. A rhetorical position is 
always responsive to the perspectives of present or symbolic others and thus, can 
only be understood in relation to others’ views. What is significant for the analysis is 
not that during a focus group people may speak from different, sometimes 
contradictory positions, at times using one type of knowledge, at other times, another. 
Instead what is important is how, alongside this eclectic usage of knowledge, a 
polyphasic representational field and a plural identity are co-constituted. As with the 
interviews, the analysis was assisted by drawing on background information (i.e. 
media, voluntary organization web pages, Government documents), from which the 
many discourses of homelessness emerge.
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6.2. Ontologies, Relatedness and Politics.
The analysis reveals the emergence of a polyphasic knowledge system and 
the co-construction of a plural and shared identity. The four groups make sense of 
homelessness through co-constructing a common identity as a community of HPs. 
They share the different themes that emerge, and how these are related to each other 
in a semantic network. The contradictory dynamics of the co-construction of identity 
and knowledge are tied to, and at the same time express, the conflicting character of 
the context where they are produced, and the challenges HPs confront in their 
everyday work. They reveal the dilemmatic nature of the groups’ relationships to the 
context of service provision and offer insights into the diverse ways HPs locate 
within it and identity themselves as a community.
Their representational field is organized around three co-existing and 
interconnected themes, each one is plural and has its own conflicting content and 
internal dynamics: (1.) discourses o f relatedness; (2.) discourses o f  reification and 
politicization and (3.) epistemological and ontological discourses (see Figure 11). 
Discourses o f relatedness and discourses o f  reification and politicization clash and 
dialogically relate to each other to produce a view of what homelessness is, and it is 
out of this dilemmatic relation that epistemological and ontological discourses 
containing diverse representations about the identity of the HP co-emerge. 
Discourses o f  relatedness, which seek to preserve the homeless person as a dialogical 
co-partner arose spontaneously and reiteratively in the four groups. They are 
associated with representations of homelessness as a transformable ontology and a 
dialogical responsibility. They are used in order to rhetorically contest statutory 
approaches and defend the need of supportive interventions founded on the dialogical 
co-operative relationship. In constructing discourses o f  relatedness, HPs enter into a 
conflict with the rhetoric of perpetuation and alienation, which is expressed in a 
representation of homelessness as a personal battle for the HP.
Discourses o f reification and politicization reflect the institutional and 
professional barriers experienced by HPs in their everyday work, their political 
struggles to defend their relational ethos, protect the oppressed homeless and have 
their expertise recognised. The homeless ontology and the dialogical nature of the
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person gets lost within HPs’ engagement in debates about policy and institutionalism. 
The homeless person becomes an object of political battles and of clashes between 
the practice-base knowledge of the HP and the dominant statutory expertise. He is 
politicised rather than dialogized and thus, unintentionally objectified. The clashes 
between discourses o f relatedness and discourses o f  reification and politicization and 
their respective internal contradictions are played out in a co-constitutive plural and 
competing representation of who the HP is. The HP emerges simultaneously as an 
ally o f  and a warrior fo r  the homeless, a member o f the ethical voluntary sector and 
a victim o f institutional domination, an essential helper/expert and non-legitimate 
practitioner.
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Figure 11: Polyphasic knowledge and plural identity.
DISCOURSES OF RELATEDNESS
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6.2.1. Discourses of Relatedness.
These discourses reflect the realization of what homelessness is and who the 
homeless are, that emerges through relational experience with clients. They emerged 
through the contestation of the views of the public and predominantly the statutory 
other. The rhetorical aim was to defend the value of the voluntary agenda and 
approach founded in the dialogue and co-operation with the client. Their knowledge 
comes from a specific location in the social fabric; from their daily experiences of 
supporting, caring, training, and outreaching and simply relating to the homeless 
person. Their ‘knowledge with\ founded on how things are ‘on the ground’ is used 
to question statutory ‘knowledge about ’ homelessness, since this does not come from 
the immediate experience with homeless people. The accounts of all groups are 
permeated by their everyday relational practice with clients. This is also the case for 
project managers, since all had previously been working as front-line HPs. When 
they discuss homelessness, although they draw on their present work, what 
predominantly springs to mind is their past lived experience of relating with the 
homeless.
For all the groups, what emerged through continuous rhetorical responses to 
institutional/ statutory knowledge was a plural and contradictory representation of 
the homeless person and homeless ontology. On the one hand, they represent the 
homeless person as a co-operative partner to claim dialogical responsibility and the 
need of approaches that recognise her voice. On the other, they alienate her, to 
describe the intricacy of their job and contest statutory versions of homelessness as 
houseless. Ultimately, both representations aim to defend the practical value of the 
voluntary sector’s approach and to demand the statutory other to care through a 
personalized dialogical relationship.
6.2.1.1. Dialogical Co-partner vs. Alienation.
On the one hand, there is a rhetoric that asserts the ‘real’ existence and 
dialogical ontology of homeless people. When using this representation, they 
rhetorically respond to the statutory other and seek to undermine its institutional
192
definitions and practices. On the other hand, the homeless person is represented as an 
alien, to her heart, body and/or mind, and as an ‘illegal alien’ within society.
Across the four groups the homeless are claimed to be dialogical co-partners 
of our experience of reality. They are represented as intersubjective co-authors of 
HPs’ knowledge (i.e. of personalized interventions/support), and of what they assert 
to be real and good (i.e. her ontology and morality). Relating with different homeless 
persons is an enriching source for the ‘soul’ and work practice. The dialogical 
relationship is claimed to be the fundamental means for help, the main satisfaction 
and ultimate reason to work in the voluntary sector. The homeless person is 
represented as ‘the cause’ of the voluntary sector and is used in order to justify its 
existence.
P2: I f  you can actually do something, which actually has a real outcome fo r  real 
people with real problems, then in this world that’s bloody amazing, let’s face it. So I  
think that’s worth gold dust and I  think we should all be very happy with ourselves.
P I: I  was just thinking what you were saying about you 7/ never get rich working in 
the voluntary sector. Well, I  came from a forensic mental health, which is in NHS. 
I'm rich now. I  never had so much money. Forget the funders, forget the 
organisation, forget the boss, forget everything else. At the end o f the day i t ’s me and 
the punters and i f  I  can... One guy said to me a few  weeks ago, ’Simon, i f  it hadn 7 
been fo r  you, I  would have gone back on drugs ’ cause he was a pretty serious 
druggie, 7 would have gone back on drugs ’ and he would have committed suicide. 
H e’s now in full-time work, clean and off, back with his wife and kids. Now fo r me 
that’s job satisfaction.
P4: But that just says it all really in a nutshell really, isn 7 it? It is about the clients 
[...]
P2: The other thing I  personally enjoy about this job is the diversity and it is the 
different people you meet. I  am genuinely interested in listening to people’s stories. 
I ’ve met some wonderful people and I  enjoy meeting them everyday and learning 
about them and learning new things. (Training & development workers)
It is through the co-operative relationship with the HP that the homeless 
person can develop self-awareness and be co-participant in setting her own life goals.
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In claiming the dialogical co-authorship of the homeless in the intervention the aim is 
to rhetorically respond to the monological approach of the statutory other, which fails 
to recognise her voice. However, there is an opposing representation of the homeless 
person as alienated, and thus with no co-authorship in her life decisions and in HPs’ 
interventions. This is permeated by images of the homeless as chaotic and 
challenging, and of homelessness as a perpetual cycle through which the HP 
struggles to help the person. This involves a depiction of the person as being 
‘unloved’ and ‘unlovable’ due to an incapability to relate to others in a satisfying and 
meaningful way. Such alienation from the heart is anchored in images of 
vulnerability, isolation and the feeling of not having a home, which is employed as a 
means for contesting public and statutory representations of homelessness as merely 
a lack of housing.
The homeless person can also be alienated from her mind, lacking self- 
control, and struggling to function alone due to an incapability to think in an 
organized and conventional way. This representation is predominant in the group of 
training workers whose main concern is to support in the development of self- 
sufficiency. For the groups, particularly those in mental health/drug misuse and 
outreach work, the extreme disintegration of the person comes with the alienation 
from their ‘alien’ body (i.e. addiction, risky behaviours). Finally, the three-level 
alienation from the self is played out at the level of society where they are excluded 
and their existence is stigmatised.
PI: We’re kind o f dealing with people who’ve forgotten or never knew how to live. 
They don 7 know how to negotiate the barriers that they have to go through. And how 
do I  do that? Coming from a place o f  no hope and then belief that I  can ’t do it 
anyway, i t’s really difficult.
P4: The general experience o f being homeless, it crowds you or it takes away from 
you quite a lot in the sense that you loose your skills, you loose knowledge and most 
o f all, you loose past relationships. There is a huge relationship breakdown which 
might be the initial reason fo r  you being homeless and then brings other things [...] 
(Mental health & Drug misuse workers)
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6.2.1.2. Transformable Ontology vs. Perpetuation.
The undeniably dialogical and transformable ontology of the homeless person; 
the inexorable perpetuality of the homelessness cycle: such a paradox revealed itself 
in the course of the discussions. The debate revolved around two competing 
representations of who the homeless person is (dialogical co-partner & alienated 
other) and two corresponding explanations of the homeless ontology. On the one 
hand, ontological change is possible through support interventions based upon 
relational approaches; a conjoint HP-client dialogical relationship. On the other hand, 
the homeless person is seen as essentially constrained by her alienation and 
entrenchment. The discourse of homelessness as perpetuation has a twofold function. 
One: it supports the construction of homelessness as personal battle for the HP, 
emphasising the difficulties of their job and the value of their practice and thus 
serves to bolster their esteem and community identity. Two: it justifies the claim that 
dialogical responsibility is essential in homelessness interventions and subverts those 
statutory funded projects that neglect this, and thus contribute to the perpetuation of 
homelessness.
There are feelings of concern because alienation constraints the homeless 
person’s dialogical engagement, hindering the negotiability of mental states and 
sustaining the endless homelessness cycle. These feelings co-exist with frustration 
since alienation places limits on HPs’ efforts to change the homeless ontology (i.e. 
‘moving on’ interventions). Feelings of frustration are prevalent in the case of mental 
health and outreach workers since they deal with the most entrenched cases.
P2: I t ’s people’s cycles, we’re working with quite a lot o f damaged people that 
maybe...the hostel...that’s their home. Homelessness means different things to 
different people.
P3:1 think some people go into the total cycle o f homelessness that they keep coming 
back round again in the hostel circuit. And I  think there’s definitely a case with early 
intervention to stop people getting into that situation in the first place. (Project 
managers)
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P3: You come across a lot o f homeless, that they are in this vicious circle o f street, 
prison, get nicked, go and steal something, shoplifting, whatever, go back to prison 
because they’re going to have food and shelter and go out and then back two weeks 
later [...]
P4: That’s also to do with the funding, i t’s also to do with the transition from saying, 
right, okay, there’s a worker that’s going to help this person from prison to 
somewhere else. Not that, here you go, here’s some money, right, see you later, do 
whatever and that’s like a gap, isn ’t it? I t ’s a gap in service which kind o f needs to 
be developed cause that vicious circle is just going to continually happen. (Mental 
health & drug misuse workers)
The representation of the homeless ontology as transformable and perpetual, 
is rhetorically used by the groups in order to justify to the statutory other their 
demands of the need to shift attention away from the individual and structural 
resources and towards the relationship. The discursive path is; 1. The contestation of 
institutional views of the homeless. 2. The call for government engagement through 
highlighting the perpetual nature of the homelessness ontology. 3. The simultaneous 
explanation of the ontology as transformable through dialogical supportive 
relationships. 4. The justification of the voluntary ethos and approaches as the ones 
that would activate the person’s potential. 5. The defense of the fundamental value of 
HPs’ knowledge. Despite the groups’ expressing pessimism and frustration, there is 
hope from all, that if wining the fight for institutional engagement with a relational 
approach, change could be achieved. The rhetorical aim is to defend the voluntary 
ethos/practices founded on relatedness and dialogicality.
6.2.1.3. Personal Battle.
The conflict between representations of the homeless person as a dialogical 
co-partner and as an alienated other is played out at the level of practice. Relational 
practices are dilemmatically experienced and homelessness is lived as a personal 
battle; a conflict between, on the one hand, genuine responsibility towards the co­
partner, and on the other, personal struggle with the alienated other. Narratives 
evoking devotedness vis-a-vis the impotence to engage the homeless person in 
dialogue were salient in the groups.
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Co-operative Supportive Relationship & Dialogical Responsibility.
The cornerstone of any homelessness intervention is the dialogical supportive 
relationship within which meaningful care is generated and the person becomes able 
to re-construct her identity and her alienated relationship with society. This relational 
approach is based on personalized support, in which the HP functions as an ‘ally' of 
the homeless in the healing of the soul and the search for solutions. The client needs 
to be engaged, not as a victim but as a co-operative co-partner in order to stand up 
for herself. The relationship is built through the development of a sense of closeness 
to the HP, of being equals rather than of being under the dominance of an authority. 
The functionality of identification amongst dialogical interlocutors is twofold. On the 
one hand, it bridges the gap between the excluded person and society, making her 
empowered about her potentialities. On the other hand, it facilitates HPs’ empathy 
and reflexivity, thus enabling an adequate supportive intervention. The HP may be 
critical and challenging, but she is always emphatic and transparent.
P2: So it's also making them come up with the answers themselves and think their 
own issues through. And really, you ’re acting there as a support and a crutch and 
almost a... ‘Come on, have you thought about this or what about that?’ But never 
directing it yourself and to actually help them, maybe for the first time in their life to 
make their own decisions and actually create a direction which maybe wasn 7 ever 
been there before, that’s the key.
P I: Along the way, aren ’tyou?
P 2:1 think it is support and encouragement, motivation, self-esteem, all these things 
you build up as you’re going along really and i f  they can then come back to you and 
go, ‘hang on, I  actually want to do this. ‘Great, do it! I ’m not going to do it. ’
PI: [..] I  think it goes back to what you just said really about you know, ‘I ’m exactly 
the same as you and, I  started off in a bed-sit, but I ’m not in a bed-sit now so..? 
(Training & development workers)
The dialogical co-operative relationship is the main purpose of being an HP 
and is considered to be ‘the main content’ of their work. This is the common aim 
across all the services of the voluntary sector; training, mental health/drug misuse, 
outreach work and so on, are all founded on a relational ethos. All the groups
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discursively protect the relational ‘content’ from the quantitative measurement of 
outcomes imposed by the government (i.e. being re-housed or getting a job). 
Outcomes need to be appropriate to the specific person and value should be attached 
to achieving both qualitative (i.e. engagement in a workshop) and quantitative (i.e. 
people being re-housed) targets. The best indicator of progress can be observed in the 
relationship with clients. All the groups voice to the statutory other, that not framing 
interventions within this type of relationship fails to help, has a detrimental effect on 
the person and compromises the HPs’ expertise. This rhetorical response to the 
statutory other’s agenda is linked to the representation of the homeless as a dialogical 
co-partner and unfolds in a discourse that claims dialogical responsibility.
PI: I t ’s about moving people through the process like you were saying. . . .What 
happens when your success story is about maintaining someone o ff the street fo r  six 
weeks? How do you put that across?
P3: That needs to be the goal. That’s where we have this argument in quite some 
detail that the success as far as this person’s concerned... I f  we hadn’t a word with 
them, they’d probably be dead. (Project managers)
.Personal Battle.
When the homeless are represented as alienated, relational work is regarded 
as a personal battle, as going against the tide of the ‘perpetual cycle’. Their 
alienation means that they can be dependant, dangerous and complicated. Despite 
claiming that they have genuine dialogical responsibility to the relationship, they also 
express that fighting becomes at points a way of struggling to get them out of the 
homelessness cycle. For mental health/drug misuse and outreach workers, loosing 
the fight could have the consequence of death. For training/development workers and 
project managers, it is translated as entrenchment of the homelessness ontology. The 
dilemma between homelessness as a genuine dialogical responsibility and as a 
personal battle emerges from a network of representations of the person as both 
alienated and dialogical co-partner. These function as rhetorical devices for, on the 
one hand, justifying their supportive interventions, and on the other, for defending 
the value of their expertise. By putting representations into this rhetorical use, 
participants are bound together as a community that shares a responsibility and a
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personal struggle; they co-construct knowledge about homelessness and co-identity 
themselves as both essential helping experts and allies o f the homeless. In this way, 
the representation of homelessness as a personal battle emphasizes the value of HPs’ 
efforts and responsibility.
P3: You need the coping skills that you ’re trying to develop in the service user.
P4: Yes, you need to learn how to cope with somebody who just told you, ‘I ’m going 
to kill myself. ’ (Mental health & drug misuse workers)
P3: That’s one o f the biggest concerns I  have. That’s something that needs 
improving. Whether people haven’t been taught to take responsibility fo r themselves 
or deal with their life skills...
P2: I  always get really worried. I  think i t’s really important that clients do take 
responsibility. (Outreach workers)
6.2.2. Discourses of Reification and Politization.
The inexorable institutional constraint of being contracted by and having to 
be professionally accountable to the statutory sector; the desperate political struggle 
for maintaining the relational/supportive agenda of the voluntary sector: this was a 
central paradox in the group discussions. Institutionalism is conflictive for HPs and 
through political battle they forge a way of contesting statutory agenda and 
knowledge of homelessness. The unintended consequence is the reification of the 
homeless person as an object of political/institutional battles. On the one hand, they 
intensely criticised the institutional agenda, which imposes a standardized 
‘professional’ relationship with the client. They justify such criticism through 
showing concern about the impact institutionalism has on the homeless, on the 
helping relationship and on HPs’ expertise. There appears a representation of the 
homeless as oppressed by institutional barriers (i.e. obstacles to the use of services 
for people without a local connection to the borough). On the other hand, the groups 
fight over institutionalism, yet justify it as the only way of being professionally 
recognised by the statutory expert. Bound to representations of the homeless person
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as a politicized object and as oppressed human there is an identification of the HP as 
both a warrior and as a victim o f institutional domination.
6.2.2.1. Professional/Institutional battle.
The spontaneous emergence of a dialogue with the statutory other and a 
direct jump into politics, was striking from the beginning of all group discussions. 
Although, in the guide to the topics I had included the issue of their views on 
governmental approaches, it was not necessary to raise it. Representations emerged 
from a consensual network of argumentative contestation to statutory institutionalism; 
its definitions and approaches to homelessness as well as its lack of recognition of 
HPs’ practice-based expertise. Statutory institutionalism constitutes a threat to HPs’ 
identity, their project and demands for recognition. In representing homelessness as a 
professional/institutional battle they are bound together as a community, co- 
constructing who they are, stating their identity to the statutory other and using 
discourses o f relatedness in order to defend their knowledge and approach. However, 
at certain points the groups, particularly the project managers/chief executives, 
justify having to adjust to institutionalized relationships with the homeless, as this is 
the only way of being professionally accountable.
Institutionalized relation.
The groups express frustration when arguing that professional accountability, 
and funding, is only achieved through the institutional standardization of 
interventions and the bureaucratization of services. This means a loss of the 
supportive/dialogical relationship and a move towards institutionalized ways of 
relating to clients (i.e. multiple formal assessments to access the services they need). 
There is a strong concern because the application of policies implies emphasis on 
quantitative outcomes (i.e. people being employed) and the systematization of client 
assessment and HPs’ performance reviews. Value should also be attached to 
qualitative outcomes (i.e. gaining self-esteem), taking a more holistic approach to 
meeting client needs, rather than to hitting departmental targets.
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There is anger when arguing about the need to conform to institutional 
procedures and reviews/assessments of the statutory sector. Institutional practices 
legitimate the privileged position of the professional. Domination, (im)position, 
(de)personalization and (dis)unity: these notions of the institutional relationship are 
evoked in order to explain the impact of institutionalism on the support relation. 
These tell us about relational and structural barriers imposed on the homeless person, 
and are used in combination with their discourse o f relatedness as a way of stating 
their knowledge to the statutory other. Domination and (im)position evoke power 
differentials and lack of co-participation of the homeless. (Dis)unity tells us about the 
separation between ‘us’ (HPs) and ‘them’ (the homeless) and (des)personalization 
exposes the de-humanization of the homeless within the institutional relationship. 
Contrary to the co-operative relationship, the institutionalized relation comes a priori, 
is standardized (i.e. filling assessment forms, allocating needs, ticking boxes, etc.) 
and neglects the voice and individual needs of the homeless person.
P2: The ultimate thing is the actual outcome at the end o f it is someone improves 
their life as opposed to someone hits their fucking departmental target or something. 
PI: Yeah, exactly.
P2: That’s the other good thing about the job.
PI: I f  you’ve come from that field, you do realise that it is just about an outcome. 
They don ’t care about the person. They don ’t care about the steps that that person 
needs to make before they get the job. (Training & development workers)
P3: The voluntary sector is becoming a lot more statutory. There is a lot more form  
filling and lots more stats that have to go to this commission or that commission to 
prove that we ’re doing what they ’re asking us to do. We are loosing the flexibility 
that we had. And, i t’s said that more services are becoming corporations.
A; How do you feel about that?
PI: Personally, I ’m not happy about it. But like w e’re all saying here, the voluntary 
sector has lost too many good workers in the last couple o f years. And that’s where I  
think things are going wrong. As much as we dislike the new systems and new 
policies that are coming in, I  think i f  you’ve got people with our mentality still in the
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service, to question what’s going on, then we have a chance, and our clients have a 
chance. (Outreach workers)
Institutionalism focuses on outcomes and processes (i.e. filling in forms, 
funding applications, etc.) at the expenses of sacrificing the ‘content’: the dialogical 
co-operative relationship. It means abandoning the main reason to work as HPs. This 
is particularly the case in the group of project managers, who have moved from the 
front-line to managerial work. They feel sad because institutional constraints mean, 
detachment from the reality of homelessness, fear of loosing skills/expertise, and 
feeling excluded from the community of front-line HPs. The ultimate fear for all the 
groups is that institutionalism can culminate in the disappearance of the voluntary 
sector.
Professional accountability.
There is a dilemma between wanting to be professionally accountable and 
having to adjust to institutional standards of professionalism and bureaucratized 
practices imposed by the government. This conflict is rooted in their desire for 
social/professional recognition. For all groups, particularly those doing front-line 
work, homelessness is experienced as a professional battle with legitimated and 
dominant statutory knowledge systems. Statutory experts ‘look down on’ and 
‘condemn’ HPs’ practice-based knowledge because it comes from the relational 
realm and it is not legitimated by an academic degree. In partnership work with 
statutory services, HPs encounter institutional barriers to the exercise of their 
knowledge and relational approach, which are materialized in institutional controls 
(i.e. reviews assessment) and procedures. Barriers are also met when the statutory 
professional does not acknowledge HPs’ needs assessments and the support plans. 
The HP has a contradiction between a desire to have their knowledge recognised by 
the statutory expert and their rejection of identifications of themselves as 
‘professionals’ rather than practitioners. This is because they associate 
professionalism with institutionalism and forms of expertise opposed to their 
discourses of relatedness. Discourses of relatedness are used to assert that the 
professionalism of their services should be assessed in terms of how well they enable 
clients to move on and improve their well-being.
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P 4 :I ’m saying, I ’m gone, that's it, but i t’s not because I  want to leave, i t ’s because 
I ’ve been forced out. I t ’s because I  can no longer ethically do this job under these 
conditions. I  don’t want to go but I ’m being forced out and I  think that’s something 
that’s really sad because at the end o f the day, I  get a job somewhere but you won’t 
get me on the street helping a client.
P2: All the pay and none o f the gain. So you have all o f the grief associated with 
being a social worker, but none o f the toil. But more importantly, when it comes to 
pushing stuff through, you don’t have the money, your hands on the budgets, you 
don’t have the statutory stick with which to beat people. So you have all the grief but 
none o f the advantages and that’s what really gets me irritated. The thing that really 
bugs me, the more I  produce stats fo r  people, is how many o f  these actually stand up 
to any real statistical analysis...we’re judged on them and, how many o f  them are 
actually statistically significant? (Outreach workers)
6.2.2.2. Politicized Object & Oppressed Human Being.
The internal conflicts of professional/institutional battles are played out in a 
set of opposing representations of the homeless person as: oppressed human vs. 
politicized object. On the one hand, there is a contestation of the institutionalized 
relationship since it oppresses and prevents the person from dialogical co- 
participation. On the other hand, the co-existence of the desire to put into practice 
discourses o f relatedness, to contest the institutional framework, and the 
simultaneous need of professional accountability means that the homeless person 
becomes an object of dispute between HPs and statutory professionals.
Rear-line and front-line HPs have to fight over institutional/professional 
barriers in their practice and struggle to defend both their expertise and those they are 
dialogically responsible for. Managers/chief executives have the duty of being 
responsible for accounting for the organization’s fulfilment of statutory outcomes, 
which conflict with their ethos. Outreach, mental health/drug misuse and 
training/development workers are the main victims of professional clashes with the 
dominant knowledge system of statutory experts (i.e. doctors, policy officers).
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The homeless is represented as oppressed by statutory policies and 
institutionalism, where; (1.) the interventions are compartmentalized and governed 
by rigid procedures, (2.) service users are not seen as equal partners, (3.) the 
dominant power remains with the professional and (4.) trusting relationships are very 
difficult to built. This representation expresses the troubling consequences that 
institutionalized/bureaucratized interventions, rather than relational approaches have 
for the identity and well-being of the homeless. The representation of the homeless 
as oppressed, is put to use in order to rhetorically respond to the statutory other and 
to claim the decisive contribution of HPs’ expertise to the provision of care.
P 1: These persons want to progress themselves, but they just cannot do it because of 
the blocks again that have been put in place, so fo r me, that’s something that really 
frustrates me. Because there’s me trying to develop an action plan with this person 
and see how I  can help them to move their life forward and then I  can’t help them to 
reach their goals because the system is not allowing them to reach the goals that they 
want to reach so that’s a big concern for me.
A; What do you think about that?
P 2: /  think a related issue is maybe knowledge that the work that people are doing in 
the sector lasts fo r as long as the funding and the money is available, each year ... 
Will we get the funding? ...and I  wonder what will happen to all o f  the people we 
work with now. They’ll either have to fit  into the next box and be supported. 
(Training & development workers)
PI: I t ’s almost as i f  homelessness ...in a sense is the politics. So i t’s not just about 
not having a home. You’ve got to attach some other legal category to a person in 
effect to access the housing. So it’s a bit like i f  you’re trying to stop being homeless 
you have to commit an offence before you get good treatment...
P2: But I  think, you have the kind o f the very clear sort o f literally on the streets kind 
o f homelessness and then obviously Crisis recently, is trying to broaden that 
definition quite a bit. (Project managers)
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The homeless as politicized object, emerges out of HPs* daily professional 
struggle for recognition of their practice-based expertise and political advocacy of 
their relational agenda. HPs’ idealism, their genuine belief that statutory 
interventions ought to be better, prompt them to advocate for support interventions 
that aim at empowering the person, yet are not worthy of government investment. 
HPs have two co-existing yet competing representations of the homeless as; 
dialogical co-partners and as politicized objects. Whilst the former recognises their 
human nature and dialogical ontology and is linked with a desire to work with them 
as equals, the latter objectifies the person into the cause/motive of HPs’ everyday 
struggles with the statutory sector.
6.2.3. Epistemological and Ontological Discourses.
Their polyphasic knowledge co-emerged with plural identities of the HPs 
shared by the participants. To make sense of homelessness implies understanding 
themselves as HPs and identifying themselves as a group. The identity of the HP 
appears both plural and contradictory, since it is co-constituted with the internal 
diversity of their knowledge through and against the polyphony of the person. 
Homelessness is represented in different ways, and so can support different identities 
of the HP, who emerges simultaneously as someone struggling between being an ally 
& a warrior o f the homeless, a member o f the ethical voluntary sector & a victim o f  
institutional domination, an essential helper/expert & a non-legitimate practitioner. 
At the core of such plural and contradictory identity, is the continuous struggle with 
the statutory other to defend the ethos and project of the voluntary sector, with which 
participants strongly identify. There is also the yearning for social recognition of 
their expertise, and the simultaneous need to conform to institutionalism. Despite 
being multi-faceted, there is reasonable coherence within their identity, which limits 
how far they move from one identity to another. There is a tendency to co-construct a 
positive identity (i.e. ally, a warrior, a member o f the ethical voluntary sector and 
essential helper/expert) that seeks to protect their ethos, approach and knowledge, 
bolstering their self-esteem and pride as a community of practitioners. The internal 
diversity of both their representational system of homelessness and their identity is
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understood an asset upon which HPs eclectically draw in order to cope with the 
dilemmas that they encounter in their everyday work.
All the participants construct these identities, what differs is the extent to 
which they switch to each of them. Project managers are officially responsible for 
adjusting to the institutionalism of the statutory funding body (i.e. presenting reviews 
of the service’s outcomes). Thus, they more often construct a strong identity as 
victims o f institutional domination. Outreach, mental health/drug misuse and training 
workers are also victims o f  institutionalism, but tend to position themselves more as 
allies of the homeless and their accounts are permeated by their daily relationships 
with clients. In their everyday work, outreach and mental health/drug misuse workers, 
encounter endless barriers set by statutory expertise. This might be the reason why 
they draw a lot on discourses of professional accountability through which they co­
construct themselves as non-legitimate practitioners. However, through the debate 
they ultimately seek to bolster and defend their identity through contesting statutory 
expert knowledge. In all the groups, participants construct a strong community 
identity, continuously speaking from the position of ‘we’/ ‘us’ referring to ‘our’ 
experiences/knowledge of homelessness and to the voluntary sector in terms of 
‘cooperation’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘mutual recognition’.
6.2.3.1. Ally & Warrior.
Representations of the homeless as a dialogical co-partner are used in order to 
claim to the statutory others the need to develop interventions founded on a 
supportive relationship. In contesting statutory knowledge and approaches as not 
having a genuine dialogical responsibility to the homeless person, they construct 
themselves as allies and warriors of the homeless. These co-existing identities tell us 
about HPs’ struggles (personal and political) with both sides of the interface of 
homelessness: the dialogical and alienated other in the support relationship, and the 
dominant statutory expert and government in the partnership and advocacy work.
The participants claim an identity as allies who dialogically engage with the 
homeless and co-participate in the self-awareness of the person’s own situation and 
development of a sense of ‘home’. They defend the value of their supporting role in
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the development of the homeless person (i.e. finding out where they are going in life) 
and her re-connection to the self and society. This is anchored in images of HPs as 
‘hubs’ / ’parents’ who support along the transition towards independence, which is 
achieved through unconditional care, availability, management of client’s 
expectations and critical attitude.
P 2 :1 see it more as a way o f engaging with the client and also with the way o f them 
o f engaging with the rest o f  society and then also when they’re ready, they can make 
that step themselves. And then once they’ve realised there are things available to 
them and they can do things and there are options more than just what they thought 
was available to them, they can then make choices. And when you can make choices, 
you can lead your own life, more or less. That’s why I  do training really...
P I: The best training that I  can offer which is definitely on offer in my project, is to 
almost train the clients to look at themselves rather than...and to see themselves and 
their own skills and their own strengths. (Training & development workers)
HPs’ identification as warriors is linked to representations of the homeless as 
oppressed and a politicized object and co-emerges with discourses o f 
professional/institutional battle. In identifying as warriors, they see themselves as 
representatives of the homeless rather than as equal co-partners. This is 
dilemmatically intertwined with their representation as allies, since it is their 
dialogical responsibility that urges HPs to fight for the homeless through advocacy 
and the defense of the voluntary approach. It is also put into practice on a one-to-one 
basis through challenging the decisions of those statutory experts with whom they 
are working with. This is the case when statutory experts reject the acceptance of a 
homeless person in a statutory service, or do not admit responsibility for them once 
they release them from hospital. As warriors, HPs contest institutionalism and 
demand statutory engagement with the homeless as a co-partner, a person, and an 
ontology that needs support as well as structures (i.e. accommodation).
P5: Homelessness has been criminalized. So again i t ’s sort o f perceptions o f  
somebody being homeless, their lifestyle is kind o f invalidated. I t ’s kind o f a worry 
that we have this need to fix  people’s lives, and have solutions and all the answers as
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professionals. And that’s a worry to me. And it’s also a worry that we don’t have as 
a society, anything to offer people as an alternative to their exciting lifestyles. People 
take crack cocaine all night because i t’s exciting, fun, it fucks them up, that’s why 
they do it. But what are we offering them in return? We’re not offering community. 
We’ve taken away their communities by breaking up, ...the sites where people used 
to gather. And we’ve put them in flats. We’ve put them in these places and w e’re 
saying; This is the alternative! P2: Yeah, I  agree with his point completely...There’s 
a lovely law called the Anti-social Behaviour Act, i t’s come to change people’s lives 
dramatically. People are engaged in street-based activity and so i t ’s criminalizing 
them. The clients know i t ’s criminalizing them and no one’s done anything about it. 
(Outreach workers)
6.2.32. Member of the Ethical Voluntary Sector & Victim of Institutional 
Domination.
There is a competing construction of HPs as both members o f the ethical 
voluntary sector & victims o f institutional domination. The conflict is between, on 
the one hand, dialogical responsibility and on the other, unfaithfulness and 
detachment from ‘real’ issues. The essential role of the HP as dialogical companion 
of the homeless is inherently linked with the ethical nature of the community to 
which he belongs and with which he strongly identifies;- the voluntary sector. Despite 
being constrained by institutionalism, the HP maintains a positive representation of 
who she is through asserting her ethical mission and commitment to the homeless 
whilst calling into question the oppressing statutory agenda. It is here where they 
draw on a rhetoric of dialogical responsibility. Constructing oneself as subjugated to 
institutionalism is conflicting since it suggests disloyalty to one’s ethos, 
irresponsibility towards the homeless, and giving up on their personal battle. They 
define themselves as a humane and ethical community, and in this way they claim to 
the statutory other the need of having the voluntary sector as an equal partner. 
Empathy, understanding and a desire to care, are the qualities that they proudly claim 
as defining of the voluntary sector. This is why institutional regulations are viewed 
as conflicting, especially for the group of project managers since they are the ones 
most affected by the need to adapt to institutional regulations.
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P I: And then, four years down the line, I  find myself in a job that I  can’t really agree 
with a lot o f the time. And i f  I  was here another four years, I  could probably say, 
yeah, I ’m still doing a good job, ’cause I  still care about the people. But 
fundamentally i t’s really changed.
P2: Yes, and i t’s going to get worse and ...How do we draw a line?
P6: Especially now with the ASBO’s and working with the Old Bill so closely, I ’ve 
got loads o f mates that have gone, they’ve moved on. And that’s a real shame 
because they were bloody decent human beings that really were helping people. 
(Outreach workers)
P3: To get lots o f little bits offunding, from all over the place is very hard work.
P2: So w e’ve got hard bureaucracy on our mainstream funding, narrowing down our 
options fo r  using it and then we’ve got additional work now to find the bits o f  
freedom that allow us to do something a bit more creative, a bit more supportive. 
(Project managers)
6.2.3.3. Essential Helper/Expert & Non-legitimate Practitioner.
The statutory lack of recognition of the epistemology of HPs’ knowledge and 
the significance of their interventions makes unavoidable their identity as non­
legitimate practitioner. This identity is co-constructed when the discourse of 
professional accountability is put to use by participants. Statutory experts are seen as 
scrutinizers of HPs’ knowledge disempowering them as practitioners. Not being 
professionally recognised and having to conform to its agenda is experienced as 
being ‘hemmed in by enemies’ (training workers). However, through the prevalent 
use of discourses o f relatedness, they rhetorically contest the statutory other, 
suggesting their agenda is damaging towards the homeless and identifying as 
essential helpers/experts. These competing identities tell us about the clash between 
‘professionalism’ and ‘practice’. They convey HPs’ fights over the legitimacy of 
their knowledge and search for the recognition of their expertise.
P2: You have to be able to present a case clearly and give as much detail and don’t 
be afraid. But don’t be baffled by clinical phrases. Just say, ‘This is what I ’ve seen,
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This is what I ’ve heard’. These are my concerns, this is what I ’ve noticed over, 
whatever period o f time. And because a lot o f doctors and nurses that don’t have 
any ... They have no particular skills that are different to any o f us. They have the 
textbooks...
P 3: They have the medical model...
P2: And they don’t have the time.
P3: Yeah. Just to tell you a scenario that occurred: I  was phoning a GP’s office, to 
get one o f my substance use workers to go for induction, and I ’m going, ‘she’s a 
substance use worker’ ‘No, she’s a care worker. ’ ‘No, she’s a substance use worker. ’ 
And I ’m thinking to myself, ‘Why am I  justifying that person’s title to you, actually? 
All I  want is an appointment’. But i t ’s a barrier that they’re putting up, and telling 
me that this person is not qualified (Mental health & drug misuse workers)
There are feelings of sadness and concern amongst all groups, because their 
practice is being usurped by statutory expertise and institutional establishments and 
is at risk of extinction. It is here where a strong and positive identification as 
essential helper/expert of homelessness co-emerges. Through defending the value of 
their relational-based knowledge, they collectively aim to achieve respect as a group 
of practitioners, to protect their knowledge and identity and to claim the essential 
need for the existence of themselves as a community of practitioners. They 
constantly assert their difference to the statutory other, positioning themselves as ‘us’, 
‘workers’ or ‘practitioners’ versus ‘them’ or the ‘professionals’. There are instances 
in the group where I use the word ‘professional’ and they react to it through explicit 
contestation to such identifications.
They construct their knowledge as ‘hybrid’ asserting that being a good HP 
means having ‘people skills’ and empathy. This expertise is not developed through 
formal education, but through genuine devotion to the client and sharing of 
experiences with other HPs. It is based on what is actually going on ‘on the ground’ 
and implies an ability to creatively personalize responses to each individuals’ needs. 
The groups question statutory expertise for being based upon academia rather than 
relational experience with the homeless and for fragmenting the person into different 
specialities rather than adopting a comprehensive approach.
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P5: When on the street that’s were they feel more relaxed... Ifindqu ite  free and open 
discourse on a level which you don’t necessarily get in an office environment. That’s 
one o f my favourite parts o f the job, that’s how Ifind  I  do my best.
P I: I ’m very fortunate in that I  spend up to 35 hours a week with my clients and I  do 
count myself very fortunate in that because I  think that, with that amount o f contact 
at the right level, and the continuity o f that, and the trust that’s built up with that 
contact I ’m able to see more who my clients really are. (Training & development 
workers)
6.3. Group Dynamics: Constructing Social Representations of
Homelessness and a Concomitant Identity.
In this section, I discuss the dynamics of knowledge production and of 
interaction within the groups. I explore, how the different themes emerged in the 
discussions and the emotions evoked by them. All these aspects need to be 
considered in order to understand the organisation of their representational field. The 
prevalent dynamics amongst group participants were of consensual agreement. The 
four debates were characterised by the construction of a common understanding of 
homelessness and shared identifications as a community of HPs. Participants listened 
to each other and very easily constructed together a common representational field 
and a strong identification as a unified community. The configuration that the groups 
gave to the semantic network of their representational field was similar across all 
groups. All shared the same structure of argumentation, type of interrelation between 
the different themes and rhetorical strategies to question dialogical others’ 
knowledge. At the end of this section I discuss the minor differences across groups.
Participants would agree and take on from others’ interventions, which led 
them to a more elaborate argumentation of others’ points and the progression of the 
debate towards different themes. The strong agreement and consent is understood as 
an indicator of similarity within groups, of common work patterns and a cohesive 
identification as members of the voluntary sector. All the groups were marked by 
solidarity, and expressed concern to be understood and to understand others. There 
seemed to be a deep level of comprehension and recognition of the reality that others
211
were expressing, and which all shared. Their representations occurred against a 
background of questioning institutional practices and statutory knowledge (i.e. 
policies, statutory definitions of homelessness and services) and of defending their 
own, whilst simultaneously co-constructing a shared identity. The general sequence 
of the debate was: 1. A contestation of other’s representations of homelessness. 2. An 
argumentative defense of what homelessness means to ‘us’. 3. A critique of statutory 
responses to homelessness. 4. Contestation of the imposition of the statutory agenda 
and a justification of having to conform to it. 5. A defense of the value of voluntary 
sector’s approaches and knowledge and the need of the community of HPs to exist. 
These different narrative strategies are co-constitutive of the diverse identities of the 
HP.
Although at the very beginning of the discussion, the main concern of the 
groups was to tell me (moderator) about homelessness, the whole debate was 
characterized by dynamic interaction between participants. They continuously shared 
their views on homelessness and the difficulties of their job and supported each other 
in their criticisms to statutory/governmental agenda. The first accounts that emerged 
consisted of appropriating the views of those outside the reality of homelessness (i.e. 
statutory sector, the public), contesting and re-accentuating them with ‘educative’ 
intentions; with the images of the homeless that HPs use in their 
campaigns/advocacy. This initial positioning is explicitly aimed at educating the 
interviewer and is common across all narrative interviews and focus groups. It is 
understood as a product of the interviewer’s co-authorship in the research (as an 
outsider of homelessness), through participation in the researcher-researched 
dialogue that occurs at the inter-subjective level. Through the process of self­
reflection of my relationship with the participants (See Chapter 4 for a discussion on 
Self-Reflexivity), I realized the interplay of positions as ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’. At 
the beginning of the focus groups, participants seemed to construct me as an 
‘outsider’ and intentionally responded according to these assumptions, drawing upon 
the general images of their public campaigns. Take this first section of text from a 
focus group and see how it reflects the ethos and campaign slogans that appear in the 
web pages of two voluntary organizations, that participated in the research.
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PI: I  think it's quite a broad term. I  think people tend to look at homelessness, 
society tends to look at homelessness as somebody just living on the street. But fo r us 
it means, you could be living in a friend's property and sleeping on the floor or you 
don’t have your own accommodation. So it's quite a broad term.
Y2:Yeah, homelessness is any people who are, who live in temporary 
accommodation, or in hostels or in bed & breakfast, or on the street, but they might 
not have ...soyes, a very broad term.
P3: I  think i f  it was any different, it would actually be called houselessness as i f  it 
was actually not having accommodation per se but is actually homelessness which 
suggests you don't have a place to call your own. (Training and development 
workers)
‘Homelessness is not just about having a roof over your head; it is about being 
without a home-a place that is secure, safe, decent and affordable to live in. 
Homelessness is not simply about housing. Each homeless young person who comes 
to X  [Organization Name] has their own history, their own particular needs and their 
own challenges [...]
Home-fullness is a sense o f belonging, enabling a young person's personal, social 
and economic well-being.' (Extract from Organization 1 web page)
‘[...] the task o f getting them o ff the street fo r  good is a complex one. It is much more 
than offering a roof over someone's head. ’ (Extract from Organization 2 web page)
Just after their first ‘educative’ account, participants started feeling free to 
take up tacit positions, involving higher degrees of abstraction. The tone became 
more contesting and the statutory other became the main dialogical co-partner for the 
rest of the debate. Participants began drawing on their work experience, voluntary 
ethos and more elaborate forms of reasoning, which at points become politicizing of 
the homeless. The dynamics were characterised by a striking process of attempting to 
legitimize the voluntary sector, resisting the authority of the statutory sector and 
asserting a community identity as crucial pillars for the care of the homeless. This 
was the predominant discursive view of themselves that emerged within their plural 
identification. Their striking contestation to the statutory other reveals how their
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knowledge and identity are dialogically co-constructed through and against others’ 
knowledge. Ultimately, it reveals how the discursive character of their 
representations is founded in their desire to protect their professional aims and values, 
and their identities from dominant others.
Their concerns about institutionalism and alienation, were frequently 
permeated by a sense of humour (i.e. there were a lot of jokes about politicians) 
addressed towards themselves and the more ‘extreme’ clients. There are two 
explanations as to why humour permeated the conversation and the anecdotes of 
relationships with clients and statutory professionals. First, the meaning of laugher is 
understood as a way of questioning and ridiculing dominant others and institutions 
(Bakhtin, 1984b). Mockery and laugher emerged, as strategies to bring down the 
statutory institution together with its authoritative knowledge. Second, laugher also 
has a role as a way of coping with the drama of the reality that one presents 
(Jovchelovitch, 1995). The groups used humour in order to deal with the dramatic 
emotional load evoked by their representations.
Their narratives were simultaneously fraught with competing feelings of 
passion, frustration anger and fear, which convey the challenges and contradictions 
of their work. The fervent expression of emotions reveals their strong commitment to 
homelessness, the degree of care dedicated to the person and of cohesive 
identification within the community. Discourses o f  relatedness are characterized by 
expressions of love and passion to homelessness and simultaneous feelings of 
frustration when they explain their personal struggles to help the alienated other. 
Discourses o f reification and politicization are loaded by a plurality of contradictory 
feelings. One can hear the anger of having statutory agendas imposed whilst not 
having their knowledge recognised, the frustration of having to battle with 
institutional barriers, guilt of compromising their ethos, and fears of the 
disappearance of the voluntary sector along with its expertise. However, one can also 
hear the strong admiration, respect and esteem that they have for their own expertise 
and for the community of the voluntary sector. They spoke of the pleasure gained 
working with the homeless and expressed how proud they are, being members of the 
voluntary sector community. This strong sense of satisfaction and respect for their 
own community is at the core of their representational field.
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The organization of the representational field is common to the groups. They 
used the discourses in the same way and so offered the same elaboration of the 
representations. This is because despite having different job titles, they all depart 
from a genuine interest in homelessness, and share experience and ethos: to engage 
the client in the support relationship and to empower her to move on. These aims are 
also ingrained in the work ethos of project managers, who have a long experience 
working in different front-line jobs within the sector. Both the front-line and rear-line 
workers share a need to cope with the conflicting nature of working in the voluntary 
sector and an experience of clashing with more dominant forms of knowledge (i.e. 
statutory expertise). There are slight differences between the groups, which are 
related to their particular experience of the phenomena of homelessness due to their 
specific jobs and locations.
The group of project managers, presented a calmer and a more conforming 
discourse marked by constant reference to homelessness laws and complaints about 
bureaucracy and managerial work. They frequently drew on policies in order to 
contest the statutory other and to justify having to conform to its agenda. They re­
constructed policy prescriptions and bureaucracies with new meanings (i.e. 
constraining, barrier-like, dehumanizing), and defended the value of their own .ethos 
and knowledge. However, they did this through less intense and heated 
argumentation than the other groups. This is because they represent the public face of 
homelessness, and remain responsible for conforming to the institutional 
agendas/targets. Their argumentation highlights the difficulties of their work where 
they feel the need to conciliate policy and the need for funding within the voluntary 
sector. Hence, their debate occurred under a combination of contestation, 
rationalisation and justification of the need to conform to policy and statutory 
bureaucracies. Amongst their plural identity the dominant identification that emerged 
in their discussions was as a victim o f institutional domination.
Outreach workers were by far the most challenging group and were the most 
emotionally engaged in political battles. They were the most rebellious and created a 
highly politicized discussion, marked by strong subversion of institutionalism/ 
policies and fervent defence of their agency to develop their own relational
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interventions. They showed very little concern about my presence as a moderator. 
Their main interest was to exercise their positions and to assert their community 
identity as independent from the government. Their intellectualised discourse was 
marked by jokes, mainly towards institutionalism and statutory experts. Mockery for 
them was a strategy to assert their difference, their ethos and strong identity as 
creative HPs. The group dynamics illustrated great courage, strength, and confidence 
in their personal and professional battles. In their argumentation, which was 
structured around client stories, politics, and critiques to the institutional barriers of 
hostels they were strongly positioned as warriors and allies of their clients. They 
were the group that most denigrated anything related to the statutory sector, and the 
ones that identified less as victims o f institutional domination. This can be explained 
by their very positioning within the context of service provision. They work in the 
streets away from the head quarters of the voluntary agency where they enjoy 
freedom to put into practice their agenda. However, it is when putting the client in 
contact with services (i.e. hostels, drug rehabilitation) when they need to confront the 
statutory bureaucratic procedures and institutional barriers.
Mental health and drug misuse workers developed a rather more 
intellectualised discourse. They operated in a reflective mode explaining the causes 
and consequences of homelessness. They created a discussion marked by the use of 
psychological jargon and centred on issues of professional accountability and lack of 
epistemological recognition. Their argumentation is the one that highlights most, the 
professional barriers encountered in their job, the constant discrimination of their 
knowledge and the lack of recognition from statutory experts (doctors, psychiatric 
nurses). Throughout the discussion each of them cited examples of clashes with 
statutory and/or scientific expertise. Their concern was mainly to have their 
knowledge recognised and, throughout the debate there was a deep level of 
understanding between participants coming from a shared practice and experience of 
encountering medical/psychiatric dominant forms of knowledge. For mental health 
and drug misuse workers, to represent homelessness was intertwined with a 
determined defence of their own identity as a social group of essential experts.
Training and development workers organised the field of representations 
mainly around assertions of their views of support interventions fervently drawing
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upon discourses of relatedness. The debate was centred on narratives that expressed 
their passionate devotion to their everyday-experience, training clients and on 
intellectualised explanations of the aims of their interventions, which were defended 
as more efficient and ethical than those of the statutory agenda. For them, as for the 
rest of the groups, putting to use discourses of relatedness when explaining 
interventions, serves as a way of representing homelessness and simultaneously 
constructing a non-conformist and ethical identity as a group of professionals 
independent from the statutory sector. Particularly, they engaged in a continuous 
criticism of statutory views of training as a way of ‘filling’ clients with content. They 
contested having to adjust to the statutory agenda of hard outcomes (employment). 
Instead their narratives were replete with rhetorical defence of training as a means of 
developing a dialogical co-operative relationship with clients and as a way of 
empowering. Their argumentation highlights the closeness and emotional rapport 
with clients and the personal battle to help them become engaged in the different 
activities and workshops.
6.4. Participating and Observing.
In this section I present illustrative examples from my participation in HPs’ 
social milieu. These show how the competing and multiple representations that I 
found in the focus groups relate to the wider context of their production. I make 
references to, informal chats with HPs, participation in conferences, project visits 
and documents, all of which show the dialogicality, contradiction and plurality in 
ways of thinking characteristics of HPs’ representational field.
6.4.1. Discourses of Relatedness.
Discourses of relatedness emerged in the many narratives I encountered in the 
field. For instance, the conference ‘Homelessness and Loneliness: Building Social 
Capital in the twenty-first Century’ was fraught by assertions of relational support 
(bonding) and dialogical responsibility with the homeless. The focus was on an 
approach founded in dialogue and service-user involvement. However, the title of the 
conference and the debates reveal, contradictory representations of the homeless as 
both co-participants with agency/voice, and as alienated. Discussions during one
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Vconference seminar (‘Making the link between homelessness and loneliness’), 
represented the homeless as isolated, unwanted and uncared for by society, and 
lacking in meaningful relationships. The prevailing call for dialogical responsibility 
to the homeless co-existed with a strong emphasis on society’s role in fostering 
social inclusion which embedded images of the homeless as with neither agency not 
participatory investment in the construction social capital.
Social Capital conference fieldnotes extract:
The conference was introduced by an HP who talked about social capital, contested 
the ambitious targets set by the Government (i.e. ending child poverty) and 
challenged HPs to set out their own goals and to advocate for the end of 
homelessness as understood from the perspective of the voluntary sector: ‘Not just 
rough sleeping, not families living in bed and breakfasts -homelessness.’ A speaker 
asserted the importance of seeing clients as individuals with aspirations and as 
contributors rather than just service-users. Another HP responded: ‘People working 
in homelessness often don’t recognise the value that their clients can bring to others 
through volunteering’
Extract from project information
‘(the project) Recognises that service users are our most important stakeholders and 
we will continually seek new ways of ensuring that service users have a voice in 
shaping and participating in the operations of the organisation [...] To actively seek 
feedback from tenants and create opportunities for tenants to become involved in 
decision-making.’ This co-participation, I was told by the staff, was practiced in a 
weekly session run by HPs and service users.
During informal conversations with HPs the internal contradictions of 
discourses of relatedness emerged resulting in a representation of homelessness as a 
personal battle; a dilemma between on the one hand, dialogical responsibility, and on 
the other, struggle. In the Employability Conference Program the homeless were 
portrayed as ‘the hardest to help’ and in the conference pack you could read: ‘The 
challenge for agencies up until now has been to move the ‘hardest to help’ towards 
the labour [...]’
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Fieldnotes (21/11/04):
After interviewing Thelma she said that she was burnt-out, had lost any motivation to 
continue working in the sector. She was tired of seeing clients falling into the vicious 
circle of homelessness (Support worker)
Fieldnotes (07/11/04):
After speaking with Daniel, he told me that he was moving to do a very different job 
in the statutory sector. He justified: ‘you need to have enthusiasm, illusion, and I’ve 
lost it.’ (Campaign officer).
6.4.2. Discourses of Reification and Politization.
During my immersion within the voluntary sector the statutory other was the 
main dialogical interlocutor in HPs’ accounts. For instance, when being asked to 
write a report on the dietary needs of homeless people I was explicitly told that this 
was a document that was addressed to the government in order to raise awareness 
and receive funding. This needed to be done within the statutory framework, so I had 
to find statistics that could legitimately demonstrate deprivation. Take for example 
the seminar I attended in the employability conference titled ‘The role o f the 
Government\  Here, I was able to experience HPs’ continuous engagement in a 
political struggle for maintaining the agenda of the voluntary sector. The discussions 
were fraught with criticisms to the institutional agenda and its impact on the 
homeless person, who was represented as oppressed by institutional barriers and 
simultaneously reified as an object of political/institutional battles. Discourses of 
relatedness were drawn upon in order to assert the homeless as equal co-partners and 
to defend the approach of the voluntary sector.
Employability conference Seminar: ‘ What practice changes in current government 
policy are required to support more homeless people move towards training and 
employment. ’
One participant asserted that at the core of the fight against policy approaches is the 
fact that ‘there is zero flexibility in the system’ set by the government (HP 11). The 
impact of institutional approaches meant that: ‘clients feel that they do not have
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control’ (HP 12). Picking up on this point HP 10 asserted the need to listen to the 
voices of service users: ‘you should make it possible for people to choose what they 
want to do and where they want to work’. The debate was mainly focused on 
criticisms of exclusionary practices that do not allow them to be integrated into the 
job market. Some else pointed out that the consequences of the imposition of 
institutional goals meant the interruption of services; ‘our funding was out, we didn’t 
have good outcomes and the services had to close’ (HP 15).
Social Capital conference Fieldnotes extract:
The director of a voluntary agency argued that well-meaning attempts to reintegrate 
the homeless can be unsuccessful without the person participating in the process of 
re-integration. An HP on the floor argued that services need to be user led: ‘When we 
come to look at policies, we need to look at what homeless people have to say.’ 
There was a general feeling that policies such as ASBOS criminalise, impeding 
connectedness and social capital.
The HPs that I met during fieldwork felt that the imposition of statutory 
institutional approaches meant depersonalization, and neglecting of the voice of the 
homeless person. However, their desire for professional accountability, meant that 
they had the dilemmatic need to conform to the bureaucratized practices imposed by 
the statutory sector. This dilemma also emerged in the Social Capital Conference. 
One of the breakout sessions was titled: ‘Measuring soft outcomes with hard to reach 
Clients.’ Central to the session was a concern with how voluntary organizations 
struggle to demonstrate the outcomes that they have achieved.
Fieldnotes (10/12/041
During an informal chat with Jason (key worker) he talked about dealing with 
statutory experts. He felt frustrated since despite being fully responsible for the 
holistic care of the client, statutory experts who were only in charge of some aspects 
of that client’s care (i.e. GPs) had the power to decide: ‘at the end of the day they 
have the last word about any decision to be taken about the individual [...] Doctors 
don’t treat us as professionals’.
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Fieldnotes (17/01/05):
When Alex (training worker) was showing me the facilities where she teaches music 
she enthusiastically talked about her job and how X client had learnt to play the 
electric guitar: ‘I do the best and most enjoyable job and I’m in a much better 
position than my key workers colleagues’. She explained that this was because she 
didn’t need to deal with local authorities, housing benefit offices and so on.
6.4.3. Epistemological and Ontological discourses.
In conference debates and informal chats with HPs, their discussions about 
homelessness, implied understanding themselves as members of the voluntary sector 
and constructing a shared identity. This mirrored the inner plurality and contradiction 
of the identity of the HP that emerged in the focus groups. Conference discussions 
illustrated well how their identity co-emerged through responding to and re- 
accentuating imagined or present others’ (predominantly the statutory other) 
representations of homelessness. Despite being organised by the voluntary sector, 
government representatives had been invited so that HPs’ rhetorical responses could 
be heard. On the one hand, representations of the homeless as oppressed and 
politicized objects co-emerged with an identification of HPs as warriors of the 
homeless person, whose voice was barely physically present in the conference. On 
the other hand, a defence of the homeless as equal co-partners, co-emerged with 
identifications of the HP as an ally. See for instance what was argued by some of the 
HPs when in the conferences they advocated for the breaking of barriers to the 
employability of the homeless:
‘The advantage of employing homeless people in the sector is that they bring an 
added value. They are from the same class. We are all from the same group. We have 
a tribe language that we all understand’ (HP 17, Social Capital conference)
‘We have to make sure that there are good consultation methods to ask a wide range 
of homeless people what do they think’ (about their employability within the 
voluntary sector) (HP2)
221
Another two sets of contradictory identifications emerged through narratives 
that I encountered during my experience in the field were:
HP as a member o f the ethical voluntary sector & a victim o f institutional 
domination
Extract from the Employability conference programme: 4Overcoming barriers to 
employability. Achieving customer care while trying to meet targets: Barriers stack 
up against homeless people. Beyond the personal, cultural and societal factors, 
bureaucracies and Government policies can also serve to frustrate people’s attempts 
to escape homelessness.’
Fieldnotes (22/10/041: During an informal conversation with Daniel (front-line HP) 
he said: ‘Local authorities see us as hippies’. He said how ‘us’ (the voluntary sector) 
had ‘difficulties in delivering support and services to clients when working in 
partnership with statutory services’. He blamed local authorities for not providing 
enough drug rehabilitation services. He explained how this jeopardized all the 
support previously delivered by him to the client and the efforts to build a desire to 
recover.
Fieldnotes (10/10/041: Before the interview Martin (manager of the project) said: ‘I 
want to step away from statutory services since they don’t understand what we are 
doing and think that the work that we do is wrong’. Many times he said that in 
comparison with statutory bodies, the approach of his organization was ‘informal, 
non-judgemental and non-intrusive’ which aimed at ‘helping individuals to feel 
valued, accepted and heard’. I could see how this was materialized when he showed 
me around the project, which struck me by its openness. It was then that I could 
experience the approach of the organization, in its open plan design, lack of 
boundaries between staff and client area, which facilitated many of the client-staff 
interactions that I evidenced. It was also reflected in a leaflet that he gave me about 
the objectives of his organization: ‘to provide an alternative space for those 
individuals who are afraid or suspicious, or both, of structured and local authority 
day centres.’
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Essential helper/expert & non-legitimate practitioner
Fieldnotes (20/11/04): After the interview with Simon he said that he also had a part- 
time job in the NHS. He told me: ‘when I started in the NHS they looked at me with 
hostility because of my working in X (voluntary) organization’. He argued that his 
work in the NHS had greatly benefited from his expertise working in the voluntary 
sector.
Social Capital conference Fieldnotes extract: When a key speaker asserted the need 
to advocate and lobby for policies that take into account social capital another HP 
questioned how this could be done without the sector being seen as a ‘professional 
stroppy teenager’.
6.5. Conclusions.
The analysis reveals that both the content and the organization of the 
representational field are common across the groups. I present an example of how the 
knowledge of one community, that of HPs, is characterized by the co-construction of 
a polyphasic representational field and a plural and shared identity. The ways in 
which their shared representations of homelessness and identifications as a 
community are co-constructed reveal ambivalence and contradiction, and ultimately 
exemplify the link between the plurality of knowledge and the self. Their knowledge 
and identity are mostly co-constructed through and against the definitions, 
approaches and interventions of statutory others and the views they have of HPs as a 
group of practitioners. The dynamics of knowledge were characterised by, on the one 
hand, the discursive contestation of the knowledge claims of statutory others since 
these constitute a threat to the groups’ identity, projects and search for social/ 
professional recognition and, on the other, the assertion of their commitment to the 
voluntary practice and ethos, and simultaneous protection of their community 
identity.
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The dilemmatic nature of their representational field and the plural identities 
that are co-constituted with the use of each of the different discourses, are a 
reflection of the dynamics of the context of service provision. Within this context 
HPs struggle to sustain their relational approach, to engage the client to co- 
participate in the supportive relationship, to obtain statutory recognition of their 
expertise and to engage statutory experts in their own definitions and interventions. 
In their everyday work, the challenge for HPs is to maintain a positive community 
identity, and to bolster their esteem as a group of practitioners that live in a constant 
struggle with the dominant statutory other. The conflicts of their relation with the 
contested context of their work shape the plural identity and cognitive polyphasia 
expressed in the representations they hold. The identity and knowledge struggles that 
characterize the self and community of HPs function as a resourceful asset from 
which HPs can draw upon, in order to cope with the contradictions and battles of the 
context of their work. Ultimately, the critical way they put to use their 
representations, through rhetorical responses to others’ knowledges, reveals a strong 
tendency to defend their threatened knowledge, practices and community identity as 
a group of professionals.
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7. CONTESTED KNOWLEDGES AND IDENTITY STRUGGLES
In this thesis I have shown the link between the dialogical epistemology of 
knowledge and ontology of individuals and groups. Dialogue with others in the 
multiple social positionings in which we live is the terrain where self and knowledge 
are co-constructed. This relational context is at the heart of social life, since it is 
constitutive of both the ontological and the epistemological. It shapes the making of 
self and knowledge and explains their plural and contradictory nature. The internal 
dilemmas and battles that they contain between different themes, representations and 
practices do not cancel each other out. Instead, they co-exist within the person, who 
relates to them as a resourceful asset that is differently put to use to deal with the 
needs and challenges of the diverse contexts where she lives. My investigation into 
HPs’ knowledge of homelessness reveals how representational fields are at one and 
the same time, identity struggles and knowledge struggles. HPs’ ontological and 
epistemological battles reflect the dilemmatic nature of their relationships to the 
context of service provision and their particular location at die intersection between 
different spheres of knowledge and social sectors. Their multiple positionings and 
interactions with social actors holding diverse knowledges, projects and levels of 
expertise, provide the resources for these professionals to construct the plurality of 
contents and dialogues through which they co-construct their knowledge and identity.
The aim of this thesis was twofold. Firstly, to make a contribution towards 
the development of the critical potential of social representations theory through a 
Bakhtinian approach to the concept of cognitive polyphasia and its link to the 
polyphony of self. I was driven by a desire to further develop the concept of 
cognitive polyphasia and its co-constitution with identity processes. I wanted to 
contribute towards an understanding of what drives the eclectic use of 
representations; the fact that the same individual or group can think in different ways 
and eclectically use diverse and conflicting contents, practices and ideas about the 
same object. Secondly, to investigate how HPs co-construct knowledge about 
homelessness and themselves through critically engaging in debate with the 
representations of dialogical others. Special attention was focussed on how the co­
construction of HPs’ knowledge and identity was mediated by their positioning 
towards others’ representations. How they re-constructed them with their own
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intentions and values, whilst struggling with the positions and discourses that these 
others imposed upon them. This highlighted the contested and argumentative nature 
of social representations. In this chapter, by integrating the empirical evidence with 
the theoretical propositions, I wish to support my contention that possibilities for 
critique and contestation in the dialogical encounter with competing knowledge 
systems lie in our ability to position towards others’ knowledges.
7.1. Towards a Dialogical Understanding o f Self and Knowledge.
Adopting a social representation approach to the study of social knowledge in 
context (Jovchelovitch, 2007) and integrating it with a Bakhtinian perspective, in this 
thesis I have shown that the phenomenon of cognitive polyphasia and the polyphony 
of the self are two sides of the same coin. Particularly, I have demonstrated how 
positioning enables the person to move along many locations and relationships in the 
social fabric simultaneously existing in multiple inner and outer dialogues where self 
and knowledge are mutually co-constructed. The dialogicality and contextuality of 
knowledge leads to a number of important conclusions. These are related to the 
understanding of the inner plurality of the person and the critical potential of social 
representations in their mediation of our dialogical relationships with others and the 
social world.
7.1.1. Polyphony and Polyphasia in Self and Knowledge.
The polyphasia of knowledge is rooted in the dialogical ontology of human 
beings and can only be properly understood within the grounds of the social, 
dialogical and communicative context of its production. This is a context of multiple 
ego-alter dialogical relationships, where different ideas and modes of thinking clash 
and compete over meaning giving way to the emergence of social representations. In 
order to understand the plurality of knowledge and identity we must first understand
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how both are contained in the dialogical triad self-other-object. I have shown how a 
perspective that takes dialogicality as both ontology and social practice (material, 
linguistic and non-verbal), ties together the relational and symbolic dimensions, 
whereby social representations are constituted and constitute our experience of the 
world and self. Against the dichotomy between individual/society that so often has 
characterized the debate on self and knowledge, the dialogical ontology and 
epistemology of social representations theory involves the acknowledgement of the 
conjoint existence of the ego in relationship with the alterity of manifold others. 
Knowledge and identity are neither centred on individuals nor society, instead, they 
are grounded in the dialogical space in-between, where ego and alter co-participate in 
the constitution of each other’s subjectivity and knowledge. It is exactly in this space, 
which the person may not intentionally choose to occupy, where the multiple and 
conflicting styles of thinking brought by self and others clash and compete to 
institute their versions of reality and to position the other in the social fabric. 
Bakhtin’s perspective on dialogue, is crucial in this regard since he conceptualises 
dialogicality of self and knowledge as responsiveness and positioning towards the 
polyphony of others’ voices (1984a; 1986). This implies the recognition of the voice 
of the other in the back-and-forth- dynamics between each other’s voices and 
positions along which elements from self cross over to others and vice versa. He 
recognises that the self is polyphonic, inhabited by the ‘traces’ of others’ discourses, 
with which the person simultaneously exists in dialogue with and responds to in the 
process of meaning making. This leads to a multiplicity of co-authorships in the co- 
construction of self and knowledge, and explains the plurality of the ontological, as 
well as the epistemological. Dialogicality means both containing the alterity of the 
other but at the same time separating from it through positioning towards the 
representations that she brings to dialogue. We can clearly see how knowledge and 
identity are constituted through and against others’ ‘words’ in a tensional struggle to 
institute one’s versions of reality. In this way, the inner plurality of the person and 
the content and dynamics of her knowledge are bound to the conflicts and diversity 
of the dialogical context, the person’s repertoire of internal and external relationships 
with others, where their different worldviews meet and compete with one another. 
Polyphony and polyphasia of self and knowledge contain in their very content and 
dynamics the resources for plural thinking and identity.
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Polyphasic knowledge is organized in representational fields, characterized 
by plural and oppositional themes as well as modes of thinking, living side-by-side 
within individuals and groups. These differ in their degree of symbolic power. How, 
at different times, one is privileged over others, needs to be understood in the light of 
the position we take in relation to others’ worldviews. Co-existence of plural and 
contradictory modes of thinking and identities is possible due to the spatialization of 
the self alongside simultaneous dialogues where she takes different I-Other 
positionings. This spatialization is central to the ability of the person to live in 
simultaneous locations in the social fabric appropriating and re-accentuating the 
voices of different others, which come to constitute her inner plurality. The 
movements alongside I-other positionings are at the heart of the dynamics of 
polyphasic knowledge, whereby particular meanings are eclectically put to use 
(merging with a particular identity), with different aims- to contest, to negotiate 
and/or to support others’ representations. Positioning mediates the way people are 
able to think in multiple ways and experience plural concomitant identities. Without 
the ability to position oneself in relation to the knowledge of multiple others and also 
re-construct this knowledge, some voices have the risk of being muted. The 
consequence would be that knowledge would remain the property of one voice. This 
would result in what Jovchelovitch (2007) identifies as monological segregation and 
exclusion of forms of knowledge.
7.1.2. Socio-ideological Determinants of Knowledge and Identity.
Related to Bakhtins’ view (1986), that the person exists in reaction to others’ 
words, we find processes of constructing knowledge co-merging with processes of 
identity. The inherent link of the dialogicality of self and knowledge means that in 
the constmction of social representations meanings about others and the world merge 
with identificatory discourses about oneself. Both the dialogicality of self and 
knowledge are one and the same socio-ideological process. This process is dependent 
on a complex tension between privileging one’s knowledge under centripetal forces 
and centrifugal forces of meaning that tend towards the other’s views and the 
position that they impose upon us. These are the internal battles between ‘voices’ of
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dialogical others struggling for hegemony to institute their competing discourses and 
impose positions on the self, framing the subjectivity of the person and the 
representational act. The person has possibilities for either being subordinated to the 
dominant ‘voices’ of authoritative others, or taking contesting I-positions subverting 
the other’s knowledge and the position it imposes on the self To construct social 
representations and identity involves taking different I-positionings, through which 
the discourses of others are evaluated and re-constructed in order to claim and defend 
a particular worldview and identity. The person emerges through her participation in 
dialogical relationships with others, not as a centralized fixed entity, but as one who 
is constituted and re-constituted through the various positionings orientated towards 
and at the same time framed by interlocutors’ positions and discourses. For every 
response to another’s representations, the new meaning that emerges ‘talks’ about the 
referential object, the interlocutors’ knowledge and the self of the person. 
Accordingly, developing a sense of who we are, is always in co-authorship with 
others, which is bound to the ongoing back-and-forth tensional dynamics between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. It is within this context of dialogical confrontation 
and struggle with others’ perspectives, where a plural self and polyphasic knowledge 
co-emerge. That is to say that, when social subjects dialogically use representations, 
they do so in order to assert a version of reality and to propose an identity, and 
through this they have the possibility to reject the positions offered to them by the 
alter and the representations claimed by them in discourse. This explains the 
symbolic struggles within representational fields.
7.13. The Critical Potential of Social Representations.
Processes of representation embed possibilities for critical engagement with 
the social world. The critical potential of social representations is neither centred on 
the individual nor in society, but in the dialogicality between them and is also framed 
(constrained or facilitated) by structural dimensions. The socio-ideological/dialogical 
making of knowledge and identity is never a neutral process, instead it is bound to 
the conflict of worldviews, projects and positionings of different groups, 
communities and individuals. Hence, it involves positioning with respect to others’
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representations in the battle between contested meanings of self and other. Within 
these ‘ideological’ battles the person struggles for social significance and social 
recognition of one’s own voice, identity and project. The rhetorical nature of 
positioning and appropriation opens possibilities to engage, through argument and 
debate, in a critique of others’ discourses. It contains possibilities to take contesting 
positionings and through re-accentuation find ways to challenge representations that 
position one in an inferior place perpetuating the status quo. This explains the 
possibilities to contest forms of knowledge legitimately regarded as containing the 
‘truth’ and that have a privileged relationship to others in terms of the criterion of 
‘rationality’. In looking at the production of knowledge in focus group conversations, 
narratives and social practices I found that, along the dialogical tensions produced by 
the dynamics between multiple opposing positions, HPs’ social representations were 
put to use in order to contest and oppose policy and institutional hegemonic 
discourses. In drawing on elements of their polyphasic representational field and 
infusing statutory others’ discourse with different intentions and values, they showed 
their ability to critically engage with relations of inequality with statutory 
interlocutors. Their knowledge, thus involved polyphasia of ways of thinking, 
responsiveness to dialogical others, creativity, dynamism, argumentation and debate 
in the production and re-construction of social representations.
The foregoing features of knowledge and identity confirm important elements 
of social representations theory and its concept of cognitive polyphasia. They tie up 
some theoretical ‘knots’ of the concept through linking conceptualization with 
empirical evidence from this investigation. With this, of course, I do not seek to 
‘finalize’ the concept. On the contrary, my theoretical contribution to cognitive 
polyphasia poses new questions and is open to possible and significant 
developments. What I hope is that in this thesis I have contributed towards a step in 
the right direction regarding the enhancement of the epistemological credentials of 
social representations theory. The points outlined above integrate both theoretical 
and empirical investigation to propose the following:
I. Relationships are the context of the ‘birth’ of social representations and 
the construction of identities. Social representations, however, also 
constitute relationships and ontologies. The person understood as a body
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in relation to others, is the product of the matrix of a myriad of 
relationships where one participates (and has participated), and thus 
embodies the multitudes of others, their discourses and voices. The 
person therefore, is bom of representations that are constituted in and 
constitute (material, verbal and non-verbal) relationships where she is 
located and which are expressed in social practices, institutional rituals 
and so on. Relationships are spaces with potential for both limitations and 
possibilities for generating, sustaining contesting and/or disrupting 
meanings. They are the site for negotiability of the knowledges and 
identities of individuals and groups. Social representations have a 
relational genesis, are constitutive of social life and enshrine the 
dialogical repertoire of the person with the conflicts, upheavals, 
disagreements and harmonies between interlocutors. It is not surprising 
then that knowledge is polyphasic since social representations contain the 
different identities and forms of thinking developed in our relationship 
with others. Therefore, self-other relationships, as well as the enactment 
of representations in material practices, and their crystallization in the 
subjectivity and physicality of the person must be taken seriously.
II. The notion of positioning is very important to the relational. Positioning, 
gives us an understanding of the self, moving across different relational 
locations, co-constructing with the other but not being substituted by her 
discourses. This means that knowledge and identity are neither self 
sufficient nor completely substituted by another interlocutor’s 
consciousness, instead they are a joint enterprise of multiple co-authors. 
Others frame our positions, and can impose a particular position onto us, 
but positions also have potentialities and are the very source for critically 
engaging with others. The relational is a space where the voice of an 
interlocutor (institution, authoritative other) can impose particular 
positions on the self suppressing, sanctioning and/or muting certain 
voices of the self, limiting the negotiability of knowledge and 
subjectivities, and constraining the persons’/groups’ epistemological and 
ontological potentials. However, the relational is also a space of 
possibilities since the rhetorical nature of positioning towards the others’
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discourse enables one to enter into the arena of her knowledge, 
applauding, contesting or detesting it. Positioning is at the heart of the 
tensions between centripetal and centrifugal forces in the self and 
explains how certain forms of thinking and being are given way, 
becoming viable and intelligible in a particular dialogue with others. The 
theory of social representations would benefit from including positioning 
as a mediator in the dialogical triad of representations. The dialectics 
between assimilation (reproduction) and contestation (agency); unity 
(permanence) and variability/fragmentation (fluidity), is at the very heart 
of how social representations are formed and put to use. As Jovchelovitch 
(1995) argues a representation emerges through a process that ‘involves at 
one and the same time a work of bonding and of differentiation between 
self and alterity. A representation links self and other and yet, by the same 
token, it separates self and other [..]’ (p. 121).
III. Finally, let me consider the importance of the notion of polyphasia. First, 
polyphasia is bom in socio-psychological processes and lives at the level 
of performative and linguistic practices (of individuals, groups and 
institutions), the subjective (emotions, selfhood), the social (social 
practices) and the material. Polyphasia, therefore, is epistemological and 
ontological. Failing to recognise its intertwined dimensions would imply 
falling into the same dualisms from which the theory of social 
representations has sought to escape from. Second, polyphasia is not only 
a product of the intersection of the multiple dialogical relationships in 
which the person is (and has been) engaged, it is a phenomenon; a source 
o f possibilities both for the ontology and epistemology of individuals and 
groups. The contradictions, diversity and dilemmas contained within 
polyphasia should not be considered problematic incoherence or faulty 
deviation. Instead, polyphasia is emblematic of the broader connections of 
the person/group to the social world and to a particular cultural history 
where conflicts and plurality are the normal order of things. Its plural and 
conflicting nature is freighted with otherness, and at the same time it 
enables us to manage the dilemmas that the multiplication of relationships 
with others in contemporary times bring forward. As paradoxical as it
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may seem, the internal conflicts and dilemmas of polyphasia are also the 
wellsprings of its strength. The positive potentials inherent to polyphasia 
refer to its function as a repertoire; a capital of meanings and practices 
that we eclectically draw upon from different positions in order to act 
intelligibly and functionally in the multiple locations in which we live. 
And it is through bringing elements from this capital into immediate 
relationships and contexts that they can take on new meanings and 
polyphasia can add and modify. The issue of polyphasia should continue 
to be, I believe, on the agenda of social representations researchers. This 
is necessary since the very importance of polyphasia is that it ultimately 
mediates between self and alterity, and allows for coping with the diverse 
and sometimes dilemmatic relational experiences in which we live (work, 
support, intellectual exchange, love, moral commitment, institutional).
7.2. Contested Knowledges: Representations in the Battlefield.
The other aspect this thesis investigated was concerned with a critical 
engagement with the broader socio-cultural and political context of homelessness, 
which plays an essential part in the production of homelessness subjectivities and 
(material) experiences. Particularly, I focused on social knowledge of homelessness 
from the perspective of HPs in context. If through my investigation, I was hoping to 
contribute to a critical social psychology of homelessness I needed to engage with 
the context where symbolic constructions of homelessness emerge and penetrate 
practices and relationships constituting the physical and psychological experience of 
the homeless person. The particular case of HPs working in the context of service 
provision in London provides valuable insights and modestly contributes to a general 
social psychology of homelessness. HPs are certainly well placed to explore the 
production of knowledge of homelessness. They are at the intersection between 
different spheres of knowledge, moving locations from the front-line of 
homelessness to the spheres of policy making and the public. Within these locations 
they confront obstacles to the realization of their interventions and they struggle to
234
engage others with their definitions and approaches to homelessness. And it is along 
these multiple locations in which they simultaneously live, where they dialogically 
relate to others, whose representations and discourses are appropriated and re­
accentuated, thus providing HPs with the resources to make sense of homelessness. 
These plural and conflicting resources are at the heart of the formation of HPs’ 
knowledge and identity, which ultimately shape practices and relationships with 
clients, potentially enhancing or undermining the health and subjective experience of 
homeless people.
As I explained in Chapter One, from the outset of this research I did not seek 
to defend a theory of professional knowledge of homelessness. Instead, I sought to 
understand the content and dynamics of HPs’ knowledge focusing on the interacting 
dialogue between its constitutive elements and how these were drawn upon and 
eclectically put to use when making sense of homelessness. Particular attention was 
paid to how these professionals were able to critically engage in relations of power 
with authoritative others (i.e. statutory/policy professionals). I was interested in how 
their dialogical use of knowledge had the potential to contest the hegemonic 
representations of those interlocutors with legitimated power to lead constructions of 
homelessness. That is, those representations that HPs regarded as ideological because 
they constrained their agenda and limited the interests of the homeless person. The 
aim was to explore how in the making sense of homelessness, HPs were able to 
engage in socio-ideological and dialogical battles with the voices and discourses of 
others, challenging and re-constructing the views and approaches these interlocutors 
strive to impose on them. If social representations are symbolic dimensions of 
homelessness that are inherently constitutive of the material and socio-psychological 
experience of the homeless, to look at their content and dynamics is crucial if we 
want to assess exclusionary barriers and possibilities of fostering their inclusion and 
participation within mainstream society. This is certainly important since research 
has demonstrated that exclusionary practices place barriers to the homeless, hence 
contributing to increased risk of illness and experiences of material deprivation 
(Hodgetts et al., 2007).
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7.2.1. Polyphony amongst HPs.
One of the most important aspects of social representations highlighted in this 
study is how polyphony and polyphasia of self and knowledge are two sides of the 
same process. This study has shown that HPs’ identity and knowledge of 
homelessness is a dialogical process sharply framed by the socio-ideological and 
political battles of the context of service provision. This is characterized by the 
competing approaches and definitional clashes between the statutory and voluntary 
sector. The analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussed in Chapter Five and 
Six, has produced a coherent and similar representational field sharply characterized 
by cognitive polyphasia, with content and forms of knowledge drawn from the 
dialogues with the polyphony of others (i.e. the voluntary sector, policy, the statutory 
sector, the homeless and the public).
The dynamics of their representational field were mediated by the shifting 
and re-shifting of different positions, from which diverse and competing themes were 
dialogically put to use, in response to others’ representations. Furthermore, a global 
overview of data points at the co-constitution of a plural identity merging with the 
polyphasia of their knowledge. The identity of the HP emerged as one side of the 
same socio-ideological process of knowledge production and it was through 
argument and debate with others, predominantly the statutory interlocutor that 
particular meanings of homelessness merged with particular identities of the HP.
Now, how is their representational field organized and which dynamics does 
it reveal? How is the dialogical use of competing representations ‘voiced’ from 
different positions while merging with particular identities of the HP? As argued in 
the foregoing section in order to understand how HPs live in a sphere of conflict 
between different discourses of what homelessness is and who the homeless person 
is, we need to look at the terrain where the constitutive dialogues of the inner 
plurality of the person emerge. It is in this dialogical space in-between HPs and 
others, where diverging and even contradictory discourses of multiple interlocutors 
and the person’s evaluation of them compete with each other in the making of 
representations of homelessness.
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At the heart of HPs’ knowledge are the disputes for the construction of 
representations of homelessness with the public and private funding bodies (through 
educative campaigns, the media and fundraising activities), the government and 
statutory experts (through policy lobbying, voluntary sector conferences). 
Particularly, the dialogue with the statutory other appeared as dominant to the 
organization and dynamics of their representational field. Statutory institutional 
demands and the hegemony of their definitions of homelessness pose a dilemma and 
a threat to voluntary ethos and practices. In HPs’ knowledge one could also ‘hear’ 
the spontaneous emergence of otherizing and alienating discourses embodied in the 
voices of the lay person. These were reflective of the fact that as well as being 
practitioners, HPs are lay members of the public and as such also contain 
representations that victimize and alienate. These commonsensical images of the 
homeless that had been bom of other relations with lay people, were borrowed and 
used into the immediate interchange of the interview where the HP was 
simultaneously engaged in internal dialogues with the statutory interlocutor. When 
being imported into the dialogue they were infused with new values and took on a 
different meaning. As they lost their previous anchorage, these were put to use, 
infused with different motivations, such as to advocate and fight for homelessness as 
a social cause and to justify to the government the need of approaches based on 
supportive relationships. Whether it was the representations of what homelessness 
meant to them, or who the homeless person is, the tensions and conflicts with which 
their everyday relationships with others are fraught, shaped the content and 
dialogical use of their knowledge and were ultimately played out in the ontology of 
the HP. The tensions between the voices that are at the core of their polyphasic 
knowledge were played out in the production of plural and contradictory identities of 
the HP.
7.3. Dialogicality, Regulation and Ontology.
This study has shown that HPs’ knowledge of homelessness and co­
construction of identity were built upon dialogical and socio-ideological battles 
between self and a polyphony of others and were constituted as a response to their 
representations. The contested and argumentative character of the knowledge and the
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identity of the HP appeared as central in the data. Their representational field was 
constituted of identity and knowledge struggles, which emerged as inherent to the 
reactive nature of the dialogical person and her capacity to critically engage with the 
representations of others. However, these dynamics also expressed the simultaneous 
unavoidable structural need of having to conform to the statutory (and private 
funding body) frame and the positions that it imposes on the HP. At points, 
contestation to statutory others’ representations and agenda was intertwined with 
justification of having to conform to their knowledge. The scenario that appeared in 
the data was a plurality of struggles faced by HPs when making sense of 
homelessness along which others’ representations were continuously evaluated, re­
accentuated, and responded to. These battles emerged in a sequence of contestation 
to others’ knowledge, argumentative defense of one’s representations, critique 
intertwined with justification of conforming to the imposed statutory agenda, and a 
defense of HPs’ knowledge, project and identity. They consisted on socio-ideological 
battles between hegemonic and oppositional representations of homelessness striving 
to overpower the other and to take the lead in the construction of homelessness. In 
particular, the statutory interlocutor emerged as controller and regulator of HPs’ 
practice. Hence, HPs fought over the statutory other’s limitation and setting of 
boundaries to HPs’ ethos, knowledge and supportive approaches to the homeless.
It is possible to divide these struggles into three sets of battles, which co­
existed in conflictive relationship between them, whilst at the same time supporting 
each other: battles o f humanization & relatedness, battles o f institutionalization, 
reification and politization, and battles o f identity. The first regards the dialogical 
responsibility towards the relationship with the homeless, where the HP fights 
between, on the one hand, humanization, companionship, morality and ethics, and on 
the other, alienation, victimization and otherization. The second relates to the 
pragmatics of institutional regulation, where the HP finds herself in a dilemmatic 
conflict between, on the one hand, bureaucracies and institutional control that limit 
their supportive interventions and on the other hand, a strong sense of advocacy and 
responsibility as political representative of the homeless, which results in 
objectification and politization of the homeless ontology. The conflict between these 
two battles brings about a third battle related to the ‘embodiment’ of these 
contradictions in the ontology of the homeless and the HP. The experience of these
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dilemmas in their everyday practices and in their relationship with clients is played 
out in a set of representations of who the homeless person is and a co-construction of 
the identity of the HP. Certainly, the full significance of HPs’ representational field, 
needs to be understood over and against the co-construction of their ontology, since 
the production of their knowledge goes hand in hand with the co-production of their 
subjective experience and their community identity.
7.3.1. Battles of Humanization & Relatedness.
A defence of the need to re-shift attention away from the individual homeless 
to the sphere of dialogical relationships, emerged through struggles with statutory 
and public others. They were requested to relate to the homeless as fellow human 
beings and dialogical co-partners through understanding. This battle was linked to 
HPs’ vocational and ethical ideals in their role as communicators and educators o f 
the public, politicians and the media and was rooted in their positioning at the front­
line with the homeless. It reflects HPs’ realization of who the homeless are and what 
homelessness is, that is developed through their relational experience with clients. 
But this idealist rhetoric was not free from internal contradiction. Its dynamics 
expressed how HPs’ struggle to include the homeless co-emerged through tensional 
dynamics with excluding and judging discourses. These were anchored in images of 
the homeless as alienated and deficient and were translated at the level of practices 
asserting the need to cure. HPs entered in conflict between, on the one hand; the 
homeless person as an equal co-partner, whole human being, dialogical responsibility, 
moral commitment, and transformable ontology through practices of healing, 
humanization, understanding, dialogue and co-operation on the path towards self- 
actualization, and on the other hand, the homeless person as oppressed victim, 
deficient/ alienated, a personal battle for the HP, a perpetual ontology judged and in 
need of curing.
HPs’ fight for the dialogical support of homeless people and client-focused 
approaches is at the core of the debate between the voluntary and statutory sector in 
the UK. Their concern with the de-otherization of the homeless and emphasis on 
bridging is also central to their role as translators of homeless issues into the public
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sphere, whereby they are fighting to link the domiciled community with the homeless. 
Certainly, HPs’ positioning within these relationships mediated their knowledge 
processes in the interviews and focus groups. For HPs in the study, meaningful 
approaches to homelessness can only be generated within dialogical processes of 
relationships, where both ontology and morality are co-constructed (McNamee & 
Gergen, 1999). Dialogical responsibility, as is claimed by HPs, is about humanizing 
ways of engaging with others through companionship and support. They asserted, 
from positions as fellow human beings and representatives of the homeless, that 
through this relational process self and co-partner in dialogue constitute each other. It 
is only within the dialogical relationship that a sense of self-esteem and feeling of 
belonging can emerge. Indeed, the project of changing ontology is a relational one 
based upon the crafting of conjoint interventions (McNamee & Gergen, 1999). An 
approach like this, that recognises the voices of the clients, their diverse experiences, 
resources and agency, has more potential to work in the right direction towards social 
change in the status quo of the homeless (Zufferey & Kerr, 2004).
However, HPs’ discourse on relational responsibility became at points too 
moralistic and entered into conflict with victimization where HPs engaged in the 
same alienating processes that they criticised the statutory and public other for. Here, 
they put to use representations of the homeless as a personal battle for the HP. 
Paradoxically, these representations emerged along intertwined positions of the HP 
as a knowledgeable professional and representative of the homeless. The aim was to 
assert the complexity of their job in order to defend the need of responsive/dialogical 
approaches and to contest the dominant and reductionistic statutory/policy definition 
of homelessness. The ultimate aim was to justify to the statutory other their demands 
of governmental moral commitment (as dialogical responsibility) and to defend the 
practical and ethical value of the voluntary sector’s relational, supportive and 
comprehensive approach. In the same way as in their public education campaigns 
and policy work, HPs’ advocacy for the dignity and humanization of homeless 
people co-existed in paradox with victimization. In this way, claims of moral 
commitment were infused with a rhetoric of compassion towards the homeless as 
victims. Indeed, the power of charity advocates to access the media and define 
homelessness in the UK has been criticised for instituting victimizing images that
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remove them from their own ontologies and represent them as pitiful and needy 
(Hodgetts et al., 2005).
As the data has shown, there is no doubt that despite the fact that HPs took 
positions as fellow human beings and representatives of the homeless from which 
they fought for a dialogical ethic of homelessness, they also co-constructed their 
responsibility to the homeless as conflictive. It was here were victimizing notions of 
the homeless emerged from their positionings as the mainstream, but this time 
infused with a different meaning. Here, the voice of the lay person who struggles to 
relate with the alienated other percolated in a more veiled way. What emerged was a 
declaration of the difficulties HPs experience in practice when endeavouring to 
construct conjoint supportive relationships with the deviant other.
Ultimately, the clash of their conflicting images and feelings towards the 
homeless was translated into the practices they develop. Hence, a defence of healing 
approaches (practices of relatedness) emerged intertwined with a rhetoric of curing. 
In blaming the alienated nature of the individual their personal battles with 
homelessness and difficulties to deliver successful interventions were justified. This 
mirrors the prevailing Western assumption of the existence of an autonomous self, 
which in emphasising subjective agency rather than relational one constructs 
individual responsibility and justifies practices of correction and restoration (curing) 
(McNamee & Gergen, 1999).
73 . 2 .  Battles of Institutionalization, Reification and Politization.
The most prevalent battle was between ethics, political control and 
institutional regulation of the homeless. The homeless were excluded from 
participation in HPs’ judgements and political fights with the government over 
morality, interventions and policies. These battles disregarded important issues of 
their identity and neglected their agency to assert their lifeworlds and ontologies. 
There was a shift from HPs’ focus on the social justice of the homeless as a conjoint 
dialogical action to social control through politization and institutionalization of the 
homeless. This movement is entrenched in what has been criticized by homeless
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people as the enduring transformation of the voluntary sector into a ‘homelessness 
industry’, which has led to a growing separation between providers and clients (Daly, 
1997).
These battles are rooted in the socio-political context of service provision 
where fights (verbal and material) between the discursive practices of statutory 
others and HPs over homelessness are everywhere to be seen. In contemporary times, 
the voluntary sector is increasingly reliant on external funding and thus is subjected 
to the political and economic constraints of British society and the domination of its 
rationalist discourses (Wigglesworth & Kendall, 2000). Dependency on external 
funding and increased partnerships with statutory agencies pose an imminent risk of 
proselytization into institutionalism. This also means subordination to the order, 
control, accountability and competition emphasised by a public sector that is 
entrenched in a privatization of the welfare system (Daly, 1997). The dilemma for 
the HP, is that the institutional requirements of state and private funding bodies 
jeopardize their fight for humanization, and ultimately, their dialogical responsibility. 
HPs’ expressed deep fear of the consequences of this for the wellbeing of homeless 
people. Within this dilemmatic context, HPs shifted positions as ‘knowledgeable 
professionals’, ‘’defiant nonconformists’ and ‘’victims o f the institutional power’, 
from which they engaged in continuous fights for social justice and the recognition 
of their moral ethos and expertise. But in this paternalistic fight the voice of the 
homeless was not invited to engage as dialogical co-partner in the struggle with the 
outside audience. When HPs shifted their positions to ‘contractors o f  the government 
client’ and ‘traders o f  the homeless product’, their fight for justice became 
politicized and monological. The unintended consequence was the reification and 
exclusion of those who are the ultimate cause of their struggles and their existence as 
a professional sector.
The conflicts that appeared within this battle are rather difficult to reconcile. 
Bureaucratization, professionalisation (accountability), hard-outcomes, institutional 
care and the oppression of the homeless by institutional barriers were the main 
signifiers, giving meaning to the adjustment to practices defined by others. 
Relational/dialogical approaches, practice-based knowledge, humanization, co­
participation of clients, healing and companionship, soft-outcomes and personalized
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care were notions put to use when defending the agency and practices of the 
voluntary sector. Both sets of conflicting signifiers were rhetorically put to use with 
different aims and emerged as a set of contestations and justifications in the dialogue 
between the statutory interlocutor and the different positioned-I(s) of the HP. The HP 
positioned as a contractor of the government is required to be targeted, programmatic 
and hard outcomes-driven, which results in the regulation of HPs’ practices and 
ultimately the ontology of the homeless person. HPs’ humanizing practices and 
experience-based knowledge is illegitimated and thus required to be substituted by 
order of bureaucracies and the institutional control of the funding body. Hence, HPs 
are at the same time, engaged in a fight against the exclusion of the homeless and the 
exclusion of their knowledge. Theirs is a hybrid knowledge that crosses boundaries 
of academic expertise. Its disqualification and marginalization is rooted in its very 
lack of compartmentalization (Sibley, 1995). By not having secure boundaries it is 
considered illegitimate and thus is left disempowered and with no authority in its 
relation to expert knowledge (Sibley, 1995).
Nevertheless, the research has given evidence of HPs’ ability to engage in 
discursive and material contestation to the imposition of the statutory agenda and 
definition of homelessness. Despite statutory imposition of the form and content of 
service delivery, they find ways within institutional framing to put into practice their 
ethos and approach. Homeless institutional contexts, as Zufferey & Kerr (2004) have 
pointed out offer ‘both constraints and opportunities for developing collaborative and 
client focused service provision’ (p.352). However, HPs’ political and ideological 
battles meant the objectification of the homeless person. Their fight for social justice 
turned into a fight for social control of homelessness issues. In being cut off from co- 
participating in decisions about their life and about their re-integration into 
mainstream society, the homeless were disempowered from social change. Indeed, it 
is argued that the most empowering approach is to treat service users as experts on 
their own ontology (Boydell, Goering, & Morrell-Bellai, 2000 ). In the advocacy for 
resources and defence of their expertise, HPs’ perpetuate homelessness and increase 
the separation between service providers and clients (Zufferey & Kerr, 2004). HPs’ 
defence of relatedness with the homeless, which corresponds to a Habermasian 
dialogical approach to morality (McMahon, 2000) clashed with their monological 
discourse o f justice. Within this, the act of identifying and asserting the principles of
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morality concerning the homeless were carried out without the participation of the 
homeless voice. Despite the fact that their political battle was motivated by the desire 
to do the right thing for the homeless, it turned into an epistemological and political 
fight over who was in control of issues of homelessness. Hence, their battle for 
justice lost sight of its original aim, that was at the core of any discourse of morality, 
which according to Habermas (1990), is rightness instead of truth and should be 
dialogical in nature, inviting those affected parties to participate in discussion 
(McMahon, 2000). These political battles, or monological judgements on morality in 
Habermasian terms, emerged through HPs’ conflicting thinking both in interviews 
and focus groups, as well as in observed practices during fieldwork. As I discussed in 
the participative-observation section in Chapters Five and Six, the homeless voice 
was barely present in the debates of both conferences, and institutional control was in 
some projects exerted through spatial regulation.
7.33. Battles of Identity.
Tensional forces between battles o f  humanization & relatedness and battles 
o f institutionalization, reification & politization competed to produce a view of what 
homelessness is. It was out of this struggling relationship that battles containing 
representations about the identity of the homeless person appeared. The homeless 
person emerged simultaneously as being; (1) alienated and politicized or recognised 
as an equal dialogical partner, (2) objectified and victimized or ontologically 
recognised, (3) whole or fragmented, resulting in a bifurcated identity. The 
conflicting dialogue between the three sets of battles was also played out in a set of 
co-existing representations of the identity of the HP. This appeared merged with the 
plural representations of what homelessness is and who the homeless person is. 
Hence, the HP emerged simultaneously as someone struggling between being: (1) a 
member o f the ethical voluntary sector vs. victim o f institutional domination, (2) an 
essential helper/expert vs. non-legitimate practitioner, (3) an ally vs. warrior.
HPs’ identity emerged as plural and contradictory, since it was co-constituted 
with the polyphasia of their knowledge of homelessness. Its plurality is rooted in the 
multiple self-other relations in which HPs are located and reflects the polyphony of
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the person. It was through constant shifting of positions towards symbolic 
interlocutors, predominantly statutory ones, that others’ ‘words’ came to be part of 
the identity and knowledge of the HP. What we can see in HPs’ representations is 
how their subjectivities and sensibilities are located in the dialogical space between 
self and others. The type of dialogues with interlocutors and the sequential pattern of 
argument and contra-argument through which knowledge emerged, was very similar 
in individual narratives and group discussions. HPs’ knowledge and identity 
construction occurred against a background of critically engaging with statutory and 
public others’ representations of homelessness, of questioning institutional practices 
and statutory knowledge and of defending their own agenda and ethos. The 
continuous dialogical response to others, was achieved through rhetorical 
positionings towards their knowledge claims (i.e. policies, statutory definitions of 
homelessness and services, public and media images of homelessness). These were 
re-accentuated with new meanings and intentions since they were regarded as posing 
a threat to the identities, projects and search for social recognition of the community 
of HPs. Such rhetorical acts of re-construction were mediated by the adoption of 
plural and conflicting I-positions, which gave way to the co-emergence of their 
processes of identity formation. It was through adopting an I-positioning towards the 
other co-producer of knowledge that a particular identity merged with a particular 
use of knowledge/representation.
As I have shown in Chapter Five, in the argumentative dialogue with multiple 
others that inhabit the self, HPs took up interwoven positions within the process of 
representing. On the one hand, when engaged in battles of humanization and 
relatedness, they juggled between positionings as ‘idealistic ’, ‘fellow human beings 
o f the homeless brother’, ‘representatives o f  the homeless’ and ‘knowledgeable 
professionals’. On the other hand, when engaged in battles of institutionalization, 
reification and politization, they took multiple interwoven positions as ''defiant 
nonconformist members o f the voluntary homeless sector’, ‘idealistic HPs’, 
‘professional experts o f the homeless industry\ ‘victims o f institutional power’ and 
‘members o f  the voluntary homeless sector’. At the core of the adoption of those 
positions were the various battles in which the HP is engaged; the moral fight with 
the outside audience to become critically aware of and dialogically committed to 
homelessness; the continuous struggle with the statutory other to defend the project
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of the voluntary sector, with which participants strongly identify, and, their yearning 
for social recognition and legitimacy of their expertise within a context that requires 
conforming to institutionalism, accountability and control of the statutory ‘financial 
enabler’ (Daly, 1997). Hence, the HP was simultaneously and conflictingly co­
constituted as an ally of and a warrior of the homeless, a member o f the ethical 
voluntary sector and a victim o f institutional domination, an essential helper/expert 
and non-legitimate practitioner.
7.3.4 Contestation and Critical Potential of Social Representations.
Social representations have, as we have seen, a contested and argumentative 
nature. As I have argued in Chapter Three, rhetorical positioning contains 
possibilities to either contest or legitimate exclusionary and unjust practices. As the 
particular case of HPs reveals, these argumentative dimensions of social 
representations are at the core of possibilities of critical engagement and contestation 
to others’ knowledge, practices and the positions that they impose upon us. HPs’ 
contesting practices permeated both verbal and material discourse (i.e. conferences, 
the framing of services within their own ethos, lobbying policy change through 
campaigns). However, we should not disregard here that agency to oppose and 
critically engage with the representations of others is not absolute. Their agency 
emerged inherently linked to the way HPs’ were framed by the authoritative position 
of the statutory interlocutor, who illegitimates and scrutinizes HPs’ knowledge and 
practices. The dynamics of their knowledge reveals how HPs do not have an absolute 
authorial stance to challenge and contest independently from the other’s position, 
instead this co-existed and was mutually co-constituted with the power of the 
statutory interlocutor to impose frameworks, identities and meanings. Additionally, 
their possibilities for material contestation appeared as being constrained by 
structural needs such as depending on external funding and thus having to adapt to 
the agenda of others. This finding points to the need of understanding critical 
engagement and contestation as relational and inherently linked to material and 
structural dimensions.
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The three battles reveal how the HP emerged struggling simultaneously 
between competing selves and conflicting discourses. This was clearly evident in the, 
in Bakhtinian terms, camivalesque emergence of their identity as fluid, contested, at 
times contradictory and populated by multiple voices. This is because identity is a 
socio-ideological and dialogical process o f becoming, instead of a state of monolithic 
being. However, the plurality and internal contradiction of the HP co-emerged with 
centripetal forces that reflected tendencies towards unity and a stable frame of 
reference. Both narrative interviews and focus groups have shown how despite 
plurality and contradiction there was reasonable coherence within HPs’ identity, 
which was framed by their desire to protect the ethos, knowledge and project of the 
voluntary sector. They critically engaged with the statutory interlocutor using 
knowledge in polyphasic ways in order to have their voice recognised, promote 
positive self-images and support their community identity and knowledge. Focus 
group discussions have shown very clearly how groups collectively sought to bolster 
their self-esteem and pride as a community of practitioners. This was also a practice 
that I observed in individual narratives. However, it was when constructing 
homelessness together in the focus groups that they were more vocal and felt more 
empowered to engage in a critical fight over homelessness with the statutory 
interlocutor.
The production of HPs’ representations and identity was permeated by 
relations of power and symbolic struggles. These, emerged through constant 
concomitant acts of, on the one hand, contesting statutory institutionalism and 
representations of homelessness, and on the other, justifying, through critical 
awareness of their situation, having to be submissive to the statutory agenda. This 
battle between critically engaging with the relationship with the government and 
conforming to state institutionalism and representations, takes us back to the 
historical roots and social context of these representations. We can detect how their 
battles are echoes of the origins of the third sector as a ‘shadowy enclave at the 
periphery of the mental map of policy makers and shapers’, which co-exist with a 
current amplification of their voice and greater recognition of their central position in 
the UK (Wigglesworth & Kendall, 2000, p.l). To be an independent sector and, at 
the same time to increasingly become state-controlled, to be critical advocates and, at 
the same time, to conform to politician-dominated approaches, to be ethical and
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morally committed to a social cause and, at the same time, tending towards the 
private market and having to adapt to the requirements of an industry, to dialogically 
engage with the client and, at the same time, to separate from the homeless as 
‘products’ in this dual ambivalent logic in which HPs work develops, we find the 
dilemmatic experiences and feelings that permeate their representations and identity. 
The problem of the HP is that of the location where she stands in the margins 
between homelessness and the outside audience, in-between, on the one hand, the 
private market and the state and on the other, the third sector. HPs showed critical 
awareness of the drawback of having a problematic accountability, which can neither 
be measured by the votes of an electorate or the trading of shares as is the case of the 
corporate sector (Wigglesworth & Kendall, 2000). Theirs is not at all an easily 
measurable ‘product’ since it implies providing socio-psychological and structural 
opportunities and support for participation in community life, empowering and 
bolstering the wellbeing and health of homeless people.
Within this context, the HP is in a very difficult situation and is critically 
aware of the threats to her knowledge and identity. The data has shown how they 
construct knowledge in competition with statutory others, through appropriating and 
re-constructing their representations and policy discourses in order to defend their 
identity and bolster empowering versions of their own community of voluntary 
sector practitioners. The dynamics of their knowledge have shown that HPs emerged 
as the sites of socio-ideological struggle in the negotiations of their representations, 
ontologies and project. These symbolic struggles were very clear in the battles of 
institutionalization, reification and politization, where it was possible to see how the 
voices of the voluntary sector and the statutory other disputed for the definition of 
homelessness. HPs constructed their accounts eclectically using elements from their 
three sets of battles, so as to contest or justify having to conform to the 
representations imposed by the statutory other and other private funding bodies. At 
points, HPs appropriated statutory discourses making them their own through re- 
accentuating them with intertwined critiques, justifications and infusing them with 
the ethical values of the voluntary sector. Through critical justification they sought to 
protect their versions of homelessness, practices and ultimately dignity as 
professionals and ethical HPs.
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In summary, HPs’ battles were characterized by the search for social 
recognition, contestation and justification of having to conform to those statutory 
representations and practices that were regarded as a threat to their identification and 
commitment to the community of the voluntary sector as well as to the wellbeing of 
the homeless. Their ideological battles revealed their loyalties to the community of 
the voluntary sector and its cause, their desires and ideals about homelessness, and 
their fears about state domination, becoming a corporation and institutionalizing the 
homeless. HPs made sense of homelessness through and against the positions and 
representations the statutory other sought to impose on them, which were lived as, 
discriminating of their expertise, and thus a threat to their projects and self-esteem. 
Social representations of others and HPs’ rhetorical position towards them shape the 
world in which HPs live, producing their knowledge and constituting their 
subjectivities. This investigation has, therefore, highlighted how without an 
understanding of the co-constituency of knowledge and identity in socio-political and 
material contexts that takes into account the human needs for social recognition, 
protection of one’s identities and projects, and stable frames of reference, we could 
not explain how people critically use representations to different ends - to contest, 
critique, to transform - within the polyphony and polyphasia of self and knowledge.
7.4. Prospects for Future Research.
‘To every form of knowing there corresponds a set of fundamental 
relationships between people and between people and the environment in which they 
live, which is both social and natural. These relationships frame the representational 
aims of knowledge and need to be understood if we are to explain the rationality of 
knowledge and what, at times, seems irrational for the observer who does not 
understand the context in which that form of knowing is grounded. It is the social 
psychological nature of these relationships, their quality and location in space, place 
and time that needs to be considered if we are going to be serious about treating 
social context as more than an added variable to understand knowledge.’ 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 179)
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I hope that my thesis has convinced the reader not only of the value of a 
social psychology of knowledge in context (Jovchelovitch, 2007), but of the 
necessity of understanding the ontology of groups and individuals as ‘embodying’ 
the intersection of the multiple relationships and contexts where they live (and have 
lived) and from where they ‘borrow’ voices and linguistic/material discourses that 
co-participate in their constitution. To my view, one of the most significant findings 
of this thesis is related with how the competing relationships of communication and 
power where HPs are located in their interaction with the homeless, the statutory 
sector and the public, provide the contexts (symbolic and material) and dialogues, 
within which HPs construct their knowledge and identity. Particularly, the analysis 
revealed that the conflicts posed by socio-political and economic relations of power 
between voluntary and statutory sector and the dilemmas of dialogically relating to 
the homeless person, were at the heart of the co-constitution of the inner plurality and 
contradiction of their knowledge and identity. From the interviews and focus groups 
analysis to the examples from observations in the field, from collective and 
individual narratives to discursive practices, the scene that emerges is that of co­
existing dilemmas rooted in the; irreconcilability of the voluntary ethos and statutory 
institutionalism, the personal and public struggle for moral commitment and 
dialogical responsibility to the homeless, the increasing disappearance of the non­
profit and independent nature of the sector in favour of the corporate industry and 
market arrangements.
All these representational and structural clashes are translated into the 
relational realm through material, social and linguistic practices discursively 
constituting the ontology and epistemology of HPs. The plurality and contradiction 
of HPs’ representations and identities may be regarded as producing bewilderment 
and a state of multiphrenia (Gergen, 1991). Paradoxically, I believe that the plurality 
of their knowledge and identity may provide these professionals with the symbolic 
resources to cope with the challenges they face in the dilemmatic context of their 
work. As Jovchelovitch (2007) argues: ‘different forms of knowing coexist fulfilling 
different functions and identity needs. These can be used by social actors as a 
resource from where to draw answers to the different kinds of demands of the 
everyday.’ (p.181). Certainly, the plurality of HPs’ knowledge contains possibilities 
for increasing the social esteem and belonging of homeless people, enhancing their
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wellbeing, physical health and ultimately facilitating their inclusion into mainstream 
society, yet, they also embed potential dangers. These refer to; institutionalization, 
muting of the homeless’ voice, stigmatization, the creation of difference, distrust, 
exclusion all of which impact negatively on their health and needs. Hence, we need 
to be cautious when being too optimistic about what the plurality of HPs’ knowledge 
can offer for the wellbeing and interest of homeless people. I strongly agree with 
Jovchelovitch’s emphasis of the need to move away from forms of relativism that 
unconditionally accept all knowledge as right, good or true (2007). In the case of 
homelessness my concern is that the contradictions that characterize HPs’ knowledge 
shape their interventions, campaigns, relationships with clients and the spatial 
construction of services, ultimately framing the experience of homeless people. 
Research into the cultures of homelessness and health has demonstrated the 
enactment of representations in relationships, material and spatial dimensions and 
their consequent ‘crystallization’ in the subjectivity and physical experience of 
homeless people (Hodgetts et al., 2007). My research is only a small ‘piece’ of the 
big project of developing a social psychology of homelessness; one that looks at its 
wider socio-political context focusing on HPs’ possibilities for challenging the 
representations of those that are ‘stronger’ in defining and instituting homelessness 
agendas and policies. There are still many questions to be answered and amongst the 
ones risen by this research are: How do the dilemmas embedded in HPs’ knowledge 
frame the material experience of homeless people? How do they shape the
production of the subjectivities of homeless people? How do they affect the
increasing partnership work and liaison with statutory agencies? These questions 
need to be addressed in further research. The most urgent one, in my view, relates to 
how the plurality and contradiction of HPs’ knowledge affects the socio- 
psychological and physical/material experience of homeless people.
That representations are materialized in our lived experience and translated 
into practices and relationships (Jodelet, 1989/1991) is not something new to the
theory of social representations. This study has shown how a system of
representations is co-constituted with a sense of self and of community identity, lives 
within relationships between the statutory sector and the voluntary sector and 
penetrates HPs’ social practices. What has driven my research was a desire to 
illustrate how social representations co-constitute the epistemology and ontology of
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individuals and groups. However, this study is not free from limitations and leaves 
behind many ‘knots’ that need to be addressed through future research. These relate 
with methodological techniques as well as the attempt to develop theory.
First, traces of the struggles and contradictions of HPs’ knowledge and 
identity were observed in practices (conferences, spatial arrangement, client-HP 
interactions), however, the analysis relied too heavily on linguistic forms of 
discourse, said little about its material character and nothing about the embodiment 
of representations. The main research techniques (interviews and focus groups) and 
the unit of analysis (utterance) offer a limited account of how representations in their 
materiality in discursive practices permeate relationships and come to constitute the 
identities and knowledge of HPs. Certainly, not considering the link of 
representations to embodiment, materiality and spatial aspects means neglecting 
those dimensions in which human experience and linguistic discursive practices are 
grounded (Hodgetts et al., 2007; Nightingale & Cromby, 2002). Through focusing on 
talk and language I have committed to the research tradition of social representations 
and social psychology in general. In doing so I now share with the discipline, as well 
as with most of the research done under the umbrella of social representations theory, 
the guilt of having neglected the link of representations to materiality and 
embodiment, that is; how the symbolic realm discursively constitutes and is 
constituted by not only the socio-psychological experiences that we live but also 
material relations and physicality. Locating the locus of inquiry in the link between 
these dimensions is an opportunity for social psychology to de-compartmentalize and 
engage with other disciplines. This is an important step in the movement towards 
transgressing knowledge boundaries, exclusion and control (Sibley, 1995). I believe 
that if  the theory of social representations wants to contribute to this movement, it 
needs to progress the forms of its research and methodologies. Much remains to be 
done in future work, which I believe should learn from more innovative forms of 
research that are emerging in the field of the social psychology of homelessness 
(Hodgetts et al., 2007). This work used photo-elicitation techniques in combination 
with narratives and participative observation in order to explore the link between 
embodiment, symbolic, material, relational and spatial dimensions of health and 
homelessness.
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Secondly, I have taken the risky, yet I believe necessary, endeavour to further 
develop a central aspect in social representations theory, the concept of cognitive 
polyphasia. By linking the theory of social representations with Hermans and 
Kempen socio-psychological theory of the dialogical self (1993), and with Bakhtin’s 
work on dialogicality, I hope I have contributed to tying some ‘knots’ in our 
understanding of the polyphasia of knowledge and its links to the inner plurality of 
the self By linking social psychology to the different discipline of literary critique, I 
hope I have contributed with a step in the direction towards integrative and 
multidisciplinary research. Apart from its relationships with philosophy and 
anthropology, social psychology has, for too long, been bound to itself, not 
endeavouring to link with other areas of the social sciences. This 
compartmentalization has provided the discipline with an authority over its expertise, 
yet, I believe that has disempowered it from being able to account for how the socio- 
psychological experience of individuals and groups is inherently linked to material, 
spatial and physical dimensions. These are substantive dimensions of human 
existence, and research on homelessness has given evidence that they participate in 
processes of inclusion/exclusion, stigmatization, and ultimately in the production of 
subjectivities (i.e psycho-social and physical health) (Hodgetts et al., 2007). I would 
contend that social psychology cannot turn its back on these when studying any 
social phenomena, including issues of homelessness.
Finally, whilst having attempted to contribute to our understanding of the 
plurality of knowledge and self I am aware that I have also left many shadows behind. 
One relates to the understanding of the complex tensional dialectics between 
centrifugal forces in the self, which tend towards plurality, polyphasia, polyphony, 
contradiction and fluidity and centripetal forces in the self that tend towards unity, 
permanence and stable frames of reference. I have only briefly addressed this issue in 
this research (for a discussion see Chapter Three). It is clear to me that these complex 
dialectics are at the core of our human nature and are grounded in the manifold 
contexts (material, socio-political, cultural and symbolic) and ‘repertory’ of 
relationships in which we are engaged (and have been). The concern is that when 
being dysfunctional are essentialized as conditions inherent to the nature of the 
person as a separated entity. I believe that a framework that takes into account all the 
intertwined dimensions that come to produce the subjectivity of the person is useful
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in this regard and the theory of social representations has a potential to contribute 
towards this.
As this study reaches its end, I am convinced of the importance of the 
relational in the constitution of social life. Social, political, cultural, symbolic, 
material and embodied relationships are all formative of the ontological, as well as 
the epistemological. HPs’ knowledge of homelessness is constitutive of their 
subjectivities but also lives in and is constituted by their relationships with homeless 
people. Although their representations contain promising ideas about dialogical 
responsibility and humanizing approaches to homelessness, they also point to the 
worrying consequences that interventions subdued to the rationalism of the market 
place and its institutional framework have to the identity, well-being, health and 
possibilities of inclusion of homeless people. Rationalistic and liberalist market 
democracies such as the UK one, create rigid societies heavily based on targets, 
numbers, accountability and competition, leaving little space for relational, 
humanizing and responsive homeless services. Within this political context of 
privatization of government welfare agenda, quasi market arrangements between the 
statutory sector as ‘financial enablers’ and voluntary sector as ‘providers’ (Daly, 
1997, p. 172) only rational, and not relational, systems are trusted. Hence, HPs’ live 
in a catch-22 between wanting to put into practice their ethos working in the interest 
of homeless people and, yet having to secure funding, which involves adapting to the 
pragmatics of their job and institutional discourses of others framed by the 
bureaucratic and rationalistic values of the financial market. The voluntary sector 
lives in a ‘shadow state’ (Wolch, 1990) in which their dependency on government 
funding requires them to adapt to the order, control and accountability of the 
statutory sector, which threatens their autonomy, flexibility, creativity, understanding 
of local problems in context, and ultimately their agenda of action to achieve social 
change (Daly, 1997). Policy and homeless welfare interventions will remain 
excluding and partial if they continue to neglect the importance of relational 
responsibility and be disconnected from the ontology and everyday life of homeless 
people. Sensitivity to HPs’ knowledge is important since they are directly connected 
to what happens on the ground. However, I also strongly believe that any 
conversation about policies and the care of homeless people cannot exclude the 
participation of homeless people themselves. This would imply ideologically
254
privileging the voice of elites and perpetuating the same barriers to inclusion that we 
are attempting to break. Recognising homeless peoples voices remains an essential, if 
challenging task for us all in mainstream housed society. Dialoguing with their voice, 
is critical if we want to generate relational responsibility (McNamee & Gergen, 
1999).
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Appendix 1: Interview schedule.
1. Elicitation phase:
• “Please, tell me what does ‘homelessness’ mean to you. I would 
like you to tell me at length about your views on homelessness as 
if it was a story.”
2. Questioning phase:
• “What do you think ‘homelessness’ means to other professionals 
working in the statutory sector?”
• “What do you think ‘homelessness’ means to other professionals 
working in the homelessness voluntary sector?”
• “How do you believe professionals working in the statutory sector 
see you as a professional from the voluntary sector?”
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Appendix 2: Focus groups schedule.
Focus group schedule: Training and Development Workers (Conducted on the 
6th/12/04)
Personal introduction. Aims and objectives of the research.
Participants introduce themselves to the group.
Section I: The object of work. Comprehensive / holistic view of homelessness Vs 
individualistic view.
I. What does homelessness mean to you? (Personally)
II. What do you think are the pathways to homelessness? (Causes)
III. What is what most concerns you about homelessness? (Effects/consequences)
IV. Which is the best way you can help your clients?
V. Which do you think are the solutions to end homelessness?
a. Which do you think are the benefits of training for your clients? /How 
do you see training as a way of integrating them into the community? 
Section II: The one-to-one relationship with the homeless.
I. How is the relationship with your clients? How do you approach your clients? 
Prompts: Is it difficult?
II. What is your position in this professional-client relationship?
III. How does your work differentiate from the work done by other professionals 
such as key workers/support workers?
IV. What is what you put into this relationship that benefits your clients?
V. You have day-to-day relationship with your clients. Could you tell us about 
the best things and the worse moments of this relationship?
Section III: Sources of Knowledge / Learning
I. What is the feedback that you receive from your clients about how you treat 
them/perceive them? Prompts: Do you think that they challenge the way you 
approach/perceive them?
II. Which are your main sources of knowledge?
III. How do you best leam about your clients? Prompts: experience, training,
academic background, meetings with colleagues.
IV. What have you leamt from your experience in your current work that other
sources have not given you?
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Section IV: Professional Identity
I. How do you see yourself as a training and development worker? What is
like to be a training and development worker?
a. Prompts: What do you value of being a training and development 
worker?
II. What is like to work within the homeless voluntary sector
III. What do you think about the homeless statutory sector?
Focus group schedule: Project Managers. (Conducted on the 10th/12/04) 
Personal introduction. Aims and objectives of the research.
Participants introduce themselves to the group.
Section I: The object of work. Comprehensive/holistic view of homelessness Vs 
individualistic view.
I. What does homelessness mean to you? (Personally)
II. What do you think are the pathways to homelessness? (Causes)
III. What is what most concerns you about homelessness? (Effects/ 
consequences)
IV. Which is the best way you can help your clients?
Section II: Homelessness as an organizational issue
I. How do you see homelessness in the wider context of the homelessness 
sector?
II. How has the way you see homelessness changed since you have started
working as a project manager?
a. Prompts: what have you learnt from your experiences as a manager?
III. How has your relationship with clients changed? (Could you please tell us 
about the differences and similarities between the way you approach/ 
relate to clients and the way your staff (support workers) do?
Section III: Professional identity
I. How do you see yourself as a project manager? What is like to be a project 
manager?
a. Prompts: What do you value of being a project manager?
II. Could you tell us about the differences and similarities between the work you 
do and the work done by your support workers?
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III. What is like to work within the homeless voluntary sector?
a. What do you reject of/ value of being a professional of the voluntary 
sector?
IV. What do you think about the homeless statutory sector?
V. Could you tell us about the differences and similarities between you as a 
member of the staff of your organization and professionals of other voluntary 
organizations?
VI. I would like to hear about your experiences of having to work with statutory 
homelessness services. Do you think that they value the work done by the 
voluntary sector?
Section IV: Sources of Knowledge/Learning.
I. Which are your main sources of knowledge?
II. How do you learn about your clients?
a. Prompts: Experience, training, academic background, meetings with 
colleagues.
III. What have you learnt of your experience as a manager of your project that 
you haven’t when you’ve been working in a more client-centered basis 
(e.g. when you were a support worker)?
IV. What have your previous professional experiences within the homeless
voluntary sector taught you?
Focus group schedule: Mental Health/Drug Misuse W orkers lst/2/05 
Personal introduction. Aims and objectives of the research.
Participants introduce themselves to the group.
Section I: The object of work. Homelessness as a drug misuse-mental health 
problem.
I. What does homelessness mean to you? (Personally).
II. What do you think are the pathways to homelessness? (Causes)
III. What is what most concerns you about homelessness? (Effects/consequences)
IV. Which is the best way you can help you clients?
a. Section II: Professional identity
V. What is like to be a drug misuse-mental health worker? How do you see
yourself as a professional doing that job?
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a. Prompts: What do you value of being a drug misuse/mental health 
worker?
VI. What is like to work within the homeless voluntary sector
VII. What do you think about the homeless statutory sector?
VIII. I would like to hear about your experiences of having to work with statutory 
homelessness services. Do you think that they value the work done by the 
voluntary sector?
IX. Could you tell us about the differences and similarities between the work you 
do and the work other colleagues do within the organization?
a. Do you feel that you deal with the worse elements of homelessness?
Section II: Sources of Knowledge/learning.
I. How has your academic/professional/training background helped you to
understand homelessness? (Theoretical knowledge)
II. How has the way you see homelessness changed since you have started
doing your job?
a. Prompts: What have you learnt of your experiences as a mental 
health/drug misuse worker?
III. What do you leam from the relationship with your clients? How has your 
relationship with clients changed? (Experience-based knowledge)
Section III: Health as an end to homelessness.
I. How do you think physical and mental health helps to end homelessness?
II. What is like to be homeless and mentally ill/ homeless and drug addict
from your professional perspective?
Focus group schedule: Outreach Workers conducted on the 24th/l/05 
Persona] introduction. Aims and objectives of the research.
Participants introduce themselves to the group.
Section I: The object of work.
I. What does homelessness mean to you? (Personally).
II. What do you think are the pathways to homelessness? (Causes)
III. What is what most concerns you about homelessness? (Effects/consequences)
IV. Which is the best way you can help your clients?
Section II: Professional identity
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I. What is like to be an outreach worker? How do you see yourself as a 
professional doing that job? Prompts: What do you value of being an outreach 
worker? What is like to work within the homeless voluntary sector?
II. What do you think about the homeless statutory sector?
IIL I would like to hear about your experiences of having to work with statutory 
homelessness services. Do you think that they value the work done by the 
voluntary sector?
IV. Could you tell us about the differences and similarities between the work you 
do and the work other colleagues do within the organization?
a. Do you feel that you deal with the worse elements of homelessness?
Section III: Sources of Knowledge/learning.
I. How has your academic/professional/training background helped you to 
understand homelessness? (Theoretical knowledge)
II. How has the way you see homelessness changed since you have started doing 
yourjob?
a. Prompts: What have you learnt of your experiences as an outreach 
worker?
III. What do you leam from the relationship with your clients? How has your 
relationship with clients changed? (Experience-based knowledge)
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Appendix 3: Conference programme details.
OSW Employability Conference. ‘A Job Worth Doing'
Thursday 9tb December 2004 
Conference Programme Details
9.30 Registration, tea & coffee
10.00 Welcome and keynote address - Employability for all -  A cross-sectoral 
challenge
Linda Butcher, Chief Executive, OSW 
Refreshments
11.00 Consultation seminars
These seminars will consult participants on findings from OSW’s research about 
barriers to employment and employability faced by homeless people, and will gather 
views about how to affect change across agencies and sectors.
Delegates should select a first and second choice consultation seminar to attend on 
page 3.
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1) Overcoming barriers to employability -  Chair; Peter Singh, OSW
This seminar will take a broad overview o f the range o f barriers to training and 
employment that homeless people face and will look at how agencies can improve 
their practices to overcome these barriers.
2) Hostel residents wanting to work -  Chair, Graham Burton, St Mungofs
This seminar will discuss how agencies can best support hostel residents with low 
or no support needs, who could potentially work, but who are trapped because o f a 
lack o f move-on accommodation.
3) Working with employers -  Chair, Andy Shields, St Mungo fs
This seminar will discuss existing models o f good practice in offering work placements 
and job opportunities to homeless people and looks at how homelessness agencies and 
employers can build on them.
4) Data sharing -  Chair, Ian Canadine, OSW
This seminar will examine the benefits and drawbacks o f sharing client data between 
homelessness agencies and with Government agencies.
5) Achieving customer care while trying to meet targets -  Chair, Ian Perkins, OSW
This seminar will look at how outcomes required by funding bodies affect the ability o f 
organisations to deliver services to homeless people.
6) The role o f Government -  Chair, Kevin Ireland, London Housing Foundation
This seminar will identify what practical changes in current government policy are 
required to support more homeless people move towards training and employment.
7) Volunteering -  opportunities going begging? -  Chair, Kate Bowgett, OSW
This seminar will look at how homelessness agencies can better support their clients to 
find suitable volunteering opportunities.
8) Achieving parity o f access -  Chair, Ima Miah, OSW
This seminar will look at how agencies can ensure that there is parity o f access for 
homeless people entering employability programmes.
9) Making Links with the FE sector -  in principle and in practice - Chair, Iona 
McArdle, OSW
This seminar will examine how homelessness agencies and Further Education 
colleges can work together more practically to provide a coherent route towards 
employability fo r  homeless people.
12.30 Lunch
1.30 Focus Groups
These interactive sessions will each feature presentations from two different agencies 
about their experiences/expertise in particular employability related areas. These 
presentations will then be used as a springboard to explore key issues and challenges 
for employability projects and schemes. The focus groups will facilitate learning, 
information sharing, and the development of new ideas and solutions.
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Delegates should select a first and second choice focus group to attend on page 3.
1) Implementing E U  employment strategy a t ground level - Facilitated by 
Freek Spinnewijn, European Federation o f  National Organisations Working 
with the Homeless (FEANTSA) and Ray Philips, London Voluntary Sector 
Training Consortium (LVSTC)
This focus group will look at the policy context in which employability projects 
operate and how EU employment policy could affect access to employment fo r  
vulnerable groups.
2) M aking work placem ent program mes work - Facilitated by Rupert Miller, 
Business Action on Homelessness and E -J Walker, M arks & Spencer
This focus group will explore the challenges work placement programmes face  
and look at how you can manage the expectations o f clients, the corporate and 
the voluntary sector.
3) Working in partnership - Facilitated by Val Gould, Edinburgh Wise M ove 
and M artin Cooper, Fairbridge
This focus group will look at the context, practicalities, limitations and benefits 
o f effective partnership working, on both an individual and strategic level.
4) Peer-led approaches to employability - Facilitated by A thol Halle, 
Groundswell UK and Kath Dane, Thames Reach Bondway
This focus group will explore the value o f  peer role models showing current 
clients how gaining skills can lead to gaining employment.
5) M easuring progress to employability - Facilitated by Rob Hammond, 
Depaul Trust and Ima Miah, OSW
In an environment where hard outcomes are seen as a way to measure the 
success o f a client or a project, this focus group presents an alternative 
methodology using soft outcome measurements.
6) A re we providing short-term outcomes or long-term solutions? - 
Facilitated by Kate Chester, East Potential and D avid Leighton, Emmaus UK
This focus group will take a critical look at outcomes that are achieved in 
terms o f employability and will consider whether or not these are always 
appropriate to the needs o f an individual or sustainable over the longer term.
7) Involving your clients as volunteers -  Facilitated by Frances Brodrick, 
Broadway and Kate Bowgett, OSW
This focus group launches the OSW online Involving Clients as Volunteers 
Good Practice Resource Bank' and looks at some o f the strategies 
organisations are using to successfully involve their clients as volunteers.
3.00 Refreshments
3.15 “Labour market equality begins at home” -  Chair, Linda Butcher, OSW
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Panel members: Terrie Alafat, Housing and Homelessness Directorate; Dinah Cox, 
Race on the Agenda; Kevin Tunnard, Richmond Fellowship; Jeremy Swain, Thames 
Reach Bondway.
A conference wide debate on the issue of employing former service users within the 
homelessness sector, looking at both the benefits and drawbacks for individuals and 
agencies.
4.30 Drinks reception
OSW Employability Conference
Workshop Choices
Name:
Organisation:
Tel:
Email:
CONSULTATION SEMINARS, 11.00 -1 2 3 0
PLEASE SELECT A 1st, 2nd AND 3rd CHOICE CONSULTATION SEMINAR
TO ATTEND
1) Overcoming barriers to employability Q
2) Hostel residents wanting to work □  .
3) Working with employers Q
4) Data sharing O
5) Achieving customer care while trying to meet targets □
6) The role of Government □
7) Volunteering -  opportunities going begging? Q
8) Achieving parity of access O
9) Making Links with the FE sector -  in principle and in practice Q  
FOCUS GROUPS, 1.30 -  3.00
PLEASE SELECT A 1st, 2nd AND 3rd CHOICE FOCUS GROUP TO ATTEND
1) Implementing EU employment strategy at ground level O
2) Making work placement programmes work Q
3) Working in partnership O
4) Peer-led approaches to employability Q
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5) Measuring progress to employability Q
6) Are we providing short-term outcomes or long-term solutions? O
7) Involving your clients as volunteers I 1
THE DEBATE, 3.15 -  4.30
Do you have a question you would like to direct to the panel, on the subject of 
employing former service users? If so, please write it below. We will try to ensure 
that you get the opportunity to ask your question, but this will depend on the number 
of questions that are raised. We will contact you whether or not we decide to use 
your question.
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Appendix 4: Description of each area of work.
Rear-Line
1. Director of Programmes: These HPs do not have much contact with clients. 
They are in charge of more managerial, funding and administrative activities. 
They might interview clients and have contact with them, but not on a day-to- 
day basis. Their duties are more to do with management. However, most of 
them, have a background doing front-line work with clients. (In this group I 
also include project managers whose work is office-based)
2. Policy officers: They perform “a lobbying and policy advocacy role.” 
(Wames et al., 2003, p. 141). Their tasks are to conduct, commission and/or 
publish research in order to: (1) raise awareness of the causes and nature of 
homelessness, (2) find innovative solutions to it, (3) raise housing standards 
(3) share good practice, through informing, supporting and creating dialogue 
with service providers, policy makers, and housing professionals.
3. Press Officers, media Officers: They are in charge of the design and 
coordination of political and public campaigns. Only four of the whole set of 
voluntary organizations that have participated in the study have this type of 
professionals. Political campaigns consist on lobbying and campaigning work 
aimed at politicians, local authorities and other decision-makers. Public 
campaigns also seek to influence the public, changing and informing public 
opinion.
Front-line
1. Project Workers in hostels, day centres and semi-independent housing. This 
group includes both training and development workers and key/support 
workers. In general, being a hostel/day centre worker involves, helping to 
assess and meet the support needs of the residents.
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2. Training and development workers: They are teachers that train clients in life 
skills and literacy skills. They work to provide opportunities for rough 
sleepers and housed homeless to move away from the homeless culture 
through exploring new skills and interests.
3. Kev/support workers: They work in supported housing where they provide 
“different levels of support, independence and companionship.” (Wames et 
al., 2003, p. 138). They are personally assigned to each client to help them 
getting into other services (e.g. drug rehabilitation programmes, training), 
they accompany them to the doctor, talk with social workers, doctors and 
psychiatric nurses from the NHS.
4. Resettlement workers: They work with clients in hostels/day centres, 
supporting them and helping them to resettle at home. They support in 
adjusting to a settled form of living, finances, bills and coping with boredom.
5. Project manager: in hostels, day centres, semi-structured housing. They 
manage the teams of HPs, do administrative and managerial tasks, also 
develop some of the above activities, and have done it full time in the past.
6. Mental health drug misuse workers: Members of the specialist mental health 
team who see residents in order to give services to them and to ensure that 
they take full advantage of statutory services (i.e. NHS). Also members from 
the specialist substance use team. They do sessions in day centres, hostels or 
drop-in centres. Both can also work within an outreach team.
7. Outreach workers: These professionals work with rough sleepers on the 
streets in the early morning and at night. They operate from day centres or 
from the head quarters of the organization. Their aims are “ (i) to identify 
people who begin to sleep rough as quickly as possible and to link them to 
services; (ii) to find, engage and persuade long-term rough sleepers to accept 
help and move into accommodation; and (iii) to meet some of the most 
pressing needs of long-term rough sleepers on the streets until they can be 
persuaded to move into accommodation.” (Wames et al., 2003,137)
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Appendix 5: Fragments from coded interviews and comments inserted during 
the coding process.
P 1: Tape 3 Participant l.txt - 1:2 [And so, I suppose to me is mor..] (7:12) 
(Super)
Codes: [Self about the Public]
Comment:
WHAT= Homelessness is not physicality. It is more about socio-psychological 
poverty: the lack of belongingness, the lack of support and the lack of the 
feelings that are attached to a place you call your home.
HOW= He disclaims popular images of homelessness and uses his work 
experience (and organizational ethos and missions) to contradict these images 
and justify the validity of his views. Here he is stating ‘I* as a way of saying this 
is what I think in opposition to what other lay people, media and politicians think 
about homelessness. Later he says ‘we work’ which denotes that he is drawing on 
professional/work everyday experience to show the fact that his views come from 
the experience of being a HP.
WHY= He is saying this from the beginning of the interview, which I think it 
happens with more interviews: the fact that they say first what homelessness IS 
NOT. Could it be because they position me as a lay person? Do they want to 
educate me? The reason for working in the voluntary sector is to disclaim this 
meaning o f homelessness. All his activities contest these images of 
homelessness.
Interviewee’s Positionings HPs (voluntary sector)
Imaginary Interlocutors Statutory sector (Government, policy makers ...), the 
public.
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P 1: Tape 3 Participant l.txt - 1:6 [PI: HERE I would say, either,..] (24:37) 
(Super)
Codes: [Self about Homelessness]
Comment:
WHAT= The root causes of homelessness. Weak identity. A lost of a sense of 
oneself. They lack normal + secure past= identity, family, meaningful 
relationships, sexual relationships, isolation. The physical elements (not having a 
house) affects all these psychological elements. Homelessness= a vicious circle 
of psychological and physical absence.
HOW= Personal argument + disclaimer. She/he says personal opinion of the 
meaning of homelessness (in terms of its root causes) and ends up the account by 
adding an argument that comes from her/his positioning as a professional. Even 
though is not finished the quotation aims at saying that homelessness is a difficult 
thing to work with/resolve.
WHY= Show personal expertise? to support her previous arguments about what 
homelessness is?
P 1: Tape 3 Participant l.txt - 1:7 [It is quite difficult to break..] (37:55) 
(Super)
Codes: [Self about Statutory Sector]
Comment:
WHAT= Solutions to homelessness (services). These are an imposition on the 
individual homeless. They are not a personal decision of the homeless. Do not 
lead to integration (back into society).
HOW= Starts speaking about root causes (foregoing quotation) and now moves 
on to solutions to it. Again starts by a personal opinion (that homelessness is 
difficult to resolve) and a disclaimer of what are not good solutions to it 
(statutory funded hostels as covering the physical elements).
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WHY= Might be criticizing government approach to homelessness: 1) because 
its services only cover the physicality of homelessness and don’t deal with the 
psychological elements, 2) because there is an account in which he is implying
that hostels are a way of ‘getting rid o f  * .
Interviewee’s Positionings: HPs (voluntary sector), Homeless 
Imaginary Interlocutors: Statutory sector (Government, policy makers ...)
Here he could be criticising either services in general or the statutory service 
provision towards the homeless, since statutory service provision is limited to the 
provision of housing.
PI is talking about the voluntary sector, and its services. But might be talking 
about/criticising statutory sectors''/governments’ approach to homelessness.
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P 1: Tape 3 Participant 1.txt
Path: \\STUDENT2\R_USERS\RENEDOUD\Analysis Th_.\Tape 3 Participant 1 bet
Media: TEXT
Printed: 2007-09-12T12:56:47
By: Super
From HU: Front-Une
HU-Path: (\\STUDENT2\RJJSERS\RENEDOUD\AnaSysisThesis\Transcr..AFront-Une.hpr5]
Codes: 25
Memos: 0
Quotations: 104
Families: <rrone>
Comment: Background: m ostly  fa c e - to - fa c e  c l ie n t  work (1) graphic design
course, (2) vo lu n teer, (3) d id  not have the objective to work 
in th is  f i e l d .  Previous jo b s  w ith in  the voluntary s e c to r : (1) 
vocation al guidance, (2) client support, h elp in g  peop le  to  
develop s k i l l s .  Actual jo b : (Meaningful A c t iv i ty )  P ro jec t  
Worker
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Date: 22/05/07 P 1: Tape 3 Participant 1.txt Page: 1/13
<X)1
<X)2
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
015
016
017
018 
(119 
020 
021 
022
023
024
025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033
034
035
036
Participant 1
A: Tell me what does homelessness mean to 
you?
PI: I think homelessness would be, mainly just
a sense of not belonqinq to a
place. So, it's more to do with how somebody
feels in displacement, in isolation
rather than, iust havinq somewhere to stay.
And so, I suppose to me is more
about like not houselessness, not like the
physkality of like havinq a room
somewhere in a hostel or, LIVING in temporary
accommodation, it's the feelinqs
that I would associate with havinq a home, and
basically f 1 with support
without. I sort of assume that there are
people, that when they think about
homelessness would think that those values
aren't. (Phone rinqs) Because when
we erm are workinq with people, they miqht
actually be housed for quite a lonq
time but they still have the erm the view of
themselves as homeless because
they haven't manaqed to qet f...l their values,
or other thinqs in their life that
would qo with what I would associate with like
a normal and secure PAST SO.
Urn.
A:
PI: ___  (lauqhs) Even more I__  (lauqhs)
A: .... Yeah I want you to tell me more.
PI: HERE I would say, either, would be the
thinqs I loose their contact with
family and friends erm or your own identity of
what you used to be. Erm, or if you
never had a stronq identity (couqhs). So
maybe as a child you qot to drinkinq
early on, so you never had the chance to
develop what most adults would be
able to qo throuqh and climb the ladder of
adolescence and establish erm
meaninqful relationships, you know, sexual
relationships with people. I think a lot
of, a lot of people loose that, and they loose a
bkj sense of themselves. And,
because the process of physically not havinq a
home is difficult to have ... build
up self-esteem. It's difficult then to interact
with other people, so the more
isolated and entrenched in what you haven't
qot, rather than buildinq and usinq
what you have qot, or what you possibly want
to have, and work on that. So, I
think I would say homelessness also involves
| Home-  Q paradigmatic ex.
| Homeless Identity 
) Self about Homelessness 
| Support 
j The 'Normal Us'-
| The Homelessness Feelings Self about the Publ
paradigmatic ex.
Self about Homelessness-
Home
Imposition of Agenda-  
In Need
Individualistic Explanations- 
Potential-
Reductionistic Services- 
The 'Normal Us'~
The Socio-Psychological- 
Vicious Cycle-
paradigmatic e:
t>  paradigmatic ex.
paradigmatic ex. 
0  paradigmatic ex.
288
Dat*: 22/05/07 P 1: Tap* 3 Participant 1.txt Page: 2/13
like a neqative view of yourself and
037 a neqative cycle. Erm, that it would be quite 
difficult to sort o f ... It is quite
038 difficult to break, you know, with the idea of 
just qettinq somebody into a hostel
039 or into a flat. It doesn't necessarily address 
what homelessness is. It just gives
040 somebody a place to qo to, out of the way in 
some ways, and it doesn't provide
041 any social links or sense of purpose, or a sense 
of place within the community.
042 And I think if ... if everything's painful, it doesn't 
often qive any sense of worth in
043 a lot of ways. You know, people qet like qrants 
to move in \ and I just think it's
044 hopefully unpaid and recip ...]
045 or they wait 'til everything's in the fiat So is 
there any real sense of any
046 ownership of that real home now? Or is it just, 
this is where we’re qoinq to put
047 you now? So, like the sense of institutionalisms 
continuing from hostels, which
048 are [....] , this is the way the hostel runs, and 
you fit into the way we work.
049 Alonq, you know, that that continues along the 
lines of, and this is the place
050 where they live now. There's people that are 
scared to turn them down, so that
051 like rSO THEY DON'T GET LOTS TO OFFER SOI 
. Like this is where you
052 decide he's qonna live, then you qo. And then I 
think, it’s, you know, people like
053 struqqle with this, with the type of
T HOLINESS ...1 they don’t feel that they
054 fit in. You know so, like, the THINGS/SCENES 
in a mixed block where some
055 people own their own flats [......] or whatever.
Some are f 1.
056
057 I think people still feel Hoh I don't fit in with the 
rest of the people in this block" or
058 somethinq else. They're still carrying the 
identity that they may have had WHEN
059 THEY WERE sleepinq on the streets. Or 
sleeping in their friends' flats or
060 whatever. So, I think ... I think it is more about 
a view that somebody has or
061 hasn't qot. Erm. And I think that's so easy to 
see that's more erm ... Some
062 people seem to, sort of, some people can come, 
sleep rouqh in London and sort
063 themselves out quite quickly and (phone rinqs) 
then seem to move on. Not qet
064 over it, but seem to be able to turn thinqs to 
their own advantage but
065 [ conscience] seem to be able to settle
themselves in a situation more easily.
066 Some people seem to very much erm struqqle 
with the idea of movinq on.
067 AND/THAT becomes this is quite a stronq
Self about Statutory Sector
y  paradigmatic ex.
Q  Self about Homelessness-
Homeless Identity- 
Individualistic Explanations 
Reductionists Services'- paradigmatic ex.
Vicious Cycle-
<3 Self about Homelessness
S paradigmatic ex.Self about Homelessness
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identity into mainstream existence like
068 the rest of us really. That's the means of 
identity for yourselves. So, they can I
069 suppose be seen as a qroup and there's like a 
strenqth in that qroup AFTER
070 YOU'VE BEEN IN IT. When those people are 
housed, if they loose that time, I
071 think they wonder what actually are they, and 
then they have to define
072 themselves, you know. \......1 what else do
they do if they don't really do
073 anything else. I think sometimes [....] that can 
be quite challenqinq for people,
074 you know. You're not workinq, maybe not in a 
relationship, maybe you're still
075 drinking or maybe you're in contact with people 
that perhaps you don’t want to
076 be. So thinqs like the challenge to people to 
start looking at, you know, it does
077 like prevent to start to take some direction.
And I think that can be quite stranqe
078 when people maybe move back in to "oh, no, 
no, I was thinking of the homeless
079 field, I miqht... want to work with the homeless 
organisations.'
080
081 So, I think, the idea of like when we are tryinq 
to qet people to access more sort
082 of mainstream services, I think it's a positive 
step for a lot of people. There is a
083 biq reluctance from people to sort of want to do 
things in-house or you know, qo
084 to other aqencies, that are homeless aqencies 
because they will undeista', you
085 know supposedly understand the background of 
where people are cominq from.
086 Erm. Which I think is truth to some extent but 
not true for everyone. And I think,
087 you know, for people that have been housed for 
a couple of years, I think that
< 188 you have to start to question it why is it that 
they are still so reliant on
089 homelessness services. Why, why are we not, 
you know, why have we not
090 helped to WIDEN and been able to build up an 
identity away from that?
091 Because it's such a strong thinq to be in that,
you know, in that qroup of people.
092 Erm. Yeah, so I suppose I look at it like that.
093
094 Professionally, or somethinq, the movement 
away from this culture of.... I
095 suppose for some people it's quite stronq you 
know, especially if they come
096 down to London and f 1 to team up with
them or BOX with them, or quite
097 often they feel that they look after someone 
else on the streets. And to move
098 away from th a t to find a house, maybe miles
away, is quite a big thing to them.
f *  Self about HPs-
< 8  Self about HPs-
paradigmatic ex. Self about Homelessness
a * *  about Hometessness'-
J
^  ) Homeless Identity
I Individualistic Explanations 
) Label
) Reductionistic Services - 
| The Homelessness Feelings 
) The Socio-Psychotogical-
paradigmatic ex.
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(199 rCARBOARD TONIGHT 1 anybody wouid find
that difficult. You know, in the
100 same way like people who relocate, move. You 
know, to Scotland and you don't
101 know anyone. Without a job, people can find it 
hard to interact socially and I
102 think if you felt, you know, if I thouqht my self­
esteem was low or, then I would
103 find it hard to interact with other people. So
this proves in a lot of ways it is
104 difficult for people when they are housed to,
people are expecting you to like get
105 on with it. You know. So. Without the 
progression .... It's, you know the natural
106 progression of erm. beinq housed, beinq reliant 
on homeless services, so you're
107 moving up into mainstream services. I don't 
know if that happens that much.
Kt8 Only ... I'd maybe question some areas like the 
homelessness fields Tl
109 WOULDN'T/ AREN'T DOING ] perhaps as
many f  1 ouqht to have
110 for people. And when you think of erm, people 
movinq into like rough sleeper
111 flats, used to like one, you know, usually for 
one person, they're n o t.... They
112 don't build them with the idea that people are 
qoinq to change from the status of
113 homelessness into being a couple, havinq a 
family. You know. When they want
114 to make an exchange, they can't, it’s difficult 
for people to move. They have to
115 move to another rouqh sleeper flat. They can't 
say, "but that's not me anymore.
116 I want to, you know, Tm working or I'm on a 
training course. Der, I don't want
117 this. You know, not there's nothing wrong with 
it  But you know, I moved on
118 from that place in my life and now I want 
somethinq else".
119
120 And I think for some people it's quite annoymq 
like when we, you blank out
121 contacts with everyone. You know, some 
people have been working for ten
122 years or somethinq, don't necessanly want us 
to be in contact with them still.
123 Because they're not that, in that.... It's 
because you sort of like a tag or tattoo or
124 somethinq, as if you mark them. It's like 'oh 
you've been through our system'.
125 It's plus or minus idea to say to pick up support 
because obviously people can qo
126 for quite a lonq time and then fall down. So 
there's a support network, b u t... I
127 wonder if sometimes if it's a bit too, you know, 
nannyinq, you know. Let's look
128 after you, kind of thing. Or maybe a bit more 
realisation of like, "Look at you, you
129 must have like massive amounts of skills to
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P 3: Tape 4 P ll.txt - 3:9 [What it’s meant for me, gettin..] (34:44) (Super) 
Comment:
WHAT=Homeless people constitute an heterogeneous group with different ages, 
needs, backgrounds. One common denominator might be the fact that at the root 
of many cases of homelessness is the de-institutionalization of people who were 
in care (there are other interviewees that talk about the de-institutionalization of 
soldiers. People in the army). These people don’t develop socialization skills and 
problem solving skills.
HOW=Positioned as a HP speaking with the imaginary interlocutor = the 
government.
WHY=Criticizing the fact that these people that are under the responsibility of 
the government in an institution are then left alone and become homeless. 
Criticizing the discontinuity of statutory services?? (also present in participant 2). 
Is she preparing the path to claim the need of the voluntary sector to fill the gap 
left by the government?
P 3: Tape 4 P ll.txt - 3:10 [P ll: Ah, good. Erm. The client..] (50:72) (Super) 
Comment:
It seems to me that for front-line HPs there is greater sense of psychological 
elements of homelessness. They talk about self-esteem and psychological 
elements more than rear-line people, which talk about services, policy etc...
WHAT=Homelessness understood as living in a hostel, in a friend’s flat or on the 
streets. Homelessness (the experience and the label, the construction of it) 
affects people's self-esteem/ self-confidence, causes addictions... Addictions are 
justified as a way of self medication, a way of avoiding the reality of 
homelessness (the reality of having low self stem and self-worth). Also mental 
health might cause homelessness.
292
HOW= She uses her work experience as evidence of her arguments. Positioned 
as HP, maybe even as a manager of a meaningful activity group (her job). She is 
also criticising the hostel, flat service as not enough.
WHY= She is trying to justify why homeless people are addicts? Homeless 
people are labelled and objectified. Labels attached to homelessness produce low 
self esteem which leads to addiction to cope with it an then once again to be 
labelled which engraves their situation. Why is she constructing homelessness as 
rooted in mental health (sometimes) but when talking about drugs she says that 
drug addictions are a consequence of homelessness??
3:12 So, on the one hand, I do have.. (74:78)
Comment:
WHAT=Criticizing the fact that the homeless are stereotyped. This aggravates 
the situation of those who once become homeless are deeply damaged and for 
who the way out is difficult. Homelessness is an easy status to reach and very 
difficult to get out off (not for everybody).
HOW= Dialogue with the mainstream, contesting their alienating labeling, which 
otherizes?
WHY=Trying to justify the fact that to get out of homelessness, which according 
to her is a long journey, there is a need of HPs doing the work she is doing 
(support along the journey).
P 3: Tape 4 P ll.txt - 3:14 [And increasingly now, erm, I'm..] (78:81) (Super) 
Comment:
A definition of floating support:
http://www.communitvni.org/index.cfm/section/Jobs/kev/AAA078F3-B0D0-
7815-0F0D38CEF9B5C6D4
293
‘What is floating Support?: Floating support is assistance provided in your home 
by a Housing Support Worker. It is called floating support because it can be 
given to people wherever they live. Floating Support can include any of the 
following:
• Help with claiming benefits and budgeting
• Help with furnishing your home
• Maintaining the safety and security of your home
• Help to access social and leisure activities
• Counselling / emotional support
• Help with finding training or employment
• Help to deal with other agencies ie. rent department, benefits agency, Help
with finding other accommodation’
From http://www.scambs.gov.Uk/Housing/HousingAdvice/Floating.htm#What
WHAT= She is talking about what she has learnt from the experience of 
working as a ‘floating support worker’.
WHY= Supporting her argument by giving evidence of her day-to-day work.
P 3: Tape 4 P ll.txt - 3:15 [But I guess another thing home..] (92:93) (Super) 
Comment:
WHAT=Very interesting. She is working within a meaningful occupation team 
and for her Homelessness means "potentialY'capability".
HOW= She is positioning as an HP doing that particular job, and hence uses 
professional knowledge to make sense of homelessness.
She is constructing homelessness on the light of her job objectives because in the 
following quotation she goes on and makes explicit these objectives.
WHY= She is defending her point (through positioning as an expert practitioner). 
She understands homelessness on the light of her job mission and objectives, 
which are to support people to develop their capabilities.
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0
130
<none>
Background: S years experience w ith in the homelessness sec to r .
Previous jo b s: She went back to  the p r iv a te  s e c to r  bu t d id n 't  
l ik e  i t s  e thos and came back to the voluntary se c to r . Actual 
job: manager o f the meaningful occupation team. She i s  the  
manager so does a lo t  o f  administrative th ings as w ell.
Training: Within the organization  they sen t her to  do a 
management course in  Open U n iversity  (tra in ed  in  management in  
general). She i s  a lso  doing psychotherapy because o f  her 
in te r e s ts  and not because o f  the organization  asking her to  be 
tra in ed .
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Participant 11
A: I would like you to speak about or tell me ...
Tell me what is homelessness for
you’
Pll: Homelessness for me is, erm ..it's 
definitely not just about erm, people 
that are sleeping on the str eet, erm, in a 
sleeping bag. Erm. I think there's a 
huge amount of homelessness that we don't 
see. Erm. In the trade, we call it 
the hrdden homeless. Er m. And I think that's 
shown by 80% of our dient group 
that we meet here are men, erm, but I believe 
a large percentage of women are 
probably sleeping on fiiends' floors or couches 
or in veiy insecure
accommodation, erm, and I think that's, that's
one of the, erm, parts of
homelessness that I feel is important anyway,
in general, and we, we don't come
dose. We just don't meet them, the clients.
Erm.
I didn't work with many homeless people before
I came to Thames Reach
Bondway. Erm. I've worked with some, erm,
and I've been domg it probably for
five years and what’s realty struck me is the, the
variety of, erm, different types of
insecure accommodation.
There's people that are in their- own flats or 
technically have their own flats but 
actually somebody else is using them and 
they’re not able to even access their 
own accommodation because they are ver y 
vulnerable people and their fiat may 
have been taken over by a friend or drug 
dealers and so they're actually [...] and 
although they have a r oof over their head, erm, 
in name, actually they're sleeping 
elsewhere.
I think the word "homeless" to me, erm, I find 
that society uses it in a way that’s 
quite, comes with quite a stigma. So, my 
feeling is that my friend or the general 
public think the homeless person is always 
there, a stereotype of a drinking, erm,
35-50 year old male or, you know, a young, a 
young person who, who's run away 
from home. Erm. And ...
What it's meant for me, getting to know more
homeless people ts just the huge
variety of ages and backgrounds and support
needs that people have. One of
the surprises for me was how many r ough
Labe)~
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sleepers used to live in care. Erm.
And that doesn’t mean that they've left
children's services or care and gone
straight onto the sheet. It may be that they’ve,
they've had such a, an unhappy
experience of, of home and no experience of a
family or settled way of life. But
even if they've gone into a relationship for a
few years, they've got manled or
had children, when problems have occumed
they haven't got the socialization
skills to cope with them so they may then turn
to diink or may then just leave,
erm, because they haven’t had that kind of,
erm, role-modelling of how to work
through problems and keep somewher e or a
relationship stable. And this ts
where I do feel I'm going (laughs) off the back,
but I'll just keep talking. Is this
OK?
A: It's OK .
P ll: Ah, good. Erm. The clients that I come 
into contact with in homelessness,
I think the biggest effect on people has been
their , their confidence in
themselves. Even if people have had, erm, you
know, Quite responsible jobs or ,
erm, maybe have done well at school previously
very quickly it seems either if
living on the str eet or in a hostel or, or
insecurely with friends, people's sense of
self-esteem and woith and achievement, I
think, is the first thing to really suffer.
Erm. And we do see a lot of people with 
alcohol pr oblems who didn't have 
alcohol problems befor e they went on the 
sheet, who didn’t have drug problems 
befor e they went on the street Erm.
And I r eally feel that for a lot of people that’s 
about, erm . it's almost a self- 
medication, it's blocking . your reality is, is, is 
so not what you want it to be.
Your sense of achievement is so low, erm, that
it’s a way just of numbing it erm,
that experience. Erm. The difficulty is there's
obviously once people have
become addicted is their self-esteem will then
take a further dr op because they
have another label. Not only are they homeless
and unemployed, but they're
also then a drug addict or a substance misuser.
Also a very high proportion of people have,
erm, mental health problems which
may have conbibuted to them becoming
homeless in the first place. Erm. But
even if you only had mild depr ession, you know,
a  paradigmatic ex.
|Home~
| Label-
| Reductionisbc Services- 
| The Homelessness Feelings-
paradigmatic
o  paradigmatic ex.
paradigmatic ex.
Individualistic Explanations- 
Reductionisbc Services-
par adigmatic ex.
Self about Voluntary Sector
ex.
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a few weeks of either living in a
071 hostel or supported housing, erm, you know, 
it's quite a big trigger for people's
072 mental health to, to, to take that in.
073
074 So, on the one hand, I do have this idea that 
homeless people shouldn't be
075 stereotyped as I’ve said and, on the other , the 
reality we deal with is that, erm,
076 however people got onto the street the damage 
that then happens takes quite a
077 long time to repair. I think it can be a very 
quick journey down and a very slow
078 journey back -  for some people, not for 
everybody. Erm. And increasingly now,
079 erm, I'm finding in my previous line of work 
which was floating support - so that's
080 with council tenants or people applying for 
council housing - erm, that asylum
081 seekers and r efugees are being put into 
temporary accommodation, erm -  so
082 they might be in a bed and breakfast -  erm, but 
if they have any English at all or
083 maybe very poor, there's very little support for 
them to access the benefits they
084 need and their move from STORM to bed and 
breakfast to hostel on quite a
085 regular basis. So even if, erm, an asylum 
seeker or refugee doesn't have any
086 other support needs, just being able to access 
the English system and get help
087 with, you know, how to keep a tenancy. Erm. 
That can be done but it's
088 important. I think that can quite quickly 
contribute to, to them losing their
089 temporary accommodation because they 
haven't abided by the rules. Erm. And
090 other than that, I feel another per son who is 
homeless. Erm.
091
092 But I guess another thing homelessness means 
to me is . and very, linked with
093 the word "potential" because, erm, I work in a 
meaningful occupation team, erm,
094 and our aim is to, erm, assist people to access, 
erm, education, erm, training,
095 employment or even just social activities, erm, 
and we do a whole . different,
096 different ways of inter acting with people. With 
some people it's just basically
097 building their self-esteem and then going into . 
where they go into a group
098 where they can get back into socialization, erm, 
because a homeless person's
099 problems, erm, don't end once they've got a 
flat. Most of the clients we see here
100 may have had a tenancy for a few months or a 
few years, erm, but they're
101 equally still dealing with problems of, erm, how 
to sort out their benefits, erm,
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socialised emotion, they may have been in or 
out of London, I don't know. Erm.
And they still have mental health problems and
alcohol and drug needs, erm, and
the stress of moving, erm, into somewhere
where you have that responsibility
again, erm, of water r ates and council tax and
bills can be a huge challenge.
Erm. So, erm, we're allied with [..... ] Thames
Reach sustainment teams whose 
. their job is to help, erm, people with their... 
their housing problems that liaise 
with them OVER DOCKETS making sure that 
they're paying their rent, erm, but 
they can sort out any problem with the 
neighbours, you know, kind of quite 
quickly. Eim. And that enables my team, once 
they've settled in, to then try and 
complete that last step, you know, if their 
tenancy's quite stable, erm, they’re 
paying their bills, they're, they're functioning 
quite well. It's going to, erm, enable 
them to fulfil their potential, to, to get back into 
the community and society. But I 
think homelessness is a very side-lining label to 
have.
And a lot of people I’ve met still call themselves 
ex-homeless or homeless and 
they've been housed for five yeais but that's 
still how they identify themselves.
I think there’s . for the street population,
people who are out on the street for a
long time, erm, they're not likely to make
friends with members of the general
public. Erm. They’ll make friends with their
peer group, probably other people
on the str eet, erm, and they share benefits they
[.....] share, addictions as well.
Erm. But for somebody to make the break from 
that, used to a very basic level of 
friendship and camaraderie to then moving 
across the line and sitting in a flat on 
their own.
One of the problems they do face is that they 
like to invite all their friends back to 
their flat so they could actually maintain a street 
lifestyle but within a house.
Erm. That then causes, erm, problems with the
neighbour and their tenancy is at
risk, erm, at risk from being evicted because the
neighbour s don’t want that kind
of disturbance or population in that flat. So,
erm, ifs ... I think there are a
number of very currently important areas where
people need suppoit in and if ..
and for each person it's differ ent. Erm. So if .
we really try and work very
Self about Otganization~
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individually with, erm, each client, erm, rather 
than ... I know we have to call 
them homeless or ex-homeless or rough sleeper 
but at the end of the day it's, 
you know, it's one individual.
Next door-, I know we have a client who used to 
be a r ough sleeper, has, has 
been resettled and he's starting, erm, a 
volunteer assistant training with us and 
he's actually satting ther e writing the application 
for m to apply for a job with us.
So, erm, then hopefully that's the kind of 
progress we're making.
I'm not sure whether that last b it... I don't 
think I’ve breeched his confidentiality, 
b u t...
A: Don't worry...
P ll: But if I can just say, you know, we, we, 
we're aiming to have clients, you 
know. we're actively ... at the moment we, 
we've got a, an advert out.
A: [........ ]
P ll: So I can say we’ve got, erm, yeah, a 
position that we're advertising at the 
moment that Is only open to our service users, 
to our clients, to actually be 
trained [..... ]
You might need to prompt me now. I think I've 
run out (laughs)
A: I think where there is something [ 
(silence)
<3 Potential''
P ll: I mean, personally, I can't think of
anything that, erm, is more, erm,
isolating and sou I-destroying than, than
knowing that tomorrow you've got
nowhere to sleep. Erm. And that if you ask,
you'll probably be. depending on
the time of year, you know, out and In the cold
and in danger. Erm. I don't know
the statistics for the number of women on the
street who've been, erm, sexually
and physically attacked, but I do know it's high.
I can't give you exact numbers.
Erm.
So, at any time, if I get complacent about what
I do, erm, which a lot of my work
now involves the computer and answering
emails and internal things and
managing my team, er m, It's r eally important
for me to, to keep that, erm, that
| Imposition of Agenda~
| The Homelessness Fedmgs-
] «
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paradigmatic ex.
Self about the Self
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O r  Self about HPs
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173 image of insecurity and, erm, and lack of choice 
that peopie have when they’re
174 actually, erm, homeless. And I, I, I think that 
again applies to people that are, are
175 sleeping on a friend's couch. You don't know 
how long they going to be able to
176 stay there. Erm. You can’t make any other 
plans in your life because you
177 haven't got an address. Erm. If you 
experience, erm, going to a day centre, you
178 know, very conscious of, o f ... that the power is 
already within somebody else's
179 hands. There's veiy little that you can do for 
yourself to make things, erm,
180 happen. Eim.
181
182 My team work with clients in hostels, erm, 
Thames Reach fund work hostels and
183 Thames Reach fund [.. ] supported housing as 
well as put clients in their own
184 flats. Erm. And I think especially in hostels and 
shared housing, even though
185 you’ll, you’ll have your own room, it’s a forced 
kind of communal living. I at least
186 get to choose who I share with, erm, and, you 
know, I'm living in London. I can’t
187 affor d to live on my own and I'm renting, erm, 
but I can still choose to move in
188 with friends. I have some power over that 
Eim. And so I think that, that lack of
189 choice, being able to determine, you know, who 
you’ll see and when (laughs),
190 who you're going to share a kitchen with and a 
bathroom with, erm, again is kind
191 of a way to [......... ] .  Eim.
192
193 I get veiy, erm, erm, mixed feelings about, 
erm, drug users who beg on the street
194 because I know a lot of them aren't homeless 
and I think it then, erm, furthers the
195 stigma that homeless people have to, erm, 
endure -  and especially the ones on
196 the tube (laughs) -  because I think, erm, 
especially in England that, erm, for the
197 public when somebody asks them for something 
and then they can’t escape,
198 erm, I, I think people would feel very awkward 
and then, you know, all the
199 negative judgements can then be made. It’s 
like, "Oh, don't ask me. Don’t force
200 me." Erm. And, and so I've really been kind of 
str uggling with if, if I see
201 somebody on the street, you know, before I 
worked with, erm, Thames Reach
202 Bondway. Actually I was tempted sometimes 
to give money and I did. And
203 sometimes, you know, now, you know, it’s, it’s 
a peisonal judgement, but that
204 whole relationship between the genuine 
homeless and, erm, you know, people
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205 that beg but actually are begging are rather a 
nuisance. It's erm.. it's quite a
206 problematic area, I think, for the workers to 
deal with personally. Erm. And, and
207 also, sort of organizationally, you know, I have 
had clients who have had a flat
208 who’ve had drug and alcohol issues and they've 
died aged 32 from an overdose
209 on the street with money that they got from 
begging, so, erm. And, you know,
210 that’s in no way a judgement against the people 
that gave money. I mean It's
211 just a very sad feet, erm, that a lot of our 
clients, you know, if they make It past
212 50 or 60 having been out on the street for a 
long time, they're doing very well.
213 Yeah. It’s, it's life experience and It's awful and
214
215 Eim. Another thing homeless means to me is 
politics. I think, erm, around
216 Christmas time suddenly ever/one is concerned 
about the homeless. Or if
217 there's a lot of people visibly on the street then 
that moves our concern about
218 homelessness. Erm. If it disappears from the 
public view, erm, then I think it
219 boils down to the placements on the 
Government agenda oi FUNDING and
220 publicity, erm, which is why, you know, we will 
have, erm, street counts of how
221 many people are sleeping on the street, but 
that by no means takes into account
222 all the people that are, you know, living in 
hostels, living in, eim, you know,
223 squats, on friends' floors. Erm. So, what I like 
about working for Thames Reach
224 from there is that they're not frightened to, you 
know, talk to the Government
225 about what they actually believe should be 
happening. Erm.
226
227 One of the big problems at the moment is, is 
getting people access to, erm,
228 hostel places. I've got also rehabilitation or 
detox for drugs. Erm. You can make
229 the contact on the street but because there's a 
lack of housing for people to
230 move out of the hostels and into the houses, 
there's also then the tack of space
231 from the str eet into the hostel or from the 
street into the REHAB . So if you
232 manage to make a connection with somebody 
and say, "OK," you know, "do you
233 want to do something about your drug habit’" 
Eim. And they say, "Yes". You've
234 then got to wait ten weeks or something to 
actually find a place. So I think
235 there's more movement now towards faster 
services, erm, but because that side
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of things, I think, you probably don’t see then 
after, then the Government won't 
MOVE ON so Quickly, so .
I didn't realise, yeah, how political an issue it 
can be. (short silence)
I think I've just about run out now (laughs), 
(long silence)
Something else might come to me. Erm.
A: [.....] what do you think of [........... .]
P ll: Erm. It’s difficult I mean, I do think that
you, there are some people in
Government that are genuine people. I’m
ceitain. Erm. But at the end of the
day, each Government department is competing
for finances and for votes, I
guess. Erm. So, I don’t think that people who
work in Government deliberately,
you know, make bad decisions but I do think
that unless, unless an rssue was
causing a big political problem, erm, it probably
gets less attention. So, erm, I
don’t think there’s a deliberate policy to neglect
or underfund. Erm. I just think
that, you know, other , other priorities come up,
erm, as always happens in
politics and attention gets diverted elsewhere.
Erm. So I think it’s probably Quite
difficult. I ... Personally I wouldn't do it, eim, in
the Government (laughs) around
homelessness. Er m. But I think that’s because
I actually, I’m not so interested in
the policy side of things. You know, my job
satisfaction in the everyday really
comes from, erm, seeing clients, you know,
pr ogress, eim, and seeing my team
progress because I'm a team manager. Erm.
So I’m much more interested in
the kind of personal development side for, erm,
for our clients. Eim. I think part
of the problem for Government workers that
work with the homeless is they get
so for removed from a person as a person. You
know, they just become a
statistic and, erm ...
One of the big difficulties has been, erm, how 
those services are funded because 
in the past I never needed, it needed to change 
because you had, you know,
Salvation Army, Outreach team or Shelter and
Thames Reach Bondway and a
person on the street could come into contact
with five different organizations on
one night. So the streamlining of services, erm,
I think was a good idea. Erm.
Self about Homelessr>ess~
paradigmatic ex.
Q  As a Political Issue 
| As Specialist Area~ 
|Potenbal~ 
j The 'Normal Us'~
| The Socio-Psychological~
Self about Homelessness~
H paradigmatic ex.Self about the Self
paradigmatic ex.
Self about Statutory Sector*
| Imposition of Agenda*- 
| Professional ism~
Self about Voluntary Sector
Self about St 
paradigmatic
Self about HF
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272 But what’s happened with, say, services that I 
run is I can get funding from the
273 European Social Fund and I’m dealing with 
Associated London GOVERNMENT,
274 or what you call "ALG”, but it's only for two 
years for a specific pr oject which has
275 a, an awful lot of bureaucracy around it Erm. 
So instead of running a pr oject for
276 the last month, I'm now being, you know, the 
funding has ended and all our
277 energy is spent into kind of r edoing another bid 
to fund another seivice and it
278 makes it quite difficult to provide the continuity 
for clients but it also provides
279 insecurity for the workers. We like to employ 
everybody as much as possible on
280 a permanent contract, erm, and if we don't get 
them funding, we'll try and find
281 work for people elsewhere. Erm. But because, 
because you have to get
282 refunding every- two years and you're never 
sure if you’re going to get the money
283 and you have to change the scheme, again,
[........  you could do with some
284 .. ] but the amount of time and resources 
that they, all of these organizations
285 are spending into trying, in competing to get 
the BITS, to get the money, erm, it
286 feels like a bit of distr action from the actual, 
doing the work. Erm.
287
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I do appr eciate that services need to be thought
through, they need to be
reviewed, they need to accounted for but, erm,
yeah, two years shoit-teim
funding for a lot of vital stuff is a real strain,
you know. Yeah. That’s a bit I hadn't
thought about. Eim.
A: How do you, how do you believe [ see
... professionals...,]
P ll: Do you mean ...
A:
P ll: I'm not sure, probably. Previously, erm,
in the voluntary sector , erm,
because you don't have to have a social work
degr ee to, to start work and so
forth in the voluntary sector, erm, and there
was a lot of emphasis on, you know,
the clients come first. I think previously the
voluntary sector was seen as, you
know, amateur, you know. We had to teach
ourselves, you know, how to make
sure we were doing the financial side of things
properly to, eim ,. yeah, be mot e
competitive. So I think now that people do see
par adigmatic ex.
Self about Organizatioo~
Self about Voluntary Sector
o  paradigmatic ex.
paradigmatic ex.
^ 1  Professionalism ~ Q  paradigmatic ex. 
Self about HPs~
O  Self atx
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that we’re quite, erm, we're quite
well rounded, a lot, a lot better than we were I
think previously. A good
reputation for working with clients and doing
that one-to-one approach supporting
stuff, but not much idea about the kind of, the,
the wider infrastructure of, of what
needs to happen for, for partnership working
or, erm, you know, erm, for secure
financial positions. Erm.
And I think that we've shown, erm, quite a
commitment to getting our selves
skilled up -  it was a matter of survival really
(laughs) when, you know, lots of
small organizations were erm, you know, not
getting funding and felling by the
wayside and luckily Thames Reach, as it was,
merged with Bondway, but you
know we've spent, erm, quite a lot of time
among it. I was put through the Open
University Management Course during my first
year as a manager which covers,
you know, budgeting, erm, marketing and
customers, you know, let alone the
usual management supervising and stuff like
that but very much the wider’ picture
of how to make, you know, it was managing in
the normal not for profit sector but
there was a very clear, erm, aim to, to give us,
erm, [.....] business counter!..]
I guess.
I’m not sur e whether professionals think that
about us, now. I think we, that's
how we perceive ourselves more now, we, you
know. I could transfer these skills
directly into the private sector. I did leave for
six months actually and work in the
private sector and came str aight back (laughs).
Eim. That wasn’t about lack of
skills. That was about not wor king for an
organization that, that shared my ethos.
One thing that is difficult, I guess, for the 
voluntary sector and the Government to 
many up sometimes is, erm, so Thames Reach 
Bondway, part of our mission 
statement says we're committed to working 
with those who are most difficult and 
challenging to reach which means it may take 
us two years to do the [. ] pilot.
It would take somebody else two weeks to deal 
with another- client because we 
are working with someone who's very 
entrenched and very hard on support.
Eim. So if we were funding from, erm, from 
the Government and another 
professional says, "We want (snaps fingers), 
you know, 30 people into Jobs, 20
about HPs~
^  paradigmatic ex.
O  paradigmatic ex. Self about the Self
H  Self about HPs-| Advocates^
| Imposition of Agenda'1 
| Professionalism^
| Vicious Cyde~ 
paradigmatic ex.
Self about the Self
paradigmatic ex.
| Self about Statutory Sector ~
| Self about Organization paradigmatic e:
J  £$ Self about Homelessness~
* paradigmatic ex.Self about Homelessness'
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people into here and five people into there,"
erm, that’s not necessarily going to
happen with the client group that we’re trying
to reach. So it's trying to persuade
all the time that it’s not a lost cause working
with the hardest to reach. Erm. We
don’t just want to target our seivkes at those
that will Just give us result and
earns the money from funders.
A: How do you, how do you many, erm, those 
[ 1
Self about Homelessness~
Pll: Emotional blackmail, you know.(laughs) 
Erm. I think for the funding, ei m,
347 we had to do a lot of work on showing what we 
cali soft indicators. So, erm, if an
348 indication of success for somebody was getting 
a job at one end (laughs), erm,
349 we’ve had to really look at, at the end, 
somebody gaining self-esteem, erm, you
350 know, attending group for the first time, 
attending a class or some work for the
351 first time, somebody turning up for a session 
and not drinking for an entire day
352 and then not drinking for two days, erm, so it, 
it, it is kind of showing up in all of
353 those first steps in order to get this last step. 
Erm. We’ve been documenting,
354 you know, and showing funders that our clients 
need to go through those five
355 steps or we’ve got to think about those. Erm. 
So what, what’s tending to happen
356 is we put in our bids, for example, that yes, we 
will aim for so many percent of
357 people to be high achieving, to go into training 
or jobs, but we also want to be
358 able to cater within that bid for those soft 
outcomes as well. So hopefully you get
359 a range of results and a i ange of targets rather 
than just those.
360 Erm. And I think it’s happening more and more 
because I think there's a number
361 of people, the phrase at the moment is 
"economically inactive" (laughs) but, erm,
362 the Job Centre Pius and everybody else has 
tar gets to, to, to get into economic
363 activity, erm, and I think we're, we're making 
quite a good case, er m, for
364 [............. ] (laughs) Erm. And I’m not quite
sure how we're getting that
365 message across. I know our chief executive 
does a lot of, erm, the equivalent of
366 Kilroy daytime TV (laughs), erm, but also, you 
know, talking with Government
367 steering groups, er m, and we're talking to 
fundeis about what’s realistic, you
368 know, that's something we have to keep 
pushing. Eim. So I'm happy to have
369 the top targets as long as they incorporate the
| Advocates ~
) Imposition of Agenda^
I Individualistic Explanations--
paradigmatic ex.
Self about the Self
Self about HPs<
paradigmatic ex.
Self about Or gan
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bottom, the bottom target, the
lower targets as well as .. yeah . those ones
that are just going to cream off
the achieving people and leaving behind a lot
of, a lot of others.
A: Thank you. When I asked you about [..... ]
, you said, erm, [....... ..]
P ll: Erm. I guess other professionals within 
the voluntary sector will 
acknowledge that we ate all in direct 
competition with each other, erm, to provide 
services. Also there is a high degree of 
information and skill shaiing between 
organizations which is . It, it’s very strange 
that on the one hand I could be sat 
In my office and my, my equivalent at St 
Mungo’s or, erm, anothei housing 
association will be sat in their office and we 
both know that there is, you know,
£200,000 (laughs) in that pot, erm, and on
some occasions we're making a joint
bid so they'll pr ovide some and we'll provide
some and that’s great. And on cither
occasions we ar e just in direct competition for
the same piece of money, so
there's a real fine line between wanting to share
best practice, erm, and also
wanting to, to keep, you know, some of that
expertise for yourselves so you’ve
got the edge when it, when it comes to getting
the money. Erm. So, It’s a real
mix. Erm.
And, you know, if I wasn't competitive then, 
erm, It's my service manager, my 
direct line manager , that's responsible for 
actually putting it all together, erm, anc 
getting ... but at the end of the day it’s not 
competitive. If we don’t get the 
finance, we can't keep the worker s, we can't 
service the clients. They may get a 
service from another organization, erm, but it 
might not be in the right 
geographical area for them, they’ve already got 
a relationship with our team.
Eim. So what would happen namely, a client’s 
had a, an important relationship 
for them, eim, with a worker but if we lose the 
funding and then say, "Oh," you 
know, "Threshold are now providing your 
support," all that history, all that 
continuity, all that confidence they've built up 
with us is lost, so I need to be 
competitive. Erm.
I also like to show off occasionally (laughs), but 
for, you know, but for sharing 
innovations and good Ideas. Eim. But as I
Imposition of Agenda** 
Professionalism-
Q  paradigmatic ex.
paradigmatic ex.
f t  Self about the Self 
Q  Self about Voluntary Sector
Q  Self about Volun
U  Self about HPs~
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say, we're, we're putting in a bid with
403 St Mungo’s around some skill-based activities, 
erm, and there's a partnership
404 that we're going to have with Broadway to try 
and get service users volunteering
405 and wor king acr oss the organizations, so it's a 
fine balance. Veah. But how they
406 see me personally, I don’t know (laughs).
407
408 A: [...] Thank you very much [......... ]
409
410 P ll: No, I think I've finished.
411
412 A: Thank you very much.
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P 2: Tape 8 _P6.txt - 2:13 [You know, I suppose we going t..] (47:72) (Super)
Codes: [Self about Homelessness]
Comment:
WHAT= This continuous with what he said before, about homeless as socio- 
psychological, as lack of belonging which goes across all the other psychological 
issues that homeless people have such as lack of self-esteem. Homelessness as a 
complex mixture of psychological problems (mental health, addiction) all rooted 
in lack of self-worth, lack of self-esteem, which at the same time is rooted in lack 
of belonging due to lack of home (what he believes to be a home= social 
relations, social networks...). Lack of self-esteem goes across all the cases. Lack 
of self esteem as causing drug misuse, or other many problems. Lack of self 
esteem as the common denominator amongst homeless people (before he said 
that the common denominator is lack of belonging but I guess that he sees lack 
of belonging as causing lack of self esteem)
HOW= Dialogue with the statutory other. He uses his position as HP to say that 
they work with people with all these issues. He draws on his experience to 
support his arguments. Also positioned from his job 'self-esteem* is something 
talked about in the website of his project, " ....is  a new three month course run by 
several X projects, accredited by the City and Guilds Profile of Achievement. 
Custom-built to meet the needs of each candidate, it can recognise skills and 
achievements at any level. Providing a flexible learning framework through 
which candidates develop their skills and gain formal recognition of their 
achievements, this scheme provides development and training opportunities 
resulting in a more standardised approach to building tenant's skills, self esteem 
and their ability to sustain their tenancies. The course includes subjects like 
literacy and numeracy, confidence and independence, demonstrating leadership 
and working in team." Found in:
http://www.crisis.org.uk/page.builder/services under smartmove.html
WHY= In order to show that homelessness is a complex issue that needs 
supportive approaches, the ones from the voluntary sector/ his organization.
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Participant 6 (P6)
A: So tell me, what is homelessness for you?
P6: Erm. Homelessness is a term to me that 
encompasses a large number of things.
Erm. At the most basic level, it is exactly 
what it says, it’s home-less-ness. So it's 
people
in, or people in the situation that do not have 
a home. So, I guess the first question in 
saying, "what is homelessness’', is "what is a 
home?"
Erm. If you ask the person on the street, 
erm, the first thing they would say obviously 
is
"bucks and moitai ”, a roof over thetr heads, 
and that's where I initially came from when I 
first started thinking about homelessness, 
before I started working in this organisation. 
I’ve
been involved with Crisis for about two years 
now. Erm. And I guess working at Crisis 
has kind of changed my perception of that. I 
now very much regard a home as much more 
than bricks and mortar.
Eim. I guess if you don’t mention the word 
"homelessness’" to me and you just ask me 
the
question, "what is a home?" I would say 
something veiy different than what is 
homelessness. Erm. Or maybe I would have 
sard something very different, but now I 
probably relate to a lot more, erm ... If you 
ask me what a home is, I'd say it's having a 
family around you; it’s, erm, it's playing 
football in the park when you're a kid; it’s 
going on
family holidays; it's having support from your 
parents; having, erm, ei m, security that a 
home provides. So now when you ask me 
what does homelessness mean to me, erm, 
that's the kind of terms that I'd now think 
about homelessness in. I think homelessness 
for me isn't really about bricks and mortar as 
much as . it's a veiy important part because 
a home is mor e than just bilcks and mortar 
but bricks and moitar is the first part of that 
Erm. It is about eim, your social ties, your 
social relationships. It's about erm, a, a 
feeling of security, it's about erm, feeling you 
belong. Erm. So homelessness, I guess, is 
the opposite of that. What is homelessness? 
What does it mean to me? It's the feeling of 
not having a place that you belong to as much 
as not having a, a bed or a home or a roof 
over your heads. Erm. I know this is very
^  Home~ Self about Homelessness~ Q  paradigma1
■^1 Self about the Pubk~
f f l  Self about the Self~
Self about Organization-
" a  Self about Homelessness~
| Home^
| Self about Homeiessness~ 
S u :;c *-
The Homelessness Feei<ngs~ 
The Socio-Psychological~
' paradigmatic ex.
Self about Organization-
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much a kind of on Crisis message, you know, 
and I'm sure you've heard the same kind of 
thing before (laughs). But homelessness is 
mor e than just a shelter.
Eim. Homeiessness . erm, the next thing for 
people who are homeless, what do you 
mean by homeless person’ Again, it kind of, 
when you say a homeless person it conjures 
up different images. Eim. The most obvious 
image is the one that the media portrays, 
erm, the one of somebody on the str eets of, 
eim, you know, o f... someone huddling in a 
doorway and if I'm brutally honest that’s 
pr obably still the most obvious one that 
flashes
through you mind when I say "homeless 
person" to you. Erm. But equally, I guess the 
environment in here and the clients that I 
work directly with shows you that there are 
more
stereotypes than you can think of in the 
homelessness sector. Eim. And that actually 
is
just a group of individuals who all have this 
same common thread of not having a home, 
not having a sense of belonging. So you get, 
you see issues of a kind of lack of self­
esteem, erm, a lack of kind of belonging 
which kind of runs through the whole of the 
homelessness issues. Erm. You know, I 
suppose we going to work with people with a 
whole range of different problems, be it 
mental health, erm, be it depression, be it, 
you
know, substance abuse, alcohol, erm, be it 
drugs' abuse. And it all seems to come back 
to
this idea to self-worth and belonging, and 
normally, eim, self-esteem is probably the key 
factor that I'd say pervades all of that.
Eim. If there's something like low self- 
esteem, then the chances are all the other 
problems are going to flow from that. Erm.
So, when I think of a homeless person, lets 
say, I think of a person with low self-worth if 
I'm honest because if you take someone 
who's HIDDEN HOMELESS [...], someone 
who lives in a hostel or maybe they're staying
on friends' floors and [ .... ] ,  what defines
that person as a homeless person as opposed 
to somebody who hasn't quite got themselves 
Into their next flat yet? Erm. And I think 
probably it’s the person that has really low 
self-esteem, and it's, erm, and all the other 
problems that brings with it, probably then 
hence drops into the homeless box whereas 
somebody who doesn't have that problem, 
doesn't. For example, I've got, currently got a
|Home~
j Individualistic Explanations- 
| Label-
| The Homeiessness Feelings- 
j The Socio-Psychological-
I Self about Hon
Self about Homelessness- paradigmatic e
Self about Homelessness-
Q  paradigmatic ex.
I Indrvtdualisbc Explanations- Self about Homel 
) La oel~
I The Normal 'Us’~
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062 filend who's mid-twenties, eim, she can't 
even get a job, she's unemployed. Erm. You
063 know, her last r ented flat has just come to an 
end, the contr act has ended and she hasn't
064 quite found a new place yet. The last two or 
three months she's been staying in, erm, a
065 few weeks on her boyfiiend's floor, a few 
weeks, erm, somewhere else and like 
technically
066 she'd be called, you know, a surfer but I 
ceitainly don't see, view her as homeless and 
why
067 don't I view her as homeless? Probably 
because she is a middle-class, well-spoken, 
weil-
068 educated, 25 year old with prospects and feels 
really light about herself and is confident
069 and still happy to go out and mix with people. 
So I guess, you know, homelessness is in
070 that sense the fringes. It kind of comes down 
to actually how that individual views
071 themself and what mental state they are in. 
You know, I think self-esteem to me kind of
072 sums up those things.
073
074 Eim. So when you talk about a homeless 
person, yes you can, you can flash through in
075 your mind the person on the street But then 
it's normally a person who is in a situation
076 because they are feeling pretty low about 
themselves. Erm. So when you talk about 
SUP
077 into homelessness and how to move forwar d, 
a lot of the time if you just kind of come back
078 to addressing people as individuals, eim, 
you'd probably, eim, get a lot further than, 
than
079 kind of [....... ] on the stereotypes that people
do.
080
081 I don't know, it's working in a homeless 
organisation, trying to get a message across 
to a
082 sceptical public out there, a public, erm, that 
believes homelessness is much more about
083 the guys on the street or, erm, that's ceitainly 
the way the media poitrays it, the classic
084 case being at Christmas. Erm. Whenever we 
do our own Chiistmas shelters, eim, you
085 can guarantee the fir st thing the TV cr ews 
wants is the shot of someone being given a
086 blanket or a cup of soup or something just 
because, because that's what, you know ... 
it’s
087 the easiest thing to say when you think on 
homelessness: it’s what kind of myths, if you
088 like, that they propagate in, in that sense.
Erm. If you can, if we can educate the public
089 away from that and say homelessness isn't 
about a r oof it’s about a home, it’s about self-
Self about Homelessness-
par adigmatic ex. a  Setf about HPs~
| ^  Self about the Public-
] | Advocates- t t  paradigmatic ex.| Home— Q  Self about the Pi
| Individualistic Explanations- 
| Label-
j The Socio-Psychological--'
^  Self about the Public- 
^ about Homelessness-
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esteem, it's about all these issues.
Probably actually, erm, you'd get a lot further 
in terms of moving forward with the agenda 
on homelessness and know that it's been 
largely what Crisis and Shelter have been 
trying
to do in a round-about way, trying to get 
people interested and focus on hidden 
homeiessness rather than FREE/THREE 
homeiessness. And I think that’s really vatid 
because, erm, if your average person in the 
street, when they think of homeiessness 
actually think of the word "home" and thought 
about what that entails, erm, there'd be 
probably a lot less prejudice out there against 
homeless people.
Erm. I guess the issue is also somewhat 
clouded by the issue of begging which is a 
very
evocative one and one that the media again 
picks up on a lot. Erm. And begging and 
homeiessness are and most probably always 
will be linked in the public's eye as one and 
the same issue. Erm. And yes, they are to a 
ceitain extent but also they're not to a 
certain extent as well.
JJ
^  Self about Voluntary Sector~
Eim. But, I mean, you know, it all comes 
down to again this fact that people haven't 
really
107 quite got over the fact that homeiessness isn't 
just about a bed. I think most people think
108 of a bed, you know, they want a bed because 
they want to get drugs or whatever, which is
109 right So, it's kind of INVOLVES A 
DISCONNECT that if people think of begging, 
in their
110 eyes they are funding a drugs' issue, or an 
alcohol problem. Erm. So it's always like they
111 realise that a person who's homeless, "Oh, 
right it’s a homeless person who's begging, 
it's
112 always a homeless person that's begging." 
Eim. A homeless person has got all these
113 other problems. They don’t try and make the 
disconnect in their mind, the connection in
114 their mind between homeiessness about being 
more than just having a home and solving
115 the other problems. They still see 
homeiessness as about you know, the guy on 
the
116 street who's rough sleeping. But the truth of 
the matter is probably that most beggars who
117 aren't rough sleeping necessarily, they're 
probably . a lot of them [...] are still going
118 [.....] a combination. Erm, well, that's got to
be hue just from the number of beggar s
119 versus the number of rough sleepers. You
about the Public~ paradigmatic ex.
A : - .
Home--'
_a:e -
paradigmatic ex.
Self about Homelessness~
H  Self about the Public~
> Self about Homelessness~
t* paradigmatic ex.
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P 6: Tape 11B_T12A P16.txt - 6:90 [But one other thing I’d like t..] (520:534) 
(Super)
Codes: [Self about Statutory Sector]
Comment:
WHAT=His HPs colleagues criticize statutory homeless strategies. He doesn’t 
know enough for criticizing them. However, he knows through colleagues that 
these strategies are not designed for the needs of the homeless. (But this is what 
he has been talking about until now, hasn’t him?)
HOW= It seems that until here he has been voicing other HPs colleagues, 
because he is recognizing the fact that many people that he knows would criticize 
statutory homeless strategies!!!!!!!!
‘Homeless strategy is required by the Homeless Act to all local authority in 
London’
http://www.richmond.gov.uk/home/housing/housing_strategy_service_developm 
ent_and_performance/housing_strategy/homelessness_strategy2.htm 
http://www.london.gov.uk/mavor/housing/achiev hless.isp
http://www.citvoflondon.gov.uk/NR/rdonlvres/7F75C698-3C48-4811 -841E- 
E8970761 E67E/0/homelessness strategy.pdf
P 6: Tape 11B_T12A P16.txt - 6:91 [You might know more about it t..] 
(525:527) (Super)
Codes: [Self about the Self]
Comment:
After constructing himself as an expert and talking about services etc, now he 
doesn't want to be positioned as such as he believes that I know about statutory 
homeless strategies more than him. He seems to be positioning me as an expert.
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P 6: Tape 11B_T12A P16.txt - 6:92 [A: W hat do you think homelessn..] 
(536:603) (Super)
Codes: [Self about Voluntary Sector]
No memos 
Comment:
WHAT= The difficulty of working with their clients is their mistrust in the 
relationship. There are inconsistencies between words (discourse) and actions of 
the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector is in a difficult situation since, HPs 
have a framework that guides them on what and how they are meant to think, act 
and say. However, actions of the voluntary sector are not always a reflection of 
that. On the one hand, HPs talk about homeless people in a very respectable way. 
They like thinking that homeless people have dignity (respecting clients). They 
help them to achieve dignity, self-confidence and self-esteem in order for them to 
become independent and in order for them not to continue self-destructive 
behaviors, reduce mental illness, and live a normal life. On the other hand, the 
actual actions of the voluntary sector as a whole show another truth. Actions are 
more important than words. He is talking about the internal dilemmas that HPs 
have (in particular he talks about his internal dilemma of wanting to help and 
support the dignity of the homeless but at the same time mistrusting them). If you 
are not practicing the role of HP you would think that homeless people are 
'scumbags’ (scumbags= A person regarded as despicable. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=scumbag. Someone despicable is =The 
feeling or attitude of regarding someone or something as inferior, base, or 
worthless; scorn. http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=contempt).
Some are aggressive nasty, people that you wouldn’t like to deal with. However, 
because you want to be professional then you want to deal with people you even 
don’t like. You look for the dignity on them, their nature as human beings and the 
positive side of them. This is what he admires of HPs; their capacity to see the 
positive side of their clients even though they have lots of negative traits.
HOW= He is both positioning himself as a lay person seeing the homeless as 
scumbags and as a HP otherizing and having these dilemmas. He seems to have a 
dilemma that comes from his positioning as a lay person (that sees the negative
316
traits) and as a professional (HPs, who is able to be aware of those negative traits 
but gets the most of the person, sees the positive side of the person). He is 
identifying HPs with lay people that otherize, since according to him 
inconsistency is something what happens in society in general.
He is talking of inconsistencies between the words and thinking of the voluntary 
sector and the actual actions taken in the voluntary sector. However he doesn’t 
want to criticize HPs. When talking about support for the homeless and ethics he 
talks about HPs (as individuals or members of the staff). When criticizing the 
actions as inconsistent then he talks of'us' but as the voluntary sector in general. 
He is defending himself. Here he is positioning himself as an HP who has certain 
thoughts of homeless people but that then is inconsistent with his behaviors since. 
In positioning as a HPs he is making claims of how homeless people need to be 
treated (with dignity). And then he positions himself as a lay person, recognizing 
the fact that he doesn't see clients as easy, and that they are aggressive etc...
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Tape 11 Side B Participant 16
A: Tell me please, what does homeiessness 
mean to you’
P16: Weil, homeiessness is, is a far more 
difficult thing to define than at first it 
might appear because, eim, homeiessness 
takes a lot of different forms as I'm 
sure you know. It’s not just about not having 
a roof over your head, it’s just, it's 
not just about rough-sleeping any more which 
is how it used to be understood.
Now there's actually a specific term for, for 
that type of homeiessness. Some 
people call it rooflessness which is, is a 
specific type of homeiessness that we, 
we all tend to understand which is, you know, 
the very visible face of 
homeiessness that we all see.
But beyond rooflessness (rough-sleeping), the 
other forms of homeiessness are, 
are a more far more difficult thing for us to 
understand, erm, and in, in a sense, 
almost for us to care about because they 
don't sound necessarily that extr eme.
So, for example, if I was to say to you that 
most homeless peopie actually live in 
hostels or in temporary accommodation or in 
bed and breakfasts, you might say 
back to me, "Well, that’s OK, isn't it? Is that 
so terrible?' And, erm, and it's not 
terrible necessarily because at least they're 
not sleeping on the street They, 
they, they've made, for example, some kind of 
progress or they've beer, 
supported before they've been able to, before 
they've ended up on the street 
So, in a sense, people being in those 
temporary forms of accommodation is a 
positive thing. However, our business in 
homeiessness agencies is to ensure the 
people don't just remain in those forms of 
accommodation because your quality 
of life when you're in, when you’re 
temporarily housed or vulnerably housed 
makes you very vulnerable and it means you 
can't leave, lead a normal life. And 
we consider-, although differ ent people would 
argue with this, many people would 
call those people in temporary or vulnerable 
or- people who were vulnerably 
housed, they would call those people 
homeless. We, I consider- them homeless. 
Erm.
To me, a home is more than just a house,
OK? You say, "What is
homeiessness?" It’s about having, it’s about
|Home~
1 In Need
| La bel ~
I Reductionist*: Services*-
^  Self about the Public~
I Self about Homeiessness''
Self about the Public*-
^  Self about Homeles
paradigmatic ex.
^  Self about the Public*-
| Self about Voluntai 
I The Normal 'Us’~
| Home*- Self about Homele
j Reductionist* Services*- Q  paradigmatic ex.
I The Homeiessness Feelings*-
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not having a home. And a home is
035 about more than a house. So having housing, 
having accommodation is one
036 thing, but what me and you probably 
understand to be homeiess about a tot more
037 than tha t It's about stability. It's about eim, 
security. It’s about rt's almost
038 about it not being an issue, I take it for 
granted that I’ve got a nice home where,
039 which is clean, well as clean as I keep it but 
it's relatively dean. That I haven't
040 got noisy, disruptive neighbours, that I can 
come home in foe evening and get a
041 good night's sleep and relax and feel safe and 
warm, and which then leads,
042 leaves me to lead a normal life. It means, it
allows me to be able to get up in foe
043 mor ning refr eshed for work so I can operate 
normally during foe day. It means
044 that I can invite friends over in the evening 
and just do foe kind of things that we
045 all do take for granted which is what Irving our 
life is about.
046
047 Now, if you’re homeless, all those things just 
go out the window because people
048 in, in certain kinds of accommodation are, are 
for example languishing in hostels.
049 And if you’re in, and if you’re in hostel 
accommodation, for example, many
050 hostels particularly in London, erm, are dirty. 
You’re, you’re housed alongside
051 dozens, if not hundreds of other people who 
have got a lot of pr oblems maybe
052 just like yourself and that's not necessarily foe 
best environment to be in. If
053 you’ve got a drug problems, being around a 
hundred other people with drug
054 problems isn't, isn't foe best thing for you 
necessarily particularly seeing as a lot
055 of hostels are targeted by dealers, OK. So, to 
be put in a place where you're
056 surrounded by other people who are also 
facing a lot of problems isn't, isn't foe
057 best solution for people. OK? So if, imagine if 
you're living there, that, that’s not
058 a stable form of living. That does not allow 
you to lead a normal life. Erm.
059
060 And going back to things like noise for 
example, if you need to, if you, if you’re
061 trying to work while you're living in a hostel, 
it, it's often very easy for people to
062 get a good night’s sleep there, erm, just 
because of foe cramped conditions, just
063 because of foe noise, foe disruption, the lack 
of security. Erm. You know,
064 violence and theft is quite common in, in 
hostels. It, it vanes greatly from hostel
065 to hostel but it but it is, but it can be quite
^  Tbe Normal 'Us’~
Self about the Self~
|Home~
| Reductiomsbc Services~ 
The Normal 'Us’~
^  Self about Voluntary Sector~
Q  paradigmatic ex.
|Home~
(The Homeiessness Feelings^ 
jThe Normal ’Us’~  
j Vicious Cycle~
Reductionists Sc
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rife. Erm.
And then another example is families in bed 
and breakfasts. You know, if you’re 
in a bed and breakfast -  this is something I 
know very little about -  but again, 
imagine if you're a family and you're in fairly 
small, squalid bed and breakfast 
accommodation, it's actually very difficult to 
lead a normal family life there 
because often children, for example, haven't 
got a, haven't got a space to do 
their homework. Erm. You've got families 
sharing a very small space so it 
actually creates a lot more tension and 
difficulty. Facilities, like cooking facilities, 
tend to be quite limited so that any income 
that you do have, you, you, you know, 
you can’t for example buy fresh fruit and veg 
because you might not even have a 
fridge or you might have to share a fridge, 
you know, with another family down 
the, down the corridor.
So all these, these things serve to complicate 
the issue of homeiessness. So, it's 
not just about people not having a roof over 
their head, it's about, it's about 
stability and security that we all take for 
granted, that people don't have. And 
that's what we're trying to support people to 
have, you know, what we do here.
Does that give you some kind of an answer.
A: Mmm. It's very good, yeah.
P16: OK. Did you want, did you want me to 
elaborate on any of those areas in 
particular?
A: You [........]
P16: No, No. I can't think of anything I
specifically want to say more about any 
of those. Ei m. If you want to leave me to 
talk about of those I can.
A: I leave you [.....] the things that you want
to say, really. [...... ]
P16: OK. Erm. Well, on another level 
homeiessness is, er m, it's a very, 
philosophically it's a, it's a very ... no, not 
even philosophically. Erm. Culturally?
Yeah, maybe culturally, I think is the way to 
think of it, it's erm, it's erm, it's veiy 
strange idea and what it points to (and this is 
possibly somewhat of a tangent), 
what it points to I think is a real illness in our
Self about Statutory Sector~
Self about Homelessness~
^  Self about Homelessness~
Self about Voluntary Sector~
| Individualistic Explanations’' 
| The Normal 'Us'~
The Socio-Psychological~
Page: 3/30
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society. And that, I don't mean that
103 in the sense of the very fact that 
homeiessness exists, how can it happen? I
104 don't mean it in that sense, although that is 
obviously, that is clearly an issue
105 that, how do we as a society, such a wealthy 
society, allow homeiessness to
106 carry on. Why haven't we solved it’ Erm.
But I don't really want, I didn't really
107 want to talk about that issue because that
one's been well, that one's been talked
108 about, I think, you know, for centuries 
actually even really.
109
110 Erm. But what I wanted to talk about in 
terms of it repr esenting an illness in
111 society is, is not the economic reasons that 
that happens, why peopie become
112 homeless. It's more of a cultural and social
and familial r easons that people
113 become homeless and what that points to 
about society.
114
115 To me, homeless people are people that have, 
that experience all the problems
116 that you and I face on a day to day basis but 
they've, erm, suffered those
117 pr oblems in greater degree or more, er m, or 
more, in mote of a combined way,
118 erm, or at the wrong point in life. But, for 
example, drug addiction, erm, mental
119 health problems, erm, problems with, 
relationship problems, relationships with
120 families. These ar e things we all have at 
ceitain problems. Whether you have a
121 drug pr oblem or not is a different matter but, 
but, erm, most adults - 1 don't know
122 what figure there is, what statistic ther e is -  
but most adults in the country, in this
123 country consume one type of a drug or 
another, whether it's just a, a drink in the
124 pub occasionally or other, other forms of 
recreational drug use. And we don't
125 consider those things to be problem. But this 
is what’s interesting is the thin line
126 between what makes us normal people in 
quote marks and what makes
127 homeless people who they are.
128
129 And a lot of the problems they face are things 
that we, that normal society also
130 encounter. These are just people who are 
bom, have suffered from it in a, in a,
131 in a quite extreme way. Erm. So, for 
example, erm, with mental health
132 difficulties, I think there's some figure, I think 
it's something like 25% of peopie, of
133 adults in this country will suffer from severe 
depression at some point in their life.
134 One quartet, you know, of the UK population.
Self about the Public~ 
paradigmatic ex.
^  paradigmatic ex. Self about the Publ
0  paradigmatic ex.
Self about the Public-
Individualistic Explanations'- u paradigmatic ex.
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But most of these people won't 
become homeless. Erm. So it becomes very 
interesting when you took at how 
we then view homeless peopie because all 
homeless people are, people who 
experience all the things that we do and 
haven't necessarily come through it or 
have suffered it to a greater- extent.
And then I wonder why we look at homeless 
people in the way that we do. And 
what it points to is what I, what I refer to as 
an, as an illness. It's, erm, it’s a very,
I think, a, a natural, erm, human bait to look 
at people who are in a different erm, 
social or economic str ata than us and to first 
look down at them, or look at them 
and hate them. Right? But just to, but to 
have a snobbery about people who are 
differ ent from us. This is part of our , our 
evolution anyway, in natural evolution, 
that you, you look after people who are like 
you. Erm. Wher eas people who ar e 
different to you, you fear them or you hate 
them. And homeless people or are, 
have for a long time been par iahs in our, in 
our society because of, eim, because 
of how we view them as people who are, erm, 
eim, drunk, smelly, erm, 
unemployed, lazy and it’s very easy to blame 
people who in that situation, for the 
situation that they’re in.
And that's where I think that we, that society 
is, erm, is both arrogant and ill 
because it, what, what people are, what 
people don't, aren't, aren’t realizing or 
refusing to see is that, is that the way we're 
viewing this problem is, is, is ... we’re 
viewing this problem in a veiy pejorative way. 
If people are in a, if people are in 
a, eim, a bad situation, we blame them for 
being in that situation.
I'll come on to why I think the reasons for 
that are in a, in a minute, but I find it 
quite odd that if people are vulnerable and, 
erm, and desperate, we blame them 
for that And that goes back to this idea of us 
being ill. That, that shows, that 
demonstrates to me a very, very uncaring 
society that, that we, that's our 
automatic view. Not everyone's, but I would 
say that's a very common 
perception of homeless people, that we blame 
them for being in the situation that 
they're in.
And that's something that's built up culturally, 
I think, over possibly hundreds of
paradigmatic ex.
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years now, certainly over the last hundred 
year s, that we've got this thing of 
Warning people for the situation that they're in 
when really I would have thought 
the more logical and human reaction to seeing 
people who are vulnerable and 
desperate is to say, "God, what happened 
there?", "God, that guy's just like me.
That could have happened to me. How does
this person need some help? How
do we let this happen?" Emn. But we don’t
necessarily see it like that. Even
people who give money to charity, I know
there's a lot of money given to charity
and a lot, a lot of people voice suppoit for, for
homelessness. But I'm talking
about what goes on in people's hearts, our
actual reaction when we see these
people. These might be the same people who
give money to, to charity, don’t
necessarily actually think about any of these
issues. The compassion that we
show by digging our hands into our pockets
and donating money doesn’t
necessarily reflect what we feel in our heart.
Often when you give money to
charity, I, I believe it's about absolving
yourself of, of moral guilt. I'm not
necessary, necessarily saying that people
need, should feel any guilt but
nonetheless by, by giving money to charity I
think people decide that what they're
doing is, rather than really think about the
issue, they'll buy their way out of the,
the, the situation if you see what I mean. If
you give a pound, you don't need to
actually think about it, you've done your bit
But that, that, that's all well and good 
because you are doing something, you are 
contributing, contributing something towards 
a solution arguably. But what I think 
there is, where the problem is, is that people 
don't necessarily think about the 
state of homelessness and what that means 
and we, we, we've created a real, 
erm, chasm between us and those poor 
people over there, those homeless 
people and we see ourselves as being 
something qualitively different from them, 
that they're almost like a differ ent class of 
people. You've got, you know, upper 
class, middle class, working class and 
homeless. And the interesting thing about 
homelessness is that it can affect any one, 
any one of those classes. It can 
affect anyone. I know people often say that 
and don’t necessarily believe it, ei m, 
but I know of too many stories of people 
who've become homeless and, you
| Support- 
| The Normal 'Us'- 
| The Socio-Psycho logical-
Q  paradigmatic ex.
| Self about the Public- 
| The Homelessness Feelings- 
| The Normal 'Us'- 
| The Socio-Psychological-
Self about Homelessness-
U  Self about Homelet
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paradigmatic ex.
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know, they, they’ve had a set up that's been, 
and a network of friends and family 
and work that's been stronger than the one I 
have light now and yet things have 
gone wrong for them and they've ended up 
homeless. Eim.
So anyway, this, this, this, this chasm that we,
that we, that we have between us
and homeless people I think is a very false
one and what it points to is a
snobbishness in society, an arrogance in
society and just a, a lack of wanting to
engage with the very idea of it, erm, because
a homeless person is somebody
who's like the bogeyman in our society .
Somebody who we like to look at and
think of as, erm, a, erm, of putting themselves
in that situation because if you
think like that, then you don't have to worry
about yourself ending up Hke that
You can actually then say to yourself, Td
never end up like that". Whereas
saying to yourself, "God, that could be me.
That could happen to me", that’s
quite a scary thing to think to yourseif. I
don't like the thought of that myself and
a lot of people wouldn't want to think like that
so they don't think about it so it's
easier to, to blame that person for their own
situation. Erm. OK. So that's that
aspect of that, th a t.. for me to cover. But,
erm ... Is there anything you want to
lead on that7
A: Do you think that, do you feel like you 
have, do you have anything else to 
say?
P16: Well, I probably could but I, I, the thing 
is I know, I, I'm aware that I'm kind 
of, I know you said I, I, I could go off on 
tangents but I’m very good at going off 
on ail kinds of weird tangents and then 
forgetting what I'm saying a minute ago.
So it, it might be useful if you did actually 
direct me in some way to talk a bit, in a, 
in a paiticular area. Not tell me what to say 
but just, erm, you know, the kind of 
thing that you are interested in heating. And 
lean stick to the ...
A: Think whether there is anything else you 
want to say. And if not, I move on.
OK?
P16: OK. No. One, one other thing.
Another aspect of what I consider to be, 
erm, an illness is that, eim, it’s, this is 
following on fr om the point about how we
^  Self about the Publ«c~
Self about Homelessness'- 
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233 view homeless people and how they're 
different from us, but this, in, in, in a
234 different aspect in a different way. It's, it’s 
us, it's our system, our society and
235 the way we live our day to day lives that 
creates homeiessness. I, I have no
236 doubt about that. There are so many 
different like causes of homelessness and
237 they're all things that we all in our differ ent 
ways play a part in. So, for example,
238 erm, people become homeless because of 
relationship breakdown. Erm. We've
239 all been in relationships which haven’t worked 
out It's very common.
240
241 We all contribute to homelessness in what... 
Not necessarily directly but I'm
242 talking about sodetily [sic]. The, the 
consequences of our actions can lead to
243 people becoming homeless as a society. 
People engaging in recreational drug
244 use, which, which groups of friends do all the 
time together does lead on to some
245 other people within those groups taking that 
drug use further. And then when it
246 goes too far they lose the support of those 
fiiends who they previously, you
247 know, had a more recreational relationship 
with. And, and all of these, these and
248 other examples that I can give, I’d just like to 
illustr ate that where homelessness
249 begins is in, is in normal society. It begins, 
you know, amongst us all. It, it
250 begins in a family or it begins in a 
relationship. It begins in a set of fiiends. But
251 then it goes wrong for someone there and 
then they, they're cast out or cast
252 themselves out But this is, again it's not 
about people being in a different, eim,
253 erm, in a different class, or a different culture, 
or in a different part of the country
254 that this happens to. This happens all around 
us and amongst us all the time
255 based on, on, on, on day to day life.
256
257 Another- aspect of this, about how, eim, 
society are responsible for people
258 becoming homeless is, is, it's just the kind of 
culture that we live in where, erm .
259 We live in a sodety where social networks 
have become weaker and weaker,
260 where for the last, I'd say, I don't know, fifty 
to a hundred years religion is
261 declining. Now I, Tm not religious at all but I, 
I, I'm glad in, in some ways that the
262 influence in our society has declined.
However, the, the flip side of that is that it's
263 actually left a vacuum. What, what religion 
did provide for society was a glue,
264 erm, a set of principles that people lived to, a
0  paradigmatic ex.
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set of rules actually that people
265 lived to. And over the last, increasingly over 
the, since, I don’t know, since the
266 end of World War II that's, that's, eim, 
gradually come apait and, and religion's
267 declined in influence.
268
269 And what, and with the decline of religion, 
accompanying that has been the
270 decline of the family because what, certainly 
what Christian, and I, and Tm only
271 talking UK homelessness and the UK is 
predominantly a Christian, erm, country
272 even, even now. Erm. Anyway, with the 
decline of Chritianrty in this country
273 there's been a decline in family values, erm, 
which has also coincided with and
274 been made woise by the increase in popular 
culture again since round about that
275 same time, since, since the end of the, end of 
the war. So, on the one hand
276 you’ve had religion and family values declining 
and on the other hand, on the
277 other hand you've had the influence of 
popular culture, and the media, and
278 advertising, and consumer culture increasing. 
And those things have become
279 our new r eligion whether we like to admit it or 
not The, these are the, these are
280 the concerns that most people have In their 
day to day lives about the
281 programmes they see on TV, about the 
clothes they wear, erm, about the
282 lifestyle they lead, about the places they eat 
and drink. Well, these, these are
283 the, these are the daily concerns that people 
tend to have and ...
284
285 The kind of things I'm just talking about, 
about family values and religions, these
286 are, these are very con, conservative ideas. 
They’re considered very
287 conservative ideas now. If you talk about, if 
anyone, erm, on the TV was to
288 speak, for example, about the importance of 
family values or about r eligion,
289 they'd be perceived as very conservative and 
even right-wing. And that's often
290 true because the only people right now that 
talk about family values and religion
291 are the conservatives in society, not 
necessarily the Conservative party but more
292 traditional conservative people. And that's 
annoying because Tm not
293 conservative in any way, well maybe I am in 
one way. I see myself as quite
294 liberal or even left-wing but I think the liberal 
and left-wing in our society, and in
295 our media and In our cultur e have done a lot 
to, erm, destroy, well, erm, actually
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296 destroys the wrong word, but damage, 
damage, erm, the fabric of, erm, our
297 society because what, erm.. Because what's 
increasingly happened is that
298 popular culture, modem culture encouraged 
us to look after ourselves, took after
299 Number One and particularly consumer 
culture and ironically Margar et
300 Thatcher's Conservative party encouraged 
people to, to, to be independent and
301 look after yourself and to, and, you know, 
Margaret Thatcher famously said,
302 "There's no, no such thing as society", you 
know. Ironically, it's the
303 Conservatives who talk more about family and 
those kind of structur es but
304 nonetheless, erm, that was something in 
particular the Conservative party did
305 say.
306
307 Anyway, the point that I want was that the, 
the most powerful forces in society
308 now which are more liberal, left-wing, erm, 
media-based, erm, structures don't
309 talk about family values and anyone who does 
is consider ed very old-fashioned.
310 And what that'll mean is that we’ve got a 
society which is based on very, very
311 shallow ideals now. There is no, erm, there is 
no real voice for anything bigger,
312 or more, or more, erm, or with more gravity, 
you know, about, about the way we
313 live our lives. All the stuff that we're fed in 
our day to day lives is about, about
314 what we're going to buy next, what we re 
going to do next, what film we're going
315 to see next The influence of anything of a, of 
a, of a way of leading our lives, the
316 only people talking about that ar e political 
patties and, and religion which don't
317 seem to have any appeal to, to, to, 
paiticulaity to young people. And it, and it
318 doesn't to me either. I don’t, I don't listen to 
other political parties today. I don't
319 listen to, erm, what, eim, eim, what various 
religions say about family. I don't, I,
320 it doesn't, it doesn't appeal to me but what 
I’ve seen is tha t... Weil, why isn't
321 someone, why isn't our popular culture talking 
about that? Why, why isn’t the
322 culture that we do have have any respect or 
any affirmation for the importance of
323 good social networks, of, of, erm, of us 
having, living in a healthy society where
324 people took after each other? And the basic 
point ts is because it's not cool, you
325 know. Who wants to talk about that? What's 
that going to sell? And to who? It
326 doesn't achieve anything. Where's the, 
where’s the marketing in that? Where's
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327 the goal? Where's the product in any of these 
things? Erm. And what this, erm,
328 decline in religion and this increase in popular 
and consumer culture is, has
329 meant is that famiiy has no place anymore.
330
331 As a fifteen year old, like any other fifteen 
year old in the country, I wanted to
332 leave home. I couldn't wait to get away from 
my family and I haven't moved back
333 since. We're virtually encouraged to do that 
now. Over the last forty or fifty
334 years, we are encouraged to do that. We're 
now educated that, erm, rebellion is
335 pait of being a teenager-, that it's pait of what 
you do. And I, I, I, I've believed
336 that for a long time, you know, and part of 
me still believes that it is true, that you,
337 you, you rebel when you're 14, you fight your 
parents like James Dean and
338 Rebel without a Cause, you know. He 
invented the teenager virtually in, in that
339 movie and that was only in, in the nud-fiftres.
340
341 Now befor e that what happens? You were a 
young man, then you were a man.
342 You were a woman [sic], then you were a 
woman. And then you just became an
343 adult and you, and your life was still based 
around your family. You didn't work
344 very far from your family. You didn't live very 
fat away from your family. But now
345 that's sort of exploded because we're 
encouraged to, our culture encourages us
346 to live independently. And we hold up the 
notion of independence as something
347 so sacred that we for get about all the things 
that we've given up on. And
348 homelessness in today's woild, in, in today’s 
society I think is, is, isn't, erm,
349 repr esents how that has failed. Because with 
incr easing independence families
350 have become weaker and weaker. Family 
tensions have, have increased
351 greatly. There's far much more sense of if 
things don't work out in my family or in
352 my r elationship, I’m just going to get out. 
Divorce i ates have rocketed over the
353 last fifty years as well so that people, if, if 
thing's aren’t working out, they'll get a
354 divorce, they’ll get remarried. And that's a 
very common way for us to think now.
355 And for me to say, "Well, you, you’re meant 
to stick with marriage through,
356 through thick and thin'. I'd be decried as 
some kind of conservative, draconian
357 thinker on the subject and, and that's not my 
point. I do think that people should
358 be able to do what they want but if what, if 
what people want to do when their
329
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marriage Isn't working out I think it’s sad and 
I wonder why they got married in 
the first place. And these things are 
happening far more frequently now.
We, we live, again we live in a culture where 
it's so propagated on choice and 
independence and basically being spoilt, that's 
what it's about. It's saying, "you 
can be, be anything you want, you can do 
anything you want anytime you want".
It means that you need to have commitment 
to anything, not really. Not really. I 
mean, you can, erm, you can, you know, you 
can get divorced and remarried 
now. It's not frowned upon.
It's more and more common now for young 
women to have, eim, children even 
outside the context of a relationship which I 
find incredible that, eim, that a 
women will happily, consciously and 
knowingly, erm, want to have a child even 
though she knows or believes that the man 
she's going to have, who's going to, 
erm, she's going to have that child with isn’t 
necessarily going to be around 
because she wants to have a child. And good 
for her, she wants to have a child.
But again it just points to all the old things 
that, that have built up over thousands 
of years in our society, the idea of family and 
religion, these have very, very, very 
quickly and too quickly disappear ed. They've 
gone. And it’s left a vacuum.
That, that's, that's my central point that the,
the pace of change in society has
been so fast and has been such a rush to lots
of exciting, fantastic, colourful,
plastic things in our culture that we've left a
vacuum. We've forgotten about all
those things that have been build up over a
thousand, thousands of years. And
now there's a hell of, there's a lot more, erm,
erm, relationship breakdown,
there's a lot more, eim, there's a lot more
people leaving home and not living,
and not talking to their families. There's a lot
more people with a lot less friends
out there. There's a lot of lonely, alone
people out there. Most of those people
aren't homeless but what it's created is a
culture where because those networks
have dosed down or' broken down, people,
there is far far more people I believe
that are actually vulnerable to homelessness
because of the kind of society
we’ve created.
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a very differ ent kind of 
homelessness to the one that we had say a 
hundred years ago. That was based 
on material poverty and, and there not being 
a welfare state and if people didn’t 
have money they were going to become 
homeless. Now homelessness is gorng 
to be, is increasingly going to become a far 
more compkated thing and caused 
by more complicated and subtie problems, 
you know, many which have nothing 
to do with money. They’re to do with 
people's, erm, they're to do with people’s 
mental health and people, and society’s health 
and family health and fiiendship 
health, all those kind of networks that sustain 
people. As they breakdown I think 
it leaves far far more people far more 
vulnerable.
And that, erm, is homelessness. I think I've _  
spoken enough now.
A: Thank you.
P16: It’salnght.
A: I have a question now. What do you think 
homelessness means for 
professionals that work within the 
homelessness sector like [...] statutory 
agencies like [..]
P16: I can't really comment on this actually, 
not, not with any great knowledge.
So, I'll, I, I'm just going to preface my 
remarks with that because I don't deal with 
people in local authorities so I can only, only
A: [...] statutory ...
P16: Yeah. Well, there’s different kind of 
statutoiy agencies that we deal with 
and, for example, we, we deal with agent, 
agencies like the Job Centre who work 
with, erm, homeless people, vulnerable 
people. I don't want to blame, erm, 
anyone because any time I've ever met people 
who work for, erm, job centr es or 
local author ities, any kind of statutoiy 
providers, they’r e just like anyone else.
They're normally just, you know, normal, 
decent people trying to do their job.
Maybe not doing their job very well, maybe
even, like, not even liking their job
very much just like me and you might not like
our job very much, erm. And
maybe just like anyone else some of them are
a bit slack at their job, erm, or
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don't want to do their job, etc, etc. But 
anyway they'r e just like me and you. The 
problem isn't I, I, I don’t think the problem is 
with ... the, the problem is one that's 
difficult to apportion blame to anyone because 
it's a complicated problem and in 
a sense I, I think it’s something that is, is a 
problem that can almost never be 
solved because you can't create a structure, I 
don't believe you can cieate 
structures and systems and legislation which 
protects people from suffering, from 
all the shit that goes on in society.
Homelessness is about so many different 
problems that until you sorted out so 
until there was no such thing as divorce, so 
until there was no such thing as 
family breakdown and, you know, families 
ar guing amongst themselves, until 
there's no such thing as drug addiction or 
alcohol abuse and, and mental health, 
mental illness in society, when you get rid of 
all of those things then dealing with 
homelessness is easy. But you're never going 
to deal with all those other things 
so try, so you not, you, you, it's going to be 
very difficult to actually solve 
homeless, homelessness, to actually prevent 
it, I believe. Erm.
So, you asked what, you asked about those, 
erm, agencies. I think they've got a 
very, very, very difficult job in terms of 
creating legislation and, er m, suppoit 
programmes that help. What, what we can 
do is alleviate, erm, some of the 
problems that some people face. And we do. 
We, we, and statutory agencies 
are also pait of this. They can help people to 
get back in, into society. But 
they've got, they, they're working with an 
incredibly difficult client group, 
incredibly difficult. Erm.
But anyway, youi question was what, what do 
I think of them. I think that, erm, 
based on my little of them, I think that local 
authorities are under-r esourced, 
under staffed and poorly trained. They lack 
motivation because their jobs are, are 
probably poorly paid and under difficult 
conditions which are chaotic. Staff, as I 
said, are poorly trained so they don't 
understand the particular needs of their 
clients many of whom are homeless.
Mow, a, in, staff in the homeless sector find it
difficult enough to deal with
homeless people and these are people who
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are trained to do so. So local 
authorities, erm, and, and staff within them 
have got, have got an even more 
difficult job particularly seeing as they work in 
incredibly bureaucratic structure, 
very, very bureaucratic where, eim, where 
boxes need to be ticked, forms need 
to be filled in, erm, things need to be 
processed; they’re awaiting this, there are 
queues, there are databases, there are, you 
know, erm, erm, eim, points that 
you've got to score, all, all these different 
kinds of things. And, and 
homelessness, homeless people don't lend 
themselves very much to that, those 
kind of systems because basically you're, 
you're in serious trouble and you're in 
a crisis and you're not thinking straight and 
you haven't, you haven't got the 
paperwork and you haven't got the, the, the 
paperwork that people need to 
process your claim whatever that might be.
So systems and structures aren't set
up to support homeless people in the way that
they need to be supported.
I'm not saying that I've got any kind of 
solution. This is an in, an inherent 
problem is that what we, what we’re all trying 
to deal with here is, is a, is, is a, is 
a profoundly complex problem and profoundly 
complicated people and, and what 
you, what what, what the solutions that 
need to exist out there are personalized 
ones. But who can provide peisonalized, 
personalized, erm, solutions. Local 
authorities can't do that because again of 
their workload, because of their lack of 
skill, because of their lack of resources.
I, I, I think that generally bureaucracies such 
as those that eim, statutoiy 
agencies create are often the cause of a lot of 
these problems. Again, Tm not, I,
I’m not trying to point them out as bad or evil
but this, this, this, this is the
problem. If you live in a huge society of 60
million people, progr, bureaucracies
have to exists but by the veiy nature of
bureaucracies they only work, they, they
basically work in a broad way, they don't woik
in a detailed way, they don't work
in a personalized way. Bureaucracies have ...
me and you have to fit into
bureaucracies. So you pay your bills on time,
you pay your council tax, you send
off forms when they’re sent to you through
the post and then you don’t  have to
deal with those bureaucracies anymore. OK.
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Erm. And bureaucracies are designed for 
people like me and you who can easily 
r espond to them and, and just, you know, fit 
in to them and fit around them and 
do what those bur eaucracies r equire of us. 
Homeless people and other groups 
can’t do that by the very nature of their 
problem. If you, if you are homeless and 
you’ve been in six, seven different types of 
housing over the last year, where's all 
your paperwor k that you might need to 
support your claim’ You haven’t got it.
You, the, automatically that bureaucracy is
going to find it mor e difficult to deal
with you. They're not designed for, for people
having a problem. Bureaucracies
need order. Then they can't deal with chaos.
They, they’re just not designed for
that. And then what means is that when you
speak, when you tiy and, try and
get order out of that chaos and speak to staff
at, erm, the statutory agencies,
they haven’t got the resources to deal with
people's indrvidual problems because
it's all about ticking boxes which is what
programmes are always about They're
about broad, big, collective, erm, systems that
are for thousands, if not millions of
people.
So, yet again, you, you, as in so many other
areas, you find that, erm, it's
vulnerably, vulnerable people, basically non-
main stream society people that don't
fit in. In so many ways homeless people just
don't fit in. They don’t fit in our idea
of what, erm, good respectable people are
like. They don't fit in to what
bureaucr acies need people to behave like.
They don't fit in to what an employer
considers an employee to be like. They, they
sit in a ver y different place that,
that none of us quite know how to deal with.
Eim. And I can't, I can't say that
homeless, erm, local authorities are, are, you
know, are the, are the, are the
ones that are mainly at fault in it. Erm. It, it,
it’s, erm, very difficult to pin down
and, erm, blame in that way.
But one other thing I'd like to say about local, 
local authorities is just about then, 
erm, homelessness strategies which ts what 
every local authority in the country, I 
believe, if not in London is meant to have, 
erm, right now.
All 33 local London boroughs are meant to 
have a homelessness strategy which 
you probably know about. You might know
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more about it than I do. Erm. I, I 
don't know anything about this but many 
people I know would criticize what those 
strategies actually are and how detailed they 
are. Basically they vaiy, I think, 
greatly in quality. Erm. So, that, that, that's 
a more specific dir ect point to make 
about local authorities but I don't enough 
about them to actually make any 
criticisms of those strategies. But I know 
that's something that a lot of people 
would say but they're not specifically, they're, 
they're no t... very well designed 
ar ound, eim, the needs of the people that 
they're actually there to help. Yeah.
OK.
A: What do you think homelessness means to 
professionals, erm, within the 
voluntary sector?
P16: Erm. This is more interesting.
Well, it s interesting. It varies greatly, it varies 
greatly. I think that the 
homelessness sector has, finds it difficult 
because on the one hand we know 
what we're meant to think, we know how 
we're meant to behave and believe and 
know what we're meant to say. I don't 
always think our actions reflect that and I'll 
give you some examples.
Well firstly, I, Til say what we, how we like to 
think. Wow we like to think about 
homeless people is that homeless people have 
dignity and if they don't we 
should help them to attain dignity. Eim. We 
should help them to achieve self- 
confidence and self-esteem, to become more 
independent, to stop or lessen then 
involvement in destructive, self-destructive 
behaviours - whether that’s about 
diug or alcohol use or anything else -  for 
them to, to, to tackle their mental health 
problems. And again, all, all, anything and 
everything it would take to support 
them, to move, to, to become more 
independent and lead, and start leading a 
normal life. And pait of that goal is to, is to 
get people back into, into their own 
homes, into their own housing.
Now whenever you speak to staff within 
homelessness agencies, they will talk 
about homeless people in very respectable 
ways and, and, you know, that’s true.
That is how they, that is partly how they think 
and what, how they like to think
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561 and how they would like to think. Erm. But 
it's, it's a very tricky thing because
562 the actual actions of, of us as a sector r eflect 
a gr eater truth, I think. And as
563 those actons speak kxrder than words, and 
this isn’t  to actually, this isn't to
564 criticize staff, it, it, this is to just point out an 
inconsistency or [end of tape 11]
565
566 [Start of tape 12, Side A]
567 Yeah, I was saying inconsistency. Erm. I 
wouldn’t quite call it hypocrisy
568 because, erm, on a wider point I think that 
generally people, erm, aren't
569 necessarily hypocrites or we, we, in society, 
we, we, we, rather than hypocrites
570 were often just inconsistent, our actions often 
don't reflect how we think and we
571 don't necessar ily often notice that our actions 
aren't similar to what we say. So,
572 erm, hypocrisy is a deliberate thing, I think, 
and inconsistency is something when
573 we just don't necessarily, erm, connect our 
actions to our words.
574
575 But anyway, the pornt that I was going to 
make was that homeless sector staff
576 can be quite inconsistent in what they say and 
what they do. So, for example,
577 we talk about in the homeless sector a lot 
about, erm, respecting clients, about
578 dignity but at the same time the reality is, is 
that, erm, whenever I've visited a
579 homelessness pr oject if for example I, erm, 
have a bag with me I'll say, "Can I
580 leave my bag here7" and they’ll say, "No, no, 
you can't leave it here. You better
581 lock it away in the office". Now, I, that that's 
fine, erm, because that's the reality.
582 They're not just saying that. That's based on 
a truth that someone’s going to nick
583 it. It probably will get stolen if I leave it lying 
around. And that makes it a really
584 difficult that that's what makes working with 
our client group really difficult. We
585 ar e talking about a lot of people who are just 
basically that you would, if you
586 weren't at work you would say they're 
scumbags. Right (laughs)? You're
587 working with difficult people. A lot of people 
who have got behavioural problems,
588 you know, aggr ession problems, just nasty 
people that you wouldn't want to deal
589 with but in, in being professional you, you 
have got to see beneath that you have
590 got to see that no matter who, no matter 
whether you would necessarily get on
591 with somebody socially, whether you’d ever 
see yourself as a friend of that
592 person or not it is, is one point. But being
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able to see dignity in people is, is a
593 very different thing, erm, which, which, which 
is, which is a really, which is a
594 really valuable, erm, thing for any of us, for us 
to learn is that even in people that
595 you don't like who, that, that you can point 
to, you know, where you see, see
596 qualities that you just don't like about them, 
you still need to see the dignity in
597 that person, to see that they are actually a 
human being, that they as well as
598 having, erm, negative baits that they're not all 
negative. And that's what I really
599 respect about homeless sector staff, that 
despite seeing all the negative things
600 and being, you know, being real to them 
lather than pretending they're not there,
601 as well as seeing those negatives things, they, 
they, they have to see the
602 positive as well because to, you have to see 
the positive to be able to work with
603 people.
604
605 So, I think, this is the inconsistency and as I 
said I don't offer that as any kind of
606 criticism of, of homeless sector staff because I 
think that by them, their veiy
607 inconsistency is what makes them, er m, realty 
good at what they do because,
608 the, the, they, they, they, they, they woi1< 
with that ambivalence every day, they
609 work with people who can be thieves, can be 
liars, can be bullies, can be drunk,
610 violent drunks but they'll work with them in a 
positive way, and, erm, see good in
611 them. Eim. So, as I said, that, that 
inconsistency is, is a, is a, or dichotomy or
612 ambivalence is a, is a, is a necessary skill and
way of thinking to have in the
613 homelessness sector.
614
615 And just to pull this back to a, a much earlier 
point about society, I think that's
616 more how, I, I think if more people in society 
thought how homeless sector and
617 other- types of staff think then we'd have a 
much healthier society. And I'm not
618 talking about just how we think about 
homeless people. I’m just thinking about
619 how we think about people. Because if you,
I, I bet you, I bet you've got people
620 you don't, you know people you don't like. I 
know I've got a few people that I
621 don't like at all, light? But I don't hate 
anyone anymor e. I haven’t  hated anyone
622 for a, since I was something like 15 or 16.
Actually maybe a couple since then, I
623 don't know. But, ei m, I don't realty hate 
anyone because, eim, now I, I just
624 increasingly appreciate that, well they’re just
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not, I, it's not realty the kind of 
people I'd like to hang around with, I don't 
think. I think they're a bit shallow or a 
bit this or a bit that. But, you know, there's 
other- people who like them so they 
must be alright
And it, what what's really ... what erm, 
homeless profession, homeless sector 
professionals have, have kind of taught me in, 
in that way is tha t is that work, is 
that inconsrstency is actually a good thing, if 
you see what I mean. Just because 
you don't like someone or you don't respect 
ceitain things about them doesn't 
mean you can't work with them, doesn't mean 
you can't erm, work alongside 
them, work with them or even possibly be 
fiiends with them. And that's a realty, I 
think, a realty valuable lesson for any of us, 
erm, to learn just in the way we deal 
with people. I t  it it, it is just a realty useful 
philosophy I've found that everyone's 
got some dignity and that if you can see 
dignity in people, erm, then you can, you 
begin to deal with them anyway you like 
whereas if you, if you hate people, you 
create a lot of, erm, angst, I think, around 
you and inside you about er m, erm, 
about I suppose about people generally. You 
just create an us and them kind of 
situation. Eim.
Anyway. Homeless sector professionals.
What else do I say about them?
I think, erm, management within homeless 
sector- agencies ar e, are, are finding 
things difficult and I'm finding things difficult 
in terms of dying to make sense of a 
lot of these thoughts that I've been 
expr essing over the last, er m, half an hour or 
so, erm, about how we perceive, work with, 
describe, think of homeless people.
Erm. I’ll give you an example. Eim.
I think this, what, one of the things I might 
have mentioned to you at the 
innovations [...] about begging. There are 
ceitain agencies out there who will, 
erm, have recently over the last couple of 
year s campaigned a lot about not 
giving money to beggars. And you'll see 
poster in ceitain, in ceitain places 
around that say, “Don’t give money to 
beggar s because," erm, "the chances are it 
will be used," erm, “to buy drugs". Now, it’s a 
realty, realty complicated debate 
around that particular issue because, erm, 
that may well be true and then, in that
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Appendix 6: Interview codes.
1. Advocates
2. General
3. Home
4. Homeless Identity
5. Imposition of Agenda
6. In Need
7. Individualistic Explanations
8. Industry
9. Label
10. Paradigmatic ex.
11. Potential
12. Professionalism
13. Reductionistic Services
14. Support
15. The ’Normal Us'
16. The Homelessness Feelings
17. The Socio-Psychological
18. Vicious Cycle
Appendix 7: Focus groups codes
1. Re-direction/re-building of life
2. Alternative
3. Bridging
4. Co-operation/integrated approach
5. Critical consciousness
6. Dependency/independency
7. Drugs
8. Engagement
9. Feeling of home
10. Hidden homelessness
11. Inexistence/as reality
12. Label
13. Perpetuating ontology/deceitful approach
14. Object of political fashion
15. Existence
16. Ontology/identity
17. Other/outsider
18. Personalization/humanization
19. Policy
20. Professionalism/expertise
21. Responding to the government
22. Responding to the homeless sector
23. Responding to the public
24. Responsibility
25. Secure accommodation
26. Self re-connection
27. Sense of group membership
28. Spatial/home agency
29. Support
30. Targets
31. Translator
32. Vicious circle
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